

·INTRODUCTION·

·TO·THE

HISTORY

OF

·MODERN PHILOSOPHY·

BY

ARTHUR STONE DEWING

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PREFACE.

THERE are at the present time accessible to the English reader many excellent and comprehensive histories of philosophy. And the only reason for treating the subject again has arisen from the hope that a more simple treatment would prove useful to those readers unfamiliar with the technicalities of recent philosophical systems. For various reasons the historical side serves as perhaps the only broad and permanently valuable approach to the whole field of philosophy, while it is a firm conviction with many that some slight acquaintance with the development of philosophical problems is indispensable to their appreciation. This work is intended as an introduction to the subject, and is not the expression of a critical or reconstructive attitude; it makes no attempt to trace the logico-genetic development of modern thought, nor does it pretend to consider every aspect of historical development.

This definite point of view has made it necessary to keep certain matters clearly in mind. As few technical terms as possible have been used and those which were considered necessary have been defined either in the introductory chapter or later on in the book. Again, the writer has striven to avoid two difficulties which might be urged against an "Introduction,"—stress on an array of unrelated facts and too broad a point of view. The minute details of the various philosophical systems have been omitted as far as possible, and for this reason many features have been neglected which in a more subjective and critical account might be considered of importance. An exhaustive catalogue of these details would not assist the reader to the understanding of the definite world-attitude for which every great thinker stands; and, furthermore,

these particulars may be learned much better from the writings of the philosophers themselves than from any historical sketch. But, on the other hand, lack of detail has a tendency to bring into the foreground too general or superficial a view-point. We are dealing with men and movements, but not movements alone. Any broad characterization of a certain tendency is necessarily superficial,—especially when written with the present aim in mind,—yet it is hoped that this objection may prove less serious if supported by a distinct exposition of each philosophical system. For various reasons the biographies of the different men have been emphasized, with the belief that the facts of a man's life and character are often the clearest approach to the position that he has occupied in the world.

In regard to the arrangement of the subject-matter of the book: the first chapter aims to present an explicit definition of the ordinary conceptions of philosophy. This introductory chapter observes in the main the traditional interpretations of terms, even in those instances in which recent criticism has tended to invest old words with new meanings. The second chapter describes the general background on which strictly modern philosophy rests. The brief *résumé* of earlier history is given more to furnish points of reference than to supply an outline. The important pre-Kantian thinkers have been arranged according to two general attitudes towards philosophy,—the Rationalistic and the Empiric. This method of treatment expresses the outward differences and frequent internal resemblances of the Continental and English schools of thought. It also defines clearly the position of Kant with respect to those problems for the solution of which he developed the "Critical Philosophy." The emphasis on Kant both in the sketch of his life and in the outline of his system is not due to individual prejudice, but is rather in accordance with the philosophical tendencies of the present time. The treatment of German transcendentalism is necessarily brief and superficial, considering the depth and magnitude of the prob-

lems at issue; but it is hoped that it will present some definite meaning to the person who has intelligently followed the previous chapters. The last chapter outlines more recent phases of philosophy. There is no unanimity of opinion concerning the relative importance of the earlier thinkers, while the comparative estimation of recent systems of philosophy is little else than a matter of personal taste. In this closing chapter it will be observed that the monistic point of view is given considerable prominence, while the last few pages suggest an interpretation of the present tendencies in this direction.



CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

	PAGE
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY	13
THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY	18
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY	22

CHAPTER II.

THE BIRTH OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL	45
THE RENAISSANCE	52
NICOLAS OF CUSA	54
GIORDANO BRUNO	57
MYSTICISM	62
JACOB BOEHME	64
FRANCIS BACON	66
THOMAS HOBBS	70

CHAPTER III.

CONTINENTAL RATIONALISM.

THE SCEPTICISM OF THE RENAISSANCE	76
RENÉ DESCARTES	77
Method	79
Foundations of Philosophy	81
Metaphysics	84
CARTESIAN SCHOOL	87
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA	89
Life	90
Metaphysics	93
Epistemology	100
Ethics	101
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ	106
Metaphysics	108
THE RATIONALISTS AS A WHOLE	115

CHAPTER IV.

LOCKE AND HIS INFLUENCE.

	PAGE
RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM CONTRASTED	119
JOHN LOCKE	120
Object of Locke's Philosophy	125
Nature of Ideas	127
Knowledge	132
Ethics	134
FRENCH SENSATIONALISM	137
THE DEISTS	142
LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON ETHICS	143
THE EMPIRICAL STAND-POINT	147

CHAPTER V.

BERKELEY AND HUME.

GEORGE BERKELEY	150
Stand-point	153
Metaphysics	155
DAVID HUME	164
Stand-point	168
Metaphysics	169
Ethics	175
HUME'S POSITION IN PHILOSOPHY	176

CHAPTER VI.

IMMANUEL KANT.

THE TWO EPISTEMOLOGICAL STAND-POINTS	179
LIFE AND CHARACTER OF KANT	180
PROBLEMS OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY	189
THE "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON"	191
THE "CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON"	212
THE "CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT"	220
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT	223

CHAPTER VII.

THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS.

	PAGE
THE POST-KANTIAN TENDENCIES	226
JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART	230
Metaphysics	231
KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD	236
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE	237
Stand-point	240
The Primacy of the Ego	241
THE ROMANTICISTS	250
FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING	251
Stand-point	252
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL	257
Relation to Former Idealists	259
Fundamental Conceptions	260
The "Phenomenology of Mind"	265
System	268
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER	274
Stand-point	276
System	280

CHAPTER VIII.

RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE	286
Auguste Comte	287
Hypotheses in Science	290
Evolution	292
PSYCHOLOGY	299
THEORIES OF ETHICS	303
Utilitarianism	305
Idealism of Green	308
IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS	309
Rudolph Hermann Lotze	309
Josiah Royce	312
F. H. Bradley	313

	PAGE
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT	
TIME	314
The Meaning of Presupposition	317
The Dual Presupposition of Philosophy	319
Experience	320
Thought	325
The Absolute	329



HISTORY

OF

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE prominence of philosophical study has exerted a remarkable influence on the intellectual life of Europe. It has deeply affected the history of religion; it is accountable, in a large measure, for the origin and growth of scientific theory, and even in recent times it is philosophy which has been the indirect cause for notable advances in the applied arts. Philosophy served as the basis of Greek culture, it kept alive the germ of learning during the darkness of the Middle Ages, and gave impetus and permanent value to the wide-spread enlightenment of the Renaissance. The truly great and original discoveries in mathematics have been made by men whose interest was primarily philosophical, and through mathematics the sciences, the arts, and civilization have advanced. There is no other branch of learning arising from a wider view-point, nor is there any other science or art which defines for itself an ideal so near to the ultimate meaning of truth. The appreciation of the value of philosophy is thus intimately associated with the intellectual progress of mankind, yet the various descriptions of the subject have led to considerable confusion. Our general understanding of the term has been derived from

the Greeks, but from them we obtain no thoroughly uniform definition of philosophy. The difficulty in defining our subject seems to have arisen from the depth and scope of its material, for it is not easy to condense a wealth of meaning into a few words.

Traditional Meaning.—From the very beginning of philosophy, when it seemed to be emerging for the first time from the mists of tradition and mythology, it has appeared in the light of a search for the *permanent reason of things*. It is almost universally inferred, both from the character of its subject-matter and from the proverbial obscurity of its classic productions, that the world of philosophy is somewhere beyond the confusion and heterogeneity of the world of common life; that it is concerned with the deeper problems of life and nature. The derivation of the word philosophy—"love of wisdom"—would seem to imply this, especially when wisdom is regarded as facts permanently true under all conditions. The ancients taught us to go beneath the surface of things and discover the permanent in the increasing changes of the world, and to this science of the permanent, tradition has given the name of philosophy. We regard its material to be those questions which are seldom brought to the foreground in the ordinary course of daily life, those enigmas of human consciousness which are relegated to the quieter moments of study and reflection, or else passed over entirely with a half-conscious faith in the adequacy of religion to solve them. Not infrequently, however, philosophy has been degraded to the position of a doctrine of magic, owing to a literal interpretation of its foundation in the mysterious. And still again it has been sometimes confused with religion, since the fields of the two seem difficult to separate. With the exception of a few such errors the popular conception of philosophy, as the *science of the permanent*, is justly correct. This search for the permanent may carry us into many regions, but it is still philosophy so long as the object of the quest is clearly before us.

Two Attitudes towards Philosophy.—Throughout the whole history of our subject there have appeared two general attitudes towards philosophy, each of which has had its classic representations. These may be briefly summarized as the *Humanistic* and the *Naturalistic*, according as the stress of definition is laid on man or on nature. The former seeks to explain man not only as the measure but also as the centre of all things. The latter regards him as merely a product or insignificant part of the universal processes of Nature.

The Humanistic Attitude.—It has been the favorite custom of many writers, especially those who have approached philosophy from the stand-points of morality and history, to regard man as the central figure in the drama of nature and to consider philosophy as simply the record of the laws of his being and the epitome of his progress. Such views are characteristic of all ages and peoples. This humanistic philosophy has had its counterpart in the man-like gods of religion, in poetry, and in literature generally. It is this stand-point which led Montaigne to quote Cicero as saying “that to Philosophy is no other thing, than for a man to prepare himself to death.”¹ When Greek philosophy was at the height of its power the attention of the foremost thinkers was directed to man. Socrates is said to have declared that the field of human knowledge was restricted to man himself, and tradition portrays another thinker of that period as saying that “Man was the measure of all things.”² Again at the beginning of modern thought the humanistic tendencies were very marked. The reaction against the traditional customs and institutions of the Middle Ages showed itself in an over-emphasis of the privileges and dignity of the individual man, accompanied by a philosophy to substantiate such views. And in our own time it is by no means uncommon to find the field of philosophy confined to

¹ Essays, Florio's translation, Book I., Chapter xix.

² Protagoras; πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος.

human action and its problems restricted to life, the soul and its immortality.

The Naturalistic Attitude.—In contrast to this former attitude towards philosophy there has always existed another and far broader stand-point. Even from the time of the earliest Greeks, when Thales identified the world with water, and Heraclitus with the eternal flux of fire, there have always been attempts to discover the original nature of the Universe. These attempts have appeared under the name of philosophy, and the object of their search has been the goal of the human intellect. Philosophy thus appears as the science of sciences, which, recognizing the office and necessary place of every field of knowledge, endeavors to harmonize the disparate and bring unity into the farthest recesses of Nature. In this sense philosophy becomes strictly the science of nature,—when this term is interpreted to mean the sum of all things. It recognizes the contradictions and enigmas that surround man on every side and tries to simplify them. In this struggle with the almost impossible the nature philosophy, like the empirical sciences, breathes its own interpretation into nature, suggests its own hypotheses and tests them in the court of common experience. It is thus similar to the sciences themselves in the general attitude towards nature, but far broader and deeper in scope than any one of them, since it is concerned with these very principles and laws upon which all possible empirical sciences must ultimately rest.

A Provisional Definition.—We have just mentioned the difficulty of any attempt to define our subject. Yet it is the undefinable which any philosophy must conscientiously fear. And besides, no clear treatment of philosophical problems is possible unless we understand their general character. A definition of philosophy cannot be so broad as to include all possible knowledge within it, although in its deepest sense philosophy truly lies at the foundation of knowledge; nor, on the other hand, can the definition be so narrow as to exclude

some of the special problems. A provisional definition of our subject is possible only if we succeed in uniting the two attitudes already referred to—the humanistic and the naturalistic—with the traditional understanding of the term as the search for the permanent in our experience.

The humanistic philosophies sought to explain the inner nature of man, the peculiar power of his reason, his relation to his environment, and the value of the moral law. In the treatment of all these problems it has been found necessary to compare with one another the many perceptions and thoughts which together comprise the conscious life of man. In this comparison the philosopher seeks to discover the unity of life behind the heterogeneity of our experiences. The humanistic philosophy is thus a science of the permanently real in man,—such as the inner laws of his character. And from the broader range of the nature philosophies this same purpose is observable. They seek to unfold the connection between the human mind and the Absolute Reason, the unity of phenomena and the harmony of natural law.

In both of these attitudes there seems to be this common element,—they each seek for a unity. In one it is the unity of human life, while in the other it is the unity of nature. And besides this inquiry for the ultimate unity of things, there are two other characteristics observable in all the humanistic and nature philosophies. These are the methods by which a unity may be discovered and the starting-point which furnishes the requisite material. The former is the reason, the latter is experience. In whatever form and under whatever outward conditions any system of philosophy has appeared, it is possible only through the medium of the human reason. With what ostentation its conclusions may be displayed, it is still the reason which makes this mockery possible; and in whatever manner we seek to avoid its meshes, it still holds us with an irresistible power. On the other hand, this is equally true of experience. Without a firm foundation in the world of mere

fact no philosophy can discover a starting-point for its speculations or a foothold for its conclusions. Even to deal with pure thought it is necessary to consider experience as its object, else the concept of thought itself would be unattainable.

In view of these common elements, which we observe in every system of philosophy under whatever conditions it has appeared, we would suggest the following provisional definition,—*Philosophy is the rational unification of the facts of experience.* Experience is the starting-point, reason the method or efficient cause, and, finally, unity is the ultimate purpose of all systems of philosophy. And this is universally true, whether we consider the speculations of Hindoo, Greek, Anglo-Saxon, or German.

SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY.

This attempt to characterize philosophy as if concerned wholly with the rational unity in all our experience may seem at first sight to be nothing else than a description of the entire field of knowledge; that we have perhaps given an undue prominence to our subject in view of the purpose and results of both natural science and religion. In answer to this criticism we might remark that by defining philosophy as the science of the real unity in our experience we have certainly raised it to an extremely important place, yet possibly not greater than it deserves; but we have by no means exhausted the whole expanse of human interests. The scope of philosophical studies is much more restricted than this definition would imply, for it is seldom that an ultimate unity is sought for within any limited range of our experience. Sometimes the objective or non-mental world, sometimes the emotions and not the reason, receive too great an emphasis to admit of a place within its clearly marked limits. Undoubtedly the scope of philosophical studies is often exaggerated and treated in so general a manner as to include almost any science within its horizon. In order to obtain a clear appreciation of their definite bounds it will be found advisable to consider the dis-

tinctions which separate this field from the natural sciences on the one hand and religion on the other.

Philosophy Different from Science.—The clearest distinction between philosophy and the physical sciences is concerned with the *treatment of material*. The former deals only with the general conceptions, while science advances by considering the smallest and simplest details. It is a scientific fact that the extinct armadillo resembles the modern and existing species of the same type of animal in all respects except size, that the variability of the light of the star Algol occurs periodically, or that the colors of many copper salts in dilute solution are near some shade of blue. An extensive array of such facts as these constitute the special sciences of biology, astronomy, and chemistry. They are, however, far from being facts of philosophy. The generalizations or laws upon which each depends—evolution, gravity, and the ion theory—may very well find a place in philosophy, but the details and minute facts are the material of science alone.

Another distinction of a similar character rests upon the *division of labor*. Science has neither the time nor the inclination to examine its presuppositions; it prefers to take the world of sense perception as it is found, without trying to inquire further into its true nature. Philosophy, on the other hand, regards nothing to be too simple or apparent for investigation. It delights in the discarded problems of science, constructs theories of its own, and derives general explanations which are altogether unintelligible to the descriptive scientist.

A less important distinction between these two fields lies in the *method of procedure*. The scientist takes no step forward until firmly fortified by direct experience. He has constantly a microscope, a telescope, or a test-tube in his hand as the sure guide to knowledge. In other words, the scientist progresses by a first-hand acquaintance with a limited part of the vast realm of nature. Philosophy is too broad to allow of such a method. It must take the concerted opinion of specialists

when it requires the knowledge of some fact, rather than to instigate separate investigations itself. The philosopher accepts the results accomplished by the patient investigations of the expert astronomer or chemist. He looks forth upon the vast expanse of human knowledge as if from some high eminence. The extensive panorama spread before him, while losing the details and close definitions of a nearer view, gains in width, comprehensiveness, and generality. On the other hand, the followers of the special sciences search with conscientious minuteness all the little by-ways of knowledge, bringing into view the details, yet remaining ignorant of what is beyond their limited scope.

Philosophy Different from Religion.—Ever since the earliest dawn of human history man has been a religious being. Modern science is ignorant of a race of men so ancient or so remote that they are devoid of any form of religion. It is the strongest and simplest bond which harmonizes civilized man with the primitive savage. Through the prominence of emotions it points to a lower plane of life, yet at the same time it raises man to the highest level of intellectual achievement through the concept of a Personified Infinite. From the rudest condition of man we learn that science and philosophy were at one time identical with religion. It was only through a process of slow differentiation that each gradually acquired an individuality of its own. It is therefore very natural that philosophy and religion should have much in common, and that many of the questions investigated by philosophy should have a corresponding place in religion. This apparent identity of both origin and subject-matter has often led to a confusion of aim and an ignorance of the fundamental distinction which separates them. To make this clearer it is necessary to indicate briefly the psychic basis of religion, and to point out the elements that constitute its mental foundations as well as the side of human character to which it appeals.

The ~~problem~~ of the *mental origin of religion* is one of

extreme complexity. It has received considerable attention from those who have endeavored to treat religion from an analytic stand-point and explain the laws which underlie the religious life. Sometimes religion is based on the emotions alone, as in the instance of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a celebrated German thinker of the early part of the nineteenth century. Religion to him was a *feeling* of absolute dependence on the universe personified as God. Again there are many philosophers who regard the emotional elements of religion as the outward covering of a purely rational centre. With such the synthetic powers of the reason are alone responsible for all the elements of religious life. Both theories are alike narrow in so far as each neglects the aspect made prominent by the other. The former forgets that feeling alone can never attain the concept of the Infinite, while the latter disregards the obvious fact that religion is always accompanied by an emotional feeling towards God or Nature. Could we look back into the past and see early man at the time when he first became conscious of the vast complexity of his environment, one would find wonder and fear intermingled with an instructive desire to understand his surroundings as the chief expressions of his attitude towards nature. Wonder and fear would appear only at times of unusual occurrences, such as earthquakes or death; whereas the desire, gradually becoming instinctive, to explain and understand this world would attain complete mastery over the mind of the primitive man. We cannot, therefore, sympathize with Lucretius in his attempt to found religion on fear, nor with a modern hypothesis that it is based on wonder.

The easiest and simplest explanation of the universe which the savage mind could bring forth would be a reflection of his own consciousness in the external world. Every physical event, such as the rise of a river, a volcano, or even the growth of a plant, would be the outward manifestation of a consciousness similar to his own. Towards the conscious Being would arise feelings of awe and respect, since its all-powerful hand con-

trolled the fortunes of the child-like savage. The first rudiments of religion would thus spring from this instinctive demand for an explanation of the universe intelligible to the poetic mind of primitive man. These two elements, the *instinctive feeling* and the *rational explanation of the world*, have always remained of paramount importance in any form of religion, and they may be regarded as salient points in our comparison of philosophy and religion.

We earlier characterized philosophy as a study of universals with the special object of bringing harmony into the variety of our world. Explanation of the world is thus a common element in both philosophy and religion. But here the similitude ends. In religion there is also the element of feeling towards God, or the Power of the world personified. This is entirely lacking in philosophy. There is absolutely no *emotional expression* of any kind towards its results; no feeling of reverence towards the Universal of universals. It is very possible that philosophy may develop a concept by no means unlike the omniscient God of the higher forms of religion, but such a concept exists for philosophy as an object only. It develops from a rational analysis of the universe,—nothing more.

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

These broad generalizations of the nature of philosophy are altogether too indefinite for ordinary purposes. It has been found convenient and almost necessary to divide philosophy as a whole into numerous branches according to the field of experience in which the unity is sought. The development of philosophy as well as science has been characterized by the increase in number of these special fields and the assertion of new problems within them. In general form each is concerned with universalizing some aspect of the world,—such, for instance, as the facts of mental life or the laws controlling moral action. These subdivisions of philosophy are intended to exhaust the field of knowledge; to be so broad as to afford an outline for

every fact, law, or science. Owing to this breadth of purpose philosophy has no occasion or space to enter minutely into the details of every fact, for this is the work of the special sciences. When referring to any single experience or observation it relies on the concerted opinions of specialists. Each branch of philosophy is content with harmonizing the facts of extensive observation within its own definite boundaries.

These subbranches of philosophy may be arranged about a centre, which may be regarded as the basis for all reference. This centre of philosophy comprises the empirical science of the various mental states, the theory of knowledge, and problem of ultimate reality. In addition to these subjects there are on the one side the various investigations concerning the ideals which the human mind may define for itself, and on the other side the philosophical analysis of the laws and presuppositions involved in science, history, and religion.

Psychology.—The most consistent approach to the various subdivisions of philosophical inquiry may be made through those subjects which are of fundamental importance to philosophy as a whole, leaving until later the consideration of human ideals, science, history, and religion. No investigation, however, can take place unless it is in some way connected with the human mind, no fact or process can be considered unless it can be related to a mental state. On this account it might seem as if the most apparent demand on the part of philosophy in general would arise from a desire to understand these mental states as they are in themselves. Such a science of mental states is called *Psychology*. It is in fact a natural science like physics or chemistry, since it regards the mental states as the empirical data which it must describe and explain, only the importance of mental states to philosophy in general seems to warrant a consideration of psychology in this connection. Psychology does not concern itself with the source or ultimate nature of these mental states, but simply describes our thoughts, feelings, and sensations, endeavoring

perhaps to explain the one by the other, but never pursuing the investigation beyond the limits of an empirical science.

Element of Psychology.—Physical science recognizes a certain hypothetical unit, called the atom, as the base for all its investigations. In the same manner psychology accepts a provisional unit which may be designated as *sensation*. This is the simple unthinking element derived from the action of the senses on the external world; it is the psychological genesis of all the higher states of consciousness. When the mind recognizes the existence of a sensation we have a *perception* or a conscious sensation. And when again these perceptions are joined together by comparison, association, or abstraction, there arises the flow of feelings, ideas, and thoughts of which the conscious mind is composed.

Psycho-physical Parallelism.—As an explanation of the apparent similitude between this series of mental states, which incessantly flows through the conscious mind, and another series of phenomena, physical in character, which takes place within the nervous system and the brain, the psychologist has invented an hypothesis known as the *Psycho-physical Parallelism*. This presupposes that for every change in the mind or psychic world there is a corresponding change in the world of material phenomena, yet there is only parallelism and no causal connection between these two series of mental and physiological states. When my mind perceives a flash of light, for instance, the hypothesis demands that there must have been a series of changes in the physical world which ran parallel to the conscious mental processes of light perception,—as the excitation and accompanying chemical changes upon the retina of the eye, the optic nerve, and the optical lobes of the brain. For the purposes of exposition we may imagine two series of phenomena, each controlled by its own laws and yet each series absolutely separated from the other. Now imagine that for every point or event in one series there is always a point or event in the other, but yet at the same time the two corre-

sponding events have no direct causal influence on one another. The laws and the terms of one series are absolutely independent of those in the other series, yet there is a constant correspondence, part for part. Upon some such hypothesis as this the empirical science of psychology is able to deal with the mental facts strictly as they are, without endangering its conclusions by any positive theory of the relation between mind and matter.

This parallelism well illustrates a rigid distinction which has, until recently, prevailed throughout the whole field of philosophy,—the opposition of subjective to objective, the self to its condition, thought to its content. On one side is the mind or psychic world, restricted entirely to the mere flow of feelings, thoughts, or ideas; on the other stands the physical world, including all the objects of sense as well as our own body, nerves, and brain. We shall see later how the true relation between the psychical and physical world becomes a question of extreme importance throughout the history of modern philosophy.

Epistemology.—Psychology, as we have seen, deals with a description of the mental states as they are in the mind, but does not concern itself with their origin. It is thus an empirical science, in so far as it receives the given facts of experience without seeking to determine their ultimate nature. It is the special field of *Epistemology* to go one step deeper than psychology and discover the source and possibility of these mental states. It thus moves in the direction of what might be called the presuppositions of empirical psychology. The investigations of epistemology seek to explain the nature and ultimate origin of our knowing processes; they endeavor to define the details of a *theory of knowledge*.

We are accustomed to regard what we call knowledge or facts as fundamental to our conscious life. This assumption early checked all attempts to go deeper than the simple experience, and it is only within a comparatively recent time that

a special branch of philosophy has been assigned to examine the character of our thinking process. When we say that the "whole is greater than any of its parts," or that a "straight line is the shortest distance between two points," we assert what we consider a fact of knowledge; and it is the task of epistemology to consider what truth there is in such an assumption and upon what basis that truth depends. Epistemology is especially interested in what might be called the *criterion of knowledge*. With psychology, this branch of philosophy recognizes that the given experience, as we know it, is all the original material that the human mind can obtain, no matter how complicated a system of knowledge it may construct. With this in view it naturally inquires why one experience should become a fact of knowledge, while another should be discarded as the product of illusion or imagination. The statement "that the earth revolves around the sun" is a fact of knowledge, while the contrary statement "that the sun revolves around the earth" is considered an illusory experience. Such a comparison suggests that perhaps the reason is instrumental in the transition from mere experience to knowledge, and epistemology seeks to determine the exact relation between sense and reason in the constitution of true knowledge.

Empiricism.—The central problem of epistemology is just this question of the component elements of knowledge; as to whether it is entirely derived from the sensuous impressions of the external world on the one hand, or, on the other, whether it consists of both elements obtained from the mind and from sensation. The former theory, which regards all of our knowledge as the direct product of experience, or sensuous impressions, is called *Empiricism*. It is the favorite theme of those writers who seek to explain the complexity of thought by the apparent simplicity of human sensations. Such a view gives to the reason and understanding no greater dignity or use than that of a blank tablet upon which experience writes its facts and from which it draws its conclusions. The truths of science

are such only because of long-continued experience, and even the feeling of assured knowledge or necessary truth is derived merely from repeated experiences and recurring series of phenomena.

Rationalism. — However plausible this empirical view of knowledge may appear, there has always existed beside it another theory of an opposite character. This latter gives to the power of reason the higher and more important position in the constitution of knowledge. *Rationalism*, the second of the epistemological theories, recognizes the value of the human reason and believes it to be the only criterion with which man is able to determine truth. It is possible that reason may lead us astray, but rationalism places it in this exalted position so long as it is impossible to find a surer method for the discovery of true knowledge. The error of the classic examples of rationalism has been a tendency to disregard the all-important truth that the starting-point of our facts and our sciences is in the simple experience of sense impressions. The thinkers of this school have been prone to erect complicated systems of philosophy without due regard to the facts of observation and sense, forgetting that an over-emphasis on reason can very easily lead beyond the limits of philosophy and into the field of the imagination.

Metaphysics. — We found that epistemology dealt with what was presupposed by psychology. There is also another branch of philosophy which is concerned, not only with the presuppositions of epistemology, but also with those of every other science, subject, or fact. This basis of philosophy, or rather *science of the ultimate nature of the universe*, is called *Metaphysics*, or *ontology*. There are *three* general methods of characterizing metaphysics, each of which exhibits its fundamental nature in a different manner. One can define it as the *base* of all the *physical sciences*,—as that branch of philosophy which has as its subject-matter the presuppositions and foundation-elements of all the other sciences. The reality of

“matter” and “energy” are presupposed by physics and the phenomena of life by biology; then, too, the concepts of time, space, and causality find an almost necessary place in every science. All these fundamental ideas, the nature of which is apparently so simple that they are taken for granted by the less critical sciences, are carefully examined and compared by metaphysics. Even the sensations and the reason, the existence of which was presupposed by both psychology and epistemology, are subjected to unrelenting criticism by this branch of philosophy. Metaphysics asks what is the ultimate nature of mind and matter, what is the meaning of pure existence and of simple *being* without any definable character. Any problem which is insoluble in the ordinary development of a special science is relegated to metaphysics with the assurance that here, if anywhere, it can find place, if not an explanation.

There is still another way of looking at metaphysics,—namely, as the *final unity of all branches of philosophy*. It was earlier suggested that the general characteristic of each of the subdivisions of our subject was the demand for a rational unity in the facts of our experience. Employing this same phrase, one may regard metaphysics as that branch of philosophy which harmonizes into a consistent whole the narrower unities of all the other subdivisions of philosophy. It has therefore for its material general ideas of an extremely abstract nature, thus making very difficult the style of its literature.

There is a third stand-point which we may assume in defining the nature of metaphysics. We may regard it as the *science of reality*, employing this word in its broadest significance. According to such a view the goal of metaphysical research is the determination of what is absolutely Real. By this term is meant that *something* which is so ultimately deep, so true, and so essentially fundamental as to include within it the endless variety of all possible experience. This reality of the metaphysician is so broad and fundamental that it is often

spoken of as something which requires its own existence, of such a character that the world would be inconceivable without it. The question of such a Reality lying behind all phenomena is the same question as the Unity of all unities, referred to in a previous paragraph. The conception of a Unity which underlies this world of changing experience would be so much the expression of all else that it could only be regarded as the ultimate Reality. And conversely, should metaphysics define what was sufficiently real to include all lesser reality, it is obviously necessary that it must contain or unite every possible element of experience. Absolute reality and ultimate unity are metaphysically synonymous.

Monism.—We have just mentioned that metaphysics seeks to discover the *unitary real* lying at the base of the universe. The school of thinkers who believe that this real is a single, simple, undifferentiated unity may be called *Monists*, in contradistinction to the *Pluralists*, who affirm the multiplicity of the world elements. The Monists reduce both mind and matter to either one or the other, or else to a something more fundamental than either. For example, the religious teacher who characterized God as a Divinity, “For in Him we live, and move, and have our being” (Acts xvii. 28), was asserting the monistic metaphysics, for he meant to make the idea of God so universal as to include every phase of man and nature. And again, when Thales asserted that water, and Anaximenes that air, were the primary elements of the world, each recognized a monistic metaphysic. Science approaches this standpoint when it regards some form of energy as the condition to which all physical phenomena may be reduced; or again when it seeks to determine a unitary element to explain the periodic variation of the atomic weights.

Pluralism.—*Pluralism*, that theory of the universe which regards several fundamental elements to be equally real, is by no means as common as monism in modern thought. It may take the form of *dualism*, which believes in two final real-

ities, such as mind and matter,—*εἶδος* and *ὕλη*,—thought and extension. Again, there is a much more complicated form of pluralism, which sometimes provides an infinite collection of Reals. A Greek thinker, Empedocles, tried to explain the world as the interrelation of water, air, earth, and fire; while his follower Anaxagoras increased the number of these elements indefinitely by regarding them as qualities.

Theology.—Even this brief review of metaphysics would be incomplete without some reference to the traditional meaning of the term, as it comes down to us from the mediæval schools. During the Middle Ages the interest taken in these same questions, which we have here referred to metaphysics, was centred about the conception of God. These philosophers—or, rather, theologians, as they would now be called—were concerned wholly with the problem of the nature of the Deity. Like metaphysics, the end sought was the ultimate unity of the universe, but they interpreted this unity in terms of a Divine Personality. This science, which might include almost everything within it, was called *Theology*.

Confusion will undoubtedly arise as to the exact relation between theology and metaphysics on the one hand, and theology and religion on the other. The aim of metaphysics, we have just discovered, is the hypothetical unity of the two entities, the self and nature. This unity of the two is a matter of reason alone; it is developed by the philosopher as the most rational explanation of the whole field of man and the world. The God of theology, on the other hand, is nothing else than this metaphysical unity transformed by the addition of personal attributes into a Subject of divine and omniscient power. The foundations of theology and the evidence upon which its conclusions rest are identical with metaphysics, only the result of the latter is abstract and colorless, while the Unity of theology is a conscious Being who personifies the ideals of mankind.

When this Divine Being of theology is regarded as an

omnipotent Power to whom all human beings owe devotion and praise, then the Personality of theology becomes the God of religion. Thus religion is the emotional feeling towards the personal God, who sympathizes with the limitations and passions of man. The connection between these three subjects may be briefly stated as follows: Metaphysics constructs a purely rational Unity of man and nature; this is interpreted in terms of Personality by theology; and, finally, religion gives to it the elements of sympathy and emotional devotion.

These then, Psychology, Epistemology and Metaphysics, form the three central and primary branches of philosophy. The first concerns itself with the feelings and ideas of the mind without considering their origin; epistemology, on the contrary, seeks to explain the origin of these ideas; while metaphysics inquires into the reality and the nature of that origin. The three thus form a graded sequence in which the last member sums up and qualifies the other two.

The Normative Sciences.—But, aside from psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics, there are numerous side branches and less general topics which, although important, have not the primary nature of the three above mentioned. The more prominent of these latter are the *Normative Sciences*, which are concerned with the unification of human ideals. The distinguishing feature of these subdivisions of philosophy lies in the mobility of their material,—the use of the concept of *ought* or change towards some ideal.

The three branches of philosophy which we have summarized above are concerned with what *is* rather than what *should be*. Psychology takes the mental states as they are, without any reference to what they might have been. Epistemology and metaphysics are equally the sciences of facts, and not of possibilities. But the normative sciences deal with laws and formulæ for the accomplishment of certain specific ends. They tell us how we must or rather ought to act in order to reach the goals we seek to attain. Their common characteristic is

X the purposeful or teleological character of their subject-matter and the primacy of the concept "ought." Philosophy as a whole is concerned with universals and universalizing; and the normative sciences, like the other subjects of philosophy, recognize this quest for the universal. Only instead of conducting their search in the realm of given fact, the normative sciences seek for the universal behind the phenomena of action and purpose. They inquire into the laws which we *ought* to observe in order to attain the end in view, be it truth, goodness, or beauty. These laws are considered universal, since they are to be regarded as valid for all similar circumstances of action. The normative sciences are classified according to the nature of the end in view, whether it is truth in thinking, morality in conduct, or beauty in art. It is *Logic* which prescribes the universal laws for the attainment of truth, *Ethics* for the realization of moral goodness, and *Æsthetics* for the portrayal and judgment of the beautiful.

Logic.—The first definite attempt to collect and arrange the laws of right thinking is to be found in the works of Aristotle, a Greek of the fourth century before Christ. Aristotle attempted to prescribe the principles and rules by the observance of which the human intellect might hope to reach the desired end of truth. During the Middle Ages the study of logic was regarded as the necessary introduction to a comprehension of philosophy, and it was in the mediæval schools that the principles of logic were definitely formulated into a system. During recent times the subject has been much amplified, especially on account of the application of mathematics to the thinking process, through the efficient labors of the Englishman, Boole. At the present time the meaning of logic has assumed new importance, owing to its reference to the *form of thought*, rather than to the ideal of correct thinking. This view is far preferable to the traditional interpretation, since it gives to logic a scientific value and enables it to define as its special field the analysis, definition, and inter-

pretation of abstract concepts, such as quantity or number. Logic thus becomes a supplement to metaphysics; the one deals with the form of thought, the other with the reality of its content. X

Axioms of Logic.—We have said that logic treats of the universal laws of right thinking. There must, however, be certain elements, or rather axiomatic principles, which logic must regard as fundamental to the process of thought. These are generally recognized to be *three* in number, and may be briefly stated as follows: A thing is identical with itself,— $A = A$,—it must either exist or not exist, and, finally, X the principle of contradiction which requires that an assertion and its contrary cannot be both true at the same time. These three principles, apparently simple, but hardly as self-evident as might appear at first sight, are regarded as the lowest terms of our thinking process. They occupy in logic the same position that the axioms of Euclid do in geometry, or the simple process of counting in arithmetic.

Rules of Logic.—From these principles as a starting-point it has been possible to work out certain laws, like the formulæ of mathematics, which express in a general way the rules which must be observed in order to think consistently. When these laws are neglected there arise certain errors or *fallacies* which are the types of erroneous thinking. As an example of fallacious reasoning consider these statements,—“All apple-trees are organisms and all pear-trees are organisms;” therefore, “all pear-trees are apple-trees, because two things equal to the same thing must be equal to each other.” The error here lies in the fact that neither apple-trees nor pear-trees exhaust the class of organisms, which is tacitly assumed in the conclusion. This fallacy has a special name, which depends on the fact that neither premise refers to *all* organisms.

Methods of Logic.—Thought has sometimes been defined as the process of drawing correct conclusions from given data. One will readily perceive, however, that some conclusions seem

to possess a greater generality or extension than others. It is possible to distinguish two ways in which we may proceed in arriving at the results of thought,—namely, from the general to the specific or from the specific fact to the general principle. The laws governing the former method comprise *deductive* logic, and the latter *inductive* logic. For example, the geometer tells us as a general fact that the radii of a sphere are all equal in length. From this general statement it may be deduced, according to the laws of deductive logic, that all the radii of a certain rubber ball are practically equal in length, as well as the fact that all the lines to the centre of the earth—if it were a perfect sphere—would be equal to each other. In the same way we employ deductive logic when we assert that a certain block of granite not yet quarried possesses weight, knowing that all stones, including the granite, have weight.

We have stated that it is necessary to start with some general or rather universal statement in order to proceed according to deductive logic, but to determine the generality or universality of a statement the opposite or *inductive* method is required. This latter process of reasoning begins by considering a vast number of particular cases and from them determines the general law, or rule, which includes them all. The inductive method is employed in science, where the general law is inferred from many experiments. Thus from a vast number of observations concerning moving bodies the general law of gravity is determined. From numerous experiences the mariner feels himself able to predict the weather with some degree of accuracy. Travellers have observed that many Bushmen are short in stature, and from these observations we assert as a scientific fact that the race of Bushmen, as a whole, is below the average of mankind in height. All these examples of induction show a process of reasoning from the particular to the general. They are based upon the presupposition that the mind can abstract from numerous experiences those characteristics which are common to all. Perfect induction, how-

ever, giving rise to absolute certainty, is possible only when every particular case is examined before the general law is stated.

Ethics.—The second of the normative sciences is *Ethics*, dealing with the *ought of conduct*. Ethics is concerned with the questions of right action, the meaning of goodness and morality; with the nice distinctions between right and wrong and the true value of life. It is this subject of inquiry which has evolved the classic codes of the moral law, such as those of Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed. These have been generally embodied in some religious faith; but one must very carefully distinguish between the ethical elements of the broad world religions and those more significant portions which refer to God and Nature. No more common error exists in the popular understanding than to recognize a necessary connection between morality and religion. The two subjects have as little in common as religion and logic, or religion and psychology. Tradition has united the science of conduct with the religious belief in God, but fundamentally they deal with altogether different sides of mental life. Owing to the fact that the science of ethics deals with perhaps the most vital of all the subjects of human interest, many have been prone to believe that it constitutes the basis of philosophy. This was referred to in an earlier part of this chapter as the humanistic attitude, and it well illustrates the importance with which the science of conduct is regarded. Among the early Persians and Hebrews of the ancient nations the interest in practical problems formed a very essential element in national life. The period of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle among the Greeks was a time when all classes were deeply concerned with questions of an ethical nature. Among the thinkers of the modern world the English, up to the last of the eighteenth century, have shown the most marked interest in questions of conduct. Such men as Locke, Shaftesbury, and the Mills have done much for the advancement of philosophy by their clear and concise

statements of the ethical problems. After the opening of the nineteenth century, however, the German philosophers were perhaps the most original in this direction. Their subtle analyses and acute reasoning tended to clear away the mists that had been gathering about the foundations of ethics since the time of Plato.

Axioms of Ethics.—Every science has some fundamental axioms. In geometry they are always stated, without proof, at the beginning of any treatise on the subject. In logic we have found them to consist of those simple principles which every one involuntarily assumes in all thinking. The science of ethics is no exception to the general rule, only here we deal with a presupposition of an altogether different character. We have said that each of the normative sciences is concerned with an *ought* of some kind,—with a comparison between what *is* and what *should* be. With ethics it is the moral comparison between the present act and some future course of conduct. This comparison, however, assumes that the person can or cannot guide himself by the results of the decision. In other words, ethics implicitly affirms that man possesses the power *to choose* between two or more courses of action. It seems to be the common assumption among us all that each person has the power and privilege to contribute to his own moral development by the free choice of action. This primal axiom of morality is the ground not only of the problems of ethics, but also of our simple and involuntary judgments of praise and blame. Philosophy has defined two opposite and contradictory theories regarding human action; the one postulates freedom, the other denies it.

Libertarianism.—The former and more natural theory accepts uncritically the dictates of one's own consciousness and gives to the human personality the unique dignity of determining its own course of conduct. This view, which appears under the name of *Libertarianism*, declares that the only means of answering any question is by employing to its full extent the

authority of our own consciousness, for this is the necessary setting to every fact of life and experience. And the libertarians further declare that our own consciousness leaves no doubt, but that at every moment of decision each person is at liberty to freely choose his next succeeding act, provided there is no physical hinderance or obstacle. Furthermore, it is contended by the "free-willist" that unless freedom is conceded to man the conceptions of praise and blame lose their force and meaning. It is freedom that distinguishes man from the brute, gives dignity to life, value to virtue, and authority to the conscience. Without it man would be like the mechanisms of nature, the direct product of circumstances, and a mere function of his environment.

Determinism.—Black as this picture of the freedomless man appears when painted by the libertarian brush, there are thinkers who accept it with all its apparent horrors. *Determinism* is the opposite of libertarianism, since it denies the ancient tradition of the freedom of the will. This school of ethics declares that we have no right to distinctly part off man from the rest of nature and declare that below him all is under the control of blind necessity, whereas this being alone is endowed with the heavenly power of choice. The determinists do not hesitate to rank man with all the other members of the animal kingdom, and refuse to recognize any other difference than that of degree in mental power. According to them our every act is the resultant of two irresistible forces,—the present environment and all our past actions as summed up in what might be called character. It is the present environment which unfolds to us the various possible lines of conduct; and it is the individual character, personifying for that moment our past actions and the lives of an indefinite series of ancestors,—with their good and evil actions, their instincts, and their passions,—which irresistibly guides the moment of decision. A tree is stunted and ill-shaped because of an unhealthy seed or decadent conditions of growth; while another of the

same species is healthy and beautiful to look at because of opposite conditions. The determinists contend that the variations in human character and conduct are the result of similar variations in inheritance and environment. The human plant prospers and grows beautiful in character and life because of circumstances over which it has absolutely no control. For this reason, if for no other, the ideas of praise and blame, of sin and virtue, have no other meaning than that of maturity or decadence. Pity, sympathy, honor, and love have no exalted place in determinism, especially in its classic examples. All is nature and natural law,—man is one of its peculiar products.³

Theoretical Ethics.—Aside from this central problem of freedom there are numerous other disputed questions within the field of ethics. It is often convenient to divide the various topics which cluster about conduct into two groups,—the first of which would include those of a distinctly theoretical nature like the one already mentioned, while the second group would comprehend those problems which approach nearer to the ordinary questions and perplexities of daily life. The former

³In connection with this fatalistic attitude towards the world—especially prominent in Oriental literature and again in Christian predestination—one may call to mind Fitzgerald's classic translation of Omar Khayyám's *Rubáiyát*:

“LXXII.

“And that inverted Bowl they call the Sky,
Whereunder crawling coop'd we live and die,
Lift not your hands to It for help, for It
As impotently moves as you or I.

“LXXIII.

“With Earth's first Clay They did the Last Man knead,
And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed:
And the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.”

we may call *theoretical* ethics, and the latter *practical* ethics.

Possibly one of the most perplexing questions of theoretical ethics is concerned with the ultimate spring or impetus which turns us towards righteousness,—the *moral sanction*, as it is called. To what final criterion do we appeal when we seek to determine the good or the evil of a certain act? Upon what ground does the human mind base its decisions of right and wrong? The history of European philosophy has had some kind of a reply to this query since the Greek Cyrenaics made individual pleasure the determining factor of human conduct. The followers of this general attitude have been called *Hedonists* (from the Greek equivalent for pleasure), because of their intense emphasis on the momentary pleasure of the individual. Subsequent English thinkers have modified the hedonistic stand-point making universal, instead of individual, happiness to be the determining moral sanction. This theory of universal happiness attained considerable prominence in England some thirty or forty years ago under the name of *Utilitarianism*. In contrast to these pleasure-seeking systems of morality there has always existed an opposite tendency which, for want of a better and less threadbare term, we may call *Idealism* or *Intuitionism*. This view gives to morality an existence altogether beyond the transient determinations of pleasure and pain. We follow the dictates of conscience because we believe it to be right; the decisions of the moral judgment may or may not agree with the momentary requirements of pleasure, but this in no wise affects our attitude towards them. With some of the idealists the authority of morality is a divine gift from God to man; with others it is a self-conceived feeling of altruism; and still again it has been founded on a certain “moral sense” of indeterminate origin.

While the question of the ultimate sanction of the moral law is of paramount importance to theoretical ethics, there are others quite as vital. The old discussion between the *optimists*

and the *pessimists* here finds its appropriate place. According to the former school, life is worth the effort of living. On the contrary, the pessimists, impressed with the evil and misery inherent to human life, feel that some state of death and perhaps non-existence would be preferable to the desire and struggle of humanity. It was among the ancient Hindoos, a race of marked philosophical power, that the pessimistic theory received its strongest support. In fact, Buddhism, the most truly metaphysical of all the broad world religions, is founded upon pessimism as the ground of its theory of being and of human reality. In the history of thought the Occident has been distinctly optimistic in its theories of ethics, while the Orient has always exhibited a pessimistic tinge.

Practical Ethics.—The field of *practical* ethics is concerned with the application of the theoretical questions to the routine of our ordinary life. The scope of this branch is far broader, but less philosophical, than that of theoretical ethics. It has for its inquiry the practical questions of the moral life. Thus we might easily agree on theoretical grounds that “lying is an evil,” but it is an altogether different matter when we come to declare that there are no cases in which lying is right. Perhaps a lie will save an honorable life, will prevent some atrocious crime, or even turn the course of history.

Æsthetics.—Now leaving our rapid survey of ethics, we come to the third and least important of the normative sciences, namely *Æsthetics*. This is concerned with the *ought of beauty*; the universal laws which we must observe if we wish to attain an ideal of beauty constant for all mankind at all times. *Æsthetics* may be considered the science of the fine arts. It is in no wise concerned with the creation of an artistic object; nor does it prescribe minute principles for artistic criticism, many of which arise from personal taste. It tries to construct a rational understanding of the meaning of beauty; after which it considers the various means by which beauty may be obtained, estimating each in view of its value as a uni-

versal element. The mere feeling of pleasure towards an object of beauty is avoided and the analytic rather than the appreciative stand-point is assumed. The attempt is made to determine the universal principles, such as unity, symmetry, harmony, and expression, which give to the object this character of beauty. It compares the various branches of the fine arts, such as music, poetry, the graphic and plastic arts, with a view to determine in what manner and to what degree each is an expression of universal principles.

Other Branches of Philosophy.—The three subjects, Logic, Ethics, and *Æsthetics*, complete the trio of the normative sciences. The list, however, of the various branches of philosophy is by no means exhausted even with these. Just as there is a permanently valuable as well as an accidental way of doing anything, so also there are certain elements of every subject which deserve to be regarded as universal, and therefore of philosophical interest. It is the universal element of commerce to derive profit, or of biology to deal with life, and of mathematics to concern itself with the pure forms of space and time. And since the very essence of philosophy is to determine, compare, and evaluate the universal whenever and wherever it is found, then there must be a place in philosophy for universals occurring in the most diversified fields of human knowledge.

In view of this demand there have arisen innumerable inquiries, each concerned with the universals peculiar to some restricted portion of scientific investigation. These studies, concerned with the fundamental or universal principles, are generally regarded as branches of philosophy, and appear to the world as such. Of the many subjects which have been treated in this manner we will mention but four,—the philosophy of science, the philosophy of society, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion.

Philosophy of Science.—Ever since the beginning of modern scientific studies there has been a desire among the

deeper thinkers to further investigate the terms, definitions, and formulæ employed in the descriptive sciences. These inquiries, restricted to universal and invariant processes, were different in character from the laboratory and class-room experiments which formed the outward material of the sciences themselves. They attempted rather to breathe a deeper and broader meaning into the common phrases of accepted teachings. Such investigations may be regarded as comprising the *philosophy of science*, for they form a branch of our subject in so far as they deal with universals. As an example of the topics which occur in this very interesting and important field may be mentioned the attempts to systematize the axioms of mathematics, the struggle to define some absolute physical constant, the various evolutionary hypotheses, or the interpretation of the general principle of scientific causalty. It is plainly seen that such questions as these are of a far more universal character than the problems which generally arise in the progress of a single one of the special sciences.

Philosophy of Society.—The philosophy of science was concerned with the universals of the objective and generally non-human side of nature. There are, however, just as interesting, just as invariable laws which are concerned entirely with the operations of man in the aggregate. When these actions are carefully examined, without reference to any particular time or place, we have the *philosophy of society*, or *sociology*. This deals with the universal elements which govern the changes, the progress, and decay of great social groups. It concerns itself with the invariable features of civilization, the laws which have been gradually evolved through a long process of trial and error. Here man is considered purely as a social animal, as a mere reflection of his time, his environment, and the condition of his fellow-men. The broad laws which control the migration of large bodies of men, such as scanty food supply, conquest, or the search for gold, are here considered. Also the gradual development of those institu-

tions, such as marriage or civil law, which especially mark off man from the beast and the civilized community from the savage tribe.

Philosophy of History.—These universal laws of sociology have no reference to any special race or time, but are equally applicable to the Anglo-Saxon and the aboriginal Australian. There are, however, certain invariant or unchangeable forces which exhibit themselves with special reference to some particular race or stage of civilization. And it is the details of these laws which constitute the history of a nation or a race. The *philosophy of history* is therefore nothing else than a description, comparison, and estimation of those primal laws and forces the manifestation of which is the history of mankind. The difference between sociology and history is not so much a natural distinction as one of convenience. Thus the great law—that lack of food supply results in migration—is generally considered in sociology, for in its abstract nature it concerns human society at large. Whereas the conditions of the Roman Empire of the first century A.D. were especially conducive to the development of colonial dependencies, or that the great Irish famine distinctly increased the rate of emigration from Ireland, are facts which would be considered under the philosophy of history, because they refer to some particular time and place.

Philosophy of Religion.—One of the favorite themes for philosophical treatment is concerned with the various forms and aspects of religion. Owing to the extent and depth of religious feeling the subject is of universal interest. The *philosophy of religion*, like the philosophy of science or of history, tries to determine the universal elements prominent in every form of religion, including those of savage tribes as well as those of civilized nations. It thus compares what may be regarded as the basal elements of a purely natural religion and endeavors to discover their mental origin and principles of development. By such a careful analysis of what is essen-

tial to religion it is possible to remove from it the feeling of reverence and to regard it from a purely objective or scientific stand-point, thereby treating it from the same stand-point as other human institutions. Thus the philosophy of religion discusses the much-controverted question as to whether religion is primarily founded on feeling or reason; also what was the origin of religion and in what form did it first appear. Often there is a comparative study of the various interpretations of God or of the many representations of an after-world. It is the philosophy of religion which compares the various proofs for the existence of God, or for the immortality of the human soul. It exhibits, if possible, the deeper conditions of environment and temperament which have influenced the development of the world religions, and often points to the effect of mere accidental conditions upon intellectual movements of universal consequence.

CHAPTER II.

THE BIRTH OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.

HISTORY is generally associated with political movements and national events of extreme importance. The history of philosophy, however, is distinctly different, dealing with the development of conceptions rather than with the concerted actions of men. By tracing the gradual alterations in the philosophical theories of mankind, it exhibits the national traits of mind and the deeper character of race. From the apparent chaos of individual opinions, clashing one with another, it weaves the thread of true intellectual progress. As the history of the state develops by the struggles and ambitions of individual men, so also the history of philosophy rests on the character, opinions, and philosophical systems of a few brilliant thinkers. Sometimes these men possess themselves extreme originality together with breadth and depth of thought. They are able to influence their contemporaries and successors solely by their unusual insight. Then again there are men endowed with a certain native faculty for order and system which enables them to cast into connected form the opinions and ideals of their own time. And there is still a third class of men who are extremely narrow and one-sided in their philosophical stand-point but yet who possess a certain persistency in carrying to the extreme the logical implications of a single conception. They help along the general current of thought by clearly defining the old issues and by suggesting new problems. The history of philosophy portrays the struggles of men, more or less like these types, to define a conscious attitude towards man and nature.

Its General Divisions.—The history of philosophy may be divided conveniently into *four* great periods, each clearly distinguished from the others by the type of problem considered and by the method of its treatment. These may be designated as the *Hindoo*, the *Greek*, the *Mediæval* or Scholastic, and the *Modern* periods. All such broad divisions of any intellectual movement are necessarily little more than convenient artifices. The exact dates which mark off one period of the history of philosophy from the others are always uncertain. The general attitude of mind, which alone is its distinguishing character, is discernible only in broad abstraction. The same problems, with perhaps a change in their setting, appear in different ages and among different peoples. It is only the comparative distinctness which national temperament gives to the treatment of a few important subjects which enables us to refer to general divisions in the history of philosophy with any exactness of meaning.

In each broad period of philosophy one may discover a time of birth and youth, when enthusiasm and assurance combined with narrowness of view are the distinguishing characteristics. Following this there is another and generally shorter period when philosophy reaches its culmination, a time when a few great intellects sum up and immortalize their whole epoch. Succeeding this short term of maturity there is a long and generally unprofitable interval of decay in which general doubt or scepticism is used to refute traditional authority. And finally towards the close of this period of stagnation there are signs of a new philosophy soon to be born under new conditions.

Hindoo Philosophy.—Neglecting for our purpose the rude but interesting philosophy of the early savages, we meet in the religious writings of ancient India a system of thought worthy of very high estimation. Hindoo philosophy began with the *Vedic hymns*, a series of devotional chants addressed to the personified forces and phenomena of nature. The true

metaphysics of the Hindoo is to be found in the *Upanishads*, a series of commentaries on the more ancient Vedas. The central theme of their philosophy is the Absolute Unity of internal and external phenomena in a single subjective consciousness. This all-inclusive and indwelling self, or *Brahma*, represents the *Soul of the Universe*. All the objects of the world and the human self or Ego in a higher degree are reflections of the great universal self. The ultimate goal of human thought is to recognize this truth and perceive that there is but one true Being, the *Brahma*, while all the objects of the world of sense are unreal in themselves, if regarded apart from the immanent reality of *Brahma*.

Aside from this pure Monism, or what may be called from a religious stand-point a *pantheism*, the Hindoos were the authors of the truly philosophical religion of *Buddhism*. This religion took its name from a teacher born about 369 B.C., whom tradition portrays as a man of the highest ethical ideals. Buddha taught that all our sensuous life is built upon the chimera of unfulfilled desire, that existence is in itself evil, and that the highest ideal of life is the recognition of this great truth of universal pessimism. This will be referred to again in connection with Schopenhauer, a modern German exponent of this same attitude of mind.

Greek Philosophy.—Perhaps a little later as a whole, but for the most part contemporaneous with Hindoo philosophy, extended the varied history of Greek thought. It began with several narrow monistic theories of the world and gradually broadened and deepened until the time of *Plato* and *Aristotle*, when Greek philosophy reached its climax. During this period of its brilliant activity Greek philosophy was distinctly humanistic, emphasizing, as no other period has done, the importance of ethics and the eminent position of man in nature. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics were all ethical philosophers of the first rank; all of them interpreted nature in terms of some aspect of human life.

Plato, probably following his master Socrates, opposed a theory of materialistic metaphysics—then widely taught in Greece—by the first system of thorough *idealism* to be found in strictly European thought. The only ultimate reality consisted in the *ideas*, which under certain circumstances could be objectively expressed as the sense-world, or subjectively manifested as the inner nature of the soul. Human knowledge consisted in the reflection on ideas, human goodness in the organic harmony of ethical ideals.

Aristotle stands for the scientific or analytic tendency in Greek thought. Instead of a monism of ideas, he found it impossible to express nature in simpler terms than the dualism of *form* and *matter*. Every sense-object represented the expression of these two world elements; above all the objective nature was the perfect embodiment of form, a sort of form-ideal without matter, which served as the end in view for all natural processes and human activities. The influence of Aristotle has been far greater than that of any other Greek thinker, owing to the fact that he later became the accepted authority for Christian speculation.

The salient feature of the *Epicurean school* was the desire to better the condition of man by prescribing a system of conduct intended to lead to the most constant happiness. The *Stoics*, on the other hand, sought to raise the moral plane of man by bringing his finite will into accord with the laws of the universe; they are said to have originated the well-known aphorism, "Live according to nature."

Mediæval Philosophy.—After the founding of the four great schools of Greek thought, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, the Epicurean, and the Stoic, the interest in philosophy began to decline, until finally, about the sixth or seventh century of the Christian era, it may be said to have wholly disappeared. It was not until the Catholic Church was well established that men began again to interest themselves in the problems of philosophy. The whole setting of these problems had been

altered, in the intervening time, by the introduction of Christian ideas; so that the older views were no longer tenable in their pagan form, but required to be reconciled and harmonized with Christianity. It was this work which fell upon the *schoolmen*, and the elaborate results of this attempted reconciliation is called the *Scholastic* or *Mediæval Philosophy*. Its most notable feature, especially during the later periods, was the systematic and exhaustive—one might almost say ponderous—character of its systems. Scholastic philosophy stood for a general and systematic treatment of the whole universe: God, angels, man, and physical nature.

Controversy over General Ideas.—Prominent among the philosophical problems which confused the schoolmen was the controversy over the reality to be ascribed to *general ideas*, a topic which is constantly reappearing in the history of philosophy. Regarding this question there were two opposing answers, according as stress was laid on universal or particular terms in connection with the interpretation of Christian dogmas. Much confusion arose in the early Church as to the proper interpretation of the relation between man and God. If we should regard God as the only reality, then all the dignity of man, the authority of the Church over the individual, and even the meaning of sin, would be lost; then the absolute reality of God would include the finite life of man. On the contrary, should the Church give to man a reality outside of God's existence, then the Divine Power would fall short of being omnipotent and absolute. Between this Scylla and Charybdis the Church endeavored to steer its course. It wished to make the individual man responsible for his own actions at the same time that it included human frailty within God's omnipotence. With this contradictory problem the Christian Church is still struggling, and even in our own time meets with less success in its solution than in the days of Augustine and Pelagius.

REALISM.—On the whole the authentic doctrine of the mediæval Church gradually acquired the form of *Realism*,

obtained chiefly through the study of the Arabic interpretations of Aristotle. This view of the world gave to the general or *universal ideas an absolute reality* independent of varying forms or modes. That is, the general idea of a man, of a horse, or of a dog, was absolutely real in itself, whereas the particular man, Thomas or William, the particular horse, and the particular dog had no reality except as specific expressions of the general concept. In brief, the abstract general ideas alone possessed reality.¹ The factors which determined the doctrines of the Church in this regard were very various. Realism gave to the Church, as a human institution, a perfectly definite reality apart from the churches, orders, and individuals which composed it; thereby increasing its temporal authority, power, and dignity. Then, too, Christ, as the Son of God, could mediate between man and God only on the hypothesis that He personified at once the frailty of universal man and the spirit of God. And still again, from another point of view, the dogma of original sin retained its force only on the supposition that the fall of Adam affected all generations of mankind through their reality in the general idea of man.

✓ NOMINALISM.—The orthodox Realism of the mediæval Church was opposed by two brilliant thinkers,—*Roscellinus*, a native of Brittany who flourished in the eleventh century, and *William of Occam*, an Englishman of the fourteenth century. These men advocated a theory of metaphysics, appearing under the name of *Nominalism*, which, as well as Realism, took its rise from the study of Aristotle. It regarded the general ideas *as names only*, possessed of absolutely no external reality. The Realism of the Church, as we have just seen, declared that the abstract idea, or thing in general, was alone real and that the individual object was unreal; while Nominalism, on the other hand, gave to the separate individual elements of the world a positive existence and a definite reality. It regarded the gen-

✓ ¹ *Universalia sunt realia.*

eral idea, which expressed the common qualities of these individuals, as merely a convenience of speech or name.²

CONCEPTUALISM.—Throughout most of the early period of Scholasticism a war of words was kept up between these conflicting schools. An attempt at reconciliation, however, was made by an original thinker named *Pierre Abelard*, a native of France, who lived from 1079 to 1142. Abelard opposed the extremes of both Realism and Nominalism, by advocating a theory known in the history of philosophy as *Conceptualism*. He interpreted the general idea, not as absolutely real, as did the Realists, nor as altogether unreal, as did the Nominalists, but as real *in the mind*. This is the most plausible view from the stand-point of "common sense." The classic expressions of conceptualism regard the universal idea of a horse as real in both the mind of God and in the mind of man, for it is by such general ideas that the thinking process is able to operate. Conceptualism by no means contends that man in general has some kind of reality out there in the world beyond, but only that the mind is capable of understanding and employing such expressions. As such the general ideas are *concepts*, real only in processes of thought.

It has been a favorite procedure on the part of modern writers to show contempt and endeavor to cast ridicule upon the methods of the mediæval schoolmen. They forget for the moment the incalculable debt which modern philosophy owes to the subtle and acute analyses of their respective genius. They conscientiously nourished and kept alive the glimmer of intellectual light which the Arabians passed on to them from the dying embers of the ancient world. They tempered the dogmatism of the Church and gave to the Christian religion the firmest philosophical basis which it has ever had. Notwithstanding the futility of many of their discussions, their over-emphasis on an uncritical deductive method, and general con-

✓² *Universalis sunt nomina.*

tempt for scientific induction, they deserve far more credit for what they have done than is generally admitted among writers desirous of showing their own superiority.

THE RENAISSANCE.

Leaving now the long period of mediæval philosophy, we approach the opening of modern thought. No exact dates can be fixed to distinguish the two periods, and no distinct lines can be drawn even among the thinkers themselves. The years from about 1400 to 1600 are often regarded as the time when the barren and futile investigations of the Middle Ages were being transformed into the life and activity of the modern world. It is distinctly a period of transition and of change. The traditional institutions and the old ways of living were undergoing complete alteration. Fire-arms superseded the ancient implements of war; the mediæval castle was abandoned for the fort, the knight and esquire gave way to the hireling soldier. With these changes there followed a new social life acting and reacting on the industrial, political, and intellectual temper of the age.

Tendencies of the Renaissance.—These changes in the outside world could not but affect the trend of philosophy. The old orthodox Church formulæ were given new meanings and a freer interpretation. The spirit of a strict ethical code was avoided, and churchmen and laymen alike recognized few principles of morality in their private life. It was an age when the individual man was asserting himself with the extreme enthusiasm of his newly-discovered importance. This assertion of the individual may be recognized as having three lines of development,—the *intellectual*, the *political*, and the *artistic*. The first is characterized by a new philosophy, a new religion, and a new science. In the political field the individual man asserted himself all over Western Europe, especially in the new social and industrial conditions, as opposed to the mediæ-

val empire; while in the fine arts this period gave to the future reformed principles and new ideals.

Intellectual Awakening.—It is the intellectual awakening that alone interests us, and it is its three branches—*philosophy*, *religion*, and *science*, each taking root in a different country—that may be associated with the true birth of modern philosophy. We may regard the *nature philosophers of Italy*, men of extreme brilliancy of mind, as the precursors of our modern technical philosophy. They stated the vital and pressing questions of metaphysics in terms of nature rather than of God, from the stand-point of philosophy rather than from that of religion. In consequence of their rashness many of them were prosecuted by the Church, but their work remains and their influence may be traced throughout modern thought. The philosophical side of the intellectual awakening developed in Italy, whereas the religious Renaissance was restricted to the more northern countries. During this period *Protestantism* first presented itself as a factor in the religious life of Europe. The religious reformation passed readily into extreme forms, of which *German mysticism* is perhaps the most interesting from our stand-point. And, finally, the *scientific side* of the intellectual unfolding of this period seems to have been concentrated in *England*, where an interest in the empirical study of nature has been apparent from early times. Even certain of her schoolmen, notably *Duns Scotus*, *Occam*, and *Roger Bacon*, were far ahead of their contemporaries in their regard for natural science.

National Characteristics.—The distinct traits of character peculiar to each of the three racial types—Italian, German, and English—are well exhibited by the three attitudes of mind above referred to, the speculative, the religious, and the empirical. The Italian, brilliant, quick, and imaginative, easily reaches the heights of metaphysics; but the shallowness of his mind and his lack of perseverance failed to withstand the decay of an uncritical scepticism. The German, on the contrary,

fails perhaps to possess the brilliant imagination of the Latin, but is more than compensated for this defect by his greater depth and constancy. German mysticism soon disappeared, but its departure only awakened a new interest in philosophy, instead of quenching it altogether. The Anglo-Saxon, with whom modern science first found protection, combines the quickness of the South with the cool, calculating perseverance of the North, and adds still a third element peculiar to his own type of mind. This is the fondness for the simple, the natural, and the near at hand. He despises all imaginative theories and elaborate hypotheses in philosophy as well as in science. He defines reality by what is close to his own consciousness; never by the complex, if the simple will answer. The English philosophers are empirical in their epistemology, and exhibit far greater success in their psychology than in their metaphysics. They approach the field of philosophy with the acuteness of the scientist and the exactness of the mathematician.

We may regard the history of modern philosophy as first beginning to formulate itself in connection with the tendency to regard God and Nature as One. The earliest name to be associated with this movement is that of

NICOLAS CHRYPPS OF CUSA.

LIFE.

He was born in 1401, at Cues, or Cusa, a small place on the Moselle. After having studied philosophy, mathematics, and law at the University of Padua, he abandoned the latter profession and devoted himself to theology. He attained marked distinction in the Church and travelled extensively on various missions connected with his work. It is interesting to note that Nicolas defined unconsciously tendencies of thought which, when more fully developed in the following century, stood in marked contrast to the established teachings of his Church.

Philosophy.—The base of the philosophy of Nicolas is his conception of the nature of God. Instead of deducing God from Aristotle and the Bible, he endeavored to construct a rational conception of the Deity which should accord with the wealth and variety of the world about him. Constantly throughout nature Nicolas recognizes the partial and incomplete union of opposite elements. God was to him the perfect and absolute harmony of all conflicting terms. God was so Infinite as to include or transcend both the finite and the infinite, the one and the many, mind and matter, identity and plurality.

Owing to the immeasurable chasm which separates the complete infinity of God from the potential and only partial infinity of man, human knowledge is unable to comprehend the Divine nature. The faintest glimmer of this perfect knowledge is attained only from the irrational suggestions of intuition. This intuition of the Being of God, or "learned ignorance,"³ is the highest condition of mind. Just below the intuitional knowledge of God, but separated from it by an incalculable difference, are the partial truths derived from the activity of the intellect⁴ in its struggles with subtle metaphysical questions. Below the intellect Nicolas places the analytic reason⁵ which harmonizes the facts of experience. While lowest of all is the sensuous knowledge obtained from the particular experiences of the external world. This fourfold classification of human knowledge is strongly suggestive of a similar division to be found considerably later in the philosophical systems of Spinoza and Immanuel Kant.

Following Nicolas came a long series of Renaissance names: *Paracelsus*, a rather eccentric character who tried to unite philosophy with medicine; *Pomponatius*, who remodelled the old Aristotle after the Renaissance view of nature; *Taurellus*, who tries to define the relation between philosophy and theology, speculation and church dogma; *Telesius*, who founded

³ Docta ignorantia.⁴ Intellectus.⁵ Ratio.

a fraternity for the avowed purpose of opposing Aristotle; and much later *Campanella*, who anticipated the Frenchman, Descartes, by resting the certainty of philosophy on the existence of the self, and the English empiricists by his emphasis on the importance of a theory of knowledge.

THE ADVANCES IN PHYSICS.

In connection with this period it may be well to consider for a moment the scientific influences which helped to mould the speculative philosophy. In 1543 *Copernicus* had published his monumental work on astronomy, which defined for the first time our modern conception of the *heliocentric* nature of the universe. Following the lead of Aristotle and the Bible, the Arabic and Scholastic philosophers had accepted unreservedly the older conception of the heavens in which the earth was the centre, while the stars, the sun, and other planets revolved about it in circular orbits. This was strictly in accordance with divine revelation. It regarded the earth as the centre of the solar system, and man, in the divine likeness of God, the spiritual and metaphysical centre of the universe. When, however, a system of physics should arise which dared to oppose the convictions of twenty centuries, it is not surprising that the whole Church should have been stirred to its foundations and should have made use of all the instruments within its power to wipe out the heresy. It perceived that the dignity of man was shaken, that a dogma of faith had been opposed by the observations of nature. The Copernicans asserted that the earth was only one of many worlds, and the Church inferred from this that it could be regarded no longer as *the* work of God created solely for the purpose of serving man.

Together with the growing influence of the heliocentric astronomy, the atomism of the Greeks began to reappear. The apparent success with which it explained the physical world in terms of moving particles of matter led the Church to regard it as an attempt to dispense with the spiritual guidance of

God, or at least to minimize His immediate control. In connection with these physical theories may be mentioned *Kepler*, whose three laws of planetary motion anticipate Newton's theory of attraction, and who rests universal mechanism on universal harmony. In this connection one must not forget the physicist *Galileo*, and at a little later time the atomist *Gassendi*.

The deepest of the Italian nature-philosophers, one who combines the speculative interests of Nicolas and the older scholastics with a keen appreciation of the value of scientific inquiry, is

GIORDANO BRUNO.

LIFE.

He early entered the Dominican order of monks, but, influenced by Nicolas, he exhibited too much freedom in his teachings to harmonize well with his monastic surroundings. Owing to certain heretical opinions concerning the dogma of the Trinity, Bruno was considered dangerous by the authorities. He emigrated across the Alps to Geneva on hearing that his conduct had met with the disapproval of the Church. During these years of unrest it has been reported that he taught a children's school, and it is well known that some years later he delivered lectures at the University of Toulouse. He visited Oxford, where his new ideas were regarded with disfavor by the British scholars. On leaving England he travelled through the length and breadth of Europe, lecturing at the various universities. He produced during this period of wandering numerous works on almost every known subject,—philosophy, theology, logic, astronomy, and other natural sciences. While at Frankfurt he accepted an invitation to visit Venice and instruct a young nobleman in logic. Suspicions having arisen in regard to his orthodoxy, he was delivered by his pupil to the Inquisition, and later transferred to Rome, where he was confined for seven years in a papal prison. At his trial Bruno bore himself

with fortitude. He rejected a proposal of reconciliation offered him by the Pope, and repeatedly declared that there was nothing in his opinions or works which was opposed to the deeper meaning of a truth-seeking Christianity. On February 9, 1600, Bruno was convicted of heresy, and burned at the stake on the 17th of the same month. To his sentence he replied, "Ye who judge me have more to fear that I who am judged;" and nearly three centuries after his death Italy raised a monument to commemorate the greatest of her philosophers. The life of Bruno was an expression not only of his own philosophy, but likewise of the whole Renaissance. Intense, feverish at the restraint of authority, he felt only dimly the fundamental nature of his mental struggles. While keenly appreciating the interest in natural science which sprung up around the labors of Leonardo da Vinci and Copernicus, he was yet unable to understand the difference in stand-point between the old Church and the new science. Seeking to the end the harmony of all truth which came to his intensive nature from every side, he nevertheless neglected to harmonize his successive points of view.

Pantheism.—The concept of a Divinity, in and through nature, was suggested by Nicolas and approached by many of the thinkers of the time, but attains its deepest significance in the thought of Bruno. God may be briefly summarized as the *soul of the universe*. Deprived of the Christian attributes and terms, He closely resembles the Brahma of the Hindoos. This same conception of a pantheistic world we shall presently meet in a more abstract form among the German mystics and afterwards in the profound metaphysics of Spinoza. The difference between pantheism and mysticism lies in an attitude of mind, a method of approach to ultimate truth, rather than in any definite conception. Both recognize a monistic unity of the world, but pantheism struggles to appreciate this in terms of the reason, whereas mysticism arises from a faith in the divine intuition of its truth. But without regard to this distinction

of method, the conception of Bruno's Nature-Deity was richer than any form of pantheism which had yet appeared. God is the absolute⁶ and complete unity of the world; the source of all things which includes within itself all phases, antitheses, and contradictions to be found in heaven or on earth. In Him are united freedom and necessity, for He is determined only by His omniscience. God not only created the universe, but He is the Universe. He not only dictates the eternal laws of the world, but is those very laws themselves through their manifestation in natural phenomena. God is *generative nature*, infinite in time and space; and at the same time the unity of the finite, *generated* forms. He is the efficient and ideal cause for the harmonious evolution of the universe towards an ultimate realization of truth, goodness, and beauty.⁷ From Him emanate, and to Him return, all the processes of nature. The plant produces the man, the man dies, and from his dust again arises the plant; and running through all these changes is the eternal law of evolution, the true expression of God's will.

This doctrine of the immanent being of God in nature was regarded as atheism by the Church, chiefly because of the narrow interpretation given to Bruno's philosophy. The distinction lies entirely in regard to the stress of emphasis. The Church gave to God an existence outside of nature, the latter being an expression of God's creative act. Bruno, on the contrary, made God the creator and Nature the created one and the same. With Bruno the universe is the never-ceasing expression of God, the eternal act of creation.

Physics.—Bruno was too much under the influence of the

⁶ "Deus ergo est substantia universalis in essendo, . . . Summa Terminorum Metaphysicorum; De Deo sev Mente, I."—Collected Latin Works, vol. i., Part 4. (The work is a very concise and clear account of Bruno's philosophy, especially in its relation to Scholasticism. The metaphysical rather than the mystical element is here prominent.)

⁷ "Deus est amor, efficiens, claritas, lux."—De Triplici Minimo et Mensura, Book I., Chapter i.

prevalent enthusiasm for mathematics and the new stimulus given to science by the Copernican astronomy to rest satisfied with a purely pantheistic explanation of the world. He sought rather to explain how from a scientific as well as a pantheistic stand-point he might exhibit the underlying unity of the world. Not that the truth of this unity can appear in two different forms,—the purposive and the mechanical,—but only that there can be two ways of interpreting it.

He regarded every object of phenomena of the physical world as a little reality in itself, uniting two opposite elements in a manner which approximates, but cannot attain, the absolute unity of nature. These two elements may be variously defined as mind and matter, form and substance, purpose and inertia, activity and passivity. Each object is thus the expression of the two great world elements, the conceptions of which can find their complete harmony only in God. From its position in each atom Bruno thus raises mere “matter” above the place assigned to it by scholastic metaphysics. Its existence is a divine necessity^s permeating every form of life,—a groundwork for the manifestation of mind. Every object or atom, owing to this harmony of opposites, is the arena for the conflict of two motives or forces, the one expansive, the other contractile. The former leads upward and outward towards God, while the contractile force tends towards the stagnation and death of the object. Through the uninterrupted action of these two forces upon the component elements of mind and matter, every atom in nature is constantly changing its relative position. Those combinations which exhibit a lack of the purposive or mental element quickly fade, whereas those others remain which are more the expression of law than of accident. Accordingly there arises in the universe a perfectly graded scale of beings, in which the lower members approximate a contracted and inert state of existence, while those of higher dig-

^s Cosa divina.

nity approach the fulness of the Nature-God. Here is a new expression of ancient atomism and an early statement of the system of evolving monads destined to occupy a prominent position in the later philosophy of Leibnitz.

Ethics.—The relative importance of man in Bruno's philosophy is distinctly in accord with the evolutionary hypothesis of the modern world. Although he recognizes that everything represents a unity of mind and matter, he believes that man is the highest fulfilment of this harmony. Human knowledge, deep and wonderful as it may appear, can never attain a complete understanding of God,—in this Bruno follows the "learned ignorance" of Nicolas,—but yet man is endowed with the dignity of expressing the will of God through moral action. In his valuation of human ideals Bruno places the pursuit and attainment of truth as the highest. He extols the virtues of the heart, as hope, sympathy, and love; he emphasizes the feelings and the emotions, since they represent the mental and moral harmony of opposites. The necessary conflict of opposition leads upward and outward to an ultimate supremacy of the good over the evil, the exalted over the degraded, the reason over the passion. Everything is good because it expresses in its own unique way the harmonious will of God; all things are perfect because each expresses an individuality of its own.

Position of Bruno.—The execution of Bruno marks the decline of Italian philosophy; it sprung suddenly into being only to fade with the same quickness and mystery that surrounded the brilliancy of its appearance. Bruno summed up in an immortal form the prevalent ideas of his time. His mind had all the quickness, intensity, and passionate struggle for an ideal which characterizes the Latins. His system, however, lacked clearness of detail and cogency of parts, although the broad outline of his metaphysics well represented many features of later modern philosophy. In his writings are elements which are found in every later school, suggestions which are

amplified into systems by such minds as those of Spinoza, Leibnitz, and even Kant, Schelling, and Hegel.

The philosophical movement of Italy was only one of the three ways in which the intellectual awakening of the Renaissance reacted on the thought of Europe. The *Reformation* introduced a new life into the strictly religious sentiment of the age. Although Protestantism was interpreted strictly as a religion of faith, and the leading spirit of its early history, *Martin Luther*, showed a distinct abhorrence for philosophical problems, yet in *Philip Melancthon* philosophy found a true student. Educated in the German universities, he developed a preference for the philosophy of Aristotle, the teachings of whom he struggles to accommodate to Protestantism. The moral principle of Aristotle was interpreted as God's will, while virtue was simply a knowledge of the Divine Law.

MYSTICISM.

General Character.—By far the most interesting of the movements directly connected with the new religious enthusiasm was the development of what has been called *Mysticism*. In our previous discussions, notably in the case of Nicolas of Cusa, we have approached very near to this type of philosophical religion. Among the Hindoos we find the first expression of its doctrine, only to reappear again in the later forms of Christian Platonism. The central theme of the mystic creed, in whatever forms it has appeared, is the simple belief in a *spiritual Essence of the Universe*, or God, unknowable to human reason, but yet suggested by the higher forms of intuition. Various terms and circumlocutions are employed to testify to the inexpressibleness of the mystic One. Sometimes He is called the *Unknowable*, owing to the finite limits of human knowledge; again He is identified with *all knowledge*, because of His immanent existence in all the objects of human thought and feeling. So far as may be judged every form of mysticism recognizes God, or this undifferentiated essence of the world,

to be the creator of all things. The universe, as we knew it, is merely an *outpouring* or effusion, which comes forth from the limitless personality of the Divine Being. His nature is infinite, it includes and transcends all truth, all goodness, and all beauty. He is pure thought, pure mind, or pure reason, of which the human forms are but meagre expressions. He is superior to law because He is law; higher than will because He is will. Towards this highest power of the universe the human soul yearns with inexpressible feelings and emotions. And it is by these intuitions alone that man is able to recognize the existence and supreme reality of the Mystic Absolute.

Christian Mystics.—The Christian Mystics differ but little, in the deeper meaning of their thought and life, from the Hindoo, Greek, or Arabic Mystics. The undifferentiated unity of the Absolute is the same to the Mystic whether it is called Brahma, Allah, or God. Although this doctrine, so peculiar and yet so universal in its nature, could not be easily amalgamated with the outward forms of Christianity, it often appeared even within the Catholic Church itself. The early Father *Origen* leaned perceptibly towards mysticism, possibly owing to the fact that his master Saccas and his fellow-pupil Plotinus are generally recognized as the founders of the mysticism of antiquity. Later *Thomas à Kempis*, in his “*Imitation of Christ*,” gave to the world an immortal statement of mysticism shrouded in the words of the subjective conflict of good and evil.

The mystics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries sought to replace the complex externality of the Church by a simple personal faith, very much akin to Protestantism. Prominent among these was *Meister Eckhart*, who was born about the middle of the thirteenth century, at a time when the power and influence of the Church was at its height. As a Dominican monk he preached at Cologne and taught in the University of Paris. Finally the Church ordered an inquiry concerning his orthodoxy, during the process of which he died, probably about 1330. In his teachings Eckhart approached very near to Pan-

theism. Reality, existence, life, even knowledge, are to him but mere expressions of a single Unit. From this unitary being of God emanate all the forms of the world and all the thoughts of men. The soul or permanent substance, which lies at the basis of every form of mind and matter, is a reflection from God. The human soul in its fundamental nature is identical with the world soul of God; from Him the immortal part of man springs and to Him it returns. Such teachings were by no means uncommon among the Mystics, but they appear in strange contrast to the formal Catholicism of the times. Eckhart's teachings were widely spread in Germany, especially by *John Tauler*, whose name is generally associated with his own.

JACOB BOEHME.

LIFE.

Christian mysticism of a later period found a sympathetic disciple in Jacob Boehme. Born in 1575, he was apprenticed at an early age to a shoemaker, and received but the meagre education of a small village school. He worked steadily at his craft in the little German town of Görlitz, and produced at the same time a number of works which have exerted a marked influence on subsequent German thought. The first of these was the "*Aurora*," which purported to be the record of a divine revelation from God to man.

Theology.—Boehme combined in his nature a strong religious feeling with a firm belief in the power of personal inspiration. Unlike the classic forms of pantheism, Boehme's philosophy found a place for evil in the world without detracting from the goodness of God. The Divine Spirit was all,—creator and created,—self-knowledge and knowledge of the world. This perfect unity, however, could not be the completely good unless it contained the opposing elements of which perfect unity and harmony is necessarily formed, and among these evil must find its place. Instead of detracting from the

goodness of God the presence of evil really adds to His glory, it being one of the forms through which the Divine Spirit expresses the dualism and conflict involved in the process of creation.

Cosmology.—The process of creation is the successive manifestation of certain activities arising directly from God. Every activity involves a duality, and this duality in turn is completely harmonized in the Divine Nature. Here unite fire and water, heat and cold, good and evil,—opposite and contradictory elements of every character. Creation is the eternal expression of the unity of God through the assertion and absorption of duality. All nature is endowed with life and value, all laws of nature are the will activities of the Spirit. The physical evolution of the universe takes place according to certain primary activities, seven in number. Each is given a metaphorical interpretation by the religious enthusiasm of Boehme,—on the one hand as a physical force, and on the other as a psychological or moral principle. The elementary principles of creation are represented by two forces; the one expansive, giving rise to physical fluidity and moral sweetness; the other a contractive force, expressing itself as solidity and acute pain. These two forces unite in a third, the principle of sensuality, desire, and anxiety. It is the union of the two elementary forces in the desires of sense which is expressed by the Mosaic account of the fall of man. The other activities which Boehme discovers in the world process are, in general, fire, love, sound, and matter. As a whole, despite his metaphorical illustrations, the mysticism of Boehme represents the first strictly German speculation. It is a religious appreciation of the initial principle of all evolutionary theory,—a unity manifesting itself in successive oppositions.

The philosophical spirit of the Renaissance showed itself in England not as Italian pantheism nor as German mysticism, but rather as a new interest in the empirical method of science.

The English mind long held a covert longing to substitute a philosophy of experience for the traditional formalism of the Church. Feelings of repugnance towards Aristotelian and scholastic logic, its methods and its results, were gradually attaining in England, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the magnitude of a national character of mind. Instead of the sudden appearance and disappearance of the Italian reformers, sharply defined against a background of mediævalism, the English nation was assuming the garb of a whole race of reformers. For from the dominant influence of a decaying church the clear-headed Anglo-Saxon was rising step by step above the intellectual plane of his ancestors. His fondness for the reality of his senses combined with the acquired distrust of scholastic dialectic, produced a new attitude towards the world, capable only of contributing to a true advance in natural science. The progress of British philosophy has been slow and steady, seldom evincing remarkable brilliancy, but never exhibiting signs of decay.

FRANCIS BACON.

LIFE.

This empirical attitude of mind, peculiar to the English Renaissance, finds in Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam and Viscount St. Albans, its fullest individual expression. He was born at London in 1561, a son of Nicolas Bacon, keeper of the great seal under Queen Elizabeth. He early entered the University of Cambridge, where he acquired the characteristic dislike for scholastic traditions, especially in the field of the sciences. Leaving his studies, he travelled in France in order to become somewhat acquainted with men, and his *Essays* testify to the success with which he learned this lesson. He was left to his own resources by the early death of his father, and turned towards politics and the law as the quickest and easiest means of attaining prominence. In this he was not disappointed, for he steadily rose in public office, especially

after the accession of James I., until in 1618 he became Lord Chancellor and was a little later vested with the titles of Baron of Verulam and Viscount St. Albans. While at the height of his glory he was charged with bribery, fined, and sentenced to imprisonment. The King, however, never permitted the full execution of the penalties. The closing years of his life were occupied by literary labors and scientific studies. In 1626 he died, "loved and admired," it is said, by all who knew him.

THE GREAT REGENERATION.

Bacon's place in the history of thought is secured for him by an extensive project of which only a fragment reached completion. This undertaking was no less than the attempt to sum up the then present stage of human knowledge, point out the defects which would hinder its future progress, and finally to mark out in broad outlines the method and direction of future science. This remarkable attempt to evaluate the human reason has been called the "*Instauratio Magna*," or great regeneration, having as its expressed purpose the "restoration of the sciences." Bacon's original plan is recognized to have been arranged according to six separate divisions, of which only the first two approached anywhere near their complete and permanent form. The first part of the "*Instauratio Magna*" began with a survey of the present condition of science. Bacon's final views on this topic were published in 1623 as "*De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum*," the same being an enlargement of the "*Advancement of Learning*" which had made its appearance seventeen years earlier. The second part of the great plan was occupied with the proper method of scientific inquiry. It treated of the "*Novum Organum*," or inductive method, in contradistinction to the old method of Aristotelian logic. In the third part Bacon wished to treat of the data of science; while the fourth was intended to exemplify the results to be attained by the use of his inductive method. The fifth and sixth parts treated respectively of Bacon's expectations in

his new philosophy and the part which future generations shall contribute towards the application of his method to the world of scientific experience.

Imperfections of Knowledge.—In Bacon's treatment of science he directs attention to the three requisites necessary to the successful investigator of nature,—namely, a starting-point in experience, a sure method, and a gradual rather than a rapid progress. In the pursuit of knowledge man is hindered by four phantoms or *groups of "idols,"* which lead the human intellect into false paths. The first of these Bacon called *idols of the tribe*,⁹ of which he enumerated seven. They represent the misguiding characters which are common to every human mind because of its organic structure. They are inherent in the nature of man and corrupt the understanding by their universality. For instance, we all make the facts fit some favorite theory; and passions influence all our judgments. Another class are the *idols of the den*¹⁰ which arise from the peculiar nature of each individual; these are traceable to habit, education, or accident. Some people, for example, are prone to observe differences, while others lay stress upon resemblances. A third class are the *idols of the market-place*¹¹ which arise from the deficiencies and ambiguity of our language; words of a fanciful or fictitious origin and meaning. And, finally, there are the *idols of the theatre*¹² which recount the errors of past systems of philosophy,—errors which are caused either by too narrow a basis, too little experiment, or too much assurance in tradition. The development of knowledge is like a theatre in which customs, opinions, and systems of philosophy appear and disappear like the scenes of a drama.

Division of Sciences.—This purely negative treatment of knowledge served only as an introduction to his positive teach-

⁹ *Idola tribus.* Novum Organum, Book I., Section 41.

¹⁰ *Idola specus.* Ibid., Section 42.

¹¹ *Idola fori.* Ibid., Section 43.

¹² *Idola theatri.* Ibid., Section 44.

ings. Bacon's philosophy, if such a term may be used to cover its breadth, was more an attempt to define a general classification and arrangement of all possible branches of human inquiry than to develop any systematic theory of reality. The only unity that pervades the almost measureless extent of the "*Instauratio Magna*" is its general empirical stand-point. The criterion which Bacon employs to differentiate the sciences depends more often on empirical and frequently accidental data derived from psychological evidence, than on the meaning of the sciences themselves. In this respect he defines in its classic form the assurance which the English mind has always felt in the simple facts of experience and the sufficiency of psychological explanations.

The general classification of all knowledge depends on a threefold division of the faculties of the mind; *history* relates to the *memory*, *poetry* to the *imagination*, and *philosophy* to the *reason*. It is history which simply reviews the images or impressions received from *sense*, "which is, as it were, the port or entrance to the understanding."¹³ Civil history records the works and acts of mankind; natural history describes the generative processes of nature and the use of material objects. Poetry comes from a fanciful rearrangement of sense-impressions without reference to true individuals. Philosophy, which alone arises from the reason, is concerned with knowledge of *God*, of *Nature*, and of *Man*. Theology, however, has taken to itself the problems which refer to God and the human soul, thus leaving to philosophy in its stricter sense the investigation of the laws of nature, the activities and interests of man.

It is in the field of the natural sciences that the reason has perhaps its firmest hold. Here the inductive method, upon which Bacon laid so much emphasis, finds an almost unlimited opportunity for the exercise of its authority. It is this emphasis on the importance of the inductive approach to science

¹³ De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Book II., Chapter i.

that gives to Bacon the prominence which he deserves in modern thought. The authority of experience and the method of induction defines the position of Bacon, and it is through the confidence in these two factors that the natural science of modern times has been able to fulfil the predictions of its founder.

Position of Bacon.—One looks in vain for a complete and clearly articulated system of metaphysics in the works of Bacon. His analytical and psychological account of the divisions of knowledge belongs more to the history of science than to speculative thought. The whole object of his undertaking was the advancement of natural science, although the accomplishment of this might initiate a decay in philosophy proper. The tribute which the modern world owes to Bacon and his associates rests upon the stimulation which they gave to the empirical and scientific tendency of the whole English race. German historians of philosophy are prone to decry the importance of the position allotted to him by Englishmen, and can see little worthy of praise in his character or in his life-work. He may have lacked the extreme originality accredited to him by his admirers, and perhaps borrowed many of his conceptions from prevalent scientific notions; he might have been unscrupulous in character and uncompromising in the pursuit of his ambition, but notwithstanding he supplied the distinct demands of his age. His scientific aspiration and his character, to a greater degree than we are willing to admit, portrayed the ambitions of the modern world.

THOMAS HOBBS.

LIFE.

If Bacon approached philosophy from science, one may easily point to a contemporary and friend of his, Thomas Hobbes, who came to science with a metaphysical theory already formed. He was the son of the Vicar of Malmesbury, a person who is said to have lacked both intellectual and moral refine-

ment. Thomas was prematurely born in 1588. His hasty entrance into the world is ascribed to the wide-spread fear caused by the Spanish Armada. He early attended the village school, and at fifteen years of age began the study of scholastic learning at Oxford. Hobbes seems to have attained considerable proficiency in Greek, although, like Bacon, he was rather repelled by the classicism and ecclesiastical pedantry of the University. After leaving the University, Hobbes travelled extensively on the Continent, meeting the foremost thinkers of France and Italy. While waiting in a drawing-room for the arrival of a friend, he accidentally raised from the table a copy of Euclid's Geometry. From that time forth his whole attitude of mind was changed. Mathematics, mathematical methods, and mechanical explanations became the fundamental element in all his thought. Although never a professional mathematician, and latterly involved and distinctly defeated in several discussions on mathematical topics, he moulded his own philosophy on mathematical standards and indirectly defined the attitude of subsequent English naturalism. Hobbes died at the advanced age of ninety-one, retaining to the last the vigor of his faculties and the acuteness of his mind.

Epistemology.—It has been often observed, especially by historians of English and French philosophy, that a materialistic metaphysics is universally associated with an empirical epistemology. This generalization possesses the strongest force in the case of Hobbes. He may be regarded as the spiritual father of the long line of English empiricists. The human organism, higher only in degree than that of the brute, can only attain to knowledge through the medium of sensation. In fact what we recognize as knowledge, even of the most abstract character, is derived from the union of sensation. “Originally all *conceptions* proceed from the *action* of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception,” Hobbes tells us in his “*Discourse on Human Nature*,” and repeats it in his political treatise, “*Leviathan*.” And further, that the “coherence of

thought," which we would call the flow of consciousness, is the result of sensations related to one another in a single stream of time. Imagination and memory are "decaying senses;"¹⁴ experience is the collection of these past sensations and the understanding is their representation by words. An object in the external world excites the end organs of sense by means of its own movement, and this motion is transmitted through the nerves to the brain. The brain transformations, and not the true movements of the external object, are what constitute the cognitions of our thought; we can perceive the "sentient" but not the true qualities which inhere in the object itself. "Image or color is but an *apparition* unto us of the *motion*, agitation, or alteration which the *object* worketh in the *brain*."¹⁵ This theory of sense-qualities was earlier defined by the physicist Galileo and became a point of almost universal agreement among subsequent English philosophers.

Metaphysics.—The system of Hobbes divides itself very conveniently into three parts,—the metaphysics, ethics, and politics,—all of which are erected on the empirical foundation just outlined. In metaphysics Hobbes represents the first modern interpreter of *materialism*. Every phenomenon of the universe is interpreted in terms of "matter" and "motion;" and thought becomes simply a peculiar form of the latter. To account for the endless variety of the forms of matter, Hobbes premises the broad generalization that all changes or transformations represent different forms of motion. The processes of thought, as well as the development of worlds, are all mere expressions of moving coagulations of matter. Although matter is therefore synonymous with reality and existence, Hobbes believes that an ultimate law of nature lies behind its activities. This he finds in the principle of *causality*, the sequence of cause and effect. An understanding

¹⁴ *Leviathan*, Part I., Chapter ii.

¹⁵ *Human Nature*, Chapter ii.

of its various specific applications constitutes ultimate truth; philosophy itself is nothing else than the knowledge of cause and effect, and the correct method of philosophy consists in the "shortest way of finding out effects by their known causes, or of causes by their known effects."¹⁶

The terms and general conceptions which Hobbes employs readily bring to mind his early studies of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. Space is the appearance of any external thing, and time the before and after relation. Body is a specially existent thing independent of our thought processes; the accidents of body are the external sources of our conceptions. From these views one recognizes that Hobbes has transformed the scholastic doctrines into a materialism, in which "substance" of the earlier thinkers becomes the "matter" of a mechanical universe. Its mathematical laws of motion exclude the possibility of purposes or ends in nature, no "Final causes" as in the Aristotelian systems. Hobbes is thoroughly straightforward in his materialism, and does not hesitate to draw the most disagreeable conclusions if the rigidity of his mathematical method seems to demand it. The conception of a thoroughly mechanical universe, in which thought processes are regarded as movements of matter, does not meet with much sympathy among the philosophers directly following Hobbes; and materialism cannot be regarded as of much consequence until the time of the French Encyclopædists, during the latter part of the eighteenth century.

The Nature of Man.—The empiricism and materialism of Hobbes is apparent in his treatment of human relations. He develops what may be called a *naturalism*,—a term which well describes any theory of ethics which regards man merely as the causal product of his environment; a highly organized machine, properly adjusted to complicated surroundings. Pleasure and pain, beauty, morality, and truth exist for no other purpose

¹⁶ Computation or Logic, Part I., Chapter vi.

than to assist man to accommodate himself to his environment. Fundamental to human character is an insatiable love of life and power, the satisfaction of one's natural appetites, and the primitive emotions of pleasure and pain, good and evil, express its gratification or its disappointment. Freedom of will is an error of individual prejudice; it springs from a misinterpreted consciousness. Man, like every other species of animal, is controlled in his actions by the passions and inclinations of the moment. Volition is only the expression of consent to an irretrievable fate, a fate founded on the principle of sufficient reason and operative on the ground of the psychical demand for the greatest pleasure. Goodness, morality, and such terms are convenient words for the evaluation of conduct, but in an absolute sense void of any meaning. Praise and blame are ideas which are inapplicable to the estimation of moral value, they are of service only as expression of the relative utility of modes of conduct.

Philosophy of Society.—In connection with Hobbes's theory of sociology his name is best known. Earlier, *Jean Bodin* and *Hugo Grotius* attempted a naturalistic explanation of society, but lack as a starting-point the unwavering materialism of Hobbes. The latter begins with the assumption that primitive man was without social organization,—a premise which Hegel later denies as contrary to the very nature of man as a social being. Under such conditions each individual is in constant conflict with the rights of all other men, a war of all against all, without moral law or justice. "To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust."¹⁷ Peace, the attainment of which constitutes the first law of social progress, is possible only on some mutual understanding or agreement. Each man, therefore, relinquishes a *portion* of his natural rights in order that those remaining to him may be more secure. From this mutual

¹⁷ *Leviathan*, Chapter xiii.

agreement arises a universal compact vested either in a monarch or in some constituted assembly. It is the function of this centralized government to receive from each certain of his natural rights and at the same time to assure to every person the rights and privileges of a peaceful life. The state is thus a product of fear on the one hand and prudence on the other.

Estimate of Hobbes.—Hobbes and Bacon present to us very well the attitude of the English thinkers during the seventeenth century. The one initiated a new advance in physical science, the other defines the characteristic English empiricism. Hobbes cannot be called a man of extreme originality, nor, on the other hand, is his philosophy stimulated by a remarkable depth of insight. His importance lies more in the hidden currents of thought which later defined the character of English philosophy than in the immediate influence of his stand-point. It is interesting to note that Hobbes is condemned or else neglected altogether by nearly all of his successors, yet his attitude and method, and not uncommonly his theories, are unconsciously assimilated by opponent and disciple alike. His breadth of view and power of analysis are perhaps greater than in the case of the next illustrious English philosopher, Locke, but the influence of the latter has been much more pronounced.

CHAPTER III.

CONTINENTAL RATIONALISM.

SCEPTICISM OF THE RENAISSANCE.

IN the foregoing pages we traced the early movements of modern thought as they appeared in the nature philosophy of Italy, the religious enlightenment of Germany, and the critical empiricism of England. The era of these movements, each indicative of the subsequent national stand-point, may be regarded as the transition period between mediæval and strictly modern thought. The problems of the ancients were restated in the light of the Renaissance, the traditions of the old were compared with the ideals of a new; the humanistic philosophy of the Greeks and the theology of the Schoolmen were replaced by a simple philosophy of nature. The influence of this transition period was felt in France as well as in the countries already mentioned, although here the reaction away from Catholicism first appeared as a general attitude of doubt or *scepticism*. The Frenchman of the Renaissance possessed the deep imagination of the Italian but lacked sufficient intensity to give reality to his mental dream. On the other hand he shared with the Englishman an interest in science, but failed to possess the reliance of the latter on the facts of experience. A general tendency to philosophize was the only possible result of this peculiar condition of character, but a tendency which was devitalized by a deep feeling of scepticism. The French philosophy of the early Renaissance lacked confidence in both the reason and the senses.

Significant of this whole type of thought is *Michael de Montaigne*, who is really less of a sceptic than his critics often admit. Born in Southern France in 1533, he lived a quiet and retired life until his death in 1592. Montaigne was a true

child of the Renaissance, individualistic, intense, and introspective. He writes for the mere pleasure of self-culture. He penetrates by analysis and philosophizes by subtle distinctions. Like other figures of the Renaissance he places nature as the standard of life, but unfortunately fails to grasp this standard. He is a humanistic philosopher impressed with the dignity of man and the shallowness of the life of passion; ignorance is preferable to artificiality, servitude of mind is too dear a price to pay for civilization. The ancient Stoics rather than the Sceptics were his teachers. Nature, and life according to nature, sum up his metaphysics and his ethics.

RENÉ DESCARTES.

LIFE.

Not long after this time of general doubt and dissatisfaction, both with the old and the new, there appeared in France a man who belongs to the age succeeding the period of transition to the distinctly modern world. Descartes was born in a period when the spirit of the French Renaissance had lost the vigor of its freshness and when even the "life according to nature" seemed to demand a firmer foundation in some consistent metaphysic of nature. Descartes was born on March 31, 1596, at the village of La Haye, in the province of Touraine, as the son of a noble family. The young Descartes passed the first eight years of his life at home, where he showed sufficient signs of originality to be dubbed the "Little Philosopher." The years from 1604 to 1612 he spent at the Jesuit college of La Flèche. Here he acquired a considerable knowledge of Latin, an antipathy towards scholasticism, and a rather pronounced conceit of his own powers. On leaving the seclusion of the Jesuit college we find him at Paris, enacting the part of a man of the world, but later devoting all his attention to study. Becoming anxious to visit the various countries of Europe, he entered the army of the Netherlands, taking part

in several campaigns of the Thirty-Years' War. On November 10, 1619, while at Neuburg, a small town on the Danube, he records that the first intimation of the central thesis of his philosophy came to him like a vision. He then retired for some hours that he might have an opportunity of estimating the true value of his new discovery. An account of this strange incident appears in the "*Discourse concerning Method*,"¹ published in 1637, which may be regarded as the first work which belongs strictly to modern philosophy.

This incident at Neuburg was the decisive point in the career of Descartes, as well as in the history of philosophy. From that time forth his whole life was controlled by the ideal of study, as it appeared in the light of his new discovery. To accomplish this purpose of study he took up his residence in the Netherlands. The only person who was acquainted with the place of his retirement was Père Mersenne, whose friendship began in the early days of the Jesuit school. Through this friend he held communication with the outside world. By him he was kept informed concerning the scientific and literary progress in France, and also it was through his instrumentality that the works of Descartes were printed. In the seclusion and intellectual freedom of the various Dutch cities which he visited, Descartes devoted himself to an extensive work on natural science, entitled "*The World*."² This was probably completed about 1634, but the Inquisition had the previous year enjoined Galileo from teaching the Copernican cosmology, and condemned as heretics all who accepted the heliocentric astronomy. Descartes rejected the scholastic theory of the heavens and rested the elements of his treatise on the physical hypotheses of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, with the express intention of developing a mechanical theory of the universe. Owing, however, to the action of the Church, he withheld the publication of his work. Descartes wrote to

¹ Discours de la Méthode.

² Le Monde.

Mersenne at the time, that he wished in no wise to conflict with the faith and teachings of the Church, a desire which arose in a large measure from fear and love of quietude. Nothing of the Cartesian philosophy was made known until 1637, when Descartes published the very important introduction to his system, under the title of "*A Discourse concerning Method*,"³ the first four parts of which were devoted to a discussion of the circumstances of the discovery and the general nature of the Cartesian presuppositions, to which were added two sections treating of the application of the "method" to the physical world. Together with the "*Discourse concerning Method*," which is largely of metaphysical import, there appeared three other articles, the whole forming the "*Philosophical Essays*."⁴ Of these latter the "*Dioptrics*" was concerned with the application of mathematics to physics; the "*Météores*" with physics proper; while the "*Géométrie*" laid the foundations of modern analytic geometry. In 1641 Descartes published a series of "*Meditations*," together with a series of criticisms and the replies of Descartes. The work had been circulated in manuscript among prominent thinkers, Hobbes included. The last of his important works was an interesting ethical essay entitled the "*Emotions of the Soul*."⁵

Descartes was assailed by Protestants and Catholics alike, and the latter part of his life was embittered by both religious and philosophical controversies. In 1649 he accepted an invitation extended to him by Queen Christina of Sweden, at whose court his death occurred a year later, caused probably by the severity of the climate and the radical change in his habits of living.

METHOD.

The history of philosophy agrees with Descartes in regarding the method of philosophical analysis as the important element

³ Discours de la Méthode.

⁴ Essais Philisophiques.

⁵ Les Passions de l'Âme.

in the Cartesian system. Its founder seeks above all to develop some method by which he may discover the basal presuppositions of philosophy. To do this he must estimate the value of the different faculties of the mind as means to the end in view. The history of ancient peoples, poetry, rhetoric, the study of foreign languages, all lead towards the cultivation of the memory, imagination, or emotions, but fail to assist in the discovery of ultimate truth. Even ethics did not suffice in this regard, for he entertained a special antipathy towards complicated systems of morality, likening them to "impressive and magnificent palaces founded on sand and mud."⁶

Primacy of the Mathematical Method.—Mathematics appealed to Descartes above all else, its firm basis in the faculty of the reason alone, its precision and apparent certitude excited his wonder and admiration. With the method of this science clearly before him, Descartes next endeavored to apply its principles towards an analysis of himself; observing, however, four simple rules of procedure. The first of these was to discountenance every fact whose truth was not perfectly certain and true. The next step was to conduct his analysis by slow and well-graded advances, always proceeding from the simpler to the more complex; and finally making frequent reviews in order to avoid omissions. Geometry had already, by following this method, developed truths of remarkable certainty and complexity, and Descartes hoped by the use of these simple rules to introduce the same certainty within the field of metaphysics.

Rules for Living.—While engaged in this process of self-examination it was necessary to observe some fixed code of morals, just as a temporary house is required by one who is intent upon rebuilding an old structure. In the first place he resolved to obey the laws of the people with whom he resided, to rest in the faith of his childhood, and to avoid extremes of

⁶ Discours de la Méthode, Part I., Section 10.

all kinds. The second maxim of his conduct was to hold steadfast to his purpose and not deviate for insignificant reasons from his chosen line of thought; any direction if pursued far enough will lead one out from the maze of a forest. Again he would avoid any ill feeling towards fortune, whatever might occur, remembering that beyond our own individual thoughts there is little within the power of man. And, finally, Descartes decided that a life of study and reflection was, above all other occupations, the one best suited to the accomplishment of his purpose and the attainment of truth.

FOUNDATIONS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.

With these various rules of thought and maxims of conduct Descartes looked about him for the discovery of some ultimate truth upon which to base his philosophical system. It was not impossible that the senses, which men generally regard as indicative of absolute certainty, might deceive us. And still further, all the syllogisms of logic and deductions of mathematics, in fact all the ideas and thoughts which enter into the minds of men,—either in the waking or the dreaming states,—all might be founded on error and deception. But when, however, one had rejected all these it was necessary to believe that the person who was thus exhibiting the activity of thought possessed some kind of existence. In other words, the fact that *I doubt*, requires that the *I exists*.

Existence of the Self.—Although one might reject all the data of sense and thought, there still remains the perfectly certain axiom of the existence of the self, absolutely necessary for the very process of thought. "*I think, therefore I am*"¹ is a truth of so deep a character that it defines the thinking self as the necessary criterion of existence,—“a substance whose very

¹ “Cogito, ergo sum.”

“Je pense, donc je suis.”—

Discourse de la Méthode, Part IV., Section 1.

essence and nature consists in thought alone.”⁸ In replying to one of his critics, Descartes expressly declares that the mere objective act of thinking does not constitute the force of the argument. The really significant element lies in consciousness rather than in judgment,—as a mere psychical process. I am conscious that I am thinking is the full premise, and the logical amplification of any thought-activity. “I walk, therefore I am”⁹ may be substituted for “I think, therefore I am,” provided the act of walking is accompanied by the full consciousness of the activity.

Descartes, by thus predicating the existence of the self to every assertion concerning the existence of anything else, gives to the thinking subject a logical antecedence over the reality of either the external world or of God. Ancient philosophy regarded both universe and man from a purely objective standpoint, without attention to the instrument or method of inquiry. Mediæval philosophy builds an objective theology on nature, irrespective of the psychological motives which gave it birth. Modern philosophy has learned from Descartes the invaluable lesson of *criticism*. We realize to-day, with all our progress in science and philosophy, that no theory of either man, the external world, or of God is sufficient without first an assurance of the existential basis of the human mind, without the medium of which no philosophy is even possible. To-day philosophy approaches God and the world through man, and not man through God and the world.

Existence of God.—Among the many ideas which we have, the one of doubting is especially significant. Every one would agree that certainty is at least more desirable, more satisfactory, more near an ideal of perfection, than doubt.

⁸ “. . . je connus de là que j’étais une substance dont toute l’essence ou la nature n’est que de penser.”—Discours de la Méthode, Part IV., Section 2.

⁹ Les Principes de la Philosophie, Part I., Prop. 9.

When, therefore, I am conscious of the act of doubting, I am also conscious of a contrast between an imperfect and a perfect. This idea of the Perfect could not have arisen from the imperfect nature of man as a doubting being, any more than something could have arisen from nothing. It must, therefore, have been placed in the mind of man by a Being "that comprehended within itself all the perfection of which man has any idea, or, in a single word, God."¹⁰ And, furthermore, Descartes reinforced his belief in the existence of God by an old proof which may be traced back to the scholastic teacher Saint Anselm. This *ontological proof*, as it is generally known to philosophy, regards the attribute of existence as a necessary element of perfection. The idea of God, in order for it to refer to a completely perfect Being, must possess existence "in the same way that the equality of three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle."¹¹ God would not be perfect, and hence would not be God, unless He existed, for that which is possessed of existence is obviously more perfect than that which does not possess it. It is interesting here to note that the validity of this proof of the existence of God has been variously treated by more recent philosophers. Some have believed it of sufficient weight to support the whole superstructure of theology and natural religion, while others have regarded it as little else than sophistry. The most forcible objection that has been brought against it refuses to regard existence as a necessary attribute of perfection, contending that an imaginary object is none the less perfect even if only its idea exists in the mind.

Existence of the External World.—Although Descartes regarded the existence of the thinking self and of God as the

¹⁰ ". . . et même qui eût en soi toutes les perfections dont je pouvais avoir quelque idée, c'est-à-dire, pour m'expliquer en un mot, qui fût Dieu."—Discours de la Méthode, Part IV., Section 4.

¹¹ Discours de la Méthode, Part IV., Section 5.

most certain axioms of knowledge, he has by no means explained the vast array of objects which collectively we call the external world. These objects of the external world must be given the certainty of existence, else the Cartesian philosophy would contradict common sense and oppose any advance in science. Our ordinary belief in the reality of the objects of experience is thoroughly substantiated if all thoughts or activities of deception are excluded from the perfection of God. We all believe in the existence of the world of sensuous perception; and since this belief has its source in the perfection God, we must regard this testimony of the senses as truth, since universal deception is altogether foreign to the perfect nature of God. "For God has given me a very strong inclination to believe that certain ideas arise from corporeal things, and I do not perceive how it is possible to excuse him from deception, if in reality these ideas arise elsewhere, . . . and therefore it is necessary to conclude that there are corporeal things which exist."¹² Thus in Descartes's mind a knowledge of the reality and truth of God necessarily precedes the assurance of the reality of experience. He even goes so far as to assert that no possible confidence in the existence of the external world can arise without the previous faith in the Perfect and Infinite Being of God.

METAPHYSICS.

Upon the triple foundations of the existence of the self, God, and nature, Descartes conceived himself capable of erecting a self-sufficient and consistent system of philosophy. He must, however, give to these three primary entities a reality which would distinguish them from the complicated facts of our experience. He employed the scholastic term *substance* to indicate *God*, the human *soul*, and external *nature*, while

¹² Méditation sixième, Section 9.

all the individual forms in which they may appear were called *modes*. Of the three substances, God is highest, for he comprehends both nature and man.

The Three Substances.—Descartes is by no means clear as to the relation between the three substances, beyond the primal unity of soul and nature, mind and matter, in God. The God of Descartes, however important it may appear at first sight, is of little real consequence except as a convenient conception which may be brought in when everything else seems to fail. The really significant parts of his system are contained in the two opposing elements, man and external nature, mind and matter.

Man.—The essence of man, that which distinguishes him from all else, is the *power of thought*. The human soul or faculty of thought is a simple, immaterial substance which serves as the substratum or basis for all our sensations, perceptions, and ideas. It supplies that *unity* whereby thought is possible and the freedom which enables it to select the true ideas from the false. These ideas, which have their seat in the soul, may be divided into three general classes according to the "substance" from which they arise. Those which arise from the accidental sensations of the external world, those which are a product of our own intellect, and finally a third class called eternal truths.¹³ These latter, of which "The Perfect" is an example, are impressed on the mind by the hand of God, and therefore are invariably true. Besides acting as the medium for our ideas, the soul has certain emotions of its own of which wonder, love, hate, desire, joy, and sorrow may be regarded as the most elemental.¹⁴ Morality in its highest sense consists in the pursuit of truth and in the self-satisfaction of that

¹³ Les Principes de la Philosophie, Part I., Props. 48 and 49.

¹⁴ "L'admiration, l'amour, l'haïne, le désir, la joie, et la tristesse, et que toutes les autres sont composées de quelques-unes de ces six, ou bien en sont des espèces."—Les Passions de l'Âme, Part II., Art. 69.

tranquility and mental repose which arises only from the control and regulation of these various emotions.¹⁵

Matter.—Intimately associated with mind is the domain of matter, the *substance of extension*. These two realms are absolutely distinct from one another, finding their only means of communication through the close relationship of the thinking soul and the extended body of man. The "pineal gland," a small protuberance shaped like a pea and lying at the base of the brain, Descartes supposed to be the seat of the soul and the means of communication between the soul and the body. All the lower animals, as well as plants and inorganic nature, belong to the kingdom of matter. Here rules unchangeable mechanical law, mathematical certainty, and invariable causality. God is the Ultimate Will which originally started the motions of the minute particles of which all forms of matter are composed; mechanical law is therefore an expression of the thought of God. In his theory that the motion of the universe is constant Descartes suggested the conservation of energy, an hypothesis of extreme importance in modern physics.

INFLUENCE OF DESCARTES.

In character Descartes does not altogether represent the true philosopher and his originality has been perhaps overestimated. The really important and influential elements of his thought may be traced in earlier and now almost forgotten writings. The existence of the self as the axiom of all possible philosophy had been suggested several years before by the Italian Campanella. The ontological proof for the existence of God forms a very fundamental feature in the theology of Anselm, who employs it as a rational substantiation of faith and revelation. The subsequent importance of Descartes is due, in a great measure, to the lucidity and beauty of his style, the clearness and brevity of his arguments, and the significant fact

¹⁵ Les Passions de l'Âme, Part III., Art. 190.

that he wrote in the language of the people. Nevertheless, modern philosophy rightly regards Descartes as its real founder, for he was the first to define the central problem of subsequent philosophy,—the criterion of existence. He established philosophy on a firm basis by requiring a criticism of method before all else. He is the spiritual source of a movement in modern thought of incalculable importance, and in this respect he is comparable with Locke and Kant.

CARTESIAN SCHOOL.

The philosophy of Descartes stirred to its foundations the intellectual life of Western Europe. Besides arousing objectors on every side and causing numberless polemical attacks, it attracted to its standard many younger men, especially those who had inherited the Baconian distrust of scholastic learning. Prominent among this number were the Port Royalists *Arnauld* and *Nicole*, also the great French churchman *Fénélon*. But by far the most influential of the Cartesians were two young men named *Arnold Geulincx* and *Nicolas Malebranche*. The former was born in the Netherlands in 1625, and studied at Lyons and Leyden, afterwards serving as a teacher. He died in 1669. Malebranche was the son of the secretary of Louis XIII. He was born in 1638, and passed an uneventful and retired life as a member of the Catholic Order of the Oratory. He died in 1715, in consequence, it is said, of an interview and controversy with the English philosopher, George Berkeley. To Geulincx is generally accredited the elaboration of the doctrine of "*Occasionalism*," although it has been suggested that a Parisian lawyer, *Cordemoy*, was the real founder.

Occasionalism.—The difficulties and vagueness which attended the explanation of Descartes regarding the true relation between the three substances, God, mind, and matter, led to various attempts to deduce some consistent hypothesis to solve this central problem of the rationalistic metaphysic. It was the work of the Cartesians to point out that the independency

of both mind and matter, together with the primal reality of God, could be reconciled only by supposing that the Deity represented the real unity and interaction between the independent realms of mind and matter. Thus mind, thought, desire, cannot express itself in bodily or material form without calling to its aid the mediating power of God. My thought only "occasions" the act, it is merely the "*occasional cause*,"¹⁶ while the will of God is the true cause. In the same manner that modern psychology recognizes the laws of Nature, the operation of which we are ourselves unconscious of, as the media for the projection of thought into the external world. None of us are conscious of the mechanism that raises our arm; our thoughts may be said simply to occasion the movement.

Seeing all Things in God.—Besides the theory of occasional causes, Malebranche emphasized a rather mystical aspect of Cartesianism. He carries to its logical conclusion the occasionalism of the previous members of the school by giving mind an existence in and through the nature of God.¹⁷ All our ideas of material things, in fact all our thought itself, exists in the Supreme Intelligence of God. Whatever is considered the object of our thought is really the reflection in our own finite consciousness of the Idea of the Perfect God. Thus in a certain sense all our thoughts are modifications of the one thought of God, all our ideas are seen through His all-embracing mind. We, the finite minds, perceive all sensations, think all thoughts, and will all volitions in God. The ultimate conclusion of Malebranche's doctrine of "*seeing all things in God*" is really the non-existence of the third substance, matter; although he was too much under the influence of Descartes to recognize the logical outcome of his philosophy.

¹⁶ Causes occasionnelles.

¹⁷ ". . . parce qu'en effet l'attention de l'esprit n'est que son retour et sa conversion vers Dieu qui est notre seul maître, et qui seul nous instruit de toute vérité."—Preface to Malebranche,—*De la Recherche de la Vérité*.

Malebranche was a contemporary of Spinoza, Locke, and Leibnitz, men who belong to a distinctly later period of thought. In the history of philosophy he may be looked upon as representing the transition from Descartes to Spinoza. His mysticism is the connection between the pluralism of the former and the pantheism of the latter.

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.

RATIONALISTIC TENDENCY.

In Descartes one feels a new power or force first becoming aware of its strength. The human reason was turned upon itself and required to examine the instruments of its own operation. Instead of erecting its structure on the precarious array of facts brought to us through the half-conscious medium of uncriticised reason and sense-impressions, modern philosophy began to delve into the mysteries of this reason and demand of it an explanation of its own being. Delighted with its newly-discovered power, we are by no means surprised to find that Descartes and his immediate followers should wish to base upon it the entire stress of philosophical authority. If a new reliance on the power of reason, as it expressed itself in the method of mathematical induction, had raised the modern world above the philosophical plane of the past, it might be expected that the early thinkers should neglect the world of sense-experience in order to over-emphasize the power of the mind. As might be expected, therefore, the epistemological trend of the followers of Descartes is distinctly opposed to a simple empirical reliance on "common sense."

We have called the subject of this chapter the "Continental Rationalists," simply wishing to designate by this term those few truly original men who dominated the thought of continental Europe, during the seventeenth century, with their attempts to derive a system of knowledge primarily from a study of the human reason. The distinction between rationalism and empiricism is a convenient, but superficial, means for

classifying the earlier modern thinkers. Hobbes himself employs reason to discover facts of experience, and Descartes bases his system upon the empirical datum "I think," and the reality of the external world on the certainty of sense-impressions. When strictly applied the distinction is valueless, for the history of philosophy has failed to produce a system erected entirely on either reason or sense-impressions. It is extremely useful, however, to distinguish two types of mind; the one that finds the criterion of philosophical truth in abstract construction, the other in concrete experience.

LIFE.

Early Life.—Baruch (or Benedict) de Spinoza, the greatest of the Rationalists, was the foremost mind of the seventeenth century, as we shall find Kant to be of the eighteenth. His parents were Spanish Jews who, together with others of their sect, had fled to Amsterdam to avoid the persecution of the Inquisition. Baruch, who afterwards changed his name to Benedict, was probably born on November 24, 1632. His early education was conducted by a Rabbi, Moses Morteira, who was a trusted member of the Semitic community. From a study of the Talmud, one of the Jewish scriptures composed mainly towards the beginning of the Christian Era, and of the Semitic philosophers of the late Middle Ages, he acquired a mystical and fatalistic tendency. When still a young man he became interested in physical science; and later, in order to perfect himself in Latin, he attended the school of a physician, Van Ende,—a scholar of ill repute on account of his heretical opinions. From Ludwig Meyer he learned the then prevailing physical theories, and was introduced by him to the philosophy of Descartes. When the attention of Spinoza was thus turned into channels distinctly different from those approved by his Jewish brethren, he found himself confronted with two alternatives: he could either retract his opinions, reform his conduct, and again devote himself exclusively to the Jewish scrip-

tures, or continue as he was, with the prospect of alienation from his people. Spinoza chose the latter. On August 6, 1656, he was excommunicated from the Jewish Synagogue and, so far as lay in the power of man, expelled from the race of his fathers.

The Outcast.—Thus thrown upon the world without friends or sympathy, a lesser man than Spinoza might have regretted his choice and used every possible means to soften the feelings of his people towards him, or else have become embittered towards the world and enwrapped himself in a shroud of narrowed cynicism. Spinoza, however, was possessed of too little sentiment or emotional feeling to be moved by the passion of remorse or vindictiveness. True genius does not arise from a poetic fancy, nor from any ephemeral sympathy with the emotions of man, but rather from the extra-human reason. Thus the greatest men have been those least swayed by the common emotions of weaker humanity. The world of to-day recognizes a simple greatness in the lone Jew of Amsterdam, it can see a poetry in the colorlessness of his literary style, and even a religion has been discovered in the depths of his personality.¹⁸ All this because, in a distinctly humanistic period, Spinoza showed a decided tendency towards the nature view of man. In his mind the mechanical side of nature, the stern requital of natural law, combined with the exactness of mathematical methods, embodied the ideals of human life.

After his separation from the Jewish community Spinoza resided a short time in Amsterdam. But he soon found it necessary to remove from the city, owing to continued persecution by the Protestant authorities. He settled in a neighboring town, where he obtained a scanty living by grinding optical lenses, a trade he learned while a rabbinical student. Here there commenced to gather about him a small company of friends, to whom he would communicate his philosophical

¹⁸ Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*.

opinions as they gradually assumed form in his own mind. At this time Spinoza was distinctly influenced by the Italian nature-philosophy, probably by the writings of Bruno; he also felt the strength of the Cartesian method, although one of his earliest writings, an attempt to formulate the philosophy of Descartes after the manner of geometrical demonstration, was regarded with disfavor by the truer disciples of Descartes.

Later Life.—After a residence of some years in the neighborhood of Amsterdam, he removed to Rhynsburg, near Leyden, and afterwards to The Hague. During all this time his life was of the simplest character. A few intimate friends were all who may be said to have known him. The prominent men of the time were acquainted with him through correspondence, but few had ever met him. In 1670 Spinoza published the "*Theological Political Treatise*,"¹⁹ in which he advocated complete freedom of thought in all matters, and sought to derive religion from the individual consciousness rather than from formal dogma. Spinoza had been working for some years on his great work the "*Ethics*," which, however, was not published until after his death. The chair of philosophy at Heidelberg was offered to him, but his fondness for unrestrained thought and his distaste for notoriety of any kind forbid its acceptance, although perfect freedom of expression was assured to him. Spinoza died in 1677, of consumption, a disease which he is said to have inherited.

THE "ETHICS."

Parts.—Chief among the writings of Spinoza is his "*Ethics*." This work, the fruit of many years of thought and labor, ranks with Aristotle's "*Metaphysics*," Kant's "*Pure Reason*," and Hegel's "*Logic*" as the truly great classics of philosophical literature. The "*Ethics*" is divided into five parts, of which the first two are of extreme importance. Part

¹⁹ Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.

I. is concerned with "*God*,"²⁰ in which Spinoza deduces the most general propositions regarding the deeper problems of a monistic metaphysics. In Part II. he treats of the "*nature and origin of mind*,"²¹ considering this problem from a psychological stand-point. The first part, "Concerning God," is strictly rationalistic. The definitions, axioms, and demonstrations are as far as possible removed from experience. Whereas in the second part the demonstrations are based on axioms which are themselves psychological facts of experience. The third part treats of the "*passions*,"²² the fourth of "*human bondage*,"²³ and the fifth of an "*intellectual freedom*."²⁴

Method.—Spinoza describes his book "as after the plan of geometrical demonstration," a phrase which very well illustrates the character and arrangement of the work. A set of definitions and axioms, which are truly the metaphysical elements of his whole system, precede the text proper. This latter is in the form of Euclidian theorems, to each of which is suffixed a deductive proof, depending on the previous axioms or theorems. The details of the work show a marvellous ingenuity and a keenness of insight, which in its unique combination of synthesis and analysis is even superior to the strict formality of its mathematical ideal. Spinoza's mind was of a type which is seldom met with. A great mathematician he never was; but, like Hobbes, he possessed the rare ability of applying the spirit of the mathematical method to the variety, the complexity, and the depth of human life.

METAPHYSICS.

It is somewhat confusing to find a work of rare metaphysical importance bearing the title of "*Ethics*." Spinoza, as well as

²⁰ De Deo.

²¹ De Natura et Origine Mentis.

²² De Origine et Natura Affectuum.

²³ De Servitute Humana, sue de Affectuum Viribus.

²⁴ De Potentia Intellectus, seu de Libertate Humana.

Hume and Kant in later thought, regarded the problems of the moral life as at once the most familiar and at the same time the most difficult of treatment. He therefore finds it necessary to base ethics on the sure foundation of metaphysics. He was the first thinker of the modern world to recognize the logical priority of metaphysics at the same time that he felt the importance and the depth of the problems of human life and character. With Spinoza nature and man are in exact equipoise: each exist for the other. His philosophy unites the three prominent tendencies of the Renaissance referred to in a previous chapter: the pantheism of the South, the mysticism of the North, and the logical clearness in method of the early English mind.

Substance.—The initial premise of Spinoza's metaphysics is the doctrine of *Substance*. In this he advances from the pluralism of Descartes to an absolute monism. Substance was to Spinoza the ultimate unity of mind and matter, thought and extension. Although this is the true meaning of substance, as later developed, he preferred to define it first in terms of "self-being,"²⁵ believing this to be the first premise of any philosophy. In the third definition, prefixed to the first book of the "*Ethics*," we have the following formal description of Substance: "*By substance I understand that which exists in itself, and is conceived through itself alone; that is, the conception of which does not require for its formation the conception of anything else.*"²⁶ The object of this rather formal definition was to convey to the reader what in Spinoza's mind was the most elementary concept attainable by human thought. His whole method was distinctly deductive, and in order to be consistent with an absolute monism it was necessary to define

²⁵ "Causa-sui."—*Ethics*, Part I., Def. 1.

²⁶ "Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur: hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat."—*Ethics*, Part I., Def. 3.

at the outset some concept the breadth of which could include every aspect of reality.²⁷ The three characteristics of Substance are existence, unity, and infinity.²⁸ The self-being of substance simply implies its necessary fundamentality, its logical priority before all else. Should one conceive of some other concept more fundamental than Substance, Spinoza could with thorough consistency call this other concept the true substance. In this sense, of having nothing beyond it, substance is its own cause, although such a conception must not be confused with the self-creation of the Scholastics. Moreover, its very breadth unites within itself such contradictory ideas as those of liberty and necessity; for all its activities are free with respect to each other. In brief, Substance is controlled only by the self-conceived laws of its own being.

From an earlier treatise it is evident that Spinoza was at first doubtful regarding an adequate foundation for his monism. At one time he seems to have approached very near to a pure naturalism, in which mere nature occupied the primal position. Again in a pantheistic mood he regards God as the ultimate source of the mind and matter, leaning more nearly towards Cartesianism. His complete thought, however, identifies both concepts with Substance. Regarded from a naturalistic-scientific stand-point, one may refer to Substance as Nature. When so interpreted we emphasize the mechanical and mathematical side of Spinoza's philosophy and are inclined perhaps to connect him with the school of Hobbes. Again this same self-being may be interpreted in terms of religion. The Deus or God of Spinoza thus becomes identified with the "One" of the Mystics and the Jehovah of the Jews. And still from a third aspect we may regard Spinoza's monism from a purely metaphysical stand-point,—for we shall later see that it is

²⁷ "Quicquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest."—Ethics, Part I., Prop. 15.

²⁸ See letter of April 20, 1663, Spinoza to L. Meyer.

strongly suggestive of the "Absolute" in German Idealism. However interpreted as Nature, God, or Substance, Spinoza has no reference to a transcendent Being of any kind. His Substance is an *Immanent Reality* which exists in and through Nature; in the same sense that the God of pantheism or the "natural law" of physics are expressions of some esoteric force operating in and through the Universe.

Defined in such elemental terms one would certainly consider that a direct proof for the existence of God or Substance would be either superfluous or impossible. Yet Spinoza makes the attempt in no less than five different forms. All are stages and modifications of the "Ontological Proof," as given by Anselm and Descartes, only instead of deducing existence from the nature of Goodness or Perfection, Spinoza employs the concept of "Self-being." Yet recognizing the abstractness of his concept of God,—Nature,—Spinoza distinguished between Substance, immanent in and through nature, called by him "*natura naturans*," and nature in the sense of the sum of all-existent objects, or "*natura naturata*." The former is the true Real, while the latter is only the sum of the finite phases of the world. A similar distinction was pointed out in connection with Bruno, only the Italian conceived God to represent the mere identity of both generating and generated nature.

Attributes.—The barrenness of Spinoza's substance, its complete abstraction and lack of anything in the least appreciable, is at first repugnant to ordinary thought. He has made his foundation so broad that it really amounts to nothing. Spinoza recognizes this difficulty, and next advances to the doctrine of *attributes* where the boundlessness of Substance begins to take form. These attributes are the terms applied to the manner in which the existence of substance is made known to man. Infinite Substance, as the truly unconditioned, possesses an infinite number of characters, each of which may be regarded as an attribute. Of this infinite number of attributes, however, two only are known to finite man. These are mind and matter,

thought and extension, subject and object, the self and the not-self. Each of these expresses to its full extent a single aspect of the infinite character of Substance, without in any wise depreciating the value of the other attributes. Each of them is therefore relatively independent of the other, and coincidentally, because of its reference to the infinite Substance, is itself "infinite after its kind." Although restricted and partial, like the view of a mountain from a single point, either one of the attributes conveys a distinct and clear conception of Substance. An object may be white and at the same time smooth without in the least containing contradictions. In the same manner an infinite object may be supposed to contain an infinity of infinite attributes, each one of which adequately, but never perfectly, defines the object itself.

Mind and matter are the two attributes of Substance. But a question will naturally arise as to the manner in which they are related, especially to our own finite thought. Are we to interpret the attributes as really existent in Substance, just as roundness is existent in a circle? or else are we to regard them as simply the ways in which the concept of Substance comes to human consciousness? The former or *realistic* interpretation regards the attributes as truly expressing the inner nature of Substance; while the latter or *idealistic* view regards them simply as media, so to speak, through which man knows of God. This is a distinction which carries us back to the realism and conceptualism of the Middle Ages and forward to Leibnitz and Kant.

Among the first definitions of the "*Ethics*" Spinoza describes attributes as "that which the intellect perceives of Substance as constituting its essence."²⁹ And the whole dispute is narrowed down to the epistemological question does "the intellect perceive" an aspect of the true nature of Substance? One

²⁹ "Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tamquam ejusdem essentiam constituens."—*Ethics*, Part I., Def. 4.

cannot help believing that the recent historians of philosophy have made more of this ambiguity than Spinoza's text would warrant. That those idealistically inclined, Hegel, Erdmann, and others, have been prone to interpret the "*Ethics*" in terms of their own philosophy. Spinoza constantly refers to the necessary agreement between the "idea" and the "thing," so that what "the intellect perceives" cannot be separated from what "truly constitutes."

Modes.—In the thought of Spinoza the idea of Substance seems farthest removed from the common experience of man. The two attributes of Substance, mind and matter, seem a little nearer our ordinary comprehension; but even they lack that apparent familiarity which we associate with the ideas of practical life. The term mind or thought is at least abstract; it is too general to convey much significance to one who wishes a really practical explanation of the world. Likewise matter, simple as the term may appear, is capable of endless modifications and interpretations. We can therefore well understand the feeling, that although the attributes are less indefinite than the primal Substance, they also are too abstract in their nature to form the materials of our ordinary world of ideas and sense-impressions. To conform to this justifiable demand Spinoza saw the necessity for carrying his deduction one step farther and recognized a term for the various modifications and separate modifications and separate manifestations of mind and matter. In just this significance Spinoza uses the word *mode*, another term borrowed from the vocabulary of the Schoolmen. As the attributes were the distinct and differentiated aspects of Substance, so the modes are the still more individual and less abstract manifestations of the attributes.

The system of Spinoza represents in the history of modern philosophy the classic example of psycho-physical parallelism. The distinctiveness of this position becomes very clear in connection with the theory of modes. Every separate object constitutes a mode of the attribute of extension, every idea a mode

of thought. But, although ideas may be formed of objects, and objects are the necessary points of reference for ideas, the two systems of modes are absolutely distinct from one another; each may be conceived to possess its own peculiar characters and laws. Yet, notwithstanding this complete independency in regard to any causal interferences, there is a perfect parallelism between the elements of the two series, term for term, mode for mode. This is explained by a very interesting proposition in the second part of the "*Ethics*," dealing with the nature and origin of mind. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things."³⁰ This proposition is also important in connection with the controversy concerning the realistic or idealistic interpretation of attribute. It is remarkable evidence in support of the former hypothesis, for it seems to show that Spinoza recognized no difference in absolute nature between "what the intellect perceives" and what truly is.

In this doctrine of modes is developed more forcibly the abstract and fundamental character of Spinoza's lonely Substance. In its majestic "oneness" Substance is determined only by itself. It is self-caused, because the source of its being lies within its own nature. In direct contrast to the self-determined existence of Substance stand the various modes, every one of which depends on a cause beyond itself. Each finite mode arises out of and must be conceived in connection with other similar finite modes, the whole causal series of which presupposes and is implicitly contained in the infinite mode of the intellect. And likewise this latter demands the existence of the attribute of thought, infinite after its own kind, which in its turn finds its reality only in Substance itself. Each thought, each volition, and each object is intelligible only if conceived in the Absolute.

³⁰ "Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum."
—*Ethics*, Part II., Prop. 7.

EPISTEMOLOGY.

One must consider that the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology has been recognized for only a short time, and yet notwithstanding this fact that the difference was unknown at the time of Spinoza, the definiteness of his geometrical method enabled him to observe more clearly than any other writer of that period the separation between the theory of reality and the theory of knowledge. The sharp line of demarcation between objects and ideas, modes of extension and modes of thought, required some definite theory of the relation between the two series other than the proposition that the order and connection of the two was parallel. The human mind consists of nothing but ideas,—modes of thought; it is therefore the general expression for the power of ideation. The material object which corresponds to the human mind, for every form of idea must refer to an object, is the human body; it is a very complex mode of extension, “consisting of many composite parts.”³¹ Mind and body are aspects of one and the same reality, the antithesis of which arises from a difference of stand-point.

In his treatment of knowledge itself Spinoza reminds one of the fourfold classification of the sources and kinds of knowledge earlier found in the thought of Nicolas of Cusa. With Spinoza the highest type of knowledge is concerned with the *essence* (essentia),—or fundamental nature of the object. In an earlier fragment on the “Improvement of the Intellect”³² Spinoza seems to believe this purest kind of knowledge is attainable without a direct reference to the being of God, provided only we completely understand the fundamental nature of the thing,—as, for example, “By this kind of knowledge we know two and three to be five, and if there are given two lines parallel

³¹ Ethics, Part II., Postulate 1.

³² Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.

to a third, they are parallel to each other." In the "*Ethics*," however, it is expressly defined as a deduction from "an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things."³⁸ This highest kind of knowledge, perfect as it is and almost synonymous with the intuition of the Mystics, can be employed only in regard to a very few objects. The great mass of the true ideas belong to a type of knowledge obtained from observing the *interrelation* of things, by advancing from a knowledge of one thing to the knowledge of another,—from a true knowledge of light one may deduce the true conclusion that the sun is larger than it appears. These two former kinds of knowledge furnish the ground by which we may distinguish the true from the false, but they by no means exhaust the possible sources of knowledge. The *imagination* or unfounded opinion supplies us with a considerable portion of the elements of our intellectual activity. It falsely connects two ideas which should be separated, or it allows us to consider as true the confused memory images or fanciful word symbols. Even below the confused images there is the lowest kind of knowledge derived from vague experience. The senses present us a disorderly array of mutilated expressions which in nowise resemble the true nature of the objects to which they correspond. To this lowest type of knowledge belong the ideas which the mind forms of the emotions of its body; they are always felt but never intellectually perceived. Even the idea of the body itself is known only through the obscurity of vague knowledge, since the presence of its sensations is only indirectly given through confused emotions.

ETHICS.

Thus far the philosophy of Spinoza appears to be little else than a monistic metaphysics, an absolute pantheism in which there is no place for man. Although the history of modern

³⁸ Ethics, Part II., Prop. 40, Scholium 2.

philosophy considers Spinoza's metaphysical basis as the important part of his system, yet in his own mind he regarded metaphysics as merely the ground for the interpretation of the relation between man and nature. In the accomplishment of this he has recourse to both a mechanical psychology and a Stoical estimation of human character. The former led him to reduce the more complex feelings and emotions to the simplest elements of animal passion; the latter led him to find the dignity of life, the real value of these emotions, in a lofty contemplation of nature. It was a strange yet impressive harmony of mechanism and reason, of empirical psychology and rational naturalism.

Psychology of Ethics.—Owing to their subsistence in the attribute of mind the infinite modes of will and intellect are to be regarded from the metaphysical stand-point as one and the same. But when looked upon from the stand-point of human activity, we must recognize the primacy of the volitional impulse. The desire for the *preservation of life*, Spinoza, like Hobbes and the later materialists, places as the real basis of the psychology of the feelings. "Happiness consists in a man's ability to preserve his own being."³⁴ Upon this fundamental presupposition he seeks to establish the psychological side of his theory of ethics. When this desire for its own being, the universal property of all existence, is expressed through the conscious reason of man, we have will activity. This gives rise to the emotions of pleasure, when the activity of the will causes a transition from a less to a more perfect state of organic life; to those of pain, when the movement is in the opposite direction. The criterion for the determination of the pleasurable or painful rests upon certain more or less transient subjective ideals, created by each person from the individuality of his own character. Most prominent among the

³⁴ " . . . et felicitatem in eo consistere, quod homo suum esse conservare protest."—Ethics, Part IV., Prof. 18, Scholium.

forces which Spinoza believes to contribute towards the preservation of individual man are the existence and the welfare of one's fellow-men. In this connection the conception of Spinoza's original motive of self-preservation becomes transformed into a higher recognition of the brotherhood of all mankind, giving rise to the virtue of generosity. "Minds are not conquered by force but by love and generosity."³⁵

Naturalism of Ethics.—Characteristic of the breadth of Spinoza's philosophy is another element which enters into his ethical thought. Besides the empirical psychology of feeling, which starts with the animal emotion of egoism and developed through reason into the virtue of altruism, Spinoza emphasizes the subsistence of all feelings, emotions, and virtues *in Nature*. It is a virtue to see one's own happiness in the happiness of mankind, it is noble to strive for the higher ideals of others; but it is the highest virtue to recognize the real unity that lies at the base of human frailty and natural law. Just as true virtue recognizes the community of the whole human species, it is virtue of a higher kind to connect mankind with God. This noblest virtue is the intellectual contemplation of Nature,—"*amor Dei intellectualis*,"³⁶—springing from the highest kind of knowledge and eternal in its essence, and which Spinoza regards more as a passive attitude of mind than as a specific formulation of the moral law. To one who has attained this perfect intellectual peace, all the conflict of the external world, all the sin and evil of man, becomes the manifestation of the eternal laws of God. Human weakness is prone to recognize such emotions as sympathy, pity, remorse, or hope, but they have no place in the intellectual contemplation of nature. There is no evil or good, no love or hatred, beauty or ugliness, no virtue or sin in the world as it is in

³⁵ "Animi tamen non armis, sed Amore et Generositate vincuntur."
—Ethics, Part IV., Appendix 11.

³⁶ Ethics, Part V., Prop. 33.

itself, in God; it is the finitude and partiality of the human mind which creates these emotions from its own contorted consciousness. Owing to a false assumption of power, a pride in his finite judgment, man is wont to interpret nature after his own liking. He attributes purposes or final causes to impersonal nature; he even explains the will of nature by elaborate theories of his own. From a similar conceit man believes himself capable of making moral and æsthetical judgments, forgetting that goodness or beauty, as well as purpose, have no real existence except in the imagination.

The God or Nature of Spinoza, although first appearing in a metaphysical setting, now becomes the direct object of the ethical consciousness. But at the same time that he emphasizes the ideal of a colorless Nature as the object of the highest virtue, he transforms virtue from the field of the will to that of the intellect. Spinoza may be easily associated in this regard with the Greek, Socrates, whose ethical aphorism "Virtue is knowledge" is equally applicable to the seventeenth-century Jew. Morality, then, according to its highest ideal is a product of the intellect rather than of the emotions. "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself."³⁷ We may will to behold the perfection of a purely natural God, devoid of all anthropopathic attributes, but the appreciation of such a God is an act of reason alone. It is an under-emphasis on the meaning of the "intellectual contemplation of God" that leads many to regard Spinoza's monism as a religion.

NATURALISTIC FATALISM.

Notwithstanding his high estimation of human character, Spinoza did not fail to draw the conclusion which his intellectual naturalism demanded. If nature constitutes the essence of reality, then the irrevocable laws of nature must be applic-

³⁷ "Beatitudo non est virtutis præmium, sed ipsa virtus."—Ethics, Part V., Prop. 42.

able to all the finite modes of nature. In other words, Spinoza's monism in its treatment of man afforded no place for freedom. Just as the stone obeys the eternal laws of the attribute of matter, so also the human will obeys the equally irresistible laws of mind. It is true the finite intellect of man believes itself to be free, because memory and limited knowledge are unable to determine the direct causes of action. Should we know, however, every law of nature, then the forces which control human activity would become known and recognized as expressions of the divine thought of Substance. However stern and relentless this naturalistic fatalism may appear, its apparent horror was altogether alleviated in Spinoza's own mind by the lofty ideal of "the intellectual contemplation of God." It was a favorite theme among the Schoolmen to reconcile human responsibility and Divine omnipotence by suggesting that man freely chose the eternal will of God. In a similar manner Spinoza feels himself elevating the dignity of man by emphasizing his subsistence in nature. The fatalism of Spinoza lies at the very root of his system. It springs from his desire to uplift nature to a place far higher than the objective existence attributed to it by physical science. When nature is made to include man, then natural law becomes human law and the activities of Infinite Nature are reflected in every act of finite man. By his reality in nature, man becomes a significant part in a vast process and the individual expression of infinite law and mind. Spinoza exalts nature above man, but in so doing he emphasizes their ultimate harmony.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE.

In the philosophical system of Spinoza the deductive rationalism of the time reaches its fullest development. It is the most perfect monism which has been yet established on a realistic basis. Substance is something real, appreciable, definite; it is not a principle or an idea, like the "Pre-established Harmony" of Leibnitz or the "Absolute" of subsequent meta-

physics, but rather the objectively real source of all being. In his initial conception of Substance Spinoza removes himself altogether from experience. He realizes this error and endeavors to re-establish himself in the world of fact by his theory of modes. But we seek in vain for an adequate explanation of the transition. The early Schoolmen were wont to discuss the problem of "Why did God become man?" ("Cur Deus homo?") and we too inquire of Spinoza in what manner does Substance become modes. There is seemingly a need for some kind of spiritualistic unity which shall afford a basis for the existence of plurality in unity. An attempt to supply such a ground is illustrated by the "Pre-established Harmony" of the third important exponent of rationalism, Leibnitz.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ.

Among the persons who frequently wrote to Spinoza, and to whom the latter confided his "*Ethics*," was a young man who was introduced to him as "being free from the usual theological prejudices." This young man was Leibnitz, the successor of Spinoza in his rationalism, but his opposite in type of mind and in philosophical stand-point.

LIFE.

Leibnitz was born in 1646, the son of a Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. His father died when he was very young, but left a large library to which the lad had free access. From his early reading Leibnitz acquired a considerable knowledge of physics, scholastic philosophy, and various foreign languages. At fifteen years of age he entered the University of his native city, but took his final degree of Doctor of Laws at the smaller University of Altdorf. From that time to an advanced age the attention and interest of Leibnitz was distributed throughout every possible field of scientific, philosophical, and legal inquiry, in all of which he met with distinguished success. He was first associated with

the Elector of Mayence in the systematization of the laws, and later went on an embassy to Paris, with the object of diverting the attention of Louis XIV. towards the conquest of Egypt.

At the French capital he became associated with some of the most remarkable men of the time, especially those interested in mathematical physics. Through the suggestion of a friend he made an investigation into the Cartesian doctrine of God, and began to feel the need of a reconciliation between the mechanical universe of modern science and the demand for a purposive Author of Nature.

On his return journey from Paris he paid several visits to Spinoza, then residing at The Hague. Undoubtedly the later philosophy of Leibnitz was somewhat influenced by his personal intercourse with Spinoza, especially as the latter permitted him to read the "*Ethics*;" but too much stress must not be laid upon indirect testimony alone. Although their general interests were parallel and the rationalistic tendency was as prominent in one as in the other, yet it is doubtful if the difference in their temperaments and stand-points admitted of any appreciation of each other's philosophy. Soon after his return from Paris, the Duke of Hanover appointed Leibnitz to the office of Councillor and Librarian, a post which he held for many years. His death occurred in 1716.

In public life and in letters Leibnitz achieved high distinction on account of his breadth of learning and the original trend of his mind. He was the founder of the Berlin Academy of Science, and was elected its first President, an office he held for life. He was honored by several of the German States, by Austria and Russia. In 1676 he announced the discovery of the Differential Calculus, which has revolutionized pure and applied mathematics. The honor of this achievement, however, is justly divided with the Englishman Newton, who anticipated the work of Leibnitz by his Calculus of Fluxions.

During his early life Leibnitz wrote various treatises on jurisprudence, and also a small work on the logical method of

Raymond Lully. During his latter life, even after his philosophy was definitely crystallized in his own mind, Leibnitz found himself too much occupied with other things to give definite form to his thought. His literary remains form at best a patchwork, which, had he possessed a greater power of concentration, he might have welded into a philosophical system of universal power and scope. The three works on which his chief speculative merit rests are, the "*New Essay upon the Human Understanding*," "*The Theodicy*," and the "*Monadology*." The "*New Essay*" was prepared as a refutation to Locke, although it was not published until fifty years after the death of Leibnitz. The "*Theodicy*" was directed against a mild scepticism then prevalent in France and Germany. The work endeavored to harmonize—for Leibnitz was always harmonizing—the reason of God and the existence of evil. It advocated that freedom and the possibility of evil contribute to the absolute perfection of God. The "*Monadology*" was a brief analysis of his doctrine of the force atom and a philosophical justification of *realistic pluralism*. This latter is the doctrine of metaphysics which advances the belief that at the very foundation of the universe there are certain simple elements, absolutely real in themselves. The atomism of the Greeks is an excellent example of such a view, as well as the older interpretations of the atomic theory in physics.

METAPHYSICS.

Spinoza and Leibnitz.—In a foregoing paragraph we have stated that Spinoza was the opposite in almost every respect to Leibnitz. In character the former was simple and unpretentious, reserved in speech, and retired in manner of life,—little influenced by what the world calls honor and ambition. His mind was more constructive than original, more thorough and systematic than quick and powerful. In all these respects Leibnitz was the opposite. His life was full of variety, his character frank, earnest, and easily swayed by passing ambi-

tions. His mind was far more original in type than that of Spinoza, but decidedly lacked the concentrativeness of the latter. One is the personification of passivity, the other of activity. This contrast penetrates to the very roots of their respective philosophical positions. The only similarity lies in the general trend of their rationalistic epistemology, for each finds in reason the ultimate criterion of truth. With Spinoza Substance, Nature, or God was completely defined by "self-existence." This existence was purely a passive state completely self-determined in the sense that its reality was independent of all descriptive definition. Leibnitz defined the primal Substance as activity instead of passivity. Substance, to him, was ultimately real, not because it was self-determined, but because it strove to be something other than what it was. Instead of starting with a world of absolute rest, a Universal of all universals, Leibnitz chose rather to construct his universe from elements whose only positive attributes are restlessness and distinctive individuality. With this demand in mind he saw only force and activity, transition and evolution, where Spinoza had seen the opposite. The spirit of the philosophy of Leibnitz carries us back to Heraclitus, Democritus, and Lucretius; and forward to the vortex rings, the force functions, and energetics of modern physics.

Definition of Monad.—The active Substance of Leibnitz did not allow of an undifferentiated monism. Activity presupposes a duality of some kind, and in its ultimate analysis seems to evade all attempts at reduction to a single element. The organic unity of Spinoza's system demanded an undifferentiated Unit as the logical genesis of all forms of mind and matter. Leibnitz, on the contrary, is required by his fundamental definition of Substance to develop his world from original atoms of activity or force. Everything is actuated into being by the incessant reality of force; action and reaction was the first law of the Universe. These atomic forces, or monads, as they were technically called, correspond in their

variety to the modes of Spinoza. Only the two concepts differ in that the monads may be considered self-sufficient and elementary, while the modes derive their reality from the deeper nature of Substance. Briefly defined, the monads are the simple, indestructible, indivisible parts of the universe. "These monads are the true atoms of nature,—that is, the elements of things."³⁸ The objects of sense are really compounds or aggregations of these simple elements. Just as large quantities of the invisible impurities of the atmosphere are sufficient to become appreciable by obscuring the landscape, so the invisible monads are capable of congealing into tangible objects of sense. And further, the monads are themselves unaffected by the accidents of time and space,—they arise through a creative act of God, and can be annihilated only by His will.

Description of Monads.—Beyond the mere definition, however, a difficulty presents itself. A monad cannot be conceived as a physical atom, for this would be a purely material object capable of still further division; and if capable of division, it could not be regarded as a final element. Nor, on the other hand, could one define the monad in mathematical terms, for by definition the geometrical point is purely conceptual; no summation of mathematical points could give us the idea of space. The solution of this dilemma is characteristic of the harmonizing spirit of Leibnitz. We are told that the monad is not exactly a physical unit, nor is it a mathematical point; yet it partakes of the nature of each. The pure force monad has the space-filling quality of the physical atom, but at the same time the indivisibility of the mathematical point! From this premise it may be regarded as the constituent of the objects of sense at the same time that one conceives it to be the indivisible atom of the universe.

³⁸ " . . . ces Monades sont les véritables atomes de la nature et en un mot les éléments des choses."—Monadology, Section 3.

The World of Monads.—Beyond this bare presupposition of an indeterminate number of realistic monads, Leibnitz is confronted with two distinct problems. It will be remembered that one of the most significant difficulties in Spinoza's monism was concerned with the relation between Substance and its finite modes. We were able to understand much that was said in this important connection, yet found difficulty with the question: Why does Substance show itself in just these forms? We naturally inquire if there is not some deep-seated law which permeates the full extent of nature, that explains its variety and finite forms by reference to some conceptual principle of unity. To both of these problems, the *variety* of the world and the *law* of its unity, Leibnitz offers the hypothesis of the monads with their ideal harmony.

THE SERIAL ORDER OF THE MONADS.—For convenience of exposition let us first inquire into the former problem, the source of the world's variety. Leibnitz recognized activity in a certain direction to be the essential of force. Universal striving, cause and effect, action and reaction, reign throughout the world of the monads. In all this incessant striving of monads new conditions arise which are, from the nature of their struggles, more or less perfect than the preceding states. There will thus develop a long series of monads, the position of each being determined by the degree of its relative perfection. At the summit of this series stands "the Monad of monads" which occupies the position of God in the system of Leibnitz. Below God are all grades of monads extending from the purely material or formless up to the highly spiritual, such as the human soul. Every sensible object, as a chair or a stone, is a vast coalition of monads, each of which has its unique place in the scale of relative perfection. The individuality of each object, however, is defined by its *formal* or *soul-monad*. Thus, for example, a chair consists of wood-, iron-, paint-, and rattan-monads, but dominating all and giving form and character to the assembly is the special chair-monad. In a similar manner

each individual man is composed of the immortal soul-monad, acting in conjunction with a vast organized assembly of corporeal monads, together forming the body.

THE "PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY" OF THE MONADS.—In his solution to the problem of the general law which controls the activity of the monads, Leibnitz approaches more nearly to the idealism of the following century. Starting with the realistic assumption of a pluralism, he cannot have recourse to a substantive unity, like that employed by Spinoza. On the contrary, every monad is absolutely distinct in itself and possesses "no windows to look out of." Any principle of unity, therefore, that controls the monads must be distinctly spiritual, idealistic, teleological, or purposive, whichever of these terms is best suited to express the opposite of objectivity. "The natural changes in the monads arise from an internal principle, since an external one could not influence their interior."³⁹ And again, "The influence of the monads upon one another is purely ideal."⁴⁰ The importance of these passages cannot be estimated too highly, for they indicate the most pronounced advance of Leibnitz over his predecessors, that of *conceptual unity of Nature*. This element of his philosophy places it in sharp contrast to the naturalism of Spinoza and Hobbes, while it unites him closely with Kant and his idealistic followers. To supply this demand for an ideal unity of nature, Leibnitz introduced us to his doctrine of "*Pre-established Harmony*." Each monad follows its own individual course of activity, absolutely oblivious of what occurs about it; but from the perfect harmony of the whole system the impulse of the one will be the law of the whole. Each monad has its own individual activity, simple and imperishable, but yet it reflects in its own

³⁹ "... que les changements naturels des Monades viennent d'un principe interne; puisqu'une cause externe ne saurait influer dans son intérieur."—Monadology, Section 11.

⁴⁰ "Mais dans les substances simples, ce n'est qu'une influence idéale d'une monade sur l'autre."—Monadology, Section 51.

peculiar way the whole organic structure of the Universe. This is the conceptual principle upon which Leibnitz believes himself able to assert the doctrine of "Pre-established Harmony" as the universal law of the monads. Every monad acts according to its own life, but on account of its position in the organic structure of the Universe, it acts in harmony with every other monad.

Human Freedom.—This theory of "Pre-established Harmony" places the freedom of man in an altogether original light. As the soul is an imperishable and unconditioned monad, it obeys no other law than its own. But nevertheless it belongs to the organic structure of nature, and in that sense obeys the ultimate law of the Universe. The soul is free to do as it would, but yet it freely chooses what is required by the law of "Pre-established Harmony." The soul freely chooses law. This skilful evasion of the Scylla and Charybdis of the free-will controversy is characteristic of the harmonizing spirit of Leibnitz. It is in spirit similar to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century: the human will necessarily chooses the good, the will of God.

The Importance of God.—With Leibnitz this principle of "Pre-established Harmony" also supplies "a new proof for the existence of God, one of unusual clearness."⁴¹ The term "Pre-established," when applied to the world, implies the Author of the universe, for universal harmony could arise only from a creative and rational Being. "The harmony of so many substances influenced by each other could only come from a general cause, upon which they all depend, and that must possess infinite power and wisdom in order to establish this universal harmony."⁴² God created the monads, and Himself impressed upon them their deepest law of "Pre-established Harmony." Leibnitz further unites the two concepts of God

⁴¹ New System of Nature, Section 16.

⁴² Principles of Life, 1705.

and "Pre-established Harmony" by regarding the latter as the constant expression of God's will. For God, the "Monad of monads," occupies the highest possible position in the scale of being; He is the *Perfect Ideal*. And it is the constant and incessant desire of all the less perfect monads to rise to the Supreme Perfection of God. Although in harmony with one another, every monad struggles forward to some higher state. Evolution towards God is the single impulse which permeates the entire fabric of nature.

Optimism.—Owing to the fact that there can be but one God, every other monad necessarily possesses a certain amount of imperfection or evil, dependent on the relative distance from the "Monad of monads." In a similar manner Leibnitz explains away all forms of evil, as the consequence of the wisdom of God, suggesting at the same time that we live in the best of possible worlds. It is true that we observe evil in the world, but it is only here through the consent of God, for by evil is He best able to work out the salvation of mankind. Evil often accompanies and makes possible a greater good, as "a general in the army will prefer great victory and slight wounds to neither." ⁴³

SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM.

In its broader meaning and with special reference to the original philosophy of Leibnitz, the principle of "Pre-established Harmony" was supposed to control the relations among all the monads. The special relation between mind and matter, the old problem of Cartesianism, was thus but a single example of the operation of a universal principle. The importance of this single instance of the broader law has led the historians of philosophy—following the lead of Wolff, a disciple of Leibnitz—to regard the operation of the principle of "Pre-established Harmony" to be of importance only to the single case of body and soul. This popular misinterpretation brings into the fore-

⁴³ Abridgment Theodicy, 1.

ground the Cartesian problem of the relation of mind and matter, but at the same time it modifies the value of the Leibnitzian Realism. The ingenuity, originality, and power of reconciling the irreconcilable cannot but impress the reader of Leibnitz. His scattered thoughts are all brilliant, keen, and searching, but disconnected and often contradictory. In originality he has been compared with Aristotle and in analytical keenness to Kant, but his utter lack of systematic expression gives to him a position in philosophy far inferior to either.

THE RATIONALISTS AS A WHOLE.

THEIR PROBLEM.

Before we turn our attention towards the British philosophers, who look upon reality from an altogether different standpoint, it may be well to take a brief retrospect of the whole rationalistic school. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the learned world was concerned with the reconciliation of a new science to the traditions of philosophy and religion. The former pointed to a mechanical universe in which both God and man were subordinated to natural law, while the more conservative thought still held to the God of Moses and the Christian estimation of man. Various were the attempts to deal with this reconciliation and various were the results obtained. Should one over-emphasize natural law he would evolve the Universe of the materialist with its countless human machines; and if, on the contrary, natural law were forgotten, religion would become transformed into a mysticism or even a fanaticism.

Various Solutions of the Problem.—With the Cartesian metaphysics a new instrument was discovered which could be very readily employed in effecting a proper balance between law and God. This instrument was none other than a rigid examination of the meaning of existence as founded on the reality of the self. Instead of attempting the reconciliation

just alluded to, Descartes stated the new problem of self-certitude and turned the inquiry towards the relation between this self and the external. But this solution of the new problem by Descartes, with its reliance on the self-evident, was by no means sufficient to prevent any future advance. The mere existence of the self, however assured it may be, is insufficient to determine the relation of this self to a possible world beyond it. The central problem of the Cartesian theory becomes the discovery of the relation between mind and matter.

Receiving from the hands of their master the mere statement of the problem, the later Cartesians developed the doctrine of "Occasional Cause." They conceived God to be the mediator between the impulses of mind and the laws of matter. Spinoza, looking at the same problem from a monistic standpoint, considered it necessary to subsume mind and matter under the unity of substance, in order to make possible their mutual relation. And Leibnitz, approaching the problem from an opposite direction, considered the spiritual unity of "Pre-established Harmony" to be the only ground for the separate reality of self and the not-self.

Example of the Clocks.—Perhaps the clearest appreciation of the similarity and difference of the three rationalistic solutions of the relation between mind and matter is expressed in several letters written by Leibnitz, although the illustration was suggested by earlier Cartesians. He considers two clocks which run in perfect unison as a suggestive illustration of the parallelism of mind and matter. The agreement of these two timepieces may result from one of three causes. In the first instance we may presuppose a skilled workman who constantly keeps the two clocks in accord with one another. The workman corresponds to God in the Occasionalistic hypothesis. As a second explanation it is possible to believe that the two clocks are not really separated but connected by some hidden bond, such as sympathy of vibration. This illustrates the Immanent God of Spinoza, in whom both mind and matter sub-

sist. And thirdly, there is the possibility that the two clocks "have been constructed with so much art and accuracy as to assure their future harmony." This last explanation well illustrates the theory of "Pre-established Harmony" made prominent in Leibnitz's own philosophy.

Its Deeper Meaning.—In their metaphysics each branch of the rationalistic school represents a distinct phase of the central inquiry of speculative philosophy,—the possibility of both unity and variety. The deeper meaning of the old problem of mind and matter was not distinctly understood by Descartes and his immediate followers. For this reason we have God defined by means of antithetical attributes. The God of Malebranche and Geulincx supplies the ultimate and passive connection between mind and matter; and at the same time He personified constant activity, in so far as the relation between soul and body was interpreted dynamically. In this twofold position of passive Unity and active Mediator, the Deity of the Cartesians exhibits a distinct contradiction. While by original conception the Cartesians have interpreted Descartes according to a more consistent monism, they are compelled, nevertheless, to sacrifice this unity to a deeper plurality as soon as they attempt to apply it to the world. They sought to harmonize activity and passivity, without establishing a sufficient ground.

Following directly upon the failure of the Cartesians to discover a real unity beneath the variety of the world, we meet with the two opposing solutions of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The meaning and importance of the contrast between these two is of extreme moment. The Substance of Spinoza possessed an absolute reality, it comprehended in its definition all that was real; consistency required that the modes should be made dependent and that their reality should arise only in their relations to Substance. Leibnitz, on the contrary, gave to the multitude of monads an individual existence as real as the Spinozistic Substance and transformed this apparent pluralism into a monism by the universal principle of "Pre-established

Harmony." The Cartesians were at a loss to reconcile passivity and activity in the Godhead; Spinoza emphasized the former and evolved a realistic unity, requiring an idealistic variety. Leibnitz started with a realistic variety and was compelled to postulate the idealistic unity.

CHAPTER IV.

LOCKE AND HIS INFLUENCE.

RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM CONTRASTED.

CONTEMPORANEOUS with the history of Continental Rationalism, the English philosophy of science developed its reliance on the given facts of experience. We have met striking examples of the empirical and metaphysical sides of this attitude of mind in earlier writers, such as Bacon and Hobbes. Although nearly all of the thinkers of the Continent were more or less influenced by the new ideas which directly sprung from the impetus given to philosophy by Descartes, the Englishmen remained apart from the general current. They set for themselves other problems, for the solution of which the rationalistic formulæ were of little avail; and even when the same questions were investigated by both schools, the difference of stand-point rendered the results obtained by one of little value to the other.

The important and perhaps only thread that unites the philosophical systems of the Cartesians, Spinoza, and Leibnitz is their rationalistic foundation. The single bond that gives a unity to the whole extent of British thought is the constant and final reference to the test of experience. Historians of philosophy have been accustomed to regard the antithesis between the Rationalists and the English Empiricists as one of extreme importance, for it well illustrates the differences which may arise from a fundamental distinction in the epistemological stand-point. From their emphasis on the *reason* the Rationalists developed the metaphysical and logical side of philosophy; and on their emphasis of the value of *experience* the English thinkers laid the foundation of a scientific psychology. And when the two currents of thought united in the

genius of Kant, each contributed its own necessary element towards the realization of a broad and symmetrical philosophy.

Narrowness of Early Empiricism.—The influence of Hobbes was negative rather than positive; it served to stimulate and antagonize, but failed to excite the interest of any who might have been capable of developing more fully the suggestions of his significant but rather crude materialism. When similar doctrines eventually sprung up all over Europe, they could be traced only indirectly to Hobbes. He wrote at a time when the attention of the English people was turned towards political changes and had little time or inclination to analyze and estimate a new system of metaphysics. Religious principles were in the ascendancy, and any philosophy that conflicted with the dogmas of religion as a whole could expect little sympathy from either Protestant or Catholic. If any philosophy was to seriously effect the trend of national thought it could not altogether disregard ancient traditions, nor, on the other hand, could it spring from distinctly religious motives. The materialism of Hobbes faded away because it tended towards the former extreme. On the contrary, the voluminous tracts which had their origin in the religious ferment of the seventeenth century also failed to occasion more than a momentary interest. The middle course, free from the narrowness of either extreme, was followed by John Locke, the most influential of the English Empiricists.

JOHN LOCKE.

LIFE.

It was a coincidence that Locke, the broadest of English Empiricists, was born in the same year as Spinoza. The stand-points of the two men are absolutely different; yet there are many points of resemblance in their philosophical systems which the contrast in outward form seems to obscure.

Youth.—John Locke was born on August 29, 1632, in Wrington, a small village in the north of Somersetshire. His

father was a practising country attorney, from whom "he probably derived, if not his earliest instruction, at least some of his earliest influences and some of his most sterling characteristics."¹

Mr. Fox-Browne, in his *Life of Locke*, quotes a letter from Lady Masham, in which she says, "From Mr. Locke I have often heard of his father, that he was a man of parts. Mr. Locke never mentioned him but with great respect and affection. His father used a conduct towards him when young that he often spoke of afterwards with great approbation. It was the being severe to him by keeping him in much awe and at a distance when he was a boy, but relaxing, still by degrees, of that severity as he grew up to be a man, till, he being become capable of it, he lived perfectly with him as a friend."

The young empiricist spent six years at Westminster School, where he developed a dislike for the study of the Greek and Latin classics. At twenty years of age he entered Christ Church, Oxford, where the course of study convinced him of the futility of the scholastic method of education. This is often given as the reason why he failed to attain any prominence in his studies, choosing rather to develop himself by an extensive course of private reading. It is said that the works of Descartes first drew his attention to philosophy, although he never evinced very much sympathy with the more speculative parts of Cartesianism. He regularly took the degrees of Bachelor and Master of Arts, and in 1660 was appointed Greek lecturer at Christ Church.

Political Career.—The English government desired to establish an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg. For this purpose Sir Walter Vane was sent to Cleves, the capital of Brandenburg, at the head of an embassy in which Locke was appointed secretary. This embassy accomplished nothing, and returned to England after an absence of three months. Locke

¹ *Life of Locke*, by Thomas Fowler.

soon after settled down again at Oxford, and devoted himself seriously to the study of medicine, the profession which he decided to adopt. About 1666 he made the acquaintance of Lord Shaftesbury, then Lord Ashley, with whom he remained in close intimacy during the rest of Shaftesbury's life. He acted as physician and trusted friend to the Ashley family. He also became tutor to Shaftesbury's only son, Anthony, and was finally entrusted with the delicate task of selecting a wife for his young pupil. As a result of Locke's inquiries the young Anthony was married to a daughter of the Earl of Rutland, to whom was born Anthony, third Earl of Shaftesbury and author of the "*Characteristics*," a name well known in the history of English ethics. Locke assisted Ashley and the other seven "lords proprietors" in the drafting of a constitution for the colony of Carolina. It is not known just what part Locke had in the preparation of these articles, but it is almost certain that he is accountable for the section relative to religious freedom. In 1672 Shaftesbury became Lord High Chancellor of England and Locke was made Secretary of Presentations. During the following year his patron was removed from office, an event which caused Locke to lose the Secretaryship. Shortly after this circumstance Shaftesbury, who in the meantime had been raised to another position of political importance, was compelled to flee to Holland, owing to a connection with an unsuccessful revolution against Charles. Locke followed the fortunes of his old friend, and accordingly he went to Holland in 1683. Here he remained until 1689, when the new political conditions rendered his return to England admissible. William of Orange offered him several foreign positions of importance, but his enfeebled health prevented their acceptance.

Declining Years.—His declining years were spent at Oates, the seat of Sir Francis Masham. The wife of Sir Francis was the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, perhaps, of all the English thinkers, the one least in sympathy with the philosophy

of Locke. In the genial society and stanch friendship of the Masham family Locke had the opportunity and leisure to enjoy his tastes. He was constantly surrounded by men of prominence in politics and science, among whom were Boyle and Newton. Weekly meetings held at the house of Lord Pembroke for the express purpose of discussing matters of scientific moment were a source of constant pleasure to Locke. Here all the company felt at liberty to express their unbiased views on whatever topic they saw fit. "These conversations, 'undisturbed by such as could not bear a part in the best entertainment of rational minds, free discourse concerning useful truths,' were a source of great enjoyment to Locke."² During the last few years of his life he interested himself in various political undertakings, notably in the opposition to the depreciation of the currency, and again in behalf of the English woollen trade. Unfortunately, he was not spared the unpleasantness of religious controversy, for Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, provoked an extended correspondence regarding the dogma of the trinity. On October 28, 1704, Locke died, having been in very feeble health during the last few years of his life.

Literary Labors.—Although Locke wrote a number of articles on various scientific, literary, and political subjects his importance in the history of philosophy rests almost entirely on "*An Essay concerning Human Understanding*." In the epistle to the reader, prefixed to this work, Locke gives the following account of its origin: "Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that before we set

² Fowler's Life of Locke.

ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry." ³ This "meeting," to which Locke above refers, took place about 1671, but the "*Essay*" itself was not published until 1690, three years after the appearance of Newton's "*Principia*." These two works make the closing years of the seventeenth century illustrious in the history of intellectual progress. Locke's "*Essay*" has exerted a far greater influence than any other English philosophical work; and the "*Principia*," written by Locke's friend, has established the foundations of modern mathematics and physics. In the case of Locke we meet with a man who published practically nothing during his early life, but after finishing and publishing his "*Essay*" he seems to have acquired a certain degree of self-reliance, and thereafter produced works on almost every conceivable topic. The publication of all his writings is confined to a period comprising the last fifteen years of his life, during which the comparative quiet of politics allowed him ample time for literary labor. The "*Essay concerning Human Understanding*" is the first of a long series of English works on introspective psychology. The philosophy of Locke is remarkable above all else for an acuteness of observation or "common sense," as it has been called. Seldom does he approach the subtlety or profundity of the Continental philosophers, but far exceeds them all in the acuteness of psychological analysis, portions of Spinoza's "*Ethics*" alone excepted. His works are all intelligible to the ordinary mind and are altogether devoid of any arrogance of bearing or of expression. The clearness and freshness of treatment which characterizes all his writings served to initiate a wide-spread interest in speculative problems. Yet he is strictly

³ Epistle to the Reader, Locke's Works.

a psychologist and epistemologist, but wrote at a period when the limits of the various fields of philosophy were unrecognized. The description of inner experience is certainly an important element in truth, and Locke's empiric stand-point turned the course of philosophical inquiries into new and fertile fields.

OBJECT OF LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY.

Two distinct motives seem to have stimulated the production of Locke's "*Essay*." On the one hand there was a practical demand, in answer to which he endeavored to account for the extent and limitation of human knowledge. Should he discover "the utmost extent of its tether," as he hoped, he felt that it would furnish some ground whereby we could distinguish between the possible and the impossible. This desire to define the limits of human inquiry was closely connected with another motive which had considerable influence on the production of the "*Essay*." Locke favored the "Low Church" party of England against a twofold opposition. On the one side was the "High Church," as represented by such men as Stillingfleet and Lord, and on the other the atheistic tendencies of Hobbes and the free-thinkers. While wishing to limit the unsubstantiated speculations of both the uncritical clergy and the Continental Rationalists, he sought also to show that the human understanding cannot exist without the idea of God. The discovery of the limits of human knowledge and the development of a rational conception of God were the underlying motives in the philosophy of Locke.

THE SOURCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

In order to discover the limits of human knowledge, or even to discuss knowledge itself, Locke considers it necessary to understand the source of all our ideas. He recognizes but two alternatives: the ideas may be imprinted upon the mind from without, or else they may arise coincident with the very nature of the mind itself.

Opposition to Innate Ideas.—The first part of the “*Essay*” is concerned with the refutation of the latter alternative, thus preparing the ground for a more ready acceptance of the universality of the former. To prove that there is nothing innate in the mind, he observes that the most elementary facts of knowledge, those which most readily suggest common assent, are either the fundamental laws of thought or the principles of morality. The former cannot be innate, for they are consciously recognized only in a comparatively late period of one’s life. A child is aware that salt is not sugar long before it is conscious of the fundamental law of thought that “a thing cannot both *be* and *not be*.” From similar observations Locke finds that the primary principles of morality are not innate, for he conceives that the moral commandments vary with the race and the individual; they are the imprints of environments, and not the inborn laws of God. A distinct code of morals is firmly impressed on the minds of all children according to the example of their immediate surroundings; and when the child later reflects on these principles, they appear to have been present from birth.

True Source of Our Ideas.—After having, to his own satisfaction, disposed of the possibility of innate ideas, Locke believes himself able to declare that *experience* is the only source of our knowledge. “Our observation employed either about external sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.”⁴ From an historical point of view the ideas arising from mere *sensation* come first, while those proceeding from *reflection* are later, because they need more careful attention than the former. The mind is supposed to be at first like a blank sheet of white paper, upon which is written the sensuous impressions of the external world. These impressions are fur-

⁴ Locke’s *Essay*, Book II., Chapter i., Sec. 2.

ther reshaped by the reason into the more complex and abstract ideas of the thinking process.

Epistemological Foundation.—The older historians of philosophy have been accustomed to place Locke among the empiricists, and the general attitude of much that he has written seems to warrant such a view. But on the other hand the dual source of our knowledge in sensation and reflection seems to demand a little hesitancy. And still more doubtful of Locke's empiricism does one become when it is observed that the "operation of the mind" or reason occupies a very important place. *True empiricism*, in its logical consequence, is *sensationalism*, a doctrine which we meet in Condillac, a French disciple of Locke. But Locke himself was not distinctly aware of his epistemological position, although he well represents the empirical tendencies of his race. While emphasizing sensation as the material source of our ideas, he gives to the reason as high and as important a position as it occupies in the system of any rationalist. Undoubtedly the empirical school took its rise from the impetus which Locke gave to philosophy, yet its founder cannot be regarded as a strict empiricist.

THE NATURE OF OUR IDEAS.

Division of Ideas.—**SIMPLE IDEAS.**—With the general source of our knowledge clearly before him, Locke proceeds to divide the ideas into the *simple* and the *complex*, the former representing the primary elements of the latter.⁵ To the former group he attributes four distinct classes: those simple ideas which are acquired through a *single sense*, those from *many senses*, those from *reflection alone*, and, finally, those simple ideas which have their source in *both sensation and reflection*. As an example of a simple idea of a single sense may be mentioned color, sound, or heat. The ideas of "will-

⁵ For further exposition, see the opening chapters of the second book of Locke's Essay.

ing" and "thinking," which correspond to the "infinite modes" of Spinoza, are regarded by Locke as simple ideas derived from reflection alone. While pleasure, existence, or unity are examples of simple ideas derived from both sensation and reflection.

COMPLEX IDEAS.—The simple ideas are the original atoms out of which the mind constructs an almost endless variety of complex ideas. In this transition from the simple to the complex, Locke mentions six psychological processes or operations which the mind employs. And it is this emphasis on the rearranging and remoulding of our ideas which warrants the rationalistic interpretation of Locke earlier mentioned. While in the reception of the simple ideas we may fail to perceive any direct activity of the mind itself, yet when Locke proceeds to the treatment of the complex ideas one is made to feel that the mind is no longer a passive participant in the thinking process, but rather an active and indispensable agent. The first of these psychological activities by which the mind transforms the simple ideas into the complex is *perception*. This faculty was regarded by Locke as the distinguishing trait of the animal kingdom, and is best defined as the conscious recognition of the simple idea. Beyond the mere perception, the mind is able to *compare* its various ideas, either by directly contemplating them together or else by the *retention* in the memory of previous impressions. In this act of comparison it is necessary for the mind to clearly *discern* both the superficial and the subtle distinctions between its various ideas. And it is the development of this faculty of discernment which makes possible clearness and accuracy of thought. The fifth faculty of the mind to which Locke draws our attention is the *compounding* or uniting of the simpler mental states into the more complex ones. The last and by far the most highly evolved process of the mind is that of *abstraction*. This is the ability to form general concepts by the observation of numerous particular cases. By this process of abstraction one is able to

define a common characteristic, present in all members of a class, and to distinguish the class by this common quality. Thus we are able to abstract from many objects, such as chalk, snow, and milk, a common color which we call whiteness; and we define as a class all objects to which this general idea is capable of application. Locke thought that he had discovered in the power of abstraction a means for determining the relative capacity of the intellect. Brutes were totally devoid of this faculty, while it is barely visible in idiots, savages, and children. Whether any one does possess this power has been doubted, and the question will be more fully considered in the study of Berkeley and Hume. At least modern anthropology seems to countenance Locke's theory, as far as abstract names are concerned. The inhabitants of Tierra del Fuégo, one of the five lowest of natural races, are said to possess a language so lacking in general terms that thirty thousand separate words are required, and the people are incapable of counting beyond three.

DIVISION OF COMPLEX IDEAS.—In the foregoing exposition it is observable that Locke is chiefly concerned with introspective psychology. He approaches the problems of his philosophy by inquiring into the genetic source of the states of the mind, by asking what we observe to be true rather than what must or ought to be true. But once his primary analysis of the mind was firmly established, Locke felt it necessary for him to consider more speculative issues. He divided all complex ideas, of whatever origin or character, into three distinct groups. The most fundamental, from a metaphysical standpoint, was the group of *substances* which comprehends all complex ideas referrible to "distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief." * As an example of a substance take the metal lead. This includes in

* Locke's Essay, Book II., Chapter xii.

a single complex idea many simple ideas,—as color, weight, hardness, and fusibility,—combined with the concept of a tangible objective something or substance. The second division or group of complex ideas was called *modes*. This was intended to include all those ideas which refer to states of “affections” of the more fundamental substances. Thus such ideas as are conveyed by the words gratitude, wonder, hatred are not completely intelligible in themselves, but require the logical premise of some substance,—such as a man or a child. And still again there are classes of complex ideas which are called *relations* and arise from the comparison of several ideas. All complex ideas of relation are derived from the comparison of other ideas. They are generally brief methods of explaining comparison.

Substance.—In the foregoing definitions one can clearly perceive the difference of meaning which the English mind attributes to terms already used in the more speculative systems of the Continent. To the Rationalists, as well as to Locke himself, Substance meant the metaphysical premise upon which a philosophy of the external world must ultimately rest; that which is absolutely real in itself. The speculative trend of the Cartesians led them to connect this primal reality with God, Nature, or activity; the simple “common sense” of Locke led him to interpret Substance as the separate objects of a material, external world of sense. This fundamental difference in the use of a single term well illustrates the distinction between the two attributes of thought. The followers of Descartes sought a unity beyond the apprehension of the human mind, and from the hypothetical character of its definition they were able to regard it as the logical essence of the Universe. Locke, on the contrary, founded the base of his metaphysics on what is looked upon as real by all,—the objects of sense. But when he came to define Substance more definitely, he found himself at a loss for adequate expression. He employed the term very much in the scholastic sense of a

“central something” which upholds the various attributes or qualities,—“the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, ‘sine re substante,’ without something to support them.”⁷ This doctrine of Substance is a much more important element in the system of Locke than might appear at first sight. Not only does it exhibit the contrast between his own position and that of the Continental thinkers, as well as suggesting a distinct problem for Berkeley and Hume, but it also supplies a ground for Locke’s whole attitude towards the limits of scientific inquiry. The contrast which he makes between Substance and the perceivable qualities which inhere in it, is a contrast which separates the absolutely real world—an understanding of which would require a knowledge of this unknowable substance—and the world of scientific phenomena presented to us by the senses and intelligibly through experiment.

Primary and Secondary Qualities.—In this connection Locke is careful to distinguish between *primary* and *secondary* qualities. The former produces the ideas of extension, solidity, or figure; ideas which are empirically real in the object,—that is, independent of human apprehension. The secondary qualities, on the other hand, such as the colors, tastes, or sounds, are to be distinguished from the primary in that they are directly dependent on the senses and possess no real existence in the object itself. This distinction between primary and secondary qualities is closely connected with Locke’s doctrine of Substance and is of great importance in subsequent British thought. It forms the central distinction between Locke on the one side and Berkeley and Hume on the other.

Modes.—In his treatment of *modes* Locke feels more confidence in himself than he shows in the exposition of his unknown substance. For convenience he divides all modes into the simple and the mixed, according to the complexity of the

⁷ Locke’s Essay, Book II., Chapter xxiii., Sec. 2.

ideas from which they spring. The ideas of space and time are the more important simple modes, and both take their origin from reflection. The modal concept of space results from a reflection on the objects of sight and touch; time upon the succession of our ideas. We construct the concepts of an infinite space and an infinite time, by observing that a single portion of either really requires its own limitlessness. As examples of mixed or more complex modes Locke instances the ideas implied by obligation, drunkenness, falsehood: "they are not looked upon to be characteristical of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind." ⁸

Relation of Personal Identity.—The third and last group of complex ideas arise from the *relations* between the various states of mind. These are almost innumerable in kind and character, one of the most interesting of which is that of *identity*. Locke meets the old problem of what constitutes personal identity or sameness of a human being by the simple criterion of *consciousness*. The personality of a man is the same so long as the consciousness of past states of thought and action remain unaltered, but the continuation of the same body does not make the same person unless there is a continuity of consciousness.

KNOWLEDGE.

After having treated of the various elements which enter into our thought, Locke in the fourth book of his "*Essay*" considers himself ready to deal with the problem of knowledge itself. He formally defines knowledge as "the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas," ⁹ and describes three distinct grades or degrees. We have immediate or *intuitive* knowledge of the existence of the self; demonstrative knowledge of the existence

⁸ Locke's *Essay*, Book II., Chapter xxii., Sec. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Book IV., Chapter i., Sec. 2.

of God; and, finally, a sensitive knowledge of the existence of all other objective things. As regards our belief in the existence of the self, Locke follows the "cogito ergo sum" of Descartes, but is inclined to feel little confidence in the ontological proof of God. In its stead Locke substitutes the proof from first cause, generally known as the *cosmological*. The existence of the individual self, of which we have intuitive certainty, when analyzed really requires the existence of something beyond; this in its turn demands something further, and so on to the necessary existence of a First-Cause. The present reality of the self therefore requires the omniscient and eternal Being of God as its ultimate cause.

Limits of Knowledge.—Two motives, we earlier observed, were prominent in Locke's mind during the production of his "*Essay*." By this causal proof for the existence of God he felt himself able to oppose any atheistic tendencies which might emanate from the Hobbesian metaphysics, but there still remained the desire to define the limits and capabilities of the human intellect. From his empirical presuppositions Locke felt sure that our ideas are necessarily restricted to the power and scope of the senses; while he further observed that our knowledge, which can only arise from the limited perceptions of a few ideas, has even a more restricted field than the sense-perceptions themselves. The position of Locke in this regard is quite remarkable. At the same time that he restricts our knowledge to a range even narrower than the senses, he is careful to point out that the existence of God is quite as infallible as the demonstrable principles of mathematics, and that "the bare testimony of Revelation is the highest certainty."¹⁰ Locke here takes a stand which is in marked contrast to the position later developed by Kant in his "*Critique of Pure Reason*."

Science.—The pursuit of scientific inquiry is ultimately

¹⁰ Locke's *Essay*, Book IV., Chapter xvi., Sec. 14.

limited to the ideas obtained from the senses. But even this range cannot give us incontestable scientific knowledge. There are two types of condition which limit the discovery of absolute knowledge, the one due to the unknowable character of substance, the other to the limits of the human intellect. By no means whatsoever can the mind penetrate to the absolute understanding of substance, the real essence of things behind the field of sense-impression. The true and incontestable processes of nature, which neither the sense can appreciate or the reason comprehend, are forever hidden from our inquiry. It is true that the knowledge of the sequence of events, the knowledge of the qualities and accidents of substance, lead us to a belief in the high probability of the truth of our observation, but an absolute certainty of the laws of nature could arise only from a perfect knowledge of substance.

The second restriction to the pursuit of scientific knowledge is concerned with the imperfections of sense and reason. *Truth* consists in the correct union of ideas, according to their agreement with things. But this test is very limited in its application. Owing to the paucity of clear and distinct ideas of spirit we can have no true scientific knowledge of spiritual things, and from the lack of knowledge of atoms we can have no perfect knowledge of bodies, since we cannot know the nature of their finest parts. And, furthermore, when we come to the imperfection of our reason we find other difficulties. The syllogism of logic often leads to error, while all processes of reasoning abound in false assumptions and undefined terms.

ETHICS.

Basis of Morality.—Before closing this account of a few of the important and influential doctrines of Locke it may be well to refer briefly to his attitude towards some of the controverted questions of *ethics*. He regards the relation between God and man as the basis for the principles of morality; the moral law as the expression of His divine will. At the same

time Locke believes that these basal principles, such as justice or benevolence, are capable of demonstration,¹¹ and looks to the future to establish them with the same certainty as is attached to the theorems of Euclid. His advocacy of the objectivity of the ethical principles is countenanced by his doctrine of moral control.

Theory of the Will.—The idea of power, which we obtain from observing the various changes in our own consciousness,—especially the flow of thought,—served to supply Locke with a ground for his theory of the will. He is very careful at this point to avoid a confusion of terms,—a merit which is not universal among writers on this subject. *Liberty* is as little applicable to the will as squareness is to virtue; it is simply the power to follow one's own mental preference and is opposed to external restraint. Thus we are not at liberty "to lay by the idea of pain," nor is the prisoner at liberty to escape. The *will*, on the contrary, is another *power* of having a preference, and its nature is in no wise affected by the liberty to realize this preference in the external world. The deepest spring of action is, in Locke's mind, the desire for happiness. It is the universal and primary sanction that ultimately shapes the course of the will. This constant desire for happiness results in a certain uneasiness or discontent with the present surroundings; and this in turn stimulates the judgment of the mind to decide upon some action. The decisions of the judgment with regard to a pleasurable action are the final motives which definitely determine the will. This view of the volition is accepted by practically all the later English thinkers and bears a close resemblance to the naturalistic determination of Spinoza.

LOCKE'S INFLUENCE.

Comparison with Leibnitz.—In the philosophy of Locke one feels the presence of a mind of the first order, with a dis-

¹¹ Locke's Essay, Book IV., Chapter iii., Sec. 18.

tingent power of introspective analysis. In comparison with Leibnitz we observe a sharp distinction in mental force. Both possessed intellects of the first order, but totally different in character. Leibnitz was quick, energetic, strikingly original, and often superficial; Locke was slow, tenacious of purpose, analytical, but not remarkably original. If Locke had written at a more recent date he would be regarded chiefly as an epistemologist and psychologist. His method aims to describe rather than explain, to analyze rather than synthesize. Even when he approaches more profound questions of metaphysics the same reliance on inner experience is observable. In the causal demonstration of God's existence he utterly fails to reach the standards of logical power already attained by the Schoolmen and the Continental philosophers. His influence, however, came at the time it was most needed, and served to show the necessity for an introspective element in all philosophy.

Extent of Influence.—This influence of Locke's standpoint and method, truly one of the prime factors of modern philosophy, extended all over the learned world. It occasioned a long and systematic refutation on the part of Leibnitz and involved its author in controversies with the High-Churchmen and the "Free-thinkers." On its positive side Locke's philosophy served to excite no less than four separate and distinctly original tendencies. These sprung from certain fundamental conceptions developed in the "*Essay*," each of which, like the imperfect Socratic schools of Greece, laid stress on but a single aspect of the master's thought. By far the most profound of these tendencies, and the one which forms the logical completion of Locke's work, is traceable in *Berkeley* and *Hume*. It emphasizes the subjective side of Locke's empirico-rationalism. It narrows the epistemological dualism of sensation and reflection to the mere reception of ideas, and avoids the inconsistency of substance and primary qualities. Directly opposite to the school of Berkeley and Hume was the pure empiricism, or *sensationalism*, which found a welcome in

France. This discarded the reflective element in knowledge and sought to prove that organs of sense supplied the only and sufficient approach to truth.

Besides these two tendencies which are concerned with Locke's epistemology we can trace a *religious* and an *ethical* movement due to the further growth of the empirical principles and likewise to the subsequent reaction against them. The former sought to develop a natural as opposed to a revealed religion, placing its reliance on the belief that the existence of God was capable of a rational demonstration. The ethical influence of Locke was rather indecisive in character and somewhat difficult to trace. It appeared most clearly in the general demand for a rational ground of morality,—the tendency to develop the concept of goodness from experience and reason rather than from religious emotions. Owing to the extreme importance of Berkeley and Hume, we shall leave the development of their relations to Locke until the following chapter; but the sensationalistic, the religious, and the ethical tendencies may be advantageously considered here.

FRENCH SENSATIONALISM.

The variety and many-sidedness of the Lockeian philosophy was the source of a most exacting sensationalism and materialism. It had its centre of activity in France, where the whole eighteenth century is characterized by a revolt against religious traditions. Montesquieu and Voltaire are generally accredited with the introduction of English philosophy among the French. Their importance lies more in popularizing the empiric philosophy than in the development of anything new. The reputation of *Montesquieu* rests chiefly upon his achievements in political science rather than in speculative philosophy. His classic work, "*The Spirit of the Laws*,"¹² contains a favorable estimation of Locke's interpretation of the English con-

¹² L'Esprit des Loix.

stitution. *Voltaire*, equally well known in general literature, opposed the optimistic teleology of Leibnitz and sought to introduce to his countrymen the naturalism of Locke and Newton.

By far the most profound of the French sensationalists was *Étienne Bonnot de Condillac*. He was born in 1715, lived the peaceful and unassuming life of a student and thinker, and died in 1780. Although he was Abbot of Mureaux and sometime tutor to the grandson of Louis XV., his philosophy is remarkably free from sectarianism. In his attempt to establish an uncompromising sensationalism by the inductive method, Condillac admits a thorough empiricism in his general attitude towards the source of our ideas. While Locke proves to his own satisfaction that knowledge originates from sensation and reflection by precluding all other possibilities, Condillac believes that he is able to definitely trace all our ideas to sensation alone. His method for accomplishing this result is unique and interesting. Starting with a statue which is endowed only with the sense of smell,¹³ Condillac imagines various odors presented to it, each of which leaves a faint memory image. By mere passive attention to these memory images and the recognition of sameness and identity, there arises the power of reflection, the reason, and the will. And further, should the other four senses be added to that of smell, one after the other, the statue would gradually acquire all the psychic processes which we associate with the human mind. On the same grounds Condillac believes the self-conscious and personal identity of the subject to consist in the mass of sensory impressions united by the memory.

Materialism.—In the strict sense of the word Condillac was not a materialist, for his sensations are mere subjective states

¹³ "Les connoissances de notre statue bornées au sens de l'odorat, ne peuvent s'étendre qu'à des odeurs."—*Traité des Sensations*, Part I., Chapter i.

and give us no ground for a belief in the absolute reality of the material world. But the transition from a pure sensationalism to pure materialism is by no means difficult. It has been observed that a sensationalistic epistemology always accompanies a materialistic metaphysic; so that Condillac readily found disciples who did not hesitate to combine the two stand-points. To mention all the French materialists of the eighteenth century would be a difficult task. Certain among them, notably Diderot, La Mettrie, D'Holbach, and Cabanis, developed the most perfect materialism that the history of philosophy has ever seen.

Denis Diderot, the first notable name among the French materialists, was educated under church influences, but the study of the English empiricists gradually turned his mind to a materialism in which God was only a name without definite place. The name of Diderot is universally associated with the French Encyclopædia¹⁴ of which he was the editor-in-chief. This work was published in twenty-eight volumes during the years following 1750. It had as its covert intention the undermining of traditional authority by the sceptical question, "Que sais je?" It answered this inquiry by exhibiting the uncertainty and limited range of the achievements which the human intellect had thus far accomplished. But the barrier between scepticism and materialistic atheism is very easily traversed, and the step had already been taken by the French physician, Julien Offray de la Mettrie.

He was born in 1709, and early obtained considerable prominence as a physician, but was expelled from France and Holland on account of atheistic writings. He found a protector in the person of Frederick the Great, of Prussia, at whose court he died in 1751.

La Mettrie remarks in the preliminary observations to his "*Œuvres Philosophiques*" that he "does not pretend to favor

¹⁴ Encyclopédie-Dictionnaire Raisonné.

atheism, but only examine it as a disinterested physician," but nevertheless he suggests at the same time that a society composed of atheists would be more successful than one in which the recognized laws of morality were superimposed on religious fanaticism. A classic work of La Mettrie, "*The Man-Machine*,"¹⁵ attempts to prove that all the characteristics which we associate with mental processes, the ideals of religion, beauty, and justice, result from the peculiar conditions of the structure of the human organism, and are referable in all cases to movements within the nervous system. It is only the physician who is the philosopher, because he alone understands the structure and laws of this very complicated piece of mechanism, and these laws, when thoroughly understood, will be able to explain every characteristic of man. The physical state of sleep or the presence of opium is able to change entirely the mental life,—“a sleeping soldier is oblivious of the bomb that is ready to tear him to pieces.” The diet of men affects their mental processes,—rare meat makes a race fierce and indocile; rage, moral degeneracy, and madness are the immediate effects of hunger. And since the organic functions comprise the entire being of man, the purpose of life is the gratification of those pleasures which arise from bodily activities. The pleasures of the mind, however, because they are more permanent and less restricted, are superior to the sensuous pleasures.

The fact that man like other natural formations is a function of matter and its laws was further reinforced by observations among the lower animals. We are able to find very little difference except in complexity of structure between the brain of man and the brain of the monkey. La Mettrie even advances the supposition that a monkey could be so trained as to become a “perfect man, a little polite fellow, with as many parts and members as ourselves, able to think and profit by his education.” This materialist praises Descartes for interpreting the

¹⁵ L'Homme Machine.

brute as an automaton, since this is the first step towards the recognition of universal mechanism throughout the whole organic world; "that man is a machine and that there is in the universe only a single substance differently modified."¹⁶

D'Holbach, in his classic work on the "*System of Nature*" ("*Système de la Nature*"), endeavors to show that the valuable moral ideals are supported by materialism, although the existence of God, the soul, and the possibility of human immortality cannot be recognized. D'Holbach believes that the happiness derived from helping mankind is greater than would be realized from the reward of Heaven.

Pierre Jean Cabanis, a prominent physician of the French revolutionary period, was the last and perhaps the most influential of the eighteenth-century materialists. He defined the psychical processes as simply the phenomena of the nervous system, stimulated by the sensuous impressions from the real physical world. "Vivre, c'est sentir." To live is to sense.¹⁷ He describes the various emotions and mental states as the direct product of nervous activities arising from mechanical and chemical changes. Influencing the formation of ideas and moral affections there are six primary conditions,—age, sex, temperament, disease, habit, and climate.¹⁷ Controlled by the same physiological laws, thought emanates from the brain in the same manner that bile is secreted by the liver.

Stand-point of Materialism.—As a whole the materialists stand for a perfectly definite attitude of mind. They are impressed with the universal mechanism to be observed wherever they conduct their scientific studies, and can discover no sufficient reason to prevent the application of mechanical laws to human values. They are monists in the strictest sense of the word,—matter with its motion is the primordial Substance, the

¹⁶ "Que l'Homme est une Machine; & qu'il n'y a dans tout l'Univers qu'une seule substance diversement modifiée."—*L'Homme Machine*.

¹⁷ "Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme."

self-existent and eternally immutable. In the earlier instance of Hobbes materialism was just emerging from its scholastic background, Substance still retained its early significance of a metaphysical substratum, while matter was its physical representation. But the French materialists of the eighteenth century had withdrawn from all traditions which could in any wise modify the extent of their position. Imbued with the scientific enthusiasm which was developing about them, they sought to go even to the utmost limits of possible science and define a speculative structure in accordance with which experimental science might some time accomplish its ideal, the reduction of life to mechanical terms. In its deeper meaning their philosophy teaches that the science of mind is somehow a part of the whole science of nature, a conclusion with which all schools of monism are in agreement.

THE DEISTS.

The second philosophical movement which arose from the influence of Locke has been called English Deism. No exact and definite characterization of this tendency of thought is possible; those men who are generally associated with it seem devoid of any striking similarity in the result of their reflections. It is more a religious attitude than a metaphysical school, more a synthesis of faith and reason than an analysis of either. In general English Deism is a sort of philosophical religion,—a pantheism personified. Locke had taught that the existence of God was the necessary presupposition following directly from the existence of the self. If this stand-point is granted, then reason has successfully invaded the field of revealed religion; a dogma of faith has been approved by the laws of the intellect. Once this signal step is taken, all religion and Christianity must be subjected to reason, a task which the Deists attempted with all the hope of success. In brief, Deism appears as the advocate of natural religion. It exhorts men to see God in all natural processes, and to recognize

His voice in the conscience. In connection with this movement two names are worthy of mention, Toland and Chubb.

John Toland was born in 1670 and was educated as an Irish Catholic "in the grossest superstition and idolatry."¹⁸ In his chief work, "*Christianity not Mysterious*," which appeared six years after Locke's "*Essay*," Toland endeavors to examine, in the light of reason, the various tenets of simple Christianity undefiled by ecclesiastical interpretation. In the process of this investigation he is able to discover nothing which contradicts the reason, nor which is mysterious or occult; and although it contains many things that our narrow intellects cannot adequately grasp, there is nothing in the religion of Christ which absolutely contradicts the laws of human thought.

The moral side of Deism is brought into the foreground by the teachings of a very interesting character named *Thomas Chubb*, a poor tallow-chandler. Like Jacob Boehme, he sought to interpret Christianity to the lowest classes of society. In his teachings Chubb recognizes the reason as a divine gift, by which God enables man to worship him through a life of simple morality. Love, usefulness, and purity are the only means to grace,—happiness in this world and in the life to come.

LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON ETHICS.

The simple faith of Chubb, exhorting all mankind to a life of rational morality, forms a fitting transition from the Deistical to the Ethical influence of Locke. The French thinkers have always exhibited a remarkable power of logical analysis, often developing into materialism and scepticism; the Germans have evinced an aptitude for profound and subtle metaphysics, for originality and systematization. But to the British thinkers belongs the credit of founding and developing modern psychology and ethics. The "English moralists" from Hobbes to Green represent a movement of modern thought of the first

¹⁸ Preface to "*Christianity not Mysterious*."

importance. A single central theme runs through the whole of English ethics,—the discovery of the ultimate ground of morality,—and each of the eighteenth-century moralists contributes his own solution to this problem. The mention of three names will be sufficient to distinguish the general character of these writings: Clarke, who emphasized the reasonableness of morality; Shaftesbury its beauty; and Butler its origin in the conscience.

Samuel Clarke, born 1675, in Norwich, England, and educated at the University of Cambridge, supplements Locke's belief in the rational foundations of morality by a rationalistic metaphysic. He maintains the supposition that certain necessary and eternal laws control the relations between every element of the world. Each thing possesses an individuality of its own, by virtue of which there is a unique relation with every other thing. In some cases these relations express a certain degree of adaptability or fitness of relation between things; while again they indicate an heterogeneity and antipathy. In Clarke's method of proving these contentions he follows the "more geometrico" of Spinoza, and arrives at the conclusion of a dynamic world, not unlike that of Leibnitz. In his moral philosophy Clarke is as rationalistic as his Continental masters, only he emphasizes Locke's statement, "Moral principles are capable of demonstration." Goodness is the expression of the fitting and appropriate relations between things, while the term evil indicates those relations of the opposite type. Clarke observes in the first *"Discourse concerning Natural and Revealed Religion,"*—one of the most remarkable portrayals in English of a rationalistic ethics and theology,—"Also that, from the different Relations of *different Persons* one to another, there necessarily arises a Fitness or Unfitness of certain *Manners of Behavior* of some Persons towards others: Is as manifest, as that the Properties which flow from the Essences of different *mathematical Figures*, have different *Congruities* or *Incongruities* between themselves." Among these fitting moral rela-

tions are to be mentioned the worship of God, the exercise of charity, honesty, and mercy. Virtue consists in observing, by the infallible reason, the fitting relations between man and his environment; and in the observance of these immutable laws of virtue is to be found the only true happiness. There are, however, many men who are too weak to be guided by the reasonableness of virtue and who need an artificial stimulus. To this latter class Clarke regards revelation and the promise of future reward to be of especial help. In recognizing the necessary existence of both good and evil relations Clarke mediates between the uncritical optimism of the last quarter of the seventeenth century—Leibnitz and Shaftesbury—and the pessimistic tinge to be found at the beginning of the eighteenth century,—Swift and Mandeville¹⁹ and Voltaire.

Perhaps the most widely read of the English moralists was *Anthony Cooper*, third Earl of *Shaftesbury*, earlier referred to in connection with the life of Locke. He differed far more with Locke than did Clarke, and lacked the speculative ability of the latter. In fact it is no exaggeration to say that Shaftesbury had little foundation for his ethics, a circumstance which by no means benefited the latter. Throughout all nature he saw, like the ancient Stoics, a harmony and simplicity of law and order, which led him to interpret the Universe in terms of beauty. Man's relation to this natural beauty was reflected in the "moral sense," a faculty of the mind as original in character as the reason or the feeling. The operation of the "moral sense" is immediate and altogether separable from the decision of the intellect. Through the demands of this immediate faculty mankind is led towards benevolence and altruism. Happi-

¹⁹ "So vice is beneficial found

When it's by Justice lopt and bound."—

Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turn'd Honest.

Mandeville contended that social prosperity and racial progress are promoted by the struggles and vices of the individuals rather than by the exercise of Christian virtues.

ness, contentment, and prosperity result only from a life of service to others. Shaftesbury introduces a line of ethical thought in his writings which runs in opposition to Hobbes, Locke, and Clarke; it shows a distinct reaction against the assurance in reason so generally prominent in the opposite empirical school of ethics. All these *intuitional* writers seek to give the moral law a foundation above and beyond the sense or the reason, either in an innate faculty of the soul or in the direct voice of God.

The two attitudes, the empirical and the intuitional, were somewhat united by *Bishop Butler*, Dean of St. Paul's. On the one hand he admits the operation of a certain complex moral faculty, the intuitional sense; while on the other hand the exercise of the conscience is possible only through the reason. It will be observed that Shaftesbury gives us no analysis of the "moral sense." This is attempted by Joseph Butler, the author of "*The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*," one of the classical religious works of English thought. Butler finds that Nature acts according to conceptual processes, which find a correspondence in the moral life of man. Certain activities are appropriate to the constitution of Nature, and likewise certain actions are proper according to the characteristics and organization of man. But just as there is a reason which guides our thoughts towards the ends of truth, so also there is a *conscience*, the observance of which leads men to virtue and happiness. This conscience is the source of moral activity, and exerts its authority in view of the ends best adapted to the progress of mankind and the purposes of God. The lowest element observable in the conscience is concerned with the lower passions, which arouse the interests of self-love, and very often moral relations towards our fellows. Benevolence is a higher stage of the conscience, while in its complete expression Butler finds both an intuitional and a rational significance; the former is the foundation of morality, while the latter is the means of its expression.

THE EMPIRICAL STAND-POINT.

The tendencies of empirical thought, first consciously formulated by Bacon and Hobbes, were fully developed by Locke and his immediate followers. The points wherein the English philosophy of this period differ from the rationalistic tendencies of earlier and later Continental thought are very difficult to appreciate in other than the most general terms. The difference lies more in stand-point than in content; more in the attitude towards the world than in the deeper results of philosophical inquiry. This is a fact which is quite remarkable and inclined to be overlooked. It is certainly true that the outward form, the language, the methods, and even the immediate conclusions of the empirical philosophy stands in marked contrast to the similar characteristics of the Continental thinkers. Yet this notable contrast does not penetrate to the central meaning of the two schools. Beneath the form of expression, the accidents of temperament and environment, beneath even the conclusions of the individual man himself, there is discernible a similarity in the deeper values of life and the world which is appreciable only in terms of the unity of human thought. Specific illustrations of this abound. Locke accepted the aphorism of self-existence as the most certain of all knowledge, while Descartes on the other hand found it necessary to give certainty to the facts of experience, in order to go beyond the abstractions of the self and God; and in fact when stripped of external peculiarities it will be found that the reason and experience are of about the same relative importance in the systems of the founders of empiricism and rationalism. Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke are equally acute in their psychological analysis of human emotion, and with each the demonstration of moral truths is the foundation for ethics. The materialists are monists; when strictly analyzed their "matter" differs but little from Spinoza's "Substance." Clarke denounces Spinoza as an atheist, yet he observes his geometrical method and estab-

lishes the existence and attributes of God by the same rationalistic evidence earlier employed in the "*Ethica*." Leibnitz had his correspondences in the empirical school; a metaphysical atomism was taught by many scientists of the times; "Pre-established Harmony" often appears under other names among the Encyclopædists, the Deists, and the earlier English moralists.

When we have thus discovered a fundamental unity between rationalist and empiricist we have by no means exhausted the topic. While emphasizing the unity of thought which pervades the whole pre-Kantian philosophy, it must not be understood that the profound difference of stand-point between rationalism and empiricism can be for a moment neglected. These internal similarities are discovered only in the deeper recesses of the various systems of philosophy; they would probably have been repudiated by the philosophers themselves. As a matter of considerable consequence empiricism does define a type of thought peculiarly its own, but its individuality consists in its attitude towards the world, its method of approach to the problem of philosophy rather than in its ultimate conclusions. Empiricism is psychological, it is metaphysical only so far as it is epistemological; rationalism is distinctly metaphysical, logical, and critical. Reduced to its simplest terms, empiricism has always meant nothing else than a thorough reliance on the given facts of experience, on the psychological data of the mental image, "This is my fact." It approaches philosophy with a metaphysic already formed,—the fact has a reality which cannot be further analyzed,—and proceeds to show wherein many facts of this description are able to give a world consistent with itself and full of ethical and religious values. It makes no covert assumptions nor does it struggle to give the facts a mysterious significance unrepresented in their bare "givenness." It is advanced by philosophers who are by temperament active and eminently practical, generally by men who have attained some distinction in the law or in politics. Empiricism

does not disregard the reason any more than rationalism can afford to disregard experience. Experience and reason are equally essential to both methods, the former is always the content and starting-point, the latter is necessarily the form or instrument. The distinction of schools results from the difference of approach. Rationalism compels reason to prosecute an examination into itself before considering the data of sense, whereas empiricism first requires the reason to analyze experience.

CHAPTER V.

BERKELEY AND HUME.

METAPHYSICAL INFLUENCE OF LOCKE.

IN the previous chapter it was our purpose to review briefly the life and philosophy of John Locke, with special reference to those problems of marked significance to the history of philosophy. With this latter point in mind we were able to discover a metaphysical, an epistemological, a religious, and an ethical movement traceable directly to the influence of Locke. By brief summaries of the epistemological, religious, and ethical movements we traced the reception of Locke's philosophy in French Materialism, English Deism, and English Ethics, but at the same time we reserved to this chapter a consideration of his influence on the more speculative phases of British thought. Berkeley and Hume are generally associated with the metaphysical development of Locke's philosophy, although in reality they only carry his dualistic epistemology of sensation and reflection to its logical conclusion.

GEORGE BERKELEY.

LIFE.

Youth.—George Berkeley, one of the most profound thinkers of the English race, was born in the County of Kilkenny, Ireland, on March 12, 1685. His father is said to have been of English descent, while his mother was undoubtedly Irish. Little is known of his early life other than a short entry in his "*Commonplace Book*," "I was distrustful at eight years old." At eleven years of age he entered the Kilkenny school, where Swift had previously studied. Four years later we find him at Trinity College, Dublin, already deeply engaged with the problems of reality. At this period of his life Locke's influence

was distinctly felt by Berkeley, and he read, to a certain extent, the works of Descartes, Malebranche, Aristotle, and perhaps some of the Schoolmen and the Church Fathers. In Berkeley's philosophical diary or "*Commonplace Book*," continued in the years immediately following his graduation, are found entries which indicate the character of his reading and at the same time mark the progress of his own conceptions. Berkeley continued his connection with the University after taking the Masters' degree and prepared at this time two short works of extreme importance. The first of these, "*An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*," was published in 1709. This was followed the next year by "*A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*." The former leads up to Berkeley's own metaphysic, by a psychological analysis of the sense of vision, while the "*Principles*" define his own position and explain his objections to Locke and the materialists. His complete stand-point is more fully developed in later dialogues, but in these two essays, written when Berkeley was only twenty-five years of age, one observes a certain freshness, vigor, and self-assertion which is less prominent in his later writings.

Travels.—About two years after the publication of the "*Principles*" Berkeley removed to London with the manuscript of another exposition of his theory of the world, written in the form of a dialogue. Here he met some of that brilliant company that made the opening years of the eighteenth century the Augustan age in English literature,—Swift, Pope, Addison, Steele, Johnson, Clarke, Pembroke, and Collins. In the society of these men, Berkeley, whose personal charm won him favor in every direction, spent nearly a year. It is interesting to note that his "idealistic system of the world" excited a wide-spread interest. Swift writes, "That Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man, and a great philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the ministers, and have given them some of his writings, and I will favor him as much as I can."

Towards the close of 1713 Berkeley decided to accompany Lord Peterborough on an embassy to Sicily. The journey gave him the opportunity to visit France and Italy. There is a tradition extant that while in Paris Berkeley called on Father Malebranche in his cell and that a heated discussion which arose during the interview was the "occasional cause" of the aged Father's death.

Bermuda College.—About 1721 Berkeley conceived the project of founding a college in the Island of Bermuda for the education of savages, and where he might prove to be "the mean instrument of doing great good to mankind." However hypothetical and impractical such a scheme might appear, the most sincere praise is due to Berkeley for his energy and self-sacrifice. At a time when the "South Sea Catastrophe" was in everybody's mind, the fact that unaided, except by his own attractive personality, Berkeley was able to arouse interest on every side, obtain private subscriptions amounting to five thousand pounds, to which Walpole contributed, with an almost unanimous grant of twenty thousand pounds from Parliament, attests more than words to his self-denial, earnestness, and single-heartedness. Late in 1728 Berkeley sailed for America, and arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, early in the following year. He purchased a farm, about three miles from the town, where he built a large house in the prevailing colonial style. Here at "Whitehall," as he called his home, he composed the longest of his philosophical dialogues, "*Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher.*" Here he welcomed Jonathan Edwards,—one of the very few illustrious names which America has added to the History of Philosophy,—together with many missionaries and professors from Harvard and Yale. During the life of retirement at Whitehall his fortunes at the English court were not altogether prospering. The promised grant from the Crown had not been paid, and Walpole intimated that Berkeley had better come home and not wait for it. Thus was quenched the hopes and labors of many years. Fraser fittingly remarks, in

his Sketch of Berkeley's life, that "Of all who have ever landed on the American shore, none was ever moved by a purer and more self-sacrificing spirit. America still acknowledges that by Berkeley's visit on this mission it has been invested with the halo of an illustrious name, and associated with religious devotion to a magnificent ideal, even if it was sought to be realized by impractical means."¹

Last Years.—After Berkeley's return to England he received the appointment to the Bishopric of Cloyne, in South Ireland, a position which he held until the last years of his life. Here, in a secluded corner of Ireland, Berkeley was occupied with the various needs of his diocese, with literary work, and with "Tar-water." This latter was a preparation which Berkeley, with his accustomed enthusiasm, conceived to be the cure for every ailment. The news of this remarkable discovery the good Bishop of Cloyne spread far and near. "*Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water and Divers other Subjects Connected Together and Arising One from Another,*" is the title of a work prepared during this period. "Divers other subjects" comprise nearly everything in heaven and earth, and well illustrates the breadth of Berkeley's interests. About the middle of 1752 he moved from Cloyne to Oxford, in order to be near his son, who was about to enter the University. He writes at this time that he no longer felt the same enthusiasm and interest in things that characterized his earlier years, and that he was becoming very infirm in health. On January 14, 1753, Berkeley died, having been at Oxford but a few months.

STAND-POINT.

In the whole range of British thinkers there have been few who have exhibited greater breadth of mind or power of philosophical expression. The difficulty with his metaphysics arises,

¹ Berkeley's Works, edited by A. C. Fraser, Vol. I. lix.

not from narrowness of scope, but rather from over-concentration. He focused his mind upon a single aspect of truth, and from that very intensity he was able to produce a lasting influence on Modern Philosophy. Had he been unbiassed by religious motives and conceptions, he might have anticipated more fully the German Transcendentalists and effected a wider and deeper impression on the current of the world's thought.

Epistemology.—Like all British thinkers, Berkeley erects his metaphysic upon a perfectly definite epistemological basis. In such a light he is a strict empiricist; reality is reached through the senses, for they are the only means which we possess for the attainment of knowledge. "But whoever reads my book with attention," he writes in a letter, "will see that I question not the existence of anything we perceive by our senses." Instead of following Locke in his division of the ultimate origin of human knowledge into sensation and reflection, Berkeley conceived only of the ultimate existence of ideas from sensation, although he recognizes the less vivid ideas of memory and imagination. In this he was perfectly consistent with the epistemological demands of Locke, only the meaning of sense and sensation was subjected to an altogether new interpretation. This involved a new metaphysical background, which constitutes the true advance from Locke to Berkeley.

After he has defined the source of our ideas, Berkeley is next concerned with their reality. He recognizes that the determination of reality requires a certain principle or criterion which shall be in every respect authoritative. In discovering this principle we have the transition from his empirical epistemology to his spiritualistic metaphysics. For if we can assert that the data of sense is the only source of knowledge, then the power of perception is itself the absolute criterion of knowledge. In other words, Berkeley, with perfect consistency, draws the conclusion that if all we can know are sense-perceptions, they themselves comprise all that can be regarded as

real.² This was his initial principle, the absolute criterion of reality and the metaphysical foundation of his philosophy.

METAPHYSICS.

Ideas.—We may now remove the epistemological staging which enabled us to discover the principle "*esse ~~is~~ percipi*," perception constitutes existence, and consider what kind of a universe is presented to our view. The world of mere perception amounts to nothing more than a constant and uninterrupted flow of ideas, occurring either singly or in groups. Thus the blueness of the sky is an idea which is excited by simply looking up, and if the mere sensation alone is observed, it constitutes a single disconnected idea. But this pure immediacy of blueness is seldom attained. Our ideas generally come to us in groups,—that is, the color idea of yellowness, the touch idea of smoothness, the odor idea of fragrance, and the taste idea of sweetness, all join together in our concept of apple. The same color idea may occur in connection with various other groups of ideas, but we employ the term "apple" only when a certain definite and predictable combination of the various sense ideas is before us. And presently we shall see that this unique combination of sense ideas is called a "thing" and can be given an absolute reality beyond the perceiving subject, only as a matter of convenience.

SUBJECTIVITY OF IDEAS OF DISTANCE.—Before we have sufficient data to inquire into the truth of the belief in the objective existence of the "thing," it is necessary to know the real nature of these ideas of which it seems to be composed. Perhaps the most vivid class of ideas are those which we receive through the sense of sight; therefore, before extending any theory to all the ideas, it may be well to begin our examination with those derived from sight alone. One of the most impressive features of a landscape is the apparent unequal distances

² "*Esse ~~is~~ percipi*."—Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 3.

of the various objects seen. Berkeley, in his "*Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*," subjects this idea of distance to careful scrutiny, and reaches the conclusion that we are confronted with one of two attitudes. Either the distance of the various objects is given directly by the visual image, or else it is in some way inferred from the configurations and colorings. This latter alternative, which was the one advocated by Berkeley, may appear in a clearer light if we examine the relation between sight and touch. If we suppose a man endowed only with the sense of sight, he would believe every part of the whole landscape to be equally distant from his eye; the haze about the remote hills, instead of conveying to him the idea of distance, would simply indicate natural conditions; the sheep at the farther end of the pasture would appear to him as belonging to a smaller species than those in the foreground. Now let this same man be given the power of touch or movement, and he would soon discover that the blue haze indicated remoteness, that lines receding from the eye appear to converge, and that the smaller sheep are more distant, but are really of the same size as those in the foreground. He would soon learn from detailed observation to interpret, without the necessity of touch or movement, the signs and appearances which indicate variations in distances. From this analysis Berkeley concludes that the idea of distance is really *inferred by the mind* from certain appearances, and not given by *direct* perception, as was presumed before his time.

SUBJECTIVITY OF ALL OUR IDEAS.—In his "*New Theory of Vision*" Berkeley had proved to his own satisfaction that the third dimension of space was an idea originating in the mind; that the mere sight of converging lines contains in itself no idea of distance. This was only the first step towards a much broader generalization which he developed the following year in the "*Principles of Human Knowledge*." In order to prove the *subjectivity or spiritual origin* of all our ideas, he refers back to Locke's division of qualities or ideas into primary and

secondary. It will be remembered that the former comprised solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion,—qualities which had a perfectly valid existence in the external world. The secondary qualities included all the direct sense ideas, such as color, taste, or odor, and differed from the former group in that they were real only to the percipient subject. Berkeley is in perfect agreement with the latter part of this analysis, and believes, even more fervently than Locke, that the secondary qualities have only a mental existence; but fails at the same time to understand why the same is not likewise true of the primary qualities. In the application of his formula "*esse is percipi*," Berkeley finds it impossible to perceive mere dimension, figure, or motion,—these ideas always occur in connection with the secondary qualities. Take dimension, for instance. It is possible for a very small insect to look upon the foot of a mite as a man might regard a mountain. Dimension and size are merely relative; what appears to be large to one animal will be small to another. And this same relativity is also true with regard to the primary quality of number for the same object "is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch."³ From a similar stand-point all primary ideas must, at the last analysis, be looked upon as meaningless, or else placed with the secondary as subjective relations and products of some mental process, either human or divine.

Matter.—Locke found it rather difficult to define his conception of substance or mere matter, but finally led us to believe that it referred to that part of an object which held up or supported the various secondary qualities or attributes. Beyond simple extension Locke found it impossible to give to substance any positive attribute, preferring to rely on the universal belief that some material substratum supported the qualities of sense. This inability to define substance was made

³ Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I., Sec. 12.

by Berkeley the cardinal objection to any materialistic metaphysics; for so soon as extension and all other qualities are recognized to be ideas, real only for a perceiving mind, there no longer exists any need for the presupposition of an external, unknowable substratum. In other words, the old idea of matter, which we inherit from the mediæval schools, is a contradictory concept; it is said to exist, yet it cannot be described; it is real, yet it cannot be perceived. This contradiction led Berkeley to regard the concept "matter" as nothing more than a philosophical illusion.⁴ And, moreover, the epistemological theory, at that time by no means uncommon, that the subjective ideas of man were archetypes of real objective things was unable, in his estimation, to fortify this illusion. For this archetype or idea can originate in nothing but an idea, and hence can exist only in the mind. In brief, then, this is Berkeley's theory of the world: All ideas that come into our consciousness, the simple and the complex, the distinct and the indistinct, have their source in *Spirit* or mind, and not in hypothetical matter. Every conscious state of mind is an idea, and as such exists only in and through the percipient subject. The concept of matter, as it is used to indicate a world objectively valid beyond the sense, is in itself unintelligible; it can be defined only by negative terms collectively equivalent to nothing.

4 **Abstract Ideas.**—In order to reinforce this general position Berkeley thought it necessary to refute the accredited doctrine of abstract ideas. Locke believed that the mind had the power to regard, as a single quality, that element of perception which was common to several objects. The mind could abstract from

⁴ It is to be noted that a similar conception of the external world was reached by *Arthur Collier*, rector in the English Church. In 1713 he published "*Clavis Universalis: or, a new Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence, or Impossibility, of an External World.*" *Jonathan Edwards* also approached very near to the Berkeleian Idealism.

paper, snow, and clouds the common or abstract color of whiteness. This theory struck at the very heart of Berkeley's initial principle, "*esse is percipi*," for should the power of abstraction be admitted, then there would exist an important class of ideas which could not be directly perceived. Berkeley, recognizing this, contended that the abstract idea of white cannot be perceived, because it is neither dull or vivid, distinct or confused. The general idea of man is neither like Peter, James, or John, nor has it any predictable qualities. Animal-in-general is unintelligible to us, for we know not whether it has "hair, feathers, or scales."⁵ Every time we think of whiteness, in Berkeley's own opinion, we must at the same time think of a certain definite white object; the term "man" is meaningless unless it calls to mind a certain definite person with predictable qualities capable of perception. Abstract ideas are merely words or convenient expressions to Berkeley; like material substance, they are the artifices of a decadent metaphysics.

Duality of Idea and Spirit.—In our previous statement of Berkeley's theory of ideas no account was given of what was meant by mind or spirit. To transfer the origin of our ideas from one unknowable to another of a different name was certainly no great advance. Berkeley understood this, and from the very outset emphasized a reality other than that of the ideas,—the higher reality of *Spirit or mind*. The essence of the distinction between idea and spirit is that the former is passive and the latter active. We can show that all our ideas—or whatever we may choose to call them—are inactive; one idea can in nowise produce an effect on another, neither can it come or go at will. The passive existence of the ideas really shows that they are created by some active power which Berkeley designates by the name of "*Spirit*,"—the cause of the uninterrupted flow of our ideas, their regularity and apparent uniformity. This active source of our ideas "must therefore

⁵ Introduction, Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 9.

be a *substance*; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an uncorporeal active substance or Spirit."⁶ We cannot perceive spirit, since spirit is the source of the power of perception. A difficulty is at once apparent. There can be no idea of spirit, and ideas are the only elements of knowledge; then one can surely infer that we can have no knowledge of even the existence of spirit. Berkeley appreciated this dilemma after the publication of the first edition of the "*Principles*," and in his subsequent works is to be found a new doctrine of *notion*. We can have a notion—a sort of reflective mental state—of a Spirit, but no idea. But still further we may inquire as to how one may have an idea of a notion. A question which strikes at the very root of the Berkeleian Idealism.

Kinds of Spirit.—The mere duality of idea and spirit is in itself insufficient to explain the uniformity and apparent purposiveness of the sense ideas; it was necessary to define the conception of God as the ultimate unity of the world of ideas. God is the source of the true and scientific ideas, whereas the less powerful spirits of individual men are alone responsible for the creations of the imagination. The real, the burning idea of fire is impressed upon us by the Spirit of God, whereas the fire of our fancy is an idea which the human spirit produces. We are able to discern the source of those ideas which come from God by their superior vividness, strength, and associations; they correspond to the ideas which the materialists attribute to the objective world.

RELATION BETWEEN KINDS OF SPIRIT.—One of the least satisfactory points of Berkeley's philosophy is the ambiguity which settles about the relation between the universal Spirit of God and the individual spirit of man. Berkeley was educated in the faith of the Church of England and his later life was spent in its service. The Christian conception of God was therefore

⁶ Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I., Sec. 26.

very firmly fixed in his mind, and he could hardly be expected to recognize any philosophy which did not possess a religious background. In fact one of the results which he hoped his philosophy might accomplish was the permanent refutation of atheism. Had Berkeley drawn the logical conclusion from his premises he would have developed a pure pantheism like Spinoza, or else a pure idealism like that of India or late Germany. The Christian dogmas of transcendency and human freedom preclude the former alternative, while a pure idealism which should recognize only the infinite evolution of an Idea through finite forms would have then been looked upon as atheism. To be true to his original position and at the same time avoid either of these extremes was a task difficult indeed; it formed the philosophical theme of "*Siris*," his last and least homogeneous work. So far as may be judged, the Spirit of God was the true author, not only of the ideas of direct perception, but also of the less powerful spirits of man. These latter were endowed by their Divine Author with the passive ability of perception, as well as the distinct power to create by their own free will the ideas of the imagination and the ideals of life.

THEOLOGY.—As Berkeley grew older in years the importance of God in his system seemed to increase in his estimation. In his earlier writings he is content with the proof that the passive ideas must have a source beyond themselves, in a Power which should embody universal Wisdom, Authority, and Spirituality. But in his later works he reaches a final proof for God's existence based directly on his empirical epistemology. In the fourth dialogue of "*Alciphron*," after having shown that all the perceptions of the world indicate the operations of a Divine Mind, Berkeley concludes that we have the same authority for the belief in the Divine Being as we have for the existence of our fellow-men. In fact every idea is a manifestation or sign of the highest reality of God. All ideas of our sight compose a "visual language" by means of which God speaks to man.

Much akin to this is his theory of natural law, already briefly mentioned. We observe that the idea of stone is always connected with the idea of hardness, that heaviness is associated with lead, and that some characteristic noise accompanies every animal. Instead of regarding these causal relations as indications of a material background to the stone, lead, or animal, we must look upon them as the expressions of God's will. Those unalterable sequences, which we call "necessary connection," are really God's thoughts unfolding the laws of His omniscient mind. Law, order, science, truth, are mere expressions for the notion of God; imagination, error, are the ideas created by the spirit of man.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS.

Absent Objects.—A theory of the world so original and brilliant as that of Berkeley's empirical idealism would naturally meet with many objections. This fact was recognized by Berkeley himself, who made every exertion to avoid any misunderstanding,—the worst of all objections. A very apparent difficulty might arise with regard to absent objects. Berkeley does not assume that the moon ceases to exist when nobody happens to be gazing at it, or that there is continued annihilation and recreation following the history of a single percipient subject. On the contrary, we are told that all the real ideas of the so-called external world are being constantly perceived by the Divine Spirit. That I, the individual spirit, may not always perceive the moon, the table, or the chair, but that God perceives them without interruption. It is He who holds these ideas in constant reality, ready at any time to impress them on the finite spirit.

X **Extension and Mind.**—Another and more subtle objection might be advanced on the ground that if so-called "extension" can exist only in the mind, then extension is itself an attribute of mind. In reply to this, Berkeley carefully distinguishes between the idea in the mind—that is, perceived by the mind—

and what might be said regarding the mind itself. Thus it is conceivable for a vessel to contain water, and at the same time be devoid of all the qualities by which we describe water.

Meaning of "Matter."—Perhaps the hardest to convince, in Berkeley's estimation, are those who still cling to the reality of matter as either a convenient or necessary hypothesis. To the former, who regard matter as a convenient form of expression, he advances a well-known aphorism,—“We ought to think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.”⁷ Although most of us are convinced of the movement of the earth, yet we speak of the rising of the sun. To the other class, who regard the objective existence of matter to be necessary, he is by no means so lenient. If we demand “matter” for science we do not disturb either the facts or laws of science by substituting the will of God for an unknowable principle of causation itself dependent on an unknowable substance. If we demand “matter” in order to give the world of our ideas a reality, we fail utterly in such an undertaking, for we can describe it only by negative terms which make it a “something” indistinguishable from “nothing.”

Few thinkers have been more misinterpreted in their real meaning than Berkeley, and few have struggled so valiantly or so well to avoid misrepresentation. Dr. Johnson is said to have refuted him by an impetuous stamp on the earth, and others have concurred with the learned lexicographer. Even Kant, in his famous refutation of idealism, is inclined to believe that Berkeley regarded the objects of the space world to be possessed of only an imaginary reality.⁸

Whatever criticism of Berkeley's system is made, one certainly cannot suppose that he meant to do away with the reality

⁷ Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 51.

⁸ “Und darum auch die Dinge im Raum für blosse Einbildungen erklärt.”—Kant, Pure Reason, Second Ed. (Refutation of Idealism), p. 274.

of our world of sense or even of our fancy; no thinker has ever lived who rested his metaphysic more explicitly on the world of sense-perception. His chief aim was to show that the indescribable "matter" of the materialists was a fiction unintelligible and in itself contradictory; it could therefore have no value. A lasting contribution he has most certainly made to the progress of the world's thought by drawing attention to the idealistic or universalistic side of empiricism. Berkeley represents the transition from Locke to Hume. Locke found a reality behind the senses in a material world, Berkeley found a higher reality in the Spirit of God, while Hume failed to find reality in either.

DAVID HUME.

Hobbes and Locke were Englishmen in the broadest sense of the word, Berkeley and Hume were such only in name. The interests of Berkeley, his hopes, and his ambitions, were connected with Protestant Ireland. The life and character of Hume are those of the eighteenth-century Scotchman. Both, however, evinced striking similarity in disposition, character, and mental power. Both were noted for their generosity, simplicity, and dislike of ostentation. Both had written their most influential works in philosophy before the age of twenty-five, and both forsook philosophy for other pursuits in later life.

LIFE.

Early Surroundings.—David Hume was born in Edinburgh on April 26, 1711. His father, who owned a small estate or farm near the English border, died when David was but a small child. Both parents were of sturdy Scotch families, such as make up the small gentry of the Lowlands. His mother is said to have been a woman of singular mental acuteness, although an early estimation of her son seems not to indicate any great sympathy with the brooding and perhaps lazy philosopher. "Our Davie's a fine, good-natured crater, but uncom-

mon wake-minded.”⁹ Hume’s youth was spent at the parental farm of Ninewells, where he seems to have devoted himself to the study of the ancient and modern classics. He was a self-taught man, having derived little help from schools or school-masters. When about seventeen his relatives thought the profession of the law might prove a practical realization of his rather useless studies, so he entered upon the path of a young advocate. The attempt early proved to be a failure, and for the next six years he became a resident at Ninewells.

Philosophical Authorship.—About this period Hume began to exhibit a decided interest in philosophical works, especially the writings of the Roman moralists. While impressed with their brilliant portrayal of virtue and honor, he observed a lack of experiential foundation, especially in the writings of the Stoic philosophers. At the age of twenty-three he decided to travel to a foreign country where he might have the opportunity and leisure to construct a theory of morals which should supply the deficiency in the classic systems of ethics. In 1736 we find him at La Flèche, in France, where was located the Jesuit College made famous by the boyhood of Descartes. For three years Hume worked on his philosophical labors with unabated zeal and patience, and, finally, when he came forth from his self-imposed retirement, he brought with him the completed manuscript of his first and most powerful work, “*A Treatise of Human Nature*.” This was published during the first part of 1739 and met with little recognition or criticism, two results which its author hoped it might attain. Biographers of Hume place an ambition for literary fame, “a craving for notoriety and vulgar success,” as Huxley calls it, as one of the prime motives of his life and character. Whatever internal evidence may exist for this view, Hume’s whole literary career seems to verify it. Instead of resting satisfied with what he had achieved, which he must have felt would

⁹ Prof. Huxley’s Life.

ultimately influence the development of human speculation, Hume peevishly writes that his first work "fell dead-born from the press without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots."¹⁰ Thoroughly dissatisfied with the reception of the "*Treatise*," Hume sought to gain recognition by recasting his thoughts into more popular form. Accordingly he rewrote the first book of his former work, entitled, "*Of the Understanding*," publishing a more polished but less profound exposition of its main tenets under the title of "*An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*;" and the latter portions of the earlier work, which dealt with ethics, as "*An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*."

Essayist.—Hume now gradually lost his youthful interest in philosophy and began to speculate on political and economic questions. About 1740 he made the acquaintance of Adam Smith, who later wrote "*The Wealth of Nations*," a classic in the science of political economy. Smith has also a place in English ethics from the authorship of a theory of morals which emphasized the element of sympathy. This is a standpoint not very far from that of Hume. In the political field Hume exhibits the same power and subtlety of mind which made his philosophy the culmination of British thought. In the "*Political Essays*," published in 1741, may be noted the early beginning of the modern science of political economy. Here he contends that there may be discovered, permeating the laws of government and the relations of men, certain causal sequences of almost mathematical certainty, notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the motives and passions of mankind. An assumption not unlike this lies at the very foundation of all economic inquiry.

Later Life.—Soon after the publication of the "*Essays*," the friends of Hume endeavored, without success, to procure for him the professorship of moral philosophy at the Univer-

¹⁰ Hume's My Own Life.

sity of Edinburgh. His writings were by this time too well known to admit of any sympathy from among the Presbyterian Clergy. The charge of heresy and scepticism was advanced against him,—not without foundation, as it will later appear,—and the governing council filled the vacancy by “a safe nobody,” as Huxley expresses it. A few years later he began the publication of his “*History of England*” as a result of which he achieved that literary fame he had so long cherished as the dearest wish of his ambition.

His philosophical speculations produced more comment on the Continent of Europe than at home. His writings were considered to be in deep sympathy with the superficial philosophy of the more fashionable circles of French society. To the uncritical reader the epistemology and religious scepticism of Hume appeared very close to the materialism of La Mettrie and D’Holbach. A visit to France was the occasion for much attention from great nobles and great ladies, who treated him, it is said, much like a newly-found “sensation.” It was at this time also that he made the acquaintance of Rousseau, which later placed the generous and kind-hearted Hume in a position to receive, in return for his kindness, the lunatic malignity of the passionate and half-crazed Swiss.

By this time Hume had acquired a large fortune, amply sufficient to supply his needs and his generosity. He had built for himself a house on one of the newly-opened streets of Edinburgh, to which some one jokingly gave the name of “St. David’s Street,” a title which it continues to bear. Here Hume entertained the most accomplished society of the Scotch metropolis, Adam Smith, Ferguson, and many others of lesser note. About 1775 his health began to fail,—“I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. . . . I consider, besides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities,”¹¹—and on the 25th of August of the following year,

¹¹ Hume’s *My Own Life*.

1776, he died. He met death with the same cheerfulness and resignation which had been his temperamental characteristic through life; and even a full understanding of approaching death failed to bring him nearer to the faith of his fathers or excite a single expressed hope in the immortality of the soul. Yet few men whose lives have been recorded in history have met death with greater simplicity, cheerfulness, or noble fortitude. Whatever we may believe regarding his philosophy, there is certainly unanimity in the estimation of a generous and noble life consecrated to the service of others and the pursuit of truth.

STAND-POINT.

The interest that Hume manifested in early life for philosophy is probably traceable to the reading of the Roman moralists. The Hellenic-Roman philosophy, prominent about the beginning of the Christian era, is remarkable for its emphasis on man. Rome attained its prominence in the ancient world more through action than reflection. The explanation of man, his power and his passions, interested the Latins far more than theories of the world or speculations concerning the truth and the basis of knowledge. The Roman philosophers were all moralists in the strict sense of the word. Hume accepted their stand-point, but he was unwilling to recognize any system of ethics unless it could be ultimately traced to the world of experience. In this he followed his predecessors, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke. He therefore finds himself unable to continue his progress in moral philosophy until he has examined the nature of man, upon which all morality rests. His problem, then, is the examination of human nature.

Epistemology.—With this purpose in mind Hume first seeks to discover the origin of our mental states, believing with Locke that this is the key to all knowledge. "As the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so, the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself

must be laid on experience and observation."¹² He therefore divides all the perceptions of the mind, or elements of knowledge, into two broad classes, *Impressions* and *Ideas*. The former correspond to the sensations, direct perceptions, and more violent passions, all of which come to the mind with an irresistible force. The ideas, on the other hand, are secondary in character, arising rather from the processes of thought; they may be directly traced to the impressions for their origin, but are generally more complex in character and richer in content. Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas is like that between immediately present feeling and derived or secondary reflection. X

METAPHYSICS.

Previous Meaning of "Idea."—We must not confuse the meaning of the word "*idea*" as employed by the three British philosophers. With Locke it indicated "whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks."¹³ To him the ideas comprehended the perception of color, sound, as well as the concepts of existence, unity, and power; it was the general name to be applied to almost any state of mind. This appreciation of the meaning of idea was also followed by Berkeley, who wrote in his "*Commonplace Book*," "By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing." Hume, on the contrary, sought to restore the term to what he considered to be its original significance. Instead of defining idea in such a manner that it included all perceptions or psychical states, he restricted its application to thoughts or derivative processes of the mind. His use of the term was therefore much more restricted in its application than in the case of the two earlier thinkers. Hume wished it to express only the more complex reflective processes of mind, possibly a significance nearer to conception than perception. X

¹² Introduction, *Treatise of Human Nature*.

¹³ Locke's *Essay*, Book I., Chapter i., Sec. 8.

Substance.—The theory of *general ideas* advanced by Hume is almost the same as that of Berkeley. The latter, it will be remembered, positively denied the existence in the mind of any such abstract concepts, and Hume writes “that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive significance and makes them recall on occasion other individuals which are similar to them.”¹⁴ The denial on the part of Berkeley of any real existence in the mind to be ascribed to abstract ideas was followed by the denial of that unknown *substance* behind our ideas, considered so important by Locke. With this Hume was also in agreement. Substance meant to him a certain group of qualities or simple impressions often occurring together. The idea of substance, if considered apart from this collection of qualities, is contradictory in its nature. No one can mention any properties which belong to mere substance as such, since it is believed to excite no color, sound, or other sensation. It is therefore undefinable and of no value, except as the expression for a certain specific group of impressions.

Association of Ideas.—According to Hume the reappear-
ance in the mind of an impression, as an idea, is accomplished
 by two faculties,—the memory and the imagination. The former reproduces the impressions as they are in themselves, according to a fixed order and position; the latter reconstructs them into ideas, according to its own laws. These laws of the imagination, or rather the means by which we connect or associate our ideas, are three in number. It is possible that ideas may be connected in the mind by mere resemblance. The face of a stranger suggests some absent friend, a clap of thunder may bring to mind the report of artillery. These connections of ideas are merely those of superficial similarity, they point to no real connection between the stranger and the friend, or the thunder and the artillery. Another

¹⁴ Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Part I., Sec. 7.

means by which different ideas may become associated or united in the mind arises from some previously noted contiguity in space or time. Thus it is possible that the idea of a flower may suggest a certain book, because on some previous occasion the two were observed side by side. And, finally, Hume mentioned the principle of causality as perhaps the relation which produces the strongest and most certain association of ideas. The idea of the ruins of a house consumed by fire would almost invariably arouse the idea of fire. The name of an author will suggest his best-known work, and likewise the name of a book will suggest its writer.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.—Of the several relations which may exist among the ideas, Hume considers this connection of cause and effect to be especially worthy of analysis. Before his time the connection between two events was believed to be necessary, if one could infer that a causal relation existed between them. Hobbes had taken this for granted and had raised the principle of causality, the undeniable relation of necessity which controlled all mental as well as external events, to a position of supreme importance. The entire world was under the dominion of law,—this was the basis of his materialism. Locke also had accepted a rather uncritical attitude towards causality. The idea of cause was derived from that which produced something, and effect from that which was produced. The unknowable substance, in which all the qualities of an object subsist, served as the unchangeable connective between the cause and the effect. Locke's belief in substance was therefore a sufficient basis for the necessary connection between two events. Berkeley interpreted the substratum of our ideas, not as a material and unknowable substance, but as the spiritual Being of God. And even Spirit as the ultimate origin of our ideas could well serve as the basis for the necessary connection between natural events. It was this that Berkeley especially emphasized in his later writings; God, the eternal Spirit, gave to certain of our more vivid ideas that

necessary connection which leads us to associate them with the fixity and necessity of the external world.

† HUME'S VIEW OF NECESSARY CONNECTION.—Hume, on the other hand, finds himself at a loss to reconcile his thorough empiricism with the prevalent explanation of necessary connection. He could neither recognize with Locke and the scientists of his time the existence of a material "Substance," nor could he remain satisfied with the "spirit" of Berkeley, since both views premised a something which could not be received by the mind as an impression. The only alternative for Hume as a consistent empiricist was the *denial of the recognized principle of necessary connection*. One impression comes to the mind, and another, of a different character, immediately follows it. The ideas excited by these impressions are associated together in the mind by contiguity in time. On some future occasion the two impressions occur in the same temporal order, and the association by contiguity in time is further strengthened. And likewise it is observed that the two impressions always, within the limits of our experience, recur in this same temporal order, never one without the other. From this observed sequence the human mind, which is too apt always to draw its conclusions from insufficient data, infers that there is some inner unity or necessary connection between the two events. This inner connection, which gives the element of necessity to the succession of cause and effect, is what Hume denies. All we know is the impressions; these suggest no idea of internal connection beyond the mere flux in consciousness; causality is merely observed sequence, nothing more.

The Basis of Science.—Hume's interpretation of causality is certainly simple on the surface, but yet carries with it consequences of a momentous character. There is no real connection between the impressions of sun-setting and darkness, they are merely connected by customary observation. There is no absolute and infallible reason why darkness must follow the setting of the sun, only from the association of ideas, by sequence in

time, throughout unnumbered centuries. It is true that the probability is highly in its favor, but high probability is distinctly different from true knowledge. The observations of man since time immemorial give rise only to a high probability, never to absolute knowledge. What we call truth, or science, or law, is nothing but a sequence of those ideas the past observation of which has already testified to the high probability of their future re-occurrence.—Scientific facts are the epigrammatic statements of these observed sequences among our ideas.

The Character of Hume's Scepticism.—This view undoubtedly has a sceptical tinge, but it is far from the classic forms of scepticism; were this not so, Hume would have no place in the history of positive philosophy. Hume is positive in so far as he regards the impressions to be the source of all our ideas; he is sceptical in so far as he refuses to admit the validity of any ideas which cannot be traced to experience. Necessary connection, the idea of God or human immortality, are concepts which have no firm foundation in the world of impressions, and therefore he denies, or perhaps seriously doubts, their reality or value. We cannot but admire the logical consistency of Hume, who, starting with a firm belief in the infallible nature of his empiricism, constructs his whole philosophy with its demands foremost in his mind. Impressions as such exist,—that is his positive philosophy. “They are the successive perceptions only, that constitutes the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or the materials of which it is compos'd.”¹⁵ We cannot know if the objects of the impressions are real in themselves, or whether the propositions of the reason are true,—and that is his scepticism.

The Self and Personal Identity.—The empirico-sceptical attitude of Hume is still further emphasized by the problem of personal identity. Locke, it may be remembered, founded

¹⁵ Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Part IV., Sec. 6.

the continuity of selfhood upon mere consciousness, but nevertheless, as a true Christian, he recognized the existence of the human soul and likewise its immortality. Berkeley accepted the continued existence of the human spirit as the necessary condition for the flow of ideas and the operations of the mind. Hume, in his analytical attitude, wished to inquire into the nature of this soul or self before he would consent to accept it as a real idea; if such it could be directly traced to some impression. Now, the self, according to its classic definition, Hume observes, is a constant throughout life, "but there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived, and consequently there is no such idea."¹⁶ All the perceptions are distinguishable from one another and may be regarded apart from anything necessary to support them. The "self" is perhaps a brief term to express the succession of conscious states of the mind, but apart from this convenience it has no meaning whatsoever. The "I" is simply the succession of impressions.

It is merely the memory, and not a permanent soul-substance, which is able to refer back to some original impression, now awakened in the mind as an idea. The succession of impressions, which can be called an "I" only for convenience, is in some wise grasped by the faculty of the memory, which alone gives oneness to our lives. It is the memory which enables us to recognize our ideals and which guides our action according to rational motives. The "self," however, which the memory seems to represent to us, is nothing more than a reflection of the original impression; it is empirical in its character and very far from the "soul-substance" referred to in the older theories of personal identity. In brief, the self or

¹⁶ Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Part IV., Sec. 6.

person is merely a sequence of impressions and ideas, devoid ✓
of any fundamental unity and related only through the empirical character of the memory.

ETHICS.

The moral philosophy which Hume endeavors to erect upon his epistemological foundation has not the importance in the history of thought which is conceded to his metaphysics. It stands in disagreement with that of Locke, and in certain respects not far from the positions of Shaftesbury and Hume's friend, Adam Smith. Hume is distinctly opposed to Locke's original thesis, "that morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics."¹⁷ On the contrary, he believes that the moral judgments are derived from a certain moral sense arising independent of the reason. The values of good and evil are perceived or felt like any other impression; they are empirical in their nature, not rational. The element by which we may distinguish the noble from the bad is a certain feeling of pleasure or satisfaction. ✓ Hume constantly emphasizes the elementary distinction between the sentiments of pleasure and pain; it lies at the root of passion and action, of desire and volition. But this elementary feeling is not always associated with mere bodily enjoyment; sometimes it shows itself as a delicate satisfaction in the presence of the beautiful in art and the moral in conduct. Beauty and goodness were very close to one another in Hume's mind. The nature of man involuntarily approves of those actions which give rise to a feeling of pleasure. We are drawn towards both the actor and the act by an irresistible bond of sympathy. "There is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor one that gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and treacherous."¹⁸

¹⁷ Locke's Essay, Book IV., Chapter xii., Sec. 8.

¹⁸ Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. II., Part I., Sec. 2.

HUME'S POSITION IN PHILOSOPHY.

Hume's importance in the history of philosophy lies more in his relation to other thinkers than in the extreme originality of his attitude towards the world. He sums up, so to speak, the English philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He carries the empirical epistemology to its ultimate logical implications and discards every fragment of knowledge which is not countenanced by the empirical stand-point. If, on the one hand, he brings to a culmination the history of British philosophy, Hume must be regarded likewise as the real source of that critical attitude towards the world characteristic of later German speculation. He is so thoroughly an empiricist, so representative of the analytical psychology of the English type of mind, that he really initiates a movement in the opposite direction.

The problem which lies at the foundation of all English philosophy is the same problem that Hume considered himself able to dispose of by means of his empirico-scepticism,—a permanent and philosophical foundation for natural science. It was this same problem that excited Descartes, stimulated the speculation of the early Continental scientists, Kepler and Gas-sendi, and which served as a guide to the analytic methods of Spinoza and Leibnitz. But to the English thinkers the problem of science appears in an original setting. Instead of first determining the conditions and the methods by which science is possible,—the central inquiry of Continental thinkers in early as well as recent times,—the English philosophers took the empirical stand-point as their original presupposition and showed that any other point of view was radically opposed to the fundamental demands of science.

This method of presupposing the validity of all experiential data was thoroughly successful and sufficient so long as the regularity of these experiences could be interpreted as identical with the true processes of that nature which science itself

sought to interpret. So long as the empirical presupposition gave to the experiences an objectively valid *basis*, the English philosophy of experience was impregnable. But when Hume, in the light of the very stand-point which made his question possible, demanded an empirical explanation for this basis of our experiences, he removed the foundations from the entire English empirical philosophy. By showing that the causal relations among our ideas correspond only to observed sequences, he showed as well that a science resting merely on the flow of experiences is in reality no science. The solution of this perplexity was the problem which he set for himself and which unsolved was passed on to Kant.

Although Hume represents the true culmination of British thought, the central current of modern philosophy passed from him away from the English to the Germans. Yet his own countrymen were by no means satisfied with the position that he defined for them. They in turn sought to re-establish empiricism in its original self-reliance unvitiated by the sceptical outcome. Hume was followed in Scotland by a long line of thinkers whose works are of little value except from the stand-point of introspective psychology. The founder of this movement was Thomas Reid, author of "*An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*." Reid reduced all judgments of absolute or scientific truth to a certain innate faculty of the mind, which, like the moral or æsthetic sense, operated by certain infallible principles or laws. He therefore replied to the empirico-scepticism of Hume by resting the facts of science on the certainty of consciousness. And in thus transferring the criterion of necessity from the objective to the subjective he moves towards the criticism of the true successor of Hume,—Immanuel Kant.

The most original of the so-called "Scotch school" was *Sir William Hamilton*. The earlier members of this school had refuted, in their own mind, the sceptical character of Hume's empiricism by defining reality in terms of "*common sense*."

Anything is real which is determined to be such by all men at all times. Hamilton, however, refused to rest satisfied with this simple solution to the problem of reality, and he brought German criticism to the aid of English introspection. Knowledge should be defined as a system of relations or conditions. Nothing is known to consciousness, except in terms of relation; every fact is the expression of some relation. Knowledge, as the expression of conditions, has two extremes, both of which are beyond the power of the human intellect. On the one hand there is the simple immediate relation, the *absolutely conditioned* or defined; while on the other there is the *absolutely unconditioned*,—complete freedom from all determination. Between these two extremes lie the common relations of fact and life.

CHAPTER VI.

IMMANUEL KANT.

THE TWO EPISTEMOLOGICAL STAND-POINTS.

THUS far we have perceived two separate movements dominating the philosophical speculation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the Continent, Descartes and his followers emphasized above all else the rational element in our knowledge, while the British thinkers, influenced by the scientific characteristics of their nature, developed a distinctly empirical philosophy, standing in sharp contrast to the more speculative tendency of the Continent.

After the systematization of the philosophy of Leibnitz by his disciples, Wolff and Baumgarten, there is noticeable but little progress within the field of the Rationalists. Original investigation is lacking, beyond an uncritical incorporation of the doctrines of others within their own orthodox teachings,—a way of philosophizing often called *Eclecticism*. This recasting and harmonizing of somewhat contradictory principles into the form of a single system was the task of the German university professors during the early years of the eighteenth century. Just at this period, however, when rationalism was confined to a formal set of principles, the English empiricism had assumed unlooked-for importance. From the sudden impetus given to philosophy by the analytic acuteness of Locke, the empirical idealism of Berkeley, with its negative outcome in Hume, the influence of empiricism became strongly felt throughout all Europe. It penetrated to the remote city of Königsberg, near the eastern border of Prussia, where it excited the attention of a poor German tutor. And it is the transformation which empiricism received at his hands which forms the subject of this chapter. Rationalism gradually de-

clined during the eighteenth century, while at the same time the influence of empiricism steadily increased. It was natural, therefore, that some attempt should be made to unite the truer elements of each and resuscitate the dying rationalism by the youthful self-reliance of empiricism. Owing to the fundamental difference of method of the two schools, a mere amalgamation of parts was impossible; only by a new and original stand-point could the distinctive features of each be retained and harmonized. Such a stand-point was developed by Immanuel Kant, the father of contemporaneous philosophy, and perhaps the most profound thinker of the modern world.

LIFE AND CHARACTER.

Parentage.—Kant was born on April 22, 1724, in the provincial city of Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia. His father, a saddler by trade, was of Scotch descent. The elder Kant (spelled Cant) left no evidence of more than ordinary education nor any indication of remarkable intellectual brilliancy. He was extremely poor, even for his time and surroundings, but yet was always referred to by his son in terms of the deepest reverence, particularly for his honesty and thrift. The mother of the family was a woman of an extremely pious and sensitive nature, and although she had had but few educational privileges, Kant inherited from her a simple appreciation for Nature which was one of the ruling motives of his life. From her little Immanuel learned his first lessons in science, for she would often take him outside the city and tell him what she knew concerning the flowers and trees. The stern morality and sincere piety of his parents were perhaps the most notable influences of his younger years. Simple morality remained for him, throughout his whole life, an ideal superior in value to the speculative truths of philosophy.

Early Life.—At the age of eight he was sent to the Gymnasium, or public school, of his native city. It was by the suggestion of the family pastor, Dr. Schulz, that Kant was

allowed this privilege, for his parents had eleven children and could ill afford the expense. It has been said that this worthy man, Schulz, furnished the family with firewood to offset the cost of Immanuel's schooling. There is nothing in the youth of Kant which would suggest mental ability beyond the average boy of his age. He spent almost nine years in the Gymnasium, devoting his attention to the Latin language, and is said at that time to have aspired to the career of a classical philologist.

When sixteen years old he entered the University of Königsberg. Here his earlier preference for Latin was lost and he displayed a constantly growing inclination for physics and mathematics. This change in his taste was caused by the professor in physical sciences, Kuntzen by name, a man of rare ability and power, who seems to have excited a feeling of reverence in Kant. While a student at the university a dispute arose between those who were inclined to interpret Nature pantheistically and the orthodox Lutherans. The intolerance shown by the latter was sufficient to turn Kant's designs away from the ministry, although he was registered under the theological faculty. Intolerance, in whatever form it showed itself, was disagreeable to Kant, and these impressions of formal religion were amply sufficient to alienate him from the pietistic influences of his early surroundings. Kant separated the moral ideal from the religious emotions; the former he regarded as the basis of life itself, but there have been few who have felt to a less extent the influence of a religion of feeling. His university career was marked by severe poverty. He derived some income from teaching the less studious pupils, but this and a little assistance from a relative was hardly sufficient for his meagre support. Self-denial and an unconquerable will were the fruits of these early years of struggle and penury. Poverty and physical weakness taught him the power of the mind over the body, the will over the passions.

First Publication.—Kant left the university at twenty years

of age and published his first book about two years later. The subject of this work was concerned with the purely-physical interpretation of Leibnitz's concept of force. During the whole of his academic course, and even earlier at the Gymnasium, he had been taught by disciples of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy. Owing to its rationalistic foundation,—the interpretation of truth in terms of what ought to be,—Kant was led to call this whole movement *the dogmatic*. To this dogmatic way of thinking Kant was deeply attached during the first thirty years of his life; and this publication, which treated of kinetic forces in a mathematical manner, was distinctly dogmatic—rationalistic—in character.

After the death of his father, which occurred in 1746, Kant became a family tutor. This occupation lasted for nine years, during which time he was in the service of three different families, all residing in the immediate vicinity of Königsberg. In this period of his life the purely academic learning acquired during his earlier years was polished and brightened by constant intercourse with persons of culture. As a practical tutor he gained what was of inestimable value to him in later years,—the power of clear and concise expression. The duties of these positions did not demand all his attention, and he found time and opportunity for the study of his favorite subject,—astronomical physics. Besides his first publication already mentioned he prepared an essay on the retardation of the earth's motion by tidal action. From a rough estimation of the retarding effect of the action of the tides on the east coast of the whole American continent Kant inferred that the length of the day was increasing at the rate of a little less than a second in every thousand years.

Theory of the Heavens.—This short essay on the relation between the moon's attraction and the earth's diurnal motion was the prelude to an extended treatise which appeared anonymously in 1755, entitled "A General Natural History of the Heavens; or, an Essay concerning the Consitution and Me-

chanical Origin of the whole Universe considered according to the Newtonian Principles." This work, which alone places Kant in the first rank of original thinkers of the modern world, is the first exposition of the so-called "Nebular Hypothesis." The discovery of this cosmological theory, which marks a new era in astronomy, has been falsely attributed to the Frenchman, Laplace. The principal work of the latter, "*The System of the World*,"¹ did not appear until forty-one years after the publication of Kant's treatise. In it there is no mention of Kant; but it is highly improbable that Laplace would have mentioned this anonymous essay, even if he had seen it.

An exposition of Kant's discovery would properly belong to the history of astronomy rather than to that of speculative thought, but the importance warrants a brief summary here. The entire extent of the present stellar universe is supposed to have been occupied at some previous time by minute particles of matter, each of them susceptible to the laws of gravity. Gradually as the particles of the original chaos would act and react against one another there would arise centres of rotation throughout the whole mass, in a manner similar to the rotation of water while passing rapidly down a spout. Our own sun, with its attendant planets, developed from a single system of rotating particles, and each of the stars and visible nebulae represent other rotating systems in various stages of evolution. As regards the formation of the planets, Kant supposes a gradual separation of the revolving particles into rings, each ring finally concentrating about a centre. These centres, of which the earth is one, would, after they had become solid spheres, still retain the original motion of rotation about a central body or sun. Kant proceeds at length to explain the various astronomical facts by means of his theory, showing in what manner the planets, the form of their orbits, and their

¹ *Système du Monde.*

satellites are all phases in the realization of the law of stellar evolution.

University Career.—In the following year Kant published a work on physical geography, in which he offered, for the first time it is said, a true explanation of the trade-winds. This publication came out immediately after his appointment as lecturer, or “Privat-Docent,” at the University of Königsberg. This position allowed him to deliver lectures on whatever subjects he might choose and to collect the fees from the students, but it carried with it no official recognition from the university. These lectures were on the most varied subjects, comprising mathematics, physics, physical geography, anthropology, military science, pedagogics, natural theology, logic, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. In each of these subjects his name is connected with some contribution to the progress of true knowledge. By the discovery of the nebular hypothesis his name is worthy of a place beside that of Copernicus and Newton; and he may also be regarded as one of the early founders of physical geography and the modern science of anthropology. In pure metaphysics the name of Aristotle, of all the great thinkers of ancient and modern times, is alone worthy of a place beside that of Kant. Such an estimation is not the result of unmerited enthusiasm, but rather an echo of what the world is gradually coming to realize when it recognizes the extent of his influence together with the obligations which society owes to this humble thinker of remote Königsberg.

The Three “Critiques.”—Thus occupied with private lectures Kant continued until 1770, when he received the appointment to the chair of logic and metaphysics in the university of his native city, a position which he continued to hold until his death. After the inauguration as professor, Kant devoted himself almost exclusively to metaphysics. The spreading influence of English empiricism had already shaken his early reliance on the rationalistic methods, and finally the sceptical tendency of Hume had disturbed his confidence in the validity

of science. Some years before, he had conceived the fundamental premises of a philosophy wherein he hoped to restore the former eminence of science, and in his inaugural address defended a thesis made prominent in his later publications. His greatest work, the "*Critique of Pure Reason*,"² published in 1781, is the result of fifteen years of thought. Kant in this first "Critique" intended to treat of the speculative or metaphysical capacity of man and to define the limits of the human mind in its pursuit of mathematical, scientific, and metaphysical truth. This speculative reason, however, is by no means the extent of intellectual activity; the fields of moral and æsthetic judgments form a very considerable part of our mental range. To supply an estimation of these Kant found it necessary to supplement his former work by the issue in 1788 of his "*Critique of Practical Reason*,"³ and in 1790 of his "*Critique of Judgment*."⁴ Kant's reputation as a metaphysician rests almost entirely on these three works, for in them is found the fundamental elements, if not the complete exposition, of his system, called the Critical Philosophy. The "Pure Reason" is empirical and sceptical in character. It seeks to establish mathematical and physical science more firmly, while it also aims to show the inability of the reason to deal with the deeper problems of pure metaphysics. The "Practical Reason" supplements the former work and seeks to establish metaphysics on a moral rather than on a speculative basis. It shows that the same problems, such as immortality, human freedom, and God, which the "Pure Reason" found itself unable to cope with, were really solved by our faith in the ultimate reality of duty and morality. In the "*Critique of Judgment*" Kant applies an idealistic interpretation to beauty, sublimity, and natural purposes, believing such to result from

² Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

³ Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.

⁴ Kritik der Urtheilskraft.

mental attitudes rather than from the perception of qualities possessing a real existence in the external world.

Characteristics.—The many peculiarities in the personality of Kant deserve a passing remark, but hardly warrant such undue emphasis as they often receive. In physique he was weak and undersized; in stature scarcely five feet in height. A narrow chest, feeble lung power, and sunken cheeks are certainly indications of a frail body, but in Kant's case they were the result of inherited weakness enhanced by years of study. During the latter part of his life, when his feebleness and infirmities increased, he is said to have presented an emaciated and even deformed appearance, particularly noticeable to strangers. Kant was well aware of his own feebleness, and with this in mind he made the health of his body a special study. He believed that a healthy and happy state of mind was the first requirement for a healthy body, and that, within limits, the intellect controlled the condition of the whole organization. He disliked drugs of all kinds and believed that regularity and exercise, pure air and recreation were the surest foundations for a lengthened life.

The regularity of his conduct has been the source of surprise to all who know only the complicated conditions of our modern life. He rose punctually at five in the morning and partook of tea; until seven o'clock he was occupied with the preparation of his lectures, and from seven until nine with their delivery. The rest of the morning was taken up in writing for publication or in the correction of his manuscript. During hours of meditation it was his custom to fix his eye upon some distant object, in order that he might more readily concentrate his thoughts. A neighboring tower seemed well adapted for this purpose, and there is current a tradition that when it became obscured by some intervening trees Kant required their removal. Regularly at one o'clock he met a group of his friends at the dinner-table, preferring never to dine alone. These social gatherings were extremely enjoyable to Kant. Here he pur-

posely came in contact with men of the most varied experience, —merchants, professors, clergymen, and students were among the number. The subjects of conversation were never of a philosophical character; he desired rather to hear of travel, politics, and topics of daily interest. He is said to have been a “brilliant conversationalist” and interesting to all who had the privilege of dining with him. His marvellous memory, keen insight, wit, and mild sarcasm form a combination which may well deserve to be called “brilliant.” After the noonday meal he would either visit at the house of some friend or spend a few hours in the reading of newspapers. Regularly at the close of the afternoon he would take a walk. For this purpose Kant chose each day the same locality until his generosity towards beggars so increased their number that he was obliged to seek exercise elsewhere. Returning from the daily walk, which was never postponed on account of the severest weather, Kant would spend the evening enjoying some light reading. He is said to have been especially fond of Johnson and Swift among the English, and Montaigne and Rousseau among French writers. Promptly at ten he retired for the night.

Mental Qualities.—Kant was pre-eminently the thinker rather than the actor; he lived in an intellectual sphere and not in the world of practical affairs. Because of long brooding over problems of metaphysics his whole attitude towards the world became cold and reserved, evincing few traces of warmth or emotional sympathy. Although he looked with favor upon the American and French revolutions and on the cause of political freedom among all classes, it was a sympathy born of the intellect and not of the heart. The laws of human progress required an increasing respect towards the dignity of man, and Kant beheld in political liberty a single phase of human freedom. He had an especial dislike for music, believing it to be a waste of time and energy,—well enough perhaps for women who had nothing else with which to occupy their attention, but not worthy of consideration by the man of serious mind. Of

the other æsthetic arts, poetry alone appealed to him, and among the poets Lucretius, Horace, and Pope were his favorites. Eloquence was the object of special aversion to him, and he is said to have often declared that oratory attains its object through vain deceit. It is almost needless to say that Kant never married; he was too much the philosopher to subject his independence to his passions. He entertained no very high regard for women in general, and believed marriage of advantage only for rational ends, such as position or wealth.

With reference to religion Kant is the same critical philosopher. He regarded Christ as simply a personified Idea of Goodness which "reason presents to us for imitation." But beyond this religion of reason Kant had little sympathy with formal Christianity. He avoided all attendance at church and "spoke contemptuously of all acts of worship." Yet there have been few men in modern times who have had a more lasting influence on the deeper phases of Christianity or have contributed more towards a rational theology. Perhaps the deepest and firmest element in Kant's character was his reverence for simple morality. From his earliest boyhood he had respected the moral conscience above all else, and sought in later life to raise it to a position higher than that of the speculative reason.

To say that Kant was free from all emotions is certainly an exaggeration. He was often dogmatic in the expression of his views, disliked contradiction under all circumstances, and evinced unmistakable signs of anger when his old servant, Lampe, disobeyed his orders. Although modest in the estimation of his own worth, he was not always just towards those who were opposed to the Critical Philosophy. Long reflection made it difficult for him to appreciate the opinions of others, especially when they could not readily find a place in his own thought.

Death.—Towards the close of the century Kant's former powers began to fail. He no longer experienced the same pleas-

ure in the conversations of his friends or the same interest in contemporary affairs. His writings became less coherent and concise and at the same time more dogmatic in tone. Finally, towards the end of the year 1803, it was evident that he could not live much longer, and on February 12, 1804, he breathed his last. When the news of his death spread over Königsberg, a soldier pointed to a small cloud in the zenith, and said, "Behold, that is Kant's soul flying heavenward." Thus died one of the profoundest and noblest men who has ever lived.

PROBLEMS OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

In the exposition of Kant's philosophical system one meets with two difficulties,—its minuteness and its scope. Between this Scylla and Charybdis the expounder of Kant must steer his course. As regards its scope, it must be remembered that Kant endeavored to bring all branches of knowledge within the field of the Critical Philosophy and subject them to its principles. To accomplish this undertaking he had recourse to a minuteness and detail altogether inappreciable, except in the writings of the philosopher himself. As a thinker he is generally regarded as the typical German metaphysician, subtle but unintelligible, except after years of study. The style in which he wrote is often obscure and not infrequently lends itself to several interpretations.

Three Factors.—In the philosophy of Kant, considered as a whole, there are three factors which give it distinctness of form,—*rationalism*, *empiricism*, and *morality*. During the earlier years of philosophical study and reflection Kant was under the influence of the Leibnitz-Wolffian school. He displayed little originality in metaphysics and evinced a decided disposition to follow the current of the prevalent university philosophy. Later, however, he met the English empiricists, who impressed him with the inadequacy of the rationalistic stand-point and the necessity of meeting the issues of a sceptical empiricism. Hume's treatment of causality particularly trou-

bled him. He felt the cogency of its position, and yet was unwilling to accept it, since it seemed to undermine the possibility of any science whatever. If the principle of causalty was merely observed sequence, then the laws and truths of science have no value. To reconcile Leibnitz and Hume was the immediate purpose of the Kantian philosophy; but this reconciliation was by no means the only end in view. Kant had long felt that morality was superior to the syllogism of logic that the practical reason could approach nearer to ultimate reality than the speculative reason. With this in view the whole Critical Philosophy culminated in the proof of God's existence deduced from the eternal reality of the moral law. His early writings defined a new empirico-rationalism, through which Kant was able to reassert the validity of science; the later works carried this same stand-point beyond the physical world into the range of moral ideals.

The Motive.—Kant set before himself the problem of human knowledge, and the peculiar solution which he offered is known as the "Critical Philosophy." This aims to criticise the data of experience and at the same time to define the laws necessarily implied in the apprehension of experience, the origin of these laws, their nature, and their limits. This examination, however, of the presuppositions of science and the validity of empirical knowledge was subordinate to Kant's especial task of raising the authority of the moral consciousness above that of the reason. Thus, there appears to be two distinct, although in the end identical, aspects of the Kantian system,—the criticism of the sense-impression and the proper estimation of the moral consciousness; the former is made prominent by the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" alone, while the latter is in evidence when one considers this work in connection with the "*Critique of Practical Reason*."

Kantian Terminology.—At the time when Kant wrote, the meaning of philosophical terms was much less firmly fixed than at present. Especially was this true in Germany, where Wolff

and Baumgarten, but a few years before, had distinctly defined for the first time the use of the German language in technical philosophy. The original stand-point of Kant's system, together with the paucity of philosophical terms, made it necessary for him to define new meanings and attach to them new words. This makes the terminology of the Critical Philosophy a study in itself and renders its translation into popular language a difficult and precarious task. The understanding of Kant's system demands an acquaintance with a few at least of these terms, especially as they are now in use in general philosophical literature.

THE "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

The Logical Judgments of Science.—It was earlier remarked that the problem of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" was chiefly concerned with the foundations of science. With this inquiry before him Kant considered it necessary to define with considerable care the methods of reasoning employed in mathematics and science, and also the general type of logical judgment indicated by scientific statements. It is an ancient conception in logic which distinguishes between those thoughts or judgments which really join two separate facts or conceptions and those other word statements which merely repeat the same idea, as $A = A$. The former class Kant called "*synthetic*," because they indicate a synthesis or progress of ideas; whereas the latter class, which are mere redundant expressions, were called by him "*analytic*." Thus the judgment "that leaf is large" is a synthetic expression, for the two distinct and unrelated ideas "leaf" and "largeness" are united in a single statement. But when we say "the leaf is a leaf," it is quite obvious that no progress of thought had been made, and the statement is a useless redundancy,—and is therefore "*analytic*."

Still again, Kant lays special stress upon a distinction between judgments which depend on their apparent necessity

and universality. Thus it would be agreed that the statement "boats float on the water" is universal and carries with it a sort of implicit necessity which receives the assent of everybody. But if one said "this boat is white," the statement has little or no meaning until the special boat referred to is made known; for some boats are white and some are not. It is therefore possible to distinguish among judgments two broad classes. One may be said to include all those propositions which are universally valid so far as human thought and experience are concerned,—such, for example, as "boats float on the water," "two plus two make four," "barium sulphate is practically insoluble in water," or the law of gravity. These are called by Kant "*a priori*," in so far as they seem to be based on a sort of implicit necessity. In contradistinction to these judgments of universally valid facts there is a second class, which includes the simple descriptive statements of but a single experience,—“this boat is white,” “that man is tall,” or “that salt is deliquescent.” These, it will be observed, are not scientific or true facts until the boat, the man, or the salt is directly indicated by some description; the statements are true only for a limited portion of the extent of human experience; whereas the *a priori* judgments of the former class may be regarded as true throughout the whole length and breadth of our possible experience. This second class of statements whose truth is limited to a single observation Kant calls "*a posteriori*."

The Value of Synthetic Judgments.—And, furthermore, it is readily seen from the foregoing analysis that it is possible to divide all judgments into four subclasses by first classifying them into synthetic and analytic and then dividing each of these groups in its turn into *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments. Of these four classes, however, the two comprising the analytic statements are of little or no consequence, since they are mere redundant expressions. The synthetic judgments *a priori* and *a posteriori*, on the contrary,

are of great value, because it is by their means that we can attain to scientific knowledge. But a synthetic judgment is one that connects two ideas of a distinctly different character in such a manner that we regard the relation as true. There is therefore a kind of mystery connected with these synthetic judgments, for they are able to express true relations between apparently disconnected and heterogeneous ideas. In the case of the class of *synthetic judgments a posteriori* we have direct experience to appeal to in establishing this relation of truth. When I make the synthetic *a posteriori* judgment "this boat is white" I connect the different ideas of "boat" and "whiteness" by means of the sensations of sight and touch. But these sensations of sight and touch cannot penetrate beyond the boat directly before me to all boats of possible experience, hence the judgment is valid only with reference to a certain definite circumstance. From this example it is readily seen that in the case of synthetic judgments *a posteriori* we have the ground for the assurance of their truths directly derived from the certainty of sense-impression, but for that very reason the assurance is restricted to the momentary experience before us.

Synthetic Judgments a priori.—When, in the second place, we inquire regarding the basis of our certainty in the *synthetic judgments a priori* we approach a question much more difficult to answer. For when we say "boats float on the water" we assert that at any time or in any place we shall find this statement true, although our own restricted experience allows us to examine but a small number of all the boats that ever were or ever will be built and only a small portion of all the water that exists. Yet, notwithstanding this restriction, we feel able to assert as a fact of scientific knowledge that this statement is necessarily and universally true. In the case of synthetic judgments *a posteriori* we had direct experience to rely upon, but with *a priori* judgments this is entirely lacking. What, then, is their ground of truth and assurance? Or in Kant's

wording, *How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?*⁵ This is the immediate problem of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*;" through the answer to which he hopes to reconcile empiricism and rationalism and thereby permanently relieve science from scepticism.

The knowledge within the fields of mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics consists of synthetic judgments a priori, and the field of these judgments is co-extensive with the limits of possible knowledge. With this in mind Kant recognized that if he should determine the extent of the possibility of the synthetic judgments a priori he would have really determined the extent of the possible knowledge of man. Kant's new problem of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" is in truth, nothing else than the old problem of Aristotle, Nicolas of Cusa, Locke, and Hume,—the limits of human knowledge.

The Three Faculties of the Mind.—In order to deal with this problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori it was necessary to consider the various circumstances under which they could arise. For it would seem quite obvious that the same solution to the problem could not be applied to those very complex processes of thought which might be found sufficient in cases where the mind only made simple judgments of apprehension. The differences in the complexity of the various mental activities would render a single solution to the problem inadmissible. In brief, it was necessary to divide the mind into its different regions of activity and then search for the ground of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori within each field. In order to accomplish this the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" is divided into three distinct parts, each of which relates to a special aspect of the mind. At first Kant is concerned with the reception of our knowledge,—that is, the mere intuition and tabulation of the facts of experience, an operation of the

⁵ "Wie sind synthetische Urtheile a priori möglich?"—Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 19.

mind which is accomplished by the function or faculty of *sensibility*.⁶ But, besides this mere reception, the experiences of sense and imagination must be arranged and systematized in order to be of use in the processes of thought. For this purpose Kant suggests a second faculty, that of the *understanding*,⁷ which analyzes and arranges the data presented to it by the sensibility. Beyond this power of arrangement of the understanding there is still another faculty of the mind, the *reason*,⁸ which attempts to carry the facts of sense beyond their legitimate limits and into the field of abstract metaphysical constructions. The term faculty does not imply that there are three unrelated regions of the mind, each one of which operates by independent laws. On the contrary, Kant insists that the mind is a unity in itself and that these so-called faculties are only the different aspects, functions, or modes of its operation.

The "Thing-in-itself."—With this threefold classification of our mental activities clearly defined, the further treatment of the original problem regarding synthetic judgments *a priori* would quite naturally take the form of what we might call a natural history of the ordinary processes of knowledge. This would take the form of an account of *How we obtain knowledge*, it would attempt to trace each step of the mind through the three faculties from the single sense-perceptions to the formulation of the highly abstract conceptions of metaphysics. Such an historical sketch would point out the general nature of each mental process and describe the conditions under which it occurred. While tracing the natural history of our mental processes we shall later discover that Kant is a *rationalistic-idealist* in so far as he recognizes that the mind and not the outside world is responsible for the universality and necessity of all true judgments of knowledge, an *empiricist* in so far as he recognizes that the elements of these judgments are ultimately derived from sense-impressions. In order, however, for any idealism to

⁶ *Sinnlichkeit*.⁷ *Verstand*.⁸ *Vernunft*.

reconcile itself with the hard stubbornness or the given quality of our world of fact, it has always felt the necessity of some purely objective, external, or non-idealistic element. Thus Berkeley, influenced by religious motives, defined God as the ultimate source of our true ideas,—or synthetic judgments *a priori*, as the critical mind of Kant would have called the God-given ideas of Berkeley. And in the same manner Kant found it necessary to trace our knowledge back to some external source, only his clear insight found it difficult to explain the partially comprehensible facts of knowledge by the incomprehensible nature of God. On the contrary, he sought the simplest and perhaps least objectionable realistic basis for any idealism, the mere unqualified existence of a something existing outside of space and time and beyond our exact knowledge, but a something which might serve as the logical background for our world of experience. This unknowable substratum of sensation Kant called the “*thing-in-itself*” (Ding-an-sich). It must not be confused with the “substance” of Locke and the Scholastics, for the “thing-in-itself” is a spaceless, timeless, and causeless entity, the conception of which is entirely original with Kant. It is, even in his case, ultimately traceable to an inference from experience, for he sympathizes above all else with the empirical stand-point. “As regards temporal antecedence,” Kant says, in the introduction to the second edition of the “*Critique of Pure Reason*,” “there is no knowledge within our mind which was not first in experience.” He thus begins with apparently the same empirical presupposition as Locke, only Kant recognizes in experience something deeper than its mere givenness. This he finds in the logical reality of the “thing-in-itself” a non-sensuous but real something, which somehow underlies our apprehension of the outside world. This strange “thing-in-itself” is the basis or original starting-point for our natural history of the mental processes. The only conception we can possibly form of it—and even this meagre conception refers only to its existence and not to any qualities it might possess—

may be obtained by abstracting from some object all its spacial or temporal characteristics, and the mere "skeleton" which remains is some approach to Kant's "thing-in-itself." Its nature will perhaps become somewhat clearer if we proceed to trace the conditions under which it may affect the mind.

The Sensibility.—ITS FORMS OF APPREHENSION.—The impression from the outside unknowable "thing-in-itself" comes first to the mind as a mere stimulus which, owing to its spaceless and timeless character, altogether evades consciousness. It is Kant's original interpretation of the knowing process that this external stimulus to experience is received by the mind according to its own laws of perception. It is the faculty of sensibility which first reacts on the "thing-in-itself," and in so doing impresses upon it the conditional elements of *space and time*. They are the universal qualities of every experience, the peculiar and distinctive tools or instruments which the faculty of sensibility employs in the perception of the unknowable "thing-in-itself." In other words, space and time are the instrumental conditions or formulæ of procedure and tabulation by which the mind perceives the external source of its ideas. They are not, as wrong interpretations of Kant would seem to imply, the arbitrary creations of the sensibility which are somehow made and then objectified in order to deceive the mind, but, on the contrary, they are the necessary conditions or methods without which the mind could not react on the real external world; from a similar stand-point one might consider warm temperature to be one of the necessary conditions without which life could not continue, or feet, to use a simple illustration, the necessary condition for animal locomotion. Just as a man who has always worn red spectacles would perceive the external world in terms of redness, or the person under the influence of opium would look at the world through the veil which this drug impresses upon the mind, so space and time are the universal media by which the human intellect apprehends its experiences.

THE "PHENOMENON."—Should one wake up in the morning and find that everything experienced had a red color and that nothing could be conceived except as veiled in this redness it is by no means improbable that the conclusion would be drawn that the redness was a result of some peculiarity of the mind. From a similar stand-point Kant, finding that space and time are the universally necessary elements of all experience, failed to account for them in any other way than as subjective forms of apprehension. By so doing he ceased to regard our sensuous experiences as the ultimately simple (after Locke and Hume), but rather as the secondary constituents of knowledge. The term "*appearance*" (object of sense-perception),⁹ and later the word "*phenomenon*," was employed by Kant to denote those constituent elements of our knowledge which result from the action of the subjective forms of space and time on the unknowable "thing-in-itself." They are the "objects" of everyday experience, the common facts given us by sensation.

SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN MATHEMATICS.—Sir William Rowan Hamilton, the originator of the calculus of quaternions, called algebra the science of time and geometry the science of space. Under one or both of these most general forms it is perhaps possible to subsume every branch of modern mathematics. Hamilton was a disciple of Kant in metaphysics, and this observation well illustrates the stand-point of the Critical Philosophy towards mathematical science. If the mathematical truths have their source in an ultimate reference to space and time they would rest on a humanistic, subjective, or idealistic element; they would be referable to conditions of mental apprehension rather than to the external world. Now, since the mere forms of spacial and temporal apprehension are identical for all men throughout all possible ranges of experience, then what is true with reference to the space and time of

* "Erscheinungen (Gegenstände der sinnlichen Anschauung)."—Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 52.

one person remains true to everybody at all times. Thus, if I assert that within the Euclidian postulates three angles of a triangle are equal to a straight angle, I have declared what is true to every person under any condition, because the space in which this proposition holds true is the same space as that through which we all receive our experiences. This proposition is universally and necessarily true, because it is required by what is universal and necessary for all mankind,—space. This is the reply by which Kant himself answers his original question: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible in mathematics? They are possible because space and time, the forms of mathematics, are subjective elements universal for all men under all circumstances.

“TRANSCENDENTAL FORM.”—Our experiences, hitherto considered so simple and so ultimate, seem to appear in a new light if the bearing of this theory of Kant is understood. And especially interesting does this analysis of experience appear if considered in connection with Hume’s sceptical attitude towards the sciences. The Scotchman had left philosophy in an unhappy plight. While resting all the assurance of knowledge on experience he had in the next breath shown that experience gives us no basis for such an assurance. Driven to this stand-point by the irresistible logic of the Briton, Kant sought to re-establish the dignity of mathematics and the sciences by criticising experience. He recognized that Hume’s position was unassailable so long as the experience itself was considered ultimate, but by analyzing this experience he hoped to avoid a sceptical outcome. The “thing-in-itself,” like the “impressions” of Hume, can itself lead us nowhere, but the phenomenon formed by the union of this “thing-in-itself” with space and time may lead us to true knowledge through the subjective universality of the latter elements. These two necessary forms of experience, by which Kant is able to escape the scepticism of Hume, were called by him “*transcendental*,” because their existence is *necessary for even the possibility of experience*. The

term *a priori*, earlier referred to in connection with universal and necessary judgments, is often used with a similar significance, for it is by means of the implicit necessity which attaches itself to the transcendental elements, that the *a priori* judgments are possible. Briefly defined, the transcendental elements in the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" are *those forms which are necessarily required by the very nature of the possibility of experience itself*. This term must not be confused with transcendent, which has an altogether different meaning, the latter referring to that which goes beyond or transcends all possible experience,—as God and the conception of the world's beginning.

The Understanding.—We have just seen that the faculty of the sensibility has transcendental ways of looking at experience, and we now have to inquire as to the nature of the second faculty of the mind, the *understanding*. It is here that the phenomena produced by the sensibility from the "thing-in-itself" and its transcendental elements of space and time are synthesized into the propositions, thoughts, and statements of scientific knowledge. That is, the understanding is the faculty that *judges*; it brings together, according to the natural laws of thought, the mere unconnected experiences or phenomena presented to it by the sensibility. The understanding is an active faculty, for besides the mere reception of the phenomena from the sensibility, it is able to rethink, according to its own laws, these phenomena into the distinct propositions of thought.

THE MEDIACY OF ALL EXPERIENCES.—But before we inquire into these laws by which the understanding unites the experiences it may be possible to simplify the task by the discovery of some general character common to all experience. We have all probably observed that no single experience comes to us entirely disconnected from its context in thought. When we recognize the experience of something, say a mountain, the mere sensuous perception is never unmixed with the memory of

some other experiences which it serves to recall, or with the train of thought which it initiates. The perception never occurs emotions. It is quite true that these psychological processes pure, it is always set in a context of other ideas, thoughts, and which accompany the mere perception are seldom consciously recognized, they are noted only by subsequent reflection. This elementary fact of psychology, that all our experiences are united by subtle bonds of subconscious thought, is known as the interrelatedness or *mediacy of experience*. By supplying a ground or point of reference for all experiences, even of the most diverse character, it gives unity to our consciousness and purposive form to our life.

Although one may perhaps doubt that all our experiences are as intimately connected with one another as this description might imply, we would all probably agree with Kant that the flow of time at least is a bond of unity for every experience. It is always possible to connect two experiences by the before and after relation, by representing them both in one temporal series. It would seem, therefore, that the continuity of time is the simplest form of mediacy, for every fact of our conscious life has some relative position in the temporal series, and no experience can be even thought which has not a place in time.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL SELF.—Although this mediacy or connectiveness of experience may appear to be very simple and hardly worth mentioning, it seems to carry with it consequences of a most important character. To illustrate what is involved in the unity of our temporal consciousness let us take the experience of a single event and trace its logical implications. When I cast my eyes towards the west we will say that a certain pointed irregularity meets my gaze. At first I merely apprehend or perceive it, but coincident with the mere unconscious perception there comes the thought,—what is it? To this half-conscious query there appear the vague images of other experiences which I momentarily reproduce in my imagination. By means of these images of other experiences I am able to recog-

nize that this irregularity in the landscape denotes a mountain. From certain topographical features I recognize that the mountain is familiar to me, it recalls past experiences, it serves to unite my present consciousness to the thoughts and experiences of other days. An occurrence like this is constantly happening to all of us, but owing to its familiarity we have long since ceased to wonder at the process or examine its nature. But yet there is something very striking about this power of a single sensation to awaken nearly forgotten memories of the past and to change the whole current of our thought. Through all these past experiences thus reproduced in memory there must have been a certain sameness or unity, else the single experience of the familiar mountain would have been unable to bring them into consciousness. In fact the existence of a certain unperceived *bond of unity—my own self-bond*—is presupposed by the simplest unity or mediacy of our experience. This *innermost Ego*, whose function it is to bind together into a single conscious life all the experiences of a person, is never itself perceived. Yet unless we presuppose its existence the experiences of the past would lack all familiarity; we would be conscious only of the momentary present. We only appreciate the existence of this deepest self because experience, as we know it, would be impossible without such a bond of unity; its existence is inferred as the necessary condition for the possibility of our common experiences. In a previous paragraph those elements which were necessary for our experience, as space and time, were denoted by the Kantian term "*transcendental*." And this self which we have just described as the central unity of our conscious life is the "*transcendental Ego*." Although it can never itself be directly perceived, its binding nature is demanded by the unity of our conscious life.

THE CATEGORIES.—It is now possible for us to return to the laws of the understanding, for we are able to perceive that there is a transcendental element, the Ego, involved in the experiences or phenomena with which the understanding deals.

The operations of this faculty are above all else *orderly*. The very fact that in the background lies the transcendental Ego, synthesizing all the experiences into an interrelated whole, requires that unity lies at the very heart of the understanding. And, moreover, this unity of the understanding shows itself in the *laws of the judgment*, for we earlier saw that judgment was the special duty of this faculty. And behind these laws there is a unity of motive, in that all judgments of whatever character seek to attain the *truth*. Now since this unity of the understanding rests on the transcendental Ego, the laws by which this faculty acts must themselves be transcendental. In other words, the laws of the understanding, or, as Kant calls them, the *Categories*, are, like space and time, transcendental in their nature. They are the subjective, or *a priori*, or transcendental forms by which the understanding unites the phenomena handed over to it by the sensibility; the conditions which make possible the orderly processes of thought. We have thus discovered that the understanding as well as the sensibility has certain rules or formal conditions which it impresses upon the phenomena. The categories, however, are not, like space and time, mere forms of apprehension, but rather the laws by which the understanding must operate. Owing to the unity and purpose of the understanding it is possible to be perfectly sure as to the number and character of these categories, for they are identical with the general principles which the judgment employs in its search for the truth. They are twelve in number and are divided into four groups of three each. In Kant's mind they corresponded exactly to the laws of the judgment or thinking process, as exemplified by formal logic. They represent the way the human intellect must proceed in its thought in order to approach the ideal of truth.

CAUSALITY.—Of the twelve categories that of *causal relation* may be regarded as the most important and will be employed to illustrate the general nature of the others. Let us consider for a moment the case of two billiard-balls moving towards each

other. The phenomena of their movement, the contact, and the reaction are thought by the understanding under its own transcendental laws or categories. The three positions of the billiard-balls are not regarded as mere unconnected events, but are rather united by the understanding into a causal series. Wherever we apprehend nature the phenomena come to the understanding unrelated, in simple temporal succession, like the observed sequences of impressions which was all that Hume could find in nature; they are then thought by the understanding according to its own forms or categories. Causality does not exist in the world of the "thing-in-itself," it is only one of the ways by which the understanding relates the phenomena. Causality, law, order are imposed upon the world by the mind and are not found in the world itself.

SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN SCIENCE.—In view of this theory of the transcendental character of the laws of thought it is not difficult for Kant to answer his original question concerning synthetic judgments *a priori* in physical science. For if it is the universal laws of the human understanding which give the regularity, unity, and apparent necessity to the world of outer nature, then it is perfectly possible for knowledge to fall within the limits of truth, so long as it arises from the legitimate exercise of the categories of the understanding. The mind through its faculty of the understanding impresses the laws upon nature. This faculty is, like the sensibility, universal among men, so that the valid operation of its transcendental elements will always give rise to perfectly true and scientific judgments *a priori*,—these judgments arise from the universal nature of the categories themselves and in no wise refer to the objective reality of law in the world of the "thing-in-itself." Thus far Kant's work has been distinctly positive. He set before himself the problem: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? To this he replies, they are possible because their *a priori* or universally necessary nature arises from the inherent laws of the mind's activity, and not

from any externally valid relations. Mathematical predictions remain true; scientific laws are universally accepted because the transcendental elements upon which both depend are universal and necessary for all mankind. The outer world in its absolute reality, the "thing-in-itself," is forever unknowable; the nature known to our own consciousness is this unknowable, apprehended under the forms of space and time and interpreted in terms of the categories.

NOUMENA.—It is true that the understanding sometimes meets with ill-fated results when it attempts to deal with concepts which are not themselves phenomena, but which arise within the mind independently of the sensibility. These non-spacial and non-temporal concepts which the understanding finds it cannot employ in its processes of thought are called by Kant, "*noumena*." The self is an example of such a concept. In its innermost nature the soul is outside of time and space, and cannot therefore be employed by the understanding in its processes of thought. All attempts to think a "*noumenon*" are by their nature doomed to failure. Our mind can go no further than the sensibility permits; the understanding can deal only with its phenomena. Kant thus far is in agreement with Locke as to the limits of our sensuous knowledge, only we shall see later that he denies the intuitive knowledge of the soul and the rationally demonstrable knowledge of God.

Kant's reply to the scepticism of Hume is distinctly idealistic. Instead of refuting the observation of the acute Scotchman that natural laws are only observed sequences, he accepts it with all that it implies, only he asks us to consider for a moment the inner nature of these sequences. Criticise the experiences of which the sequences consist and we may not find them as simple as might appear at first sight. The error of Hume, according to Kant, consisted in the belief that the given impression was ultimate. By an analysis of experience Kant discovered not only the objective and given, but also a subjective and universal character. Thus conceived, the scepticism of

Hume vanishes. Reality has become internal rather than external, subjective instead of objective.

The Reason.—Although Kant rejected Hume's attitude towards the possibility of a true science, he did not hesitate to follow him in certain respects. By means of his transcendental stand-point he had defined the limits of the human intellect, and he was disinclined to desert his convictions. There was, however, a region of inquiry to which the understanding, limited to a few phenomena, could not attain; and it was the office of the third faculty of the *reason* to investigate those subjects which lay beyond the power of the former. If we regard the understanding as the *faculty of rules*,¹⁰ Kant believes that the reason may be defined as the *faculty of principles*.¹¹ By this Kant would indicate the highest power of the mind,—a faculty which concerns itself with general propositions and conceptions and does not hesitate to penetrate to the broadest and deepest generalities. The operation and the results of the understanding are legitimate, they are founded directly on experience and proceed no further than the separate phenomena will permit. But, on the contrary, the reason seeks to go far beyond the legitimate ground of the phenomena and construct *ideas* of its own from the insufficient data received from the understanding.

THE IDEAS OF THE REASON.—In this illusory procedure of the reason it is especially concerned with the ideas of the *unity of the soul*, the *ultimate character of the world*, and finally with the *Ideal of God*. After repeated failures on the part of the baffled reason to establish anything of value, it discovers that these ideas belong to a realm beyond experience and higher than the speculative faculty of man can penetrate. The manner in which Kant shows the insufficiency of the speculative reason in

¹⁰ "Vermögen der Regeln."—Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 356.

¹¹ "Vermögen der Principien."—Ibid.

the presence of these problems has exerted a lasting influence on later philosophy. The arguments in each case are founded in the fact that the reason can never deal with a totality of phenomena,¹² because the understanding cannot supply the necessary data. Totality implies a limited whole which can never under any condition be attained through the phenomena themselves. And the three central ideas are deduced from a totality of phenomena; hence the reason is baffled in their presence.

THE PARALOGISMS OF PSYCHOLOGY.—When the reason endeavors to make assertions regarding the *soul* it becomes involved in certain difficulties which Kant calls the “*paralogisms*.” They deal with the presuppositions of rational *psychology* and illustrate the results to the reason in its attempt to discover a spiritual essence of man, called the soul, incorruptible and immortal. The several paralogisms appear perfectly logical on the surface, for they observe the form of the syllogism of logic. But when they are further examined we find that the reason has constructed them on the premise of the subjective totality of experience. This, however, is forbidden ground, for the concept of a totality of phenomena of whatever character lies beyond the legitimate field of the intellect. Reason feels conscious that it is able to deal with the self of self-consciousness, but fails in its attempt, because the only self is the “transcendental Ego,” which we earlier saw was only an implication of experience and not a reality directly perceived. In brief, the speculative reason of metaphysics cannot know, anything about the soul, because its nature is bound up in that totality of experience which itself lies beyond all experience. And, furthermore, Kant discards the proof of the soul’s existence given by Descartes. “I think, therefore I am,” said the Frenchman, but Kant replies that the act of thinking is itself

¹² “. . . Anschauungen die Allheit (universitas) oder Totalität der Bedingungen.”—Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 379.

a single experience and cannot lead us to the reality of that unity which expresses the totality of all our experience. It proves the momentary existence of thought, but not the continuity of selfhood.

THE ANTINOMIES OF COSMOLOGY.—The soul is not the only forbidden ground for the reason; psychology is not the only science in which the reason may go astray by placing too great reliance on its power. It seems to be the universal custom to construct theories of the *world*,—concerning its beginning, its limits in space and time, and the extent of its physical laws. In all these inquiries, which generally appear under the name of *cosmology*, the human reason is the guide. We are apt to declare that the world had no beginning, or that freedom of volition is impossible, because the opposite premises contradict reason. Kant therefore set himself to discover the real powers of our speculative reason in the presence of these problems, and arrived at conclusions not altogether gratifying. The reason when confronted with the cosmical questions finds itself in a strange predicament. It is able to reach opposing and contradictory solutions to the same problem by equally valid methods of procedure. These equally valid contradictions are called *antinomies* by Kant. They are four in number and represent the exertions of the reason while trying to conceive of the totality of the world. The reason is able to prove conclusively that the universe is limited in time and space, yet in the next breath it is able also to prove the opposite or antithesis. Still again the reason finds that invariable mechanical laws are universal in the control of the human will as well as external nature. Then, as if playing with our convictions, it brings forward irresistible arguments to prove the necessity of freedom. The antinomies are thus logical contradictions. They arise from the same error that permeates the paralogisms. Only in the former case the reason tried to deal with the totality of phenomena within the grasp of a single consciousness, here in the antinomies it is the totality which is repre-

sented by the universe; the former was a subjective totality, this latter is objective. We cannot grasp the origin of the world, nor its ultimate nature, for these concepts, depending on the conception of the objective totality of all phenomena, are absolutely beyond the range of the speculative reason.

THE IDEAL OF THEOLOGY.—The third employment of the reason leads us to a higher totality than belonged to either the paralogisms of the soul or the antinomies of the universe. He is the ultimate *Ideal of Pure Reason, God*. Just as the reason sought to regard the subjective totality of all our experience as the concept of the soul and the objective totality of phenomena as the concept of the universe, it now endeavors to unite or synthesize these two totalities into the all-inclusive Ideal of God. *Theology*, therefore, as a science, unites both the premises of psychology and cosmology; the concept of God is the union of the subjective and the objective,—the soul and external nature. Just as surely as the speculative reason failed in its attempt to deal with the other two ideas, so also is it doomed to failure when it seeks to conceive of the infinite totality of all possible phenomena in God. But further than the mere conception of God, the reason believes itself able to prove His existence. In the history of previous philosophy Kant recognizes three general types of proof, all of which are familiar to the student. The *ontological* proof endeavors to move from essence to existence, from an Absolute Concept to the reality of that concept. The *cosmological* proof requires a First Cause; while the *teleological* proof moves from the purposes in nature to their Divine Author.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF.—The *ontological* proof, earlier met with in Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza, was believed by Kant to lie at the foundation of all rationalistic conceptions of God. This declares that the idea of the Perfect, which we realize by means of contrast with our own imperfection, must have all possible attributes, else it would not be Perfect. Existence, however, is a positive attribute, and therefore must be

included in the idea of the Perfect. In reply to this Kant observes that the ideas of perfection and existence are in no wise related to one another. Logic would say that the two ideas do not belong to the same universe of discourse. For although I may think of the Perfect, its nature is in no wise affected by the further addition or subtraction of the quality of existence. "A hundred real dollars," observes Kant, "contain not the least more than a hundred possible dollars."¹³ The existence of God is a matter altogether different from the concept of perfection; and the former can in no wise be inferred from the latter.

THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF.—The ontological proof is difficult to comprehend and appeals only to those metaphysically inclined. Another type of proof which has been long employed to establish the necessary existence of a Divine Being as the Author of the Universe is called the *cosmological* proof. It will be remembered that Locke employed it as the most certain of the proofs of God's existence. It starts with the intuitive existence of the thinking self, or some observed phenomena, as the premise. From this simple fact it reverts backward by the law of cause and effect to a necessary First Cause, the Author of that series of events of which the self is the present stage. "I exist," the cosmological proof declares, "and, therefore, God, the First Cause of the universe and Author of my being, must also exist." So stated it is observed that the premises of the cosmological proof are really three in number,—the existence of the self or some observed phenomena, the absolute reality of the law of cause and effect and the impossibility of an infinite series of events. To our minds, inclined to the ordinary ways of thinking, the greater simplicity of this proof is perhaps more convincing than the subtlety of the ontological proof. But not so in Kant's estimation; the cosmological proof is a form only of the more funda-

¹³ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 627.

mental ontological proof; here also the movement is made from essence to existence, from absolute causality to the existence of the First Cause. And, further, the cosmological proof rests the entire stress of authority on the uncritical acceptance of the absolute reality of the principle of causality. Already in the treatment of the understanding Kant had placed the law of cause and effect among the transcendental or subjective elements of the understanding,—it pointed therefore to no absolute reality outside of the mind. But the cosmological proof rests its whole validity upon the objective and absolute reality of this principle. It is therefore, in the opinion of Kant, even less reliable than the ontological proof, for it contradicts the essence of the transcendental character of the laws of thought.

TELEOLOGICAL PROOF.—The *teleological* or third proof for the existence of God is far simpler and more silently convincing than the other two. It was met with in connection with the “Pre-established Harmony” of Leibnitz and was especially prominent among his disciples. Briefly stated, it depends on the rational and purposive structure of nature. We see the different phases of nature following one another in perfect harmony according to fixed and invariable laws. We see that certain results are accomplished by the operation of these laws, that certain ends seem realized and certain purposes fulfilled. All of which seem the expression of thought and design rather than the result of chance or accident. The teleological proof tells us that we behold in nature an intelligence that could only proceed from the Infinite Reason of God. Thus stated, the argument from design lays all its stress upon the observation of rational ends in nature. But Kant in his transcendental mood of thought finds these ends, these laws of nature, in the mind, and not in the unknowable objective world, as it is in itself. The rational laws of nature arise from the transcendental nature of human thought, the purposes of nature are the purposes of mind; the Infinite Intelligence of

God exists only in my consciousness, and not in the world of external reality.

Thus with a single stroke, so to speak, Kant feels that he has undermined the whole superstructure of natural religion. He has shown that, according to the data of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*," the belief in the reality of an absolutely necessary Being is founded on the illegitimate claims of the speculative reason. God has no place in the cold world of the fact phenomena. This conclusion is directly opposite to that of Locke, who, like Kant, limits our possible knowledge to the extent of sense-impression, but yet ascribes to the reason the power of attaining to the truth of God by infallible demonstration. Kant finds that the epistemological stand-point of the English thinkers requires criticism; and although this criticism establishes more firmly their reliance on experience, it destroys altogether the rational belief in God.

THE "CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON."

Transition from former "Critique."—In the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" Kant laid down the premises of his stand-point and the principles of his method. In the criticism of experience he finds that a certain unknowable something, the "thing-in-itself," serves as the logical basis of our knowledge, while the mind looks at this something in terms of its transcendental elements, time and space and the categories. Just so long as our ambitions are restricted to this field of the phenomena and we are contented to consider the phenomena singly and not in their impossible totality, our knowledge finds its legitimate field. But when finally speculative reason tries to create for itself the conceptions of the self, the universe, and God by the hypothesis of a totality of phenomena which it can never rightfully perceive, it is proper to recall the mind from the impossible task. Strange as it may seem, these conclusions of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*," by no means represent the deeper meaning of the Critical Philosophy.

We have earlier said that religion in Kant's mind took the form of morality. His nature was truly moral, but hardly religious. The dignity of the moral man appealed more to him than the complicated systems of theology or the emotional sentimentality of religious feeling. His God sprung from this innate reverence for morality, and not from any acquired belief in revelation. So that the first "*Critique*" gave expression to only half his faith, and the latter portion of this was negative. It merely prepared the way for a moral metaphysic by showing that the metaphysic based on the speculative reason failed altogether to understand the soul, the universe, and God. In the "*Critique of Practical Reason*" it was Kant's purpose to treat these same problems from the stand-point of action rather than of thought, and to show if possible that, although rejected by the speculative reason, they formed the necessary grounds for the very existence of morality. The "*Critique of Pure Reason*" was sceptical towards those ideas of metaphysics; the "*Critique of Practical Reason*" sought to establish their validity from the stand-point of the moral life.

Will in Morality.—Should we desire to analyze the moral nature of man it is not at all unlikely that before long we should find that the *will* is especially important to both the ethical and psychological treatments of morality. Very soon we should discover that *morality and the will* seem in such close connection that the one is almost necessary for the other. This was not a discovery of Kant's, but is common to many ancient and modern systems of ethics. In the present instance, however, it is of special importance, because Kant was able to analyze the authority of the will and discover the secret of its moral power.

With him the value of the act is solely determined by the character of the will from which it springs. In the first sentence of one of his ethical treatises¹⁴ Kant says, "Nothing

¹⁴ Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.

can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will."

From its nature the will is coextensive with the possibility of morality, yet it is itself moral only so far as it is good. Through this distinction between the good and the bad Kant reduces the will to a principle which lies behind it and from which the will derives its moral worth; some principle, such as a maxim or rule of conduct, may be regarded as the subjective source of the act. The moral worth of the act is therefore identical with the moral worth of the principle from which it springs. The outward act is the temporary reflection of the inner law, the goodness of the will is derived from a determining principle.

The Imperatives.—These subjective rules of conduct or subjective principles which guide the will are most diverse in character. They form the temporary and often subconscious sources of our daily actions. Although fundamental to the moral acts they are too transient to serve as an ideal which shall endure unchanged throughout long periods of life. This latter is the function of the *imperative* or objective and universally appreciable laws upon which the temporary rules above referred to are founded. It is to one of the imperatives that we almost instinctively appeal in all our decisions of conduct. They are the broad and general laws which lie at the root of the moral judgments,—the universal but hidden springs which give stability to character and constancy to purpose.

HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES.—There is one class of these imperatives, such as wealth, honor, happiness, or hope in a life hereafter, which obtain their binding character because of the reward which they depict. Thus one might say, "If you wish to possess happiness, then love thy neighbor." In this instance the appeal is made in terms of an "if," and loses all its force in those cases in which the imperative appealed to is not regarded as final. It is by means of the *hypothetical* imperatives that virtue and action are correlated with some

specific reward. Sensuous immortality is often the hypothetical imperative of righteousness. Political economy derives its character as a science from the fact that all its judgments are based on the hypothetical imperative of wealth. Most forcible, however, of all the hypothetical imperatives is that of the pursuit of happiness in general. Kant rightly agrees with the Hedonists that it is involved in the very being of man, but cannot regard it as ultimate in the moral life. Happiness through riches brings envy, care, and anxiety; a long life may carry misery with it; and even knowledge is by no means a sure guide to happiness. Instinctive as this hypothetical imperative may appear, it is of little value in our moral decisions, because we are always unaware of the paths that will ultimately lead to its largest fulfilment. If, however, these rules for a happy life could be learned from experience and could afterwards be trusted with absolute certainty, we would undoubtedly employ them in all our actions, but without the possibility of such permanent precepts Kant seeks beyond happiness for an ultimate imperative, self-sufficient in its nature. On account of this lack of absolute permanency the hypothetical imperatives, such as happiness or wealth, can never lead to morality. An imperative with this latter as its object must define the nature of morality at the same time that it indicates the means for its attainment.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE.—All our conduct is guided by rules, only the variety of our life requires many such rules to fit every possible circumstance. Should we discover some precept broader than the rest which might be regarded as applicable to every possible occasion, we would have discovered a law which would be sufficient to divide every phase of the will into either good or bad. This law, or moral imperative, would be the final criterion of worth when applied to the other rules of conduct; it would in fact be *categorical*. This universal moral law is stated by Kant in the following terms, "*So act that the rule which guides thy will can always under the same circum-*

*stances hold true as a principle of universal legislation."*¹⁵ We can thus recognize the meaning of Kant's assurance that the categorical imperative is the "*a priori* principle of morality," for by its very nature it is universally applicable throughout the whole field of action.

Undoubtedly such a moral law appears at first sight too formal, and perhaps, after all, like happiness, ineffectual in our daily life. Although necessarily formal, because of its generality, it is possible to trace its application in the simplest acts of life. Conduct is right if at the moment of decision we may consistently will that the transitory rule that prompts the action may become universal throughout nature. The categorical imperative regards suicide as immoral, because no one can consistently will self-destruction throughout all nature. Theft is wrong, because if made universal it would destroy itself. Lying would lose its character if made a principle of universal legislation. The categorical imperative is of extreme importance to the whole philosophy of Kant. It was pointed out in the beginning of this chapter that the Critical Philosophy as a whole sought to develop the supremacy of morality over the speculative reason. The categorical imperative, as the expression of the principle of morality, is thus raised to a unique position in the Kantian system. And presently we shall discover that it is by the aid of this principle that Kant feels himself able to go beyond the mere negative results of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" and establish more firmly than ever before the existence of God, freedom and human immortality.

The concept of *duty* derives its force from the *a priori*, or necessary and universal character of the categorical imperative, for when we have conceived of the peculiar nature of the moral law we have a means for discovering at once the meaning

¹⁵ "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne."—Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, I., 7.

of duty. This latter is the *obligation* or demand which we feel within us that impels us towards the right as determined by the categorical imperative as the objectively universal moral law. It is a duty for one to live, for suicide would be contrary to the moral law; likewise, truth, honesty, industry are all required by duty, because each is the demand of the categorical imperative.

The Postulates of Practical Reason.—Thus far we have only stated the general conditions for a universal system of ethics. We have by no means indicated what would follow from the categorical imperative if it is recognized as the criterion of morality. In the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" the transcendental elements, time, space, and the categories, were of extreme importance, since they were necessarily assumed by even the possibility of experience and thought. From a similar standpoint Kant believes that there are certain premises, or rather *postulates*, transcendental in their character, which seem to be required by the very nature of morality. These postulates are of such a nature that given even the thought of the categorical imperative as the universal expression of the moral law and their reality is necessarily included. They are three in number,—*human freedom, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.*

THE SELF IN MORALITY.—These postulates would be real only on the condition that Kant admits of some conception of the self. For certainly some knowledge of the moral agent is required before we can intelligently refer to its freedom or to its immortality. In the paralogisms of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" we were shown the futility of all conceptions of the soul. They were valueless because the reason endeavored to deal with a totality of phenomena by carrying its inquiries beyond the limits of experience. At the same time, however, that Kant sought to dissuade all attempts to understand the concept of the soul he yet recognized a substratum of personal identity. The transcendental elements, time, space, and the categories,

all required a base or subject in which they might subsist. And we saw that the mediacy of experience pointed to the existence of the *transcendental Ego*, incapable itself of direct perception, yet required by the very nature of experience itself. Without this *noumenal or transcendental Ego* the application of the transcendental elements to the "thing-in-itself" would be impossible, life would become dissipated into a mere flux of sensations. In the "*Critique of Practical Reason*" this noumenal Ego, the presence of which was only implicitly recognized in the former "Critique," was here brought into the foreground. Further than the mere substratum of personal identity as the ground of the transcendental elements, the noumenal Ego here becomes the logical basis of morality, the self of the moral agent. Unlike the phenomenal or perceptive self, this inner soul of man is beyond the limiting conditions of time, space, and the categories. It is therefore unknowable in its true nature, but yet real in the deepest sense; it is required by the unity of the conscious life and directly assumed by morality.

THE POSTULATE OF FREEDOM.—With the categorical imperative as the universal law of morality and the innermost reality of the noumenal Ego as its source, Kant finds himself in a position to deal with those problems laid aside by the speculative reason of the former "Critique." The existence of *freedom* was perhaps the most vital question in the antinomies of cosmology, especially when considered from the stand-point of morality. But the concept was then discarded because the reason found itself able to prove its existence as well as its non-existence by equally valid methods. It is to be noted, however, that the speculative reason regards the freedom of the noumenal Ego as highly probable, owing to its transcendental nature, but was incompetent to present any direct proof. In the "*Critique of Practical Reason*" the problem assumes a new aspect, freedom becomes one of the postulates of the moral law; *freedom and morality are inseparable*. Discard personal choice in the decision of conduct and we would at the same time

refuse to admit even the possibility of morality. The binding force as well as the dignity of the categorical imperative arises from the belief that man is free to observe it. Freedom and morality are inseparable,—deny the one and you cannot admit the other; recognize either and the other necessarily follows. Kant does not attempt to prove that the noumenal Ego is free, he only requires that we observe the close connection between the concepts of freedom and morality and from this intimate association recognize the existence of both.

THE POSTULATE OF IMMORTALITY.—*Human immortality* was discarded in the paralogisms of the first “Critique” because, like other attributes of the soul, it lay beyond the power of human reason. When, on the other hand, it is considered in connection with morality, the belief in immortality assumes a new value. We constantly observe a conflict between the desires of the sense and the demands of the categorical imperative. A state in which there is no such conflict would be a condition of perfect goodness,—the *summum bonum* of morality. Such a state Kant believes to be necessarily implied in morality. It cannot, however, become realized in any temporal existence, for time always carries with it the desires of the external world. The realization of perfect morality is therefore attainable only in a *timeless existence*,—that is, in a state of immortal life. This endless process towards the ideal of perfection serves as an inspiration to man. It points out to him a state of holiness which, although unattainable in this life, is yet possible in the infinite life of the world beyond the grave.

THE POSTULATE OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.—And finally morality gives us the assurance in the *existence of God* altogether unattainable by the direct proofs of the reason. The binding force of the categorical imperative as well as the ideal of morality in the life to come, require a source beyond the individual man. The objective universality of the moral law arises from an external source, and this source, infinite in its nature because morality is infinite, is *God*. It is He, through

the moral law, that is truly the ruler of the universe, the seat of divine intelligence.

This conception of God as the necessary fulfilment of morality is the culmination, although not the completion, of the whole Critical Philosophy of Kant; it supplies both a foundation and a unity to his whole system. It removes the grounds for any charge of atheism which might have arisen from an imperfect understanding of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*." As to whether Kant is justified in the means by which he proves the existence of God, as well as the other postulates, is a matter which does not concern us at present. Our work is to understand rather than criticise, to appreciate rather than deprecate.

THE "CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT."

But even with this final postulate of God's existence Kant by no means considered his philosophical system complete. The "*Critique of Pure Reason*" proved to us the validity of science; it opened up the vast extent of the objective world and established the critical basis for a philosophy of nature. The "*Critique of Practical Reason*," on the contrary, was restricted to the subjective world of morality rather than to the objective world of fact; to the mobility of action and not to the fixity of event. Even with this exhaustive division of the world of human experience Kant regarded the gulf between these two stand-points as too wide. There was still lacking a critique of those judgments which are neither concerned altogether with fact nor with action, but which seem to belong to a faculty of the mind lying between the understanding and the moral reason. These are the judgments of mere *approval*, considered at length in the third "Critique," that of the "Judgment" proper. On the one side these judgments of approval are like those of the understanding, in so far as they express a given unchangeable fact; and on the other side they require the conception of an ideal which allies them closely to the moral judgments of the "Practical Reason." We cannot approve or disapprove of a certain

object without having in mind some purpose which it partially or wholly exemplifies. Judgments of approval arise from the comparison of the object and the ideal of the complete realization of its purpose—the comparison between the imperfect and the perfect representation of some conception.

Its Transcendental Basis.—Judgments of mere approval, like those of natural science and morality, rests upon a transcendental basis. In science it is the categories, in ethics it is freedom, and finally in these judgments of approval it is the belief in the *purposiveness of nature*. Just as the categories were the necessary conditions for the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori* and freedom a necessary postulate for the reality of the moral life, so also the belief in the existence of ends or purposes in nature is necessarily required for the possibility of the judgments of approval. Like the other transcendental principles,—time, space, and the categories,—purpose cannot be attributed to the “thing-in-itself” as the final reality, but only represents one way of looking at the world of phenomenal appearances. Purpose is a concept which the human mind imprints on nature, an attribute of the intellect, a stand-point for the judgments of approval.

Kinds of Purpose.—The judgments of purposive approval which we impress upon nature are of two kinds,—those which arise from regarding the object as the embodiment of its *own* purpose and those judgments which connect the single object with a purpose *beyond* itself. In the former case we have a feeling of pleasure towards the *form* of the object alone; in the latter case the object points to an *all-inclusive purpose beyond itself*. This feeling of pleasure in the presence of an object which embodies its own purposes already fulfilled, arises from *judgments of taste*; ¹⁶ whereas the recognition that the single object before us partially expresses the universal purpose of Nature is *teleology*.

¹⁶ Geschmacksurtheils.

Beauty.—The philosophy of taste regards its object as *beautiful* when the purpose which it embodies is distinctly expressed in definite form. That object appears to the mind as beautiful when it can excite disinterested and universal approval without requiring a purpose beyond itself. The mind regards a statue to be beautiful because it conceives the sensuous object to express fully the idea or conception which it suggests. Beauty arises from the mental judgment that representation and conception are approved to be the same. Beauty is therefore only a way of looking at those objects which are sufficient in themselves, it is the transcendental element of the æsthetic judgment.

Sublimity.—Close to our judgments of the beautiful, but differing from them in certain important respects, are the emotions of the *sublime*. A beautiful object is definite in form, an isolated perfection in so far as it embodies its completely determined purpose. The sublime object, on the contrary, represents boundlessness. It excites our admiration and respect by presenting to view an object or idea which cannot be encompassed by the senses but is comprehended in its almost infinite immensity only by the intellect. The incomparably great are alone sublime,—forces of nature or the system of stars.

Teleology.—The judgments of taste, beauty and sublimity, recognize a purpose fulfilled in the object. The *Teleological* judgments, on the contrary, are based on the universal purposiveness of nature. Mechanism interprets phenomena as causal sequences only without any reference to the purposes and ends involved. Teleology regards the processes of nature as if controlled by rational purposes; every event is a step towards the fulfilment of an ideal. Mechanism and teleology, causality and purpose, these form contradictory stand-points for the explanation of nature; both are transcendental ways of looking at the real. And, moreover, this reality, the “thing-in-itself,” is as unknowable to one as it is to the other.

The mechanical view of nature presents us with a systematic science; the purposive view discloses to us the ideals of life, art, and religion.

Retrospect.—These three works of Kant, the *Critiques of Pure Reason*, of *Practical Reason*, and of *Judgment*, present to us an elaborate system of philosophy erected around certain central ideas; a unity wonderful in its scope and organic structure. Towards the beginning of this chapter three factors were mentioned which may well be considered the important elements from which Kant formed his system. These were, first, the rationalistic conceptions which Kant acquired from the teachings of Leibnitz and Wolff; second, the importance and limitations of experience which Locke and Hume had taught him; and, finally, the moral and religious elements which influenced his character in early childhood. Each of these factors finds its place in the *Critical Philosophy* when this is regarded as an organic whole. The Rationalists are responsible for the importance of the human mind in all knowledge, for the transcendental principles of time, space, and the categories, freedom and purpose, and finally for the constructive and uniting power of the transcendental Ego. Not that these specific elements may be found in any one of the earlier thinkers, but only that the rationalistic tendencies of thought led Kant to these conclusions. To the English Empiricists may be attributed the sensuous foundation for all scientific knowledge and the sceptical attitude which supplements the positive teaching of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*." And finally his moral nature asserted itself in the presence of the ultimate problems of life. When both reason and experience proved inadequate, simple morality constructed for itself with absolute certitude the existence of God. Kant's God was the God of morality, his religion was a metaphysic of ethics. His interest was thus divided between the field of scientific fact and that of the moral ideal; between the understanding and the practical reason. "Two things fill the soul with ever new and

increasing wonder and respect, the oftener and more attentively we reflect on them: the starry heaven above me' and the moral law within me." ¹⁷ These are the words with which Kant closes the "*Critique of Practical Reason*," and they form the inscription on his monument in Königsberg.

Prospect.—We are introduced by the philosophical system of Kant to a new interpretation of nature. Instead of the certitude of the rationalistic reliance on reason and the simple faith of the empirical confidence in the testimony of the senses, the Critical Philosophy substitutes an analysis of experience according to the principles of the reason. By analyzing experience it discovers that the Rationalists and Empiricists were both in a sense correct,—the former, when they asserted that our world was transformed through mind, the latter when they founded the origin of knowledge on experience and restricted its limits to empirical data. The philosophy of Kant is, therefore, the synthesis of both schools. But in this synthesis new problems arose, the ancient values of life and nature were given a new setting, the changing view-point rendered obsolete the discussions of former centuries. These new problems could not be completely understood and developed by Kant himself. His own mind passed quickly over the presuppositions of his system; continued thinking had given them a unique value. Bacon cautioned us to avoid the "Idols of the Den," recognizing that the plausible will often become the true unless we temper our own conclusions by those of others. Kant was a solitary thinker; the truth of his own stand-point was so firmly impressed on his own consciousness that he found himself, especially in his latter life, altogether unable to compre-

¹⁷ "Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüth mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir."—Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Be-schluss.

hend the opposition which arose about him. Under these circumstances it is not strange that Kant, like Locke and Aristotle, is to be regarded rather as the founder of a magnificent movement than as a thinker who has definitely solved the ultimate problems of philosophy. His importance rests more in the statement of new issues of philosophical moment than in the solutions which they received at his own hands. The astronomy of Copernicus attained its fulfilment two centuries after in the nebular hypothesis of Kant, and the fulfilment of Kant's metaphysics is yet unwritten.

CHAPTER VII.

THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS.

THE POST-KANTIAN TENDENCIES.

EVERY original mind stimulates a group of brilliant men to follow in the same direction, but these disciples are apt to give their master's teachings a more intense interpretation. Three distinct lines of thought emanate from the critical ethics of the Platonic-Socrates: a metaphysical movement which was expressed by Aristotle and his mediæval commentators; the distinctly ethical phase of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; and, lastly, the pessimistic naturalism of the Cynics and the Stoics. Locke, whose influence, if not his originality, is to be classed with the Platonic-Socrates, also inaugurated movements which are comparable with those of later Greek thought. We have here the idealistic metaphysics of Berkeley with its sceptical outcome in Hume, the ethical tendencies of Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Butler, and the pessimistic naturalism of the French Materialists. And, finally, Kant, whose originality, and probably his influence, will prove as great as that of either the Greek or of the Englishman, set in motion certain lines of thought which bear a close resemblance to those of Greek and British philosophy. This analogy is by no means perfect. The metaphysical character of the German mind permitted an ethics or a pessimism only on a metaphysical background, while in Greece the ethical element was prominent and in England the epistemological. There were several distinct elements in the Kantian system which hardly received adequate treatment in their original setting, and the disciples of the Critical Philosophy sought to remedy these defects. They found them, however, so intimately interwoven with the organic unity of the system itself that a radical change in any part meant the reor-

ganization of the whole. This transformation of the Critical Philosophy, in order to give one or another element greater logical clearness and consistency, was attempted by the immediate successors of Kant. The dissolution of a system into parts always destroys the organic structure of the system itself and brings the elements into new and generally extravagant relations. But should one wish to dismember the Critical Philosophy for the purpose of comparison only, it would be possible perhaps to discover in it three central factors. These are the reality of the "thing-in-itself," the logical existence of the ethical Ego with its postulates, and, lastly, the will activity of the mind in the creation of the world of phenomena. Each of these is of extreme importance and each becomes the nucleus of a distinct movement in the philosophy of post-Kantian Germany. And just as in the case of Platonic-Socrates and Locke, each becomes identified with a metaphysics, a metaphysical ethics, and a pessimistic naturalism.

The Metaphysics of the "Thing-in-itself."—To all students of the Critical Philosophy the ghostly reality of the "*thing-in-itself*" appears somehow mystifying. We do not know exactly where to place it, and fail to find any relation or character which will relieve the difficulty. This predicament appealed particularly to *Herbart*, Kant's successor at Königsberg, who sought to modify the metaphysics of his master in such a manner that the "thing-in-itself" would no longer appear contradictory or incomprehensible. With him the "thing-in-itself" still retained its original significance, only it became richer in meaning, through a broader psychological context. Let us call this general school of metaphysics, which finds a real existence independent of the mind and behind the phenomena of sense, *Realism*.

The Ethical Ego.—The nucleolus of the whole Kantian world is the *Ego*. In the "Pure Reason" it is only the necessary background for the several transcendental elements, but becomes in the "Practical Reason" the essential basis for the

moral postulates of freedom, immortality, and God. Yet, notwithstanding its importance, Kant does not seem to give us any adequate idea upon which we may base our concept of this deepest self. We are constantly reminded of its importance, yet there is the "thing-in-itself" which looms up apparently beyond the Ego. Perhaps there is some relationship between the two. Perhaps it is possible to erect a metaphysical structure within which our ethical Ego may reign supreme; a system in which some aspect of the Ego occupies the fundamental position of an absolutely real "thing-in-itself" and also gives unity and internal harmony to the whole structure,—in fact the metaphysic of a world of self. This was attempted by a long line of thinkers beginning with *Reinhold* and ending with *Hegel*. Each sought to add a little to Kant's theory of the self, each contributed a little more to a consistent idealism, and each advanced a little beyond his predecessors. Let us call these thinkers, who find the ultimate reality of the world in the subjective consciousness alone, *Absolute Idealists*.

The Naturalistic Pessimism of the Will.—And still another figure appears in this little group of Kantian disciples who have exerted such a tremendous influence on the thought of the nineteenth century. We cannot discover a place for *Schopenhauer* in either of the former tendencies. His personality and the results of his philosophy are somehow outside the general current of the time; we do not know whether to connect him with the Buddhists of India, the Mystics of Persia, or the idealists of Germany. His idealism is both mystical and transcendental. The creative faculty of the mind, upon which Kant bases his transcendentalism, indicates to *Schopenhauer* an aspect of a great world-force which becomes exemplified in the will of man. This is the essence of the idealism of *Schopenhauer*. On closer examination, however, we find that *will* implies incessant struggle and can be interpreted to philosophy only as a pessimism; the world-force is purely mechanical in its operation and produces evil with an irresistible relent-

lessness. "Die, and unite thy limited will with the universal Will" is the creed of Schopenhauer. This philosophical standpoint, which is not common in our Western world, may be called *Mystical Idealism*.

The Relation of Previous Idealism.—While considering this whole movement of transcendental idealism which arose from the Critical Philosophy of Kant, it is interesting to note the relation to previous idealistic tendencies. The whole post-Kantian transcendentalism represents an idealism in metaphysics erected on a rationalistic epistemology. In earlier philosophy Leibnitz first develops a rationalistic idealism, but his incoherent system lacked the critical and analytic stimulus of Kant. The idealism of Berkeley, on the other hand, differed essentially from that of later Germany in two important respects,—the epistemological starting-point and the final interpretation of the Universal Mind. In the case of Leibnitz it will be remembered that the unity of the individual monads was founded on the "ideal principle" of "Pre-established Harmony." His monism was therefore conceptual or idealistic and stood in sharp contrast to a realistic or objective monism like that indicated by the all-inclusive character of Spinoza's Substance. This idealistic principle of Leibnitz was defined with the expressed intention of penetrating to the ultimate essence of the world, and hence was a nature-philosophy in the broadest sense. But the relative importance of the human soul-monad rendered this early idealism distinctly humanistic and self-centred when interpreted by the immediate disciples of Leibnitz. In contrast to this narrower reaction the German idealists seek to re-establish rationalistic idealism on the broader plane of a nature-philosophy. But in so doing pantheism takes the place of theism, the universal moral law supplants the arbitrary freedom of the individual.

The conditions under which Berkeley's idealism arose places it in sharp contrast to German transcendentalism. Like nearly all the British thinkers, Berkeley is an empiricist in his epis-

temology,—he bases the reality of ideas on the perception of the senses. The Germans, on the contrary, follow the lead of Kant and discover in the given experience a rational element which constitutes the form of true knowledge. Aside from this epistemological difference, Berkeley was under the influence of Christian theism; he opposes any pantheistic tendencies which might seem to arise from his idealism. Kant, however, had undermined the rationalistic foundation for theism and transformed the conception of God into a Moral Ideal. So that the Absolute Mind which the Germans as well as Berkeley believed to be the source of all intellectual forms could be described by the post-Kantians as a World-Idea of activity, of thought, or of will without involving theistical attributes in its conception.

JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART.

LIFE.

The first of the important Kantian schools is that of the *Realism* of Johann Herbart. Its founder was born in Northern Germany, the son of a lawyer, on April 4, 1776. While yet a young man, and before he entered the University of Jena, Herbart became acquainted with the works of the Leibnitz-Wolffian school and also with those of Kant. At the age of eighteen he came under the influence of those thinkers who sought to bring into prominence the ethical Ego in Kant's system, but the young Herbart was repelled by their absolute idealism. After leaving Jena, he spent several years in Switzerland as tutor in a private family. Returning to Germany, he became a teacher in Göttingen, afterwards occupying Kant's chair at Königsberg. He died in 1841. Herbart belongs to that large class of thinkers who are impressed with the depth of the problem of existence and at the same time seek to explain it in the simplest manner possible; but this very desire for simplicity often leads to the presupposition of something

that is far from simple, in order that reality and common sense may become harmonized.

METAPHYSICS.

Herbart approaches the Kantian problem of reality from the stand-point of Descartes. He doubts everything. But even after he has thus placed himself in a completely sceptical attitude he finds that he cannot resist one reality,—namely, the mere *appearance* of something. The appearances which we call our experiences are at least real, although they may or may not indicate anything beyond; the determination of this latter problem is the work of philosophy. We must assume that the appearances, the phenomena themselves, exist and are real; they form the necessary starting-point for any philosophy. But with the existence of the representations presupposed, we have no further ground for inferring that what they present is true absolutely. Are time and space or the causal relations among phenomena real in themselves, or are they merely superficial appearances involving contradiction? To determine this question it is necessary for metaphysics to analyze some simple relation among phenomena, such as *change*.

The Changeless Real.—When a certain event occurs we may say that a change of some kind has taken place,—the water has changed to ice. By this we mean that a certain phenomenon of water has passed into another called ice. We require that the water and the ice shall have something in common, else we could not connect them by means of a causal relation, yet at the same time we observe that there is a distinct difference between the two phenomena. Here we have identity and diversity united in a single concept,—that of change. We have a thing remaining the same and yet becoming different, a contradiction of the most decided character. Change of all kinds is therefore discarded by Herbart as mere appearance, belonging only to the phenomena and not to the real world beneath. This gives to Herbart a motionless, static,

inane world of reality, not very much unlike the "thing-in-itself" of his master.

The Plurality of Reals.—But he is not satisfied with this definition of his ultimately real universe. He has still before him the old problem of metaphysics, the unity and diversity, the one and the many. Spinoza solved this by a monism; Leibnitz, whom Herbart early read, placed his stress on the objective pluralism of the monads united within a system by the ideal unity of the principle of "Pre-established Harmony." Herbart follows Leibnitz in the *plurality of Reals* (das Reale). Every phenomena, because it is a presentation, must point to something which is itself presented. There can be no outward appearance without some sort of inner reality. Behind every sensation there lies a something which is given to us; nothing can transform this nucleus into subjective fact; it is purely objective in its nature,—it is the ultimate basis of being. "We cannot remove this difficulty; the form of experience becomes changed into the forms of the supposition of the Reals; . . . and it is forced upon us that the Reals are to be presupposed and defended."¹ And, furthermore, these Reals behind sensation are absolutely simple, their reality is fully explained by the possession of a single ultimate quality. It is true our consciousness cannot understand what these atomic qualities truly are, we only know of their existence through an analysis of the phenomena.

The Phenomenal Appearance.—But, even with the presupposition of these metaphysical atoms, Herbart finds some little difficulty when he comes to explain just what is in our experiences. The "thing," which we observe through sensations, consists of many properties or qualities. Each one of

¹ "Man kann diese Sorge nicht ablehnen; die Formen der Erfahrung verwandeln sich in Formen der Setzung des Realen; . . . so zwingen sie uns, das Reale zu setzen und zu hüten."—Allgemeine Metaphysik, Section 199.

these qualities represents a single Real, undifferentiated, simple and eternal,—like the quality-atoms of a Greek philosopher, Anaxagoras. Thus the whiteness of sugar is furnished by a certain group of Reals, the sweetness by another group, the crystalline form by still another, and so on until all the properties of sugar have been exhaustively ascribed, each to a certain class of Reals. “Matter is real as a sum of divisible Being; and in this Being something truly happens, as a consequence of which it has the appearance of a special existence.”² Thus the “thing” observed by sensation is never the Real, it is always a large group of these Reals. To explain the fact that the several qualities of an experience seem to form a single object Herbart has recourse to a distinction between *intellectual* and phenomenal space, which recalls to mind the peculiar spacial qualities of the Leibnitzian monads. In intellectual space two or more Reals may occupy the same point, forming an intimate relation; change is explained by the transformation of this relation, thus permitting the Reals to form new configurations. According to this hypothesis of intellectual space it is readily seen that each grain of sugar, no matter how small, may possess all the quality Reals which together comprise sugar. Phenomenal space has nothing to do with the inherence of many Reals in a single point of intellectual space.

Psychology and the Soul-Real.—Prominent among the Reals is the subjective unit, *the soul*. In Herbart’s estimation all previous psychology was in error in so far as it regarded the soul as the bond of unity existing between the several faculties of the mind. The true Ego cannot be known in self-consciousness, for a subject can never perceive itself. The Ego is a Real like other truly existent Beings, indestructible, spaceless, and eternal; but its existence can be inferred only from the analysis of the various states of mind. It is not, however, the unity of our plural consciousness, as Kant and the later

² Lehrbuch zur Psychologie, Section 156.

idealists believed; it is rather the single unit which can exist in innumerable combinations. Its only property is that of a continued assertion manifested in whatever combination of other Reals it may find itself.

THE MEANING OF REPRESENTATIONS. — With this metaphysical starting-point of the unit Ego, Herbart begins to construct a psychology. The starting-point of psychology is not the hidden Ego, but rather its own *representations* of which the flux of human consciousness is composed. The initial problem of psychology becomes, therefore, the discovery of the relation between the Ego and its appearances in the phenomenal world. To explain variety in consciousness Herbart recognized that the Ego may assert itself in numberless combinations of other Reals, although it still retains its own indestructible simplicity. These combinations, infinite in variety, yet all stamped by the presence of the Ego, are what we call the representations, the phenomena, the experiences of our daily life. In all this flux of changing combinations or representations the Ego can be abstractly recognized by thought; in the same manner that the point of a wedge may always be distinguished from its path, although it is seen in constantly changing relations.

PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATIONS.—The *sensations* are the most elemental representations; they form the starting-point of psychology. And, furthermore, just as the combinations in the physical world are capable of mathematical treatment, so these psychical combinations known as the sensation-representation can be treated from the stand-point of mathematics. This is generally recognized as Herbart's greatest contribution to psychology,—the introduction of the exact methods of mathematics within its borders.

INFLUENCE OF HERBART.

Besides his metaphysics and psychology, Herbart made important contributions to pedagogics, and has often been regarded as the first to establish the art of teaching on the firm

basis of a science. The history of philosophy has rather underestimated his importance in metaphysics proper. It has emphasized as Kant's logical successor the more brilliant but perhaps less scientific mind of Fichte. Herbart called himself a "Kantian of the year 1828," meaning thereby that he had remodelled the Kantian stand-point so that it might better agree with the later philosophical environment. In reality Herbart represents a remarkable synthesis of Leibnitzian metaphysics and Kantian criticism with the English demand for a scientific psychology. The first influences of his boyhood were those of Leibnitz and Kant; his whole philosophy was the transformation of the pluralism of the former, with its loyalty to science and mathematics, into the criticism of the latter. In this process he and his immediate disciples carried the Realistic premise of Kant to its legitimate conclusions.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

The second tendency of thought which arose from the influence of Kant we have chosen to call *Absolute Idealism*, for want of a better term. It is difficult to determine a single element which may serve to designate the definitive character of this movement. The school of Herbart assures us of the real existence of something behind our phenomena, it makes this "Real" objective. Absolute Idealism, on the contrary, is impressed with the subjective, the mental, the idealistic source of experience. It fails to find any reality beyond the thought, no existence beyond the conditions of mental activity, and no facts beyond the facts of consciousness. This is perhaps the central theme in the entire movement, but it is susceptible to many interpretations, varying with the stress of emphasis and the temperament of the thinker.

KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD.

LIFE.

Unity was the demand from all the disciples of Kant, and it was this element which they found wanting in the Critical Philosophy itself. Reinhold, the founder of the so-called "Kantian school," attempts to remedy this difficulty by introducing a greater emphasis on consciousness or the power of representing. Reinhold's parents were Austrians, and he was born at Vienna in 1758. Educated by the monks of the Jesuit-Barnabite order, he became dissatisfied with the restricted field of the Church and sought greater intellectual freedom in Germany. There he became interested in the works of Kant, and obtained the professorship at the University of Jena by his brilliant exposition of the Critical Philosophy. Latterly the numerous changes in his opinions lost for him the positive position and the influence which he had earlier exerted. Reinhold died in 1823, while holding the position of Professor at Kiel.

STAND-POINT.

Herbart based his philosophy on our representations, so also did Reinhold. There is, however, a very fundamental distinction between them; to Herbart the representations pointed to an objective plurality beyond, while to Reinhold they pointed to a subjective unity within. The great fault of the Kantian system seemed to consist in the lack of some absolutely elemental principle. It was a fundamental belief, not only on the part of Reinhold but also with many others, that the whole of the Critical Philosophy could perhaps be deduced from a single basal principle. In his important work, "*Suggestions towards a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representations*,"³ Reinhold believes himself able to deduce a funda-

³ Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens.

mental principle of this character from an analysis of our representations (*Vorstellung*). When we experience an object, it is not the object itself that points to reality,—as Herbart thought,—nor is it the presence of the subject in the representation,—as we shall soon find was the conclusion of Fichte,—but it is rather the conscious relation of these two. In *consciousness* both object and subject meet in their ultimate unity. It is consciousness alone that is Real.

The Primacy of Consciousness.—The “thing-in-itself,” which possessed a sort of phantom reality in Kant’s own mind and which was a plurality of Reals to Herbart, became the *principle of consciousness* with Reinhold. And, true to his own stand-point, he realized that if consciousness truly possessed this primacy which he ascribed to it he could deduce therefrom all the transcendental elements or forms of knowledge. In the conscious representation—the phenomenon of Kant—we have the unity of two aspects,—the formal side, which is related to the subject and gives rise to the transcendental forms of our knowledge, and an objective or material side which is seemingly beyond consciousness. Reinhold is not clear as to this objective content of our consciousness, and seems to liken it to the unknowable “thing-in-itself” of Kant. This fundamental difficulty in the explanation of the objective side of consciousness forms the transition to the second thinker of this Idealistic School, Johann Fichte.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE.

LIFE.

Fichte, the son of a poor peasant, was born in 1762, in Lusatia, in the southwestern part of Germany. He spent his early childhood in herding geese, but later attracted the notice of a wealthy land-owner by his marvellous memory and apparent aptitude for study. The incident is worth repeating. A rich nobleman of Saxony visited Fichte’s native village for

the purpose of hearing a sermon from the pastor, but arriving too late, he was told that a young boy could reproduce the entire discourse. Fichte so impressed the company by his accurate and forcible repetition of the morning sermon, his earnestness and moral force, which seemed to spring from a strength of character already clearly defined, that the nobleman readily consented to take charge of Fichte's education. The fact that a boy of eight years could arouse the interest of a stranger by his unusual personality illustrates that native force of character which was the key to Fichte's remarkable influence on the history of philosophy and the part which his popular lectures played in arousing German patriotism at the outbreak of the War of Liberation. Fichte was placed by his benefactor in a preparatory school and afterwards sent to the universities of Jena and Leipzig. Later he became a private tutor in Zurich, but did not give satisfaction, for he sought to instruct the parents as well as the children.

Influence of Kant.—Already deeply impressed by the "Ethics" of Spinoza, he became about this time acquainted with the first two "Critiques" of Kant. He writes that his life is altogether changed by the Critical Philosophy; some unconscious principle is stirred within him and cries for expression. He was possessed with a desire to do something. He felt the pressure of an inner force endeavoring to realize itself in the outside world, a struggle of the will for expression. His whole attitude towards life is erected on the supremacy of the active moral will over the external facts of the senses. This feeling, first brought to his own consciousness by the writings of Kant, developed later into the central theme of his entire philosophy. Subsequently a tutor's position called him to East Prussia, and he took this opportunity to visit Kant. In order to win the latter's approval he prepared, in a very short time, an essay treating of the Critical Philosophy as applied to revealed religion. Fichte suggested that the moral law, or the universal validity of the categorical imperative, might become

endowed with personal attributes and thus represent the God of religious reverence. In this first essay one recognizes the central element in both the personality and the philosophy of Fichte,—the primacy of the active moral will. Instead of degrading the Christian conception of the Deity, he believed that he had exalted God to the Supreme Force of the universe by identifying Him with the moral law. This work, although published anonymously, won for Fichte the respect of Kant and a literary recognition throughout Germany.

University Career.—Probably as a result of this prominence he was called to occupy the chair of Reinhold at Jena. Here he began the preparation of his classic work, "*The Science of Knowledge*,"⁴ published in 1794, but revised several times later. "*The Vocation of Man*,"⁵ published in 1800, is a popular and brilliant presentation of his system; it develops the conception of true knowledge, as Fichte considered his fundamental idea, from the three stand-points of doubt, knowledge, and faith. At Jena he became involved in several controversies, and at last he was compelled to withdraw. These controversies illustrate the distinctness of purpose and self-reliance which was characteristic of Fichte, as well as a certain officiousness which obscured his real motive and made enemies for him on every side. He enraged the students by inducing them to give up duelling, he offended the authorities by conducting popular lectures on Sunday afternoons. During this "atheistic controversy," as it is called, Fichte addressed an appeal to the public, in which he sought to show that the real motive for molesting him was due to his sympathy with political freedom rather than from any sincere religious scruples on the part of the authorities of the university. At the same time he addressed a private letter to a friend, in which he stated in rather arrogant language that any rebuke from the government would

⁴ Wissenschaftslehre.

⁵ Die Bestimmung des Menschen.

be followed by his resignation. This letter was placed before the Council, who promptly removed him from the professorship. After leaving Jena, Fichte finally settled at Berlin, where in 1810 he became professor of philosophy and rector at the recently founded university of that city. While here he delivered a series of addresses, entitled "*Talks to the German People*,"* which served more perhaps than any other single intellectual force to arouse enthusiasm in the War of Liberation. Fichte died in 1814.

STAND-POINT.

These, in brief, are the facts of Fichte's life; but behind them there was a personality of unusual force and power, although not wholly free from the emotional influences of his nature. It is a fact of unusual significance that a person's system of philosophy is often merely the outward expression of the inner character and personality. And this observation is especially true in the case of Fichte. He was more the man of the world, the actor, who sought to establish a rational and philosophical background for his emotional convictions and to bring into the foreground the dignity of the moral law. Kant began with the "thing-in-itself" and finished his philosophy with the supremacy of the moral reason. Fichte interpreted both as the free act of an absolute self. Action and not thought, the moral will and not the analytical reason, was to him the ultimate reality of the universe,—the "thing-in-itself" of Kant and the Principle of Consciousness of Reinhold. Fichte, like the other two thinkers who have just received our attention, began his philosophical investigations by means of the representation. He considered them to be the empirical basis of all philosophy, but as such implied nothing beyond the activity of the subject. Fichte, like Reinhold, was impressed by the conscious or subjective meaning of our representations, but

* Reden an die Deutsche Nation.

unlike him he sought to make this subjectiveness absolute instead of relative. Reinhold had found two elements in the Principle of Consciousness, a subjective and an objective; Fichte found but one, the subjective act.

THE PRIMACY OF THE EGO.

It will be remembered that Kant himself found it difficult to describe the "thing-in-itself" by any other means than its unknowability. Herbart met with the same difficulty in his treatment of the Reals, and Reinhold found himself at a loss to account for the objective element in consciousness. Fichte recognized this inherent difficulty present in the metaphysics of any dualistic realism. Consciousness as the unity of life explained only the subjective part of the world; it could not account for a purely objective element without becoming involved in contradictions. In the spirit of the movement of Absolute Idealism which he himself initiates he sought to immerse this duality of subject and object in the simple conscious act, the inner expression of the Ego. Fichte, who believed himself to be merely an interpreter of Kant, saw in the *assertive act of the Ego* not only the moral background for freedom, immortality, and God, but also the metaphysical unity of both the "thing-in-itself" and its transcendental forms of apperception. By immersing the objective "thing-in-itself" and the subjective transcendental elements into the deepest reality of the *Deed-act*, Fichte hoped to avoid the avowed dualism of Kant and the implied dualism of Reinhold. *Activity*, as Ego, by supplying all the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, is likewise the full condition for its own existence. From this absolute point of view—that is, from the point of view which regards the Ego-activity as the single condition for all existence—we can conceive of this Ego as in itself free, and likewise as that from which arises all the material and forms of our world of sense and knowledge.

The Assertion of the Ego.—The development of this

central theme forms the subject of Fichte's classic work, "*The Science of Knowledge*," which appeared in various forms. This critique of the conditions of absolute knowledge, to use a phrase which shows the connection between Kant and Fichte, regards all approaches to Reality as empirically starting with a fact of knowledge. In the earliest presentation of the work it was the knowledge of identity, while in a later exposition it was a mathematical truth which formed the starting-point for the science of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge is "the intuition of all intuitions; the absolute uniting of all intuitions into one."⁷ Knowledge of this character is above contradiction, because to contradict it we should be compelled to use some form of it. To discover the central principle of this kind of knowledge is the immediate problem which presents itself to Fichte and through which he hopes to give unity not only to the system of Kant but also to the whole problem of philosophy.

In view of this demand Fichte seeks to discover the "absolute first and undeniably unconditioned fundamental proposition"⁸ of all human knowledge, believing that if such a proposition could be found it would lie at the basis of a science of all sciences, the "*Science of Knowledge*." He had already pointed out in the essay "*Concerning the Concept of the Science of Knowledge*"⁹ that such a ground-proposition really exists as the form or manner of uniting all the facts of all the sciences. The world of scientific knowledge, he observes, is like a building,—at the foundation there is one element that supports the superstructure. The discovery of this element is the purpose of the true science of knowledge.

Every proposition that is a fact of empirical science is not itself absolutely elemental, there are always earlier propositions

⁷ *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre* von 1801.

⁸ "Erster, schlechthin unbedingter Grundsatz."—*Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794.

⁹ *Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*.

upon which it depends. But there is, nevertheless, one single proposition which cannot be reduced into simpler terms. It is the *deed-act of assertion*. I must will to search for knowledge before knowledge is possible. And the existence of this will-act can never be directly proved, because it is deeper than all proof. Of its existence, however, I am certain beyond doubt, for it is presupposed by every reflective process, even that of doubting its existence. "The Subject of self-conscious knowledge and the Principle of actual existence are the same."¹⁰ Kant had already employed this transcendental method of proof when he demonstrated that time, space, and the categories were necessary even for the possibility of experience, and Fichte used it to show that the reality of the act of a self-asserting consciousness is necessarily presupposed, not only for experience, but even for the possibility of thought.

To illustrate this transcendental character of the self, let us consider the proposition "A is A." Although apparently a mere judgment of repetition and at first sight of no value, yet a little reflection will show that a judgment even as simple in character as this, undoubtedly implies the assumption that *I*, a person, make the statement. That is, the simplest fact of knowledge is derived from the proposition,—*I, an existent being, act*. This is of the deepest consequence to Fichte's system. It clearly indicates that the whole science of knowledge is based on the existence and activity of the Ego; that the Ego—and not some outside, objective, inane world—is the source of our representations, the fundamental principle of all knowledge, and the ground of all reality. "Before all assertions the Ego must be asserted through itself."¹¹ Fichte did not mean to declare, however, as many of his critics seem to imply, that the individual, finite self creates arbitrarily the

¹⁰ Das System der Sittenlehre, Paragraph 4.

¹¹ ". . . vor allem Setzen im Ich vorher das Ich selbst gesetzt sey."—Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Section 1, Paragraph 5.

world about it from a previous condition of non-existence. He wished only to point out that the Ego must assert its own reality before it can assert the sense-world. The fundamental proposition of all science is thus expressed, "*The Ego asserts originally its own being.*"¹² A proposition so simple in character as to receive at once universal assent. It was suggested by Descartes when he derived all reality from the existence of the self, by Kant when he defined the transcendental Ego, and still again by Reinhold when he made consciousness the principle for the unity of the subjective and the objective. To Fichte, however, the Ego meant something more real, more central than it did to the earlier thinkers; as *act*, it expressed the identity of subject and object; as *will*, it unfolded the moral freedom of the individual. It is that reality which exists for itself, "for whatever is not for itself is not for an Ego." Its very being consists in merely asserting itself as existent.

The Assertion of the Non-Ego.—The classic objection to all forms of absolute idealism demands an explanation of the return from the Absolute to common experience. And Fichte recognized that his Ego, as the highest condition of knowledge, once defined, had little value unless applicable to life. In the bare absoluteness of this first proposition of the science of knowledge one perceives only a principle, and not a system. The mere assertiveness of the Ego, the mere will activity, cannot produce a world of experience and of thought. Some object, some *non-Ego* is necessary to supplement the abstract reality of the Ego. But this non-Ego must be derived from the Ego itself, since the assertion of the Ego is at the foundation of all science and all knowledge. A non-Ego, or medium for expression, is *asserted*, opposed, or demanded by the free activity of the Ego, in order that the Ego may have an object

¹² "Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn."—Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Section 1, Paragraph 10.

against which to assert its own self-consciousness. This non-Ego, which is truly asserted by the Ego, is known to the empirical consciousness of man as a "fact," an object, or an experience; its assertion is the *second* proposition of the science of knowledge.

Fichte is very careful to insist that our concept of the so-called external world is *not*, as is ordinarily supposed, the product of abstracting the given element from all our representations. Very ingeniously he points out that the process of abstraction by which we define a Real, external world—independent of the Ego—is a process which takes place only through the activity of the Ego. I believe in a real, external world because I have previously willed to do so; the Ego freely wills the external world, and truly wills it to be such as it is. This method of demonstrating the subjective character of any concept has been often employed by subsequent idealists. Schopenhauer, and more recently Royce, have used the same method to prove the subjectivity of the principle of causality. The subject must already have the idea of the necessary connection between two phenomena before he can objectify the idea in the world of fact-experience. The *principle* of causality arises from the mind, and the non-Ego only supplies the material for its realization.

The Limitation of the Ego and the Non-Ego.—But to return to Fichte's philosophy of self-assertion. He had already defined the existence of the Ego as the first proposition of every philosophy and the assertion of the non-Ego as the second. But these two propositions are evidently opposed to one another; a third proposition is required to exhibit their internal unity. This cannot, however, be absolutely different from either; it must be deduced from a synthesis of both. The Ego could not fully realize itself unless it freely asserted the non-Ego; the non-Ego could not exist unless it was asserted by the Ego. But the Ego which in the pure conscious activity is the ground for both the asserted Ego and the asserted non-

Ego is more unlimited than the limited Ego which is asserted. This must be recognized in the *third* proposition which synthesizes the former two. As stated by Fichte, it is as follows: "The Ego asserts a distinguishable Ego over against a distinguishable non-Ego."¹³ This distinction between the unlimited and limited Egos, which was more emphasized in his later works, will be referred to under the section treating of the Absolute in Fichte's Idealism.

Deductions from the Fundamental Propositions.—These three propositions lie at the foundation of the Fichteian philosophy. They are the result of a process of reflection, gradually exhibiting to the empirical consciousness its true existence in a *Principle of Pure Consciousness*. But as mere statements they are formal, abstract, and far from those processes of thought usually employed. Fichte, like his master, felt it necessary to show wherein the categories of thought might be deduced from a single fundamental principle. The category of *reality* is implied by the mere assertion of the Ego, that of *negation* by the assertion of the non-Ego; and, further, the reciprocity of Ego and non-Ego leads us to the category of *limitation*. This reciprocal limitation of Ego and non-Ego develops as a process through which the limited Ego struggles to assert its absolute freedom. The continual process gives rise to the various stages of knowledge of which sensation is the lowest and reason is the highest.

The inner being of reality may be called "Egoness, Intelligence, Reason, or whatever one might wish to call it."¹⁴ Besides this intellectual description we may also add the moral, the Ego is Will and Freedom. When regarded as the basis of all contemplative knowledge it is *Intelligence*; when regarded as activity it is *Will*; and when regarded as the unconditioned

¹³ "Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen."—Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Section 3, D.

¹⁴ Das System der Sittenlehre.

principle, or as the ground of the moral law, it is *Freedom*. The description opens up at once two distinct problems. We inquire, as did Fichte in his later life, the meaning of the Ego as *Absolute*, the possibility of moving from the individual self to the Highest Self. And then again there is the significance of the *moral law* which especially appealed to Fichte. Like Kant, he sought to emphasize the true dignity of morality and the perfect equilibrium between the free Ego and the moral ideal.

The Absolute.—The first of these problems—namely, to show the relation between the individual conscious act and a higher Principle of Consciousness or the Absolute—especially attracted Fichte's attention in the later expressions of his system. It is a problem that may be approached from various stand-points, all of which lead to the same conception of the Absolute Self. Like Berkeley, Fichte began with a Principle, the *deed-act*,—rather than the "*esse is percipi*" of the British Idealist,—and from this moved upward to the Absolute which was implicitly required in the whole mental process. And, like Berkeley, he tended to emphasize this Absolute more in his later expositions than in the first expression of the "Science of Knowledge." It represented, however, not so much the creative Spirit of God,—which the British Idealist had brought into the foreground,—as a universal Principle of self-conscious activity.

Of the various avenues of approach to Fichte's Absolute there are three which seem of extreme importance. The first of these has already been referred to in connection with the third fundamental proposition of the "Science of Knowledge," which required an Ego over and above the mutual limitations of the divisible Ego and non-Ego. Since my individual self is constantly asserting the not-self, and at the same time the not-self is compelling it to take successively higher and higher points of view, then in Fichte's mind there seemed to be the necessity of a *Universal Principle* in which all such finite

activities could be included. It must, however, be of the general form of the individual Ego, since it is self-activity to which everything in the universe is referred. Another approach to the Absolute may be made through the nature of *thought*. All our finite thought-processes are somehow only portions of reality,—they never express its full nature. We can, however, conceive of a highest form of thought which is free from the imperfections of the lower forms, that is in fact *Absolute* in its nature. While still again there is a third side from which the Absolute may be approached. It may be regarded as the unity of moral freedom and moral law. The human self is free, yet it finds that its freedom is possible only in the presence of the moral force of the world. This conception of the harmony of freedom and law is possible only when we conceive of a Universal Moral Being from whom sprang both human freedom and the moral law. This conception of the moral aspect of the Absolute suggests at once Fichte's interpretation of God. If the inference from various of his writings is correct, the term God always indicated to him the moral order of the universe; as such it was asserted by a free act of the Ego as the complete fulfilment of its moral Ideal. Knowledge as the operation of the human Ego, the moral law as it is reflected in human consciousness, are truly identical with the fundamental essence of all being. There is but one Absolute, one God, and one Reality. This later emphasis on God and the Absolute Ego seems truly a completion of his earlier thought, although many have considered it an altered stand-point. He had earlier defined the relation between the empirical and the pure consciousness, he now defined the relation between the human Ego and its Infinite Ideal.

Morality.—Besides the general nature of the Absolute, the problem of the moral relation among men appeared to Fichte of great importance. This he discusses at length in two treatises. The one deals with the inner laws and principles of morality and shows the development of duty in its various

forms out of a single abstract conception, while a second work traces the external conditions for moral relations among men. In "*The System of the Science of Ethics*,"¹⁵ Fichte sought to apply the chief conclusions of his more theoretical philosophy to the meaning of conduct. Starting with the conception of the free Ego, he explains that freedom *requires*, for its very conception, a law of harmonious action which the free Ego may freely observe. Freedom can only be freedom if it asserts a law to control its actions,—the free Ego wills Law. This law, which is truly at one with the inner meaning of the Ego, is the fundamental principle of morality. It is purely formal, it simply says, "to be morally free there must be a certain law or regularity to the conduct." The transition from this formal condition of morality to its various manifestations as the moral feeling, is accomplished by the practical aphorism "Act according to the best belief in thy duty, or act according to thy conscience."¹⁶ In the practical application of this commandment Fichte outlines the general nature of duty—as obligation to the moral law—and its various requirements for men in different walks of life.

The other treatise on conduct, "*The Foundation of Natural Rights*,"¹⁷ is distinctly objective and is concerned neither with the moral law or with the conception of duty. It has as its problem the discovery of the conditions, six in number, for the expression of individual freedom in the external world. Among these conditions the most important, from a certain point of view, is the existence of *other free beings*. Fichte believes that the existence of other persons can be directly developed or unfolded from the conception of a single free individual. This removes any objection to his system that might

¹⁵ Das System der Sittenlehre.

¹⁶ "Handle stets nach bester Ueberzeugung von deiner Pflicht; oder: handle nach deinem Gewissen."—Das System der Sittenlehre, Part I., Section 13.

¹⁷ Grundlage des Naturrechts.

be advanced on the ground that he believed only in the existence of himself,—a way of philosophizing known as *Solipsism*. The immediate problem of the “Natural Rights” is to discover the various means by which the freedom of the single individual can exist in harmony with other free beings so that each may assist the others to fuller and nobler lives. “The conception of right is the conception of the necessary relations among free beings.”¹⁸ This introduces us to the legal relations among men, and the institutions—the State, the city, the family—through which man seeks to attain a fuller realization of his own particular freedom in harmony with the rest of mankind.

INFLUENCE OF FICHTE’S IDEALISM.

The philosophy of Fichte is above all else original, impressive, and striking. Although often lacking in orderly arrangement of parts and logical consistency in presentation, it is remarkable for its scope and magnitude. This breadth supplies the ground for three movements not unlike, in general character, the movements which we traced from Kant. The excessive emphasis on the value of individual man finds an expression in the passionate sentimentality of the *Romanticists*. And, further, the mystical or Absolute element in Fichte is emphasized by *Schelling*, who discovers a dual aspect in the principle to Self-Consciousness. But by far the most important result of Fichte’s system is to be found in *Hegel*. The transition from Fichte to Hegel will be outlined in connection with the latter.

THE ROMANTICISTS.

Frequently in the history of thought the symbolism of theoretical principles becomes the ideal of life. The reaction against the formal æstheticism of the mediæval Church exhibited itself in the over-assertion of the individual,—the characteristic of the period of the Renaissance. In that case,

¹⁸ Grundlage des Naturrechts, Section 2.

however, the individualism represented merely a subjective reaction against outward forms, and not an objective assertion of a subjective caprice. This latter is characteristic of the stand-point of the Romanticists who applied the Fichteian principle—the Ego asserts its object—to the interpretation of life. The one element of agreement among all the Romanticists, no matter how much they disputed with one another in regard to particular points, seems to have been the supremacy of an *intuitive feeling*, an emotional rather than a logical approach to ultimate questions. The play of analogy often takes the place of reason, vain sentimentality not infrequently supplies the ground of reality. Such are the depths into which philosophy sometimes falls.

The Romantic school includes, among others, Novalis (Hardenberg), the two Schlegels, and Tieck. They all attempt to discover in the feelings a single emotion which shall explain the mysteries of all things. Novalis tries to deduce a philosophy from poetry and sexual emotion. An unfinished lyric of his defines poetry and art as the outward expressions of inner reality. Philosophy, he tells us, is only the theory of poetry,—at the root they are identical. Some mystic word, perhaps, may explain the essence of the subjective and the objective! In his life also Novalis defines poetry as the innermost essence of things. He gives his soul a year to prepare for suicide, that he might join his departed love,—at the end of the year he marries elsewhere.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING.

LIFE.

The most influential of the Romanticists, as far as further tendencies in philosophy are concerned, was Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, born in 1775, in Würtemberg, and educated at Tübingen. About 1798 he went to Jena, where, under the influence of the Kantians, Reinhold, and especially Fichte,

he prepared his more important contributions to the history of thought. After 1803 he served as professor of philosophy at various German universities, and latterly lost that vigor of philosophic expression which characterized his early manhood. Schelling succeeded Hegel at Berlin, but failed to counteract the pantheistic tendencies then prominent. He died in 1854.

STAND-POINT.

The system of absolute idealism, as it appears in the early writings of Fichte, presented a universe of self, but neglected an adequate treatment of the not-self. Schelling realized the one-sidedness on the part of his master, and sought to obviate the defect by developing a parallelism between subject and object. Fichte's subjective idealism was true so far as it went, so Schelling thought in his early life, but it represented only half the world. It was believed by this disciple of idealistic parallelism that the explanation of the agreement between subject and object, which constitutes philosophy, may be reduced to two original premises.

Nature-Philosophy.—According to one point of view it may be supposed that "the objective is first made, and the question then arises as to how the subjective may be made to correspond to it."¹⁹ This proposition gives rise to the *Philosophy of Nature*, or speculative physics, the task of which is "to explain the ideal from the real."²⁰ Nature is not a mere product (*natura naturata*), the sum total of material objects, but, on the contrary, the essence of nature is the esoteric and imperishable force behind all appreciable phenomena; it is called by Schelling "productivity,"²¹ or generating nature

¹⁹ System des transcendentalen Idealismus, 1800, Einleitung, Section 1.

²⁰ "Das Ideelle aus dem Reellen zu erklären."—Naturphilosophie, 1799, Section 1.

²¹ Naturphilosophie, Section 6, ii.

(*natura naturans*). Pure productivity, however, is formless; in order for it to become definite it must set limits for itself. This self-limiting principle of productivity, the force-substance of the Leibnitzian school, gives rise to the finite products or separate objects of sense-perception. Nature, as we know it, is the unending struggle of this inner essence of productivity to limit itself as product, an infinite metamorphosis.

Transcendental Idealism.—Instead of beginning with the objective, we may believe the “subjective made first, and the question arises as to how the objective may be brought to correspond with it;”²² this is the idealistic attitude towards the world and the true basis of any transcendental philosophy. In the “*System of Transcendental Idealism*,” published in 1800, Schelling observes, in outward form at least, the method of Fichte, whereas in the previous Nature-Philosophy he leans towards the scientific premises of Kant’s later writings. On a more minute comparison between Fichte’s “*Wissenschaftslehre*” and Schelling’s “*Transcendentalen Idealismus*” a very important distinction is discovered, which is perhaps the most fundamental difference between master and pupil. Fichte found that a mere assertion of logical identity implied the existence of the Ego, and its activity was the first principle of all philosophy. Schelling discovered in this identity not a mere activity of the Ego, but rather an antithesis between subject and object to be thought only in terms of a universal principle of self-conscious limitation. Fichte defined the Ego as essentially activity, Schelling found it to consist in an act of self-knowledge, eternally limiting itself,—a synthesis which implies both the contrast and the unity of subject and object.

EXPRESSION OF SELF-CONSCIOUS LIMITATION.—This fundamental principle of the self-conscious antithesis of subject and object forms a basis for subsequent deductions in the regions of theoretical and practical philosophy, history, religion, and

²² System des transcendentalen Idealismus, Section 1.

the fine arts. In theoretical philosophy Schelling endeavors to trace the successive steps or "epochs" whereby the absolute principle earlier defined is able to appear in the various psychological activities of the mind. The first epoch traces the principle of self-conscious limitation from *sensation to productive intuition*, from mere limitation to a consciousness of that limitation. Commencing with productive intuition, which requires the recognition of the contrast between the material and ideal worlds, the second epoch defines a process by which this productive intuition develops into *reflection*, wherein the self is not only conscious of its limitations, but is likewise conscious of itself as limited. The third and last epoch of the theoretical philosophy carries reflection over into the realm of *Will*, a process during which Schelling finds himself able to give greater unity and internal consistency to Kant's system of categories. This portion of Schelling's transcendental philosophy is thus seen to be a natural history of the chief mental processes, an attempt to exhibit their internal structure or logico-genetic relationship. Such an undertaking, which had already been outlined by Fichte, later received exhaustive treatment in Hegel's "*Phenomenology of Mind*."

NORMATIVE EXPRESSIONS.—In the latter portions of his "*Transcendental Idealism*" Schelling describes the freedom of the individual *will*, the self determination of which constitutes the ground of unity between theoretical and practical philosophy. In the political state the *will* observes the moral law of justice, history is the embodiment of its progress, while religion expresses its ultimate ideal. Finally, in the last section of his work Schelling outlines the philosophy of art, which offers to his romantic mind an appropriate close to "*Transcendental Idealism*." He has constantly referred to the implied antithesis between subject and object, and now through the æsthetic feeling he discovers a state of self-consciousness wherein this opposition is lost, where the intellect perceives that it is both self-conscious and self-created.

Philosophy of Identity.—Schelling thus far appears as a transcendental parallelist,—one who discovers by the implications of thought two relatively independent worlds. The objective world of nature is pure productivity, limiting itself as product; the subjective world of thought is self-consciousness, limiting itself through successive stages of development. Within nature the infinite struggle of productivity is supreme, within mind self-consciousness is the highest principle. An opposition of worlds so marked as this was soon recognized by Schelling himself to be illogical unless he united the nature-philosophy and the transcendental idealism by the conception of an all-inclusive Absolute. He is therefore a disciple of Spinoza born under Kantian and Fichteian influences. Schelling develops his conception of the Absolute as the ground of the identity of nature and mind in a brief outline entitled "*Presentation of my System of Philosophy*,"²³ published the year after the "*Transcendental Idealism*." This short essay, which suggests the "*Ethica*" of Spinoza in the geometrical method of proof and in the metaphysical stand-point, is a work of remarkable logical power, and seems to deserve a deeper consideration than it has generally received. As far as Schelling's future influence is concerned, it denotes the culmination of his philosophical career.

The broadest conception of the human intellect is an Absolute Reason, "thought as the total indifference of subjective and objective,"²⁴ it is the unconditioned beyond which there is nothing. It corresponds in the main to the Substance of Spinoza, although it is perhaps less abstract. The general form of this principle of Absolute Reason may be expressed by

²³ Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie, 1801.

²⁴ The first proposition of the "*Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*" is as follows: "Ich nenne Vernunft die absolute Vernunft, oder die Vernunft, insofern sie als totale Indifferenz des Subjektiven und Objektiven gedacht wird."

the logical proposition of identity,—A is A,—since the latter is true beyond the conditions of time, “eternal in an absolute but not empirical sense.” The Absolute Reason cannot be conceived as infinite unless it includes both the subjective realm of self-consciousness and the objective realm of productive nature. This internal separation of subject and object within the conception of the Absolute involves a certain quantitative differentiation which becomes definitely expressed in the finite objects of the world, such as the mechanical and electrical phenomena, the various plants and animals,—in fact the modes of Spinoza or the things of ordinary speech.

POSITION OF SCHELLING.

After the publication of the theory of the Absolute, Schelling's philosophy began to assume a theistical form and to show signs of degeneration into the poetical mysticism of the other Romanticists. An essay entitled “*Bruno, or the God-like and Natural Principle of Things,*” a strong though rather diffuse work, marks the beginning of this later period of his philosophy. Many years before Schelling's death the superior brilliancy of Hegel had obscured the Philosophy of Identity, with its “night-black” Absolute. Yet it is to be remembered that the conception of dynamic process, the germ of Hegel's evolutionary philosophy, is strongly in evidence throughout Schelling's early thought. In the history of German philosophy the idealistic parallelism of Schelling is important as the transition from Fichte's subjectivism to the deeper and richer system of Hegel. The Principle of Self-conscious Reason presented to Schelling a duality, the self perceived its object; it recognizes it as another beyond itself. But in a subsequent reflective attitude the self discovers that this object is only another form of its own inner reality. Object and subject are truly one, they exist in and through the Absolute. The pantheism of Bruno, of Spinoza, and of Schelling have much in common; Nature, Substance, and Reason are conceptions

which express each in its own way the monistic truth of the Universe,—the Imminent Absolute is all.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL.

The Fichteian philosophy was more an attitude towards life than an arbitrarily finished system. Like the self which it formulates, the Fichteian world always implies, for the full expression of its meaning, an unrealized something beyond. Fichte is the transition between Reinhold and Schelling, between the identity of subject and object in consciousness and their identity in the Absolute. But even Schelling with this formal unity of the two worlds sacrificed meaning to abstractness. His Absolute was merely the identity of subject and object, nothing else. Some meaning must be attributed to the Absolute if it is to be conceived as actual. This task was accomplished by Hegel, the profoundest and by far the most influential of the post-Kantians.

LIFE.

Hegel was born at Stuttgart, the capital of Würtemberg, on April 27, 1770. He received his early education in the schools of his native city and at Tübingen. After serving as a private tutor in Switzerland, he followed Schelling to Jena, where the two together edited a journal in the interests of the "Philosophy of Identity." The battle of Jena occurred just as Hegel was finishing the last sheets of his first important work, the "*Phenomenology of Mind*."²⁵ This is the introduction to the Hegelian system and attempts to trace the logical development of "mind" through successive stages. The defeat of the Prussians at Jena made it necessary for Hegel to seek elsewhere for a means of livelihood, and he undertook the editorship of a newspaper in a neighboring town. He resigned this position

²⁵ *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

the following year for that of rector in a preparatory school. Here he prepared an extensive statement of the formal elements of his system,—the “*Logic*,” so called. Even at that time the outlines and more important features of his whole system were clearly in his mind, and the last twenty years of his life were occupied mainly in their unfolding.

When Hegel was forty-six years of age, with a clear conception of his own philosophical position and with an equally forcible conception of its truth, he began lecturing as professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. While there he wrote an outline to his whole system,—the “*Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences*.”²⁶ This is the most concise and exhaustive presentation of his system. The first part is an outline of the larger “*Logic*” published a few years before; the second part deals with natural science; while the third part outlines his general theory of psychology, morality, art, religion, and the purpose of philosophy. In 1818 he removed to Berlin to fill the chair of Fichte, where he remained until his death in 1831. At Berlin, Hegel prepared a more detailed statement of the latter portions of the “*Encyclopædia*.” Here he became famous throughout Germany, and acquired, through his published works and various official positions a remarkable influence.

The character of Hegel is that of a student and thinker, every act is the result of careful consideration, his slow and studied utterances are devoid of feeling and sympathy. He was shrewd, reserved, and conservative, harsh to his inferiors and opponents, often patronizing to those from whom he sought to derive benefit. He was the philosopher rather than the man of the world, the observer and not the actor. In character, breadth of mind, and acumen he closely resembles Kant. They were both constructors and systematizers, but their minds were of different types. Kant was original, suggestive, and impressive; Hegel was acute, penetrating, and concise. Both were men of

²⁶ *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse.*

thought rather than of action, to whom logical consistency was the basis of the world.

RELATION TO FORMER IDEALISTS.

The Critical Philosophy of Kant was a wonderful synthesis of the subjective or mental insight of the rationalists and the objective or nature philosophy of the Englishmen. The system of Hegel unfolds a similar synthesis. It unites the intense subjectivism of Fichte, full of meaning and form, but in the end only symbolic, with the breadth of Schelling's nature-philosophy, so exhaustive as to be devoid of definite form and meaning.

Fichte.—The transition from the Fichteian activity of the Ego to the Hegelian world of reason presents a remarkable insight into the distinction between the two stand-points. Fichte had declared that the Ego freely created the non-Ego, in order that it might have a ground for its self-assertion. Hegel, however, saw in this merely a process in which the *Absolute Reason* manifested itself through both Ego and non-Ego. The self could not know that it had asserted the not-self,—or even conceive of the possibility of such an assertion,—unless it was itself grounded on a *principle of reason*. In order to distinguish Ego from non-Ego, subject from object, some common element must include them both. And reason as this ground is more fundamental than the will-assertive force of Fichte, because it alone can be the basis for consciousness, freedom, and purposive thought.

Schelling.—This difficulty of the Fichteian system was recognized by Hegel's early friend Schelling, whose brilliant exposition of the philosophy of identity rather startled the meditative and conservative Hegel. But the latter soon discovered that behind the various attempts on the part of Schelling to transcend the seemingly magic circle of Fichte's Ego and non-Ego by a kind of poetic intuition there lurked a mystic element altogether unintelligible to Hegel. Schelling

had, it is true, supplied a ground of identity for both Ego and non-Ego, but unfortunately this "night-black" Absolute, as the mere identity of the two world-aspects, was a formal and abstract something, inconceivable except in terms of the Mystic One. Hegel regarded Schelling's Absolute as a more recent form of Spinoza's Substance,—only an abstract universal,—and this Substance or Absolute, as the mere identity of thought and extension, of Ego and non-Ego, represented to him a meaningless abstraction. Schelling laid stress on the immediate or intuitive nature of thought in the comprehension of the Absolute. Hegel required that thought must be mediate in all cases in order to be intelligible.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS.

There is something magnificent in the completeness and conciseness—lacking literary form, yet suggestive of latent power—that lurks in the expositions of Hegel's system. Analysis shows us that this fascination arises mainly from the impression which we receive of thoroughness in its presentation. This thoroughness, together with the precision of his utterances, shows plainly that the system is at least clear in its author's mind. Hegel's philosophy is an intellectualism. He represents the culmination of the rationalistic methods of analysis. The pantheism of Spinoza with its two equally fundamental attributes of thought and extension is reduced by Hegel to a "panlogism" of thought. Logical process, matter, extension, the phenomenal world, and the world of ideals are all different modes or aspects of a universal Thought-Idea unfolding itself in various forms. The individualism of Leibnitz, with its ideal principle of "Pre-established Harmony," is transformed into a universalism which yet retains all the richness, all the finite differentiation of a pluralism. Like the series of monads ordered by the truth of God, the Hegelian world is a universe of particulars, each of which expresses in its own finite way the Thought-Idea of the whole. Hegel's

system is a monism, but yet a monism in which every fact of life, even every feeling, emotion, or will-activity, finds its ordered place,—not through contrast with other objects, but through the expression of its own definite meaning in the Thought-Absolute. In this system which thus unfolds a logical evolution of the World-Forms we are able to discover two fundamental conceptions, which together give life and character to the Hegelian world. The *dialectic* movement, a process of development in three stages, might be regarded as the *form*; while the concept of *free and actual thought* as the World-Idea—manifesting itself through the dialectic movement as its form—might be conceived as the *content* of the system.

The Form of Philosophy as the Dialectic Movement.—

It is a common aphorism that an extreme of some kind often induces a reaction in the opposite direction. And it is often noticeable that both the action and reaction finally unite in a third stage which combines the essential features of each. Such a process is, in brief, the *dialectic* movement made prominent in Hegelianism. It is by no means original with Hegel, but represents a formal element common to Kant and many of his successors. This dialectic movement is not necessarily a temporal development. It is rather a thought or logical process of unfolding, in which each stage is conceived as a necessary supplement,—the development,—directly deducible from the previous stage. This process is not an infinite regression like the number series, but rather a closed circle in which every element dovetails into its predecessor and its successor.

THE HISTORY OF THE DIALECTIC CONCEPTION.—In the treatment of the ideas of the speculative Reason in the third part of Kant's first "Critique" it will be remembered that Kant laid especial stress on the meaning of "totality of phenomena." In the case of the paralogisms we noticed that it was a *subjective* totality of mental states, from which the reason inferred the absolute unity of the soul-subject; and in the antinomies it was the objective totality of the phenomena that led to the

concept of the universe. And, moreover, the Ideal of God united both the subjective and the objective in a single totality,—“the synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general.”²⁷ It is quite obvious that in Kant’s mind the concept of God included or synthesized the abstract, subjective self and the multiform, objective world. This is in brief the conception which the later idealists employed, not only in this single instance, but throughout their entire philosophical systems.

It will be remembered that Fichte introduced us to his system by means of three propositions,—the assertion of the Ego, the assertion of the non-Ego, and their reciprocal limitation. There can be observed in this process the same stages which Kant employed in the ideas of the reason,—the abstract subjective and the more concrete objective, with the final inclusion of both. Schelling observed this same movement when he regarded the formal absolute as the identity of the two worlds of objective productivity and subjective self-consciousness. It was to him a poetic conception and lacked in its application the simplicity of the Fichteian form or the symmetrical precision of the Hegelian form.

THE DIALECTIC AS USED BY HEGEL.—Although of importance to the previous idealists, the dialectic movement becomes in the hands of Hegel the formal principle of organic harmony of the entire universe. To the casual observer his system suggests nothing more than the world expressed in dialectic terms, for the meaning of the world itself seems at first obscured by this outward form. With Hegel the first or *thesis* stage of the dialectic is always abstract, indefinite; it represents the abstractness of our thought, and in that sense it is subjective. Usually the thesis stage contains the germ of all that is to

²⁷ “. . . synthetische Einheit aller Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Dinge überhaupt.”—Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second edition, p. 398.

follow, but yet the germ is so unconscious and indefinite that it requires a further realization to become truly itself.

The *antithesis*, as the second stage, represents the concrete objectification of the germ of truth, only abstractly stated in the thesis. This truth has become concrete, definite, and real; it is limited by its conditions and is not merely an indefinite something. But just because it is a concrete object it cannot possess the abstract universality of the thesis. Neither the abstract thesis or the concrete antithesis is a full expression of the truth partly realized by each in its own way. It is necessary for a third stage to unite, bring together, or transform ²⁸ the imperfect realizations of the truth in its two former aspects.

The *synthesis* stage is therefore a completion of the dialectic; it is "the truth returned to itself," as is often said. It is vastly richer, more full of meaning than either of the former stages, and just on account of this fulness it is both abstract and concrete. It seems as if there is a slight difference between the Fichteian and the Hegelian forms of the dialectic, which it is well to observe. Hegel emphasized especially the transition from the first to the second stage, believing that the concrete object is directly deduced from its abstract concept; while Fichte, on the contrary, regarded the separate propositions of the Ego and non-Ego to be independent of each other.

A familiar illustration of the dialectic may not be amiss at this point. Take the rules of any applied art to represent the thesis stage. They are abstract in character and have no reality beyond the subject. The specific application of these rules to a piece of raw material represents the antithesis stage. The rules find their realization in a single phase of the objective. And finally in the synthetic stage the artisan realizes that the rules mean more to him, have a new value, after he has conceived of their concrete application. This third conception

²⁸ Aufheben (raise out of).

opens up to him the full meaning of the rules, but partially comprehended in their abstract statement.

THE CIRCULAR FORM OF THE DIALECTIC.—Over and over again Hegel tells us that philosophy resembles a closed curve, the dialectic process is essentially a going out and a subsequent return unto itself. Conceived in its entirety, philosophy, as the explanation of the parts of a system—the system of the world—is an *inclusive circle*; while each of the subdivisions of philosophy is a lesser whole resembling a circle of smaller extension. This analogy of the circle to the dialectic process becomes clearer if we regard the infinite nature of both the closed curve and the world process. This circle-infinity, however, must be carefully distinguished from the endless succession exemplified by the infinite series of whole numbers; the former is the *real infinite*, full of meaning because completely comprehended within itself; the latter is the *false infinite*, contradictory because never itself. The circle passes through opposite points and finally returns to itself, only to repeat the process over and over again and each time with a fuller meaning.

The Content of Philosophy as Thought-Idea.—In the previous section we have traced the general form of the Hegelian system, but in so doing we were compelled to neglect the *content* which moved in this form. This content, as we shall presently recognize, is nothing else than the actuality of the world, "the outer and inner world of consciousness."²⁹ The dialectic movement supplies the steps for the realization of truth through a succession of logical stages; but we very naturally inquire as to the truth which moves in this form. We have earlier said that the primacy of thought over the deed represented the transition from Fichte to Hegel, and that fulness of meaning represented the latter's advance over

²⁹ Aeussern und innern Welt des Bewusstseins. . . ."—Encyklopädie, Section 6.

Schelling. In discussing Hegel's meaning of this *thought-idea*—mind as the content of his system—we shall first briefly describe his interpretation of common empirical thought as the medium for philosophical analysis before undertaking to trace the successive appearances of mind from mere sensation up to the self-conscious Absolute.

EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.—Thought,³⁰ from its very nature, is the instrument of philosophy. It is a faculty that pertains to the dignity of man, but its philosophical application must be free from habitual illusions or religious prejudices. The thought employed in philosophical analysis is necessarily a reflective process in which the "thinking consideration of objects" is transformed into true knowledge. In this reflective act thought is surrounded by what we call experience, through the medium of which it struggles to understand its own activities. From an historical point of view philosophy arose from the struggle of thought to comprehend itself, to understand the process by which it became actual.

THE "PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND."

Thought, as the instrument of philosophical analysis, is merely a phase of *mind* or spirit in its broadest sense. In the "*Phenomenology of Mind*,"³¹ Hegel undertakes to trace the evolution or developing-realization of this concept, and enumerates six stages. This natural history of the mental process was the earliest important publication of Hegel. It contains in germ the outline of his whole system, although the parts are not so clearly articulated as in his more mature works. The fundamental purpose of the "*Phenomenology of Mind*" is an interpretation of absolute idealism, erected on the ideal character of mediated thought rather than on intuition, an idealism which would prove the inconsistency of a real "thing-in-itself" at the same time that it unfolded the richness of an

³⁰ Denken.

³¹ Phänomenologie des Geistes.

Absolute-Thought. It will be remembered that such a natural history of mental processes was suggested by the general arrangement of the three faculties in Kant's "*Critique of Pure Reason*." It was more explicitly attempted by Fichte in the theoretical portions of "*The Science of Knowledge*," and such a purpose pervades the whole of Schelling's "*Transcendental Idealism*." But the most carefully developed and finished treatment of the natural history of the mental processes or the forms in which mind may unfold itself is to be found in this early work of Hegel.

External Consciousness.—In his estimation the most objective and lowest form of mind is *external consciousness*, in which the self is viewed as essentially apart from the object. The first condition of this external consciousness would be the mere *sensuous knowing* of an object, in which the thing is known immediately as an independency absolutely unrelated to all else. But this very attempt to view the "thing" as immediate is meaningless. Every present object contradicts its predecessors, if it is regarded as the whole truth. The "now" is in eternal change,—it is successively night and noon,—and if it alone is real there is no constant reality. The "thing" as "here" is successively a tree and a mountain; it is, so far as any sameness is concerned, nothing at all. And, further, Hegel is quite as desirous as Berkeley that his opponent shall discover in the "thing" some element or quality which is not an idea expressing a relation. The object is not a mere unintelligible something, it is rather a complex of relations, each one of which carries us beyond the object itself. Immediateness is an illusion, sensuous knowing requires a relatedness. This analysis of the "thing" given in Hegel's "*Phenomenology*" is in striking contrast to the conclusions of Locke, Kant, and Herbart on the same topic. To Herbart the "thing" indicated at the last analysis a substratum of "thing-in-itself" or Real, existent apart from consciousness, but interpreted as phenomenon by the transcendental elements of the

mind. To Hegel, on the contrary, the "thing" represents a phase of mind, a complex which consciousness finally recognized to be the same as itself.

Perception,³² the second condition of consciousness, represents the taking together of the accidental and hypothetical sensations. It is essentially mediate, for it recognizes the interconnection among the elements of consciousness. The *understanding* is the third and last condition of external consciousness proper. This in a measure unites the immediacy of *sensuous knowing* and the interrelatedness or mediacy of perception. It is able to recognize the "thing" as an appearance for itself and also cognize its internal structure.

Self-Consciousness.—Succeeding the three conditions of external consciousness, each representing a phase of the conscious apprehension of things, there is the second stage in the unfolding of mind, that of *self-consciousness*. Here the "object"—the mere "thing" of external consciousness—becomes identical with the self that is conscious. The subject becomes aware of itself in every respect. This is essentially the basis of the doctrine of individuality. The self-conscious being is all desire; he is in conflict with others because he believes the world to be virtually his own. We may remark that self-consciousness in this Hegelian sense very well explains the "genius" of the Romanticists. Above this stage there is the *reason*,³³ which, by uniting external consciousness and self-consciousness, forms the synthetic or third phase in the logical development of mind.

Reason.—Reason represents the thought of the object and the thought of the subject in the one thought activity. In its operation it is the reason that comprehends the laws that control nature, the physical expression of mind. The final stages of mind, *ethical consciousness*,³⁴ *religion*,³⁵ and the *Absolute*,³⁶ find another and perhaps more satisfactory treatment in

³² Wahrnehmung.

³³ Vernunft.

³⁴ Der Geist.

³⁵ Die Religion.

³⁶ Das absolute Wissen.

Hegel's subsequent works. They will be mentioned, therefore, in their place in his system.

SYSTEM.

It is an impossible task to give in an outline any adequate conception of the breadth of the Hegelian system. Translations and exhaustive commentaries have been published, and must be referred to by those who desire a detailed statement. "*The Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline*," published by Hegel while a professor at Heidelberg, is a complete and concise epitome of his whole work. The latter portions were amplified in the years just before his death, but the ideas expressed were in the main unchanged.

General Divisions.—The three divisions of his system correspond to three stages of the dialectic. The *Logic* represents the abstract concepts of philosophy. It is, so to speak, the laws of thought when thought is conceived in terms of certain general conceptions. The antithesis stage of the system is illustrated by the second part of the "*Encyclopædia*," the *philosophy of nature*.³⁷ Here Hegel outlined the objective development of the thought-idea, showing wherein the logical abstractness of the thesis stage becomes actualized in the objective world of nature. And finally the synthesis stage of the world process is reached in the *philosophy of mind*,³⁸ where the Thought-Idea attains its full and complete development. It raises the Logic out of its formal abstractness and the world of nature out of its concrete individuality. In brief, the philosophy of mind treats of distinctly mental processes, such as the soul, civilization, art, religion, and the ultimate concepts of philosophy. Throughout this whole statement it must be remembered that there are no indivisible elements anywhere to be found in the Hegelian world. Each of these three larger

³⁷ Philosophie der Natur.

³⁸ Philosophie des Geistes.

divisions is itself the dialectic circle which forms the ground for smaller and smaller dialectics. There is no element which can be considered an indivisible entity; the large and the small alike, each is the seat of a process which when analyzed presents the tricotomy of the dialectic movement.

The Logic.—The *Logic* is the thesis stage of the whole world process, and as such it is extremely abstract in its nature. “Logic is the science of the pure Idea, that is, the Idea as the abstract element of thought.”³⁹ It is concerned with the elemental concepts of thought,—the categories of being the ground for existence or the laws of the judgment. The thesis of the Logic is represented by as abstract a concept as Hegel conceived it possible to define “mere Being,”⁴⁰ that which requires for its appreciation quality, quantity, and their union. The quality aspect of being is a mere identity-being without definable attributes. Hegel, in a famous passage, defines this “mere being,” without any relations, as the same as *no-being*. “This pure being is a pure abstraction, in character absolutely negative, which likewise taken immediately is nothing.”⁴¹ This recalls Berkeley’s contention that mere “matter,” which can be defined only in negative terms, is equivalent to nothing. In Hegel’s estimation the apparent contradiction of mere being—including everything—and no-being—equivalent to nothing—is relieved only by regarding mere being as essentially *becoming* a concept in which both the positive and negative aspects are present.

The antithesis and synthesis stages of the Logic are represented respectively by the Doctrine of Essence⁴² and the Doctrine of the Concept.⁴³ The former represents the stages of existence, such as “the thing,” the appearance, and the actu-

³⁹ “Die Logik ist die Wissenschaft der reinen Idee, das ist, der Idee im abstrakten Elemente des Denkens.”—Encyklopädie, Section 19.

⁴⁰ Sein.

⁴¹ Encyklopädie, Section 78.

⁴² Wesen.

⁴³ Begriff.

ality. The concept exhibits itself in such forms as the syllogisms of the traditional logic, our judgments of purpose, and finally as the abstract concept of the Absolute.

Philosophy of Nature.—*Nature* represents the antithesis stage of the whole world movement. The abstract and indeterminate principles of the Logic find their concrete and definite application—their finite realization—in the processes of nature. “The nature represents the Idea in its otherness.”⁴⁴ In this otherness or concrete finitude the Thought-Idea becomes identified with the facts and materials of science. Nature, in its abstract form, is represented by *Mechanics* as the science of space, time, and motion, the laws of which become concrete in *Physical Chemistry*. This treats of the different elements, the forms of energy, and the character of natural processes. And finally objective nature attains its highest realization in the structure of *organic bodies*,—the slow movement of geologic processes the evolution of plants, and lastly the animal organisms.

Philosophy of Mind.—The synthetic or completely realized stage of the world movement is attained in the philosophy of *mind* as it is exemplified in the intellectual activities of man. This portion of the “*Encyclopædia*” is in a measure the restatement of the later portions of the “*Phenomenology*” earlier mentioned. Mind has at once the abstract universality of the pure idea, as treated in the Logic and the concrete definiteness of the phenomena of Nature. Within this highest region of mind one may observe the same dialectic movement which extends throughout the entire range of Hegel’s system. The subjective phases, however, because they are higher developments of the Thought-Idea, have a fuller meaning than could be discovered in either the logic or philosophy of nature. They represent the ideals of life, the teleological

““Die Natur hat sich als die Idee in der Form des Andersseins ergeben.”—Encyklopädie, Section 247.

significance of those activities which are characteristic of the human intellect.

SUBJECTIVE MIND.—The abstract form of the philosophy of mind is denoted by *subjective mind*. This refers to the soul, to consciousness, and to the various psychical processes. The highest realization of this subjective phase of mind is to be found in the “free will as free intelligence.”⁴⁵ A will so free that it realizes its own freedom; a freedom which arises from intelligence and the desire for the truly permanent, but never from mere impulse. In this regard Hegel suggests the intellectual freedom of Spinoza; they both recognize true freedom only so far as it is a freedom of the intellect.

ETHICS.—The *objective mind*, or second part of the whole division of philosophy of mind, refers to the theory of ethics and its various applications,—“the conception of right and its realization in the objective world.”⁴⁶ In the entire treatment of this subject Hegel is in search of the principles of our daily life and social intercourse, which exemplify the application of the principle of intellectual freedom, as it is outlined in the former section, to the world of experience. He recognizes everywhere the subsistence of all forms of morality, as well as the complex human institutions, in the single idea of freedom. In the *conception of right* it is freedom which gives value to property, contract, and the fundamental distinction between right and wrong; and likewise it is freedom upon which morality and the institutions of society are grounded. These human institutions which Hegel believes to be fundamental for society are three in number,—the family, the community, and the state. Hegel opposes the political views of such thinkers as Hobbes, who declare that the state is a compact among its members, and follows the Aristotelian view that man is natur-

⁴⁵ “Wille als freie Intelligenz ist.”—Encyklopädie, Section 481.

⁴⁶ “Die Idee des Rechts, den Begriff des Rechts und dessen Verwirklichung zum Gegenstande.”—Philosophie des Rechts, Section 1.

ally a social being. It is part of one's nature to belong to the state,—the man unrelated to organized society is a contradiction in terms. By nature man is dependent on his social context, and he attains to the mastery of his powers through his subsistence in the state. The state is not without the individual, nor is the individual without the state. The state “has the highest right over the individual, the highest duty of whom is to be a part of the state.”⁴⁷

ABSOLUTE MIND.—The complete realization of the world process is represented by the philosophy of *Absolute mind*. It is a conception of an Ideal in which the soul and its finite manifestations become united into a deeper and fuller mind. It is mind with all its meaning realized. This Ideal shows itself in three forms,—as the Beauty of *Art*, the Divine Perfection in the God of *Religion*, and finally as the Absolute of *Philosophy*. Art is the limited sensuous expression of the Idea. In its history Art has observed the same dialectic process which is found elsewhere; the synthetic stage of this development is found in the poetry of modern times, wherein all artistic forms are united. In religion Hegel emphasizes especially the reason, in contradistinction to the prominence of feeling. Not that thinking is the entire meaning of God, but that thought is the formal aspect by which alone the concept of God may be attained. The *Absolute*, which is the Ideal of Philosophy expressed without anthropomorphic symbolism, is nothing else than the world process actualized. It is the Absolute in which the logical principles, the natural phenomena, and finally the mind itself, all subsist. The Absolute is the Thought-Idea complete with all possible meaning. It has the abstract universality of the “mere being,”—which was the starting-point in the first thesis of the whole world process; it has also the meaning, the

“ . . . Endzweck das höchste Recht gegen die Einzelnen hat, deren höchste Pflicht es ist, Mitglieder des Staats zu sehn.”—Philosophie des Rechts, Section 258.

value, of all the intervening stages, each of which exemplifies some form of its unlimited truth. The Absolute is mere Being, but mere Being in which all the stages of its possible realization are actualized. It is this doctrine of the Absolute which brings the Hegelian monism clearly into the foreground. Notwithstanding the diversity of world elements, the apparent separateness of the stages of the dialectic process, and the individuality which seems to be implied in many of the Hegelian terms, yet in its deeper meaning the philosophy of the Idea is a compact unity, a monism in which the diversity only assists to the fuller meaning of the World-Idea.

INFLUENCE OF HEGEL.

The movement of Absolute Idealism, which had begun with Reinhold, culminated in the universalistic system of Hegel. There is a greater logical sequence of ideas in this movement than it is possible to discover in any other period of philosophy. The transcendentalism of Kant attained its most finished expression in Hegel. In the terms of his own philosophy Hegel represents the synthesis of Fichte's abstract philosophy of the self with the more concrete nature-philosophy of Schelling; and likewise the whole movement of idealism from Kant to Hegel represents a synthesis of the subjective rationalists and the objective empiricists. The year of Hegel's death, 1831, marked the climax of his power and the most wide-spread influence of the idealistic tendency of thought. This very completion, however, contained the germs of immediate decay. A philosophical movement has vitality just so long as it represents growth; dissipation invariably follows completion. The immediate disciples of Hegel found themselves unable to interpret the Absolute Thought-Idea in any other than pantheistic terms, yet they recognized the prominence in which Hegel himself had held the Christian conception of God. The result was the division of his disciples into two schools, each of which professed to teach the master's true doctrine, but differed as to the fundamental

theological conception. The keen edges of his system, its breadth, and its cogency disappeared in the hands of his followers. In their struggle to interpret his "panlogism" in terms of a religion the Hegelian world was distorted beyond recognition, and in the end every disciple struggled to remodel, according to his own individual caprice, the dissociated fragments of the once homogeneous whole. At the same time the dialectic methods and the possibility of deducing all things from a single principle were assailed by such men as Herbart,—all of whom were repelled by what were called the extravagant deductions of Kant's "false disciples,"—and who sought to reinstate the original psychological and epistemological premises of the Critical Philosophy. The recognition on the part of the government in the end proved detrimental to the popularity of Hegelian philosophy. An "official philosophy" is a contradiction. All these tendencies helped to undermine the position of Absolute Idealism, and so effectually did they operate that the direct influence of the whole movement which culminates in Hegel had grown insignificant by the middle of the century.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

During the years immediately succeeding Hegel's death there arose a mystical and pessimistic tendency which took the form of a reaction against his system. The influences, many in number, which militated against the further extension of Absolute Idealism in its Hegelian form were summarized in the mystical idealism of Schopenhauer. At the beginning of this chapter three separate tendencies were defined, each emphasizing a certain aspect of the Kantian criticism. Herbart sought a realistic interpretation of the "thing-in-itself," the movement from Reinhold to Hegel erected an objective world about the transcendental character of the ethical Ego, and finally Schopenhauer brought into prominence the will-activity of the mind in the creation of its world.

LIFE.

Schopenhauer was born at Danzig, in Northeastern Germany, on February 22, 1788. His father was a merchant who had travelled much, a man of stern character and morose disposition. The young Schopenhauer was intended by his parents for a mercantile career, but the death of his father permitted him to adopt the life of a student. His interests covered a wide field,—the ancient classics, history, science, and philosophy. Early travels and residence in France and England gave him an opportunity of acquiring more than an ordinary knowledge of the world. He first attended the University of Göttingen, but later removed to Berlin, where he heard the lectures of Fichte, then at the zenith of his fame. The philosopher of Absolute Idealism was positively repugnant to him. On the cover of his notes of Fichte's lectures he is said to have written "Wissenschafts leere" (science of emptiness).

With the approaching political disturbances of 1812 Schopenhauer retired to the Thuringian forest. Here he prepared an essay, entitled "*Concerning the Fourfold-Root of the Principle of Sufficient Ground*,"⁴⁸ which was accepted by the University of Jena for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Already Schopenhauer had become conscious of the fundamental conceptions of his philosophy, and in his early work he gave to the will a higher position than it had hitherto received in Germany. The following year he repaired to Dresden, and there remained for four years. During this period he thought out and wrote his classic work, "*The World as Will and Presentation*,"⁴⁹ published at Leipzig in 1818. A second edition, containing a restatement and further additions to the earlier work, was published some twenty-five years later. During this Dresden residence an incident occurred which has been often quoted. On a visit to a botanical conservatory Schopenhauer, who evidently

⁴⁸ Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde.

⁴⁹ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.

acted strangely, was asked who he was. "If you can tell me who I am," he is said to have replied, "I shall be deeply obliged to you." While a resident at Berlin his dislike for the Fichte-Hegel philosophy manifested itself very prominently. A course of lectures announced by him to be given at the same hours that Hegel had his fullest audience proved a failure. This incident by no means tended to soften his opposition towards the Absolute Idealism and his prejudice against its disciples. Like Hume, he craved for literary notoriety, and the apparent contempt for his writings on the part of the philosophical world only tended to aggravate his sensitive disposition, morbid and pessimistic by nature. Schopenhauer's temperament was naturally impulsive; strong in will and opinion, he undoubtedly controlled his powerful emotions as few others could have done. Towards women he entertained a profound contempt, accountable partially to the lack of sympathy between his mother and himself. Religion also was especially distasteful to him, since it rested on the emotional rather than the intellectual side of man. In 1833 Schopenhauer retired to Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he led a solitary life until his death in 1860.

STAND-POINT.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer is directly traceable to three sources,—the transcendental idealism of Kant, the ethical mysticism of India, and finally the emotional, one might almost say impulsive, tendencies of his personality. Two central ideas dominate his thought,—the world, in its innermost structure is not the mere appearances (Kant), but its inner reality is a blind force struggling for self-assertion (Buddhism).

Behind the appearances of the phenomenal world there is the reality of will. "Will is the 'thing-in-itself,' the inner content, the true essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the reflection of the Will."⁵⁰ The fun-

⁵⁰ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Book IV.

damental difference between Schopenhauer and Hegel lies in the relative importance of will. To Hegel the intellect was the highest truth; it supplied not only the means for philosophic expression, but likewise the very conception of the Absolute. All the emotions, impulses, and feelings were fundamentally irrational, and could be admitted into philosophy only if tempered by reason. To Schopenhauer thought was only a secondary product of will. The volitional impulse, the struggle of inner forces for some objective expression, was the true basis of philosophy and the only possible approach to the Absolute. In his personality and in the emphasis on the emotional and intuitive aspect of life Schopenhauer recalls Bruno. Both were monists who were far more deeply impressed by a mystical appreciativeness than by an intellectual interpretation of the Absolute. Yet, notwithstanding the mystical tendencies of Schopenhauer, his own system has much more in common with the school of Fichte and Hegel than he is willing to admit. Both stand-points interpret the given objects of the world as mere appearance, and look for a transcendental reality beyond; and in details of expression Schopenhauer's idealism has recourse to many conceptions which originated in the other school. The relation between Schopenhauer and Schelling was especially close; "will" resembles "self-conscious limitation," the unending struggle of the universal Will recalls the infinite productivity of Nature. Schopenhauer's philosophy of art differs but little from the treatment by the Romanticists. Both regard art as the highest sensuous embodiment of Reality, and both look to beauty for the harmony of object and subject, the fact and its ideal.

Buddhism.—It is quite impossible for one unfamiliar with the central doctrines of Buddhism to understand the true bearing of this modern instance of a pessimistic will-philosophy. The outward appearance as well as the deeper meaning of Buddhism is distinctly opposed to Christianity. Arising as it

did from a reaction against the formalism of the ancient Hindoo Vedas and the Upanishads, Buddhism is distinctly humanistic. Like Christianity, it seeks to define the salvation of man,—but here the resemblance ceases. Christianity in its native purity may be said to have had no metaphysical foundation, no other theory of the world than a faith which cannot be penetrated by reason. Buddhism, on the other hand, is grounded on a definite theory of reality,—the blind struggle for an unattainable end, the eternal truth that all the “constituents of being are misery.”⁵¹ The life of man is an evil in itself, the goal of human endeavor is the freedom from this misery of existence. In man there is no central spiritual element analogous to the Occidental conception of soul, but rather a continuity of a *principle of consciousness*,⁵² which is the direct cause of future rebirths. All life arises from sensuous desire; or rather from the longing of the individual for the physical gratification of those will-emotions which prove valueless when attained. “By cleaving to anything thus done one come to be.”⁵³ Complete salvation results only when the person has reached the supreme thought that this illusory desire which he seeks is itself merely a subjective appreciation. Then he has attained to complete knowledge of the world and has freed his “principle of consciousness” from the curse of future being.

Universal pessimism is perhaps the most apparent conclusion from even a superficial acquaintance with Eastern thought, but yet there is a deeper meaning which Europe has itself long

⁵¹ Aūgutta-Nikāya. (Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. xiv.)

⁵² I have here used the term “principle of consciousness” to express that Nidana consciousness which is alone reborn; it is not an element, but rather a process. The word “self” is objectionable, as the existence of the Ego or soul is directly denied. (See Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. 133. Buddha-ghosa’s Visuddhi-Magga, Chapter xviii.)

⁵³ Samyutta-Nikāya. (Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. 161.)

struggled to realize. It is the duality of worlds; the inner reality of an uncaused cause in contradistinction to its causal manifestations in the world of sense-perceptions. It is a conception which is found in all those systems of monism that find a deeper reality than is given in the flux of sense-phenomena. This duality of the real and the apparent is to be discovered in the pantheistic thinkers of the mediæval school,—traceable from them through the Arabian to Oriental sources. It forms a fundamental distinction in Bruno and in Spinoza,—the “*natura naturans*” representing the self-caused reality of Substance and the “*natura naturata*” its manifestations as the world of experience. It is the distinction between the “thing-in-itself” and the transcendental elements in the Critical Philosophy. Traces of the distinction are observed in Fichte, and it is especially prominent in Schelling, who employs the same terms as were used by Spinoza.

The Influence of Personality.—Aside from both the direct influences of Buddhism,—with its metaphysic of the will and its ethics of pessimism,—and Kant’s system of transcendentalism,—with its two worlds of appearance and reality,—Schopenhauer’s philosophy is to a large extent the expression of *his own personality*. He was intense, restless of mind, easily moved by prejudice, strong in his likes and dislikes; in fact, a man to whom the volitional, the expressive side of his nature was always in the foreground. He was keen, analytical, and fond of self-introspection; his temperament was extremely sensitive to some emotions, such as the artistic and the sexual, but yet remained inflexible to others. Patriotism and religion were ridiculed by him because irrational, and he ignored his mother during the latter part of her life. In character Schopenhauer seems to unite in a most original manner a powerful analytical mind with the active striving side of human nature. The former explains the grasp which he undoubtedly had on the deepest problems of philosophy, while the latter gives us the key to his fondness for Hindoo literature, with its cry for the

cessation of the turbulent spirit of man. He sought to give philosophical expression to a self which struggles for unattainable ends, fully recognizing the present hopelessness of its task.

SYSTEM.

Schopenhauer's philosophy, more than any of the Occidental systems, is built upon the fundamental distinction between the immanent reality of the universe, as struggling will, and its limiting conditions. The first part of "*The World as Will and Presentation*" deals with *presented* fact. It is epistemological in character and defines the grounds of knowledge. Once, however, he had discovered the solution to the world as a presentation he directed his attention to the deeper aspect of the world, the inner reality of the *Uncaused Will*. This is a concept only, and valueless as a precept for our daily existence. He therefore returns to the presented world as it is unfolded in *art*. Beauty is to him a transitory realization of that perfect salvation attainable only by the submersion of the individual self in the Absolute Will.

Epistemology.—The theory of knowledge is summarized in Schopenhauer's mind by the quotation, "The world is my presentation." Following his masters, Kant and Buddha, he feels that the given world becomes vitalized about a conscious centre which may be abstractly termed the "subject." But the ideas which compose the conscious life are not given archetypes of an external reality beyond; they are presentations created by my own subjectivity from the principle of "sufficient ground" (*zureichenden Grunde*). Like Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and Hegel, from whom Schopenhauer differs less than he supposes, he recognizes the presentation as such to be the direct product of transcendental laws or roots (*Wurzel*). These he finds to be four in number: The logical ground according to which we find ourselves able to think a conclusion from given premises,—the transcendental source of the belief in the

authority of the laws of the reason; secondly, the validity of the principle of causality; thirdly, the mathematical forms of space and time, through which the objects stand in a relation which is mutually determined by each other, yet a relation which is nevertheless purely intuitional in character. The fourth root is by far the most important in Schopenhauer's mind,—it is the necessary manifestation of the *will-activity*. The logical and causal roots to the principle of sufficient ground have been long recognized; whereas Schopenhauer conceived the two latter to be original with Kant and himself.

Metaphysic.—The central theme of the Schopenhauerian philosophy is the *will*. He recognizes, as all the transcendentalists did, that the substratum upon which the mind imposes its forms of time, space, and causality must be explained in some way. He was dissatisfied with the unknowability of the “thing-in-itself” as well as the indefinable self-consciousness of the Absolute Idealists. Schopenhauer discovered the innermost reality of the world, not in an undefinable external, but rather in a clearly appreciable subjective force. This Absolute, the “*natura naturans*,” is will, an unconscious force behind our world of appearance. Anselm defined the Absolute as Goodness, Descartes as Perfection, Spinoza as Self-being, Kant as Personified Morality, and Schopenhauer in his turn identifies it with a blind and insatiable struggle for self-existence. His metaphysic is an approach near to mystic pantheism. Nature is the expression of an unthinking force, the forms of which struggle for their existence in the temporal and spacial order. In its innermost reality the nature of the Absolute Will can never be known to the human consciousness, which conceives of every thing in terms of its transcendental elements. Yet the desires, the ambitions, the struggles which control the conscious life of every individual are the reflections of the Supreme Will beneath.

After having defined the concept of the Absolute Will, he again turned towards the world of presented fact. There he

is able to discover successive *objectifications* of the *Will*. The lowest of these is represented by inorganic nature and the highest by the brain of man. Each separate objectification of the will is itself the embodiment of an eternal purpose to exist, "a will to be." "The world as presentation is the reflection of the Will in which it recognizes itself in various grades of distinctness and completeness, the highest of which is man."⁵⁴ Pleasure, harmony, and progress result from the gratification of this "will to be;" pain, discord, and decadence follow its arrest. This vain struggle of the will for a fuller expression is wrong; utterly wrong. The duty of man is to search for rest, some state in which his "will to be" no longer yearns for the unattainable. This is achieved in artistic contemplation and in death.

Æsthetics.—To many Schopenhauer is known only as the philosopher of the world of art. Yet the fine arts, as such, are regarded by him as important only as corollaries to the theory of the will. Each type of art represents a certain meaning of the Will; in architecture it is force, in painting action, in poetry temporal order, while music, as the highest art, represents the Will in its inner being. The presentation of art serves for the moment to quell the struggle of the human "will to be," for the personal identity of the subject is lost in the contemplation of beauty. The individual will, as the will of the æsthetic object, are both momentarily merged in the Universal Will. The object of beauty serves only to arrest the terrible struggle of existence for a single moment. The soul yearns for complete rest, the eternal suppression of the finite in the Infinite; this is to be found in the moral denial of the individual will.

Ethics.—In his ethics Schopenhauer continues to observe the same duality of worlds which is to be found in his whole system. Man represents the highest form of objectified will

⁵⁴ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Book IV.

and the only being who may become fully conscious of the "will to live." Life for most of mankind is merely an incessant struggle for existence; the fear of death is the chief incentive to endure this struggle, and yet death is its inevitable climax. Pain is the unavoidable accompaniment of this unending strife; and even the happiness which is to be found in life is purely negative, for it arises merely from the anticipation of desires, and generally disappears at the moment of their fulfilment. Aside from this universal "will to live," which however extends only to the finite individual, there is the desire to propagate the finite objectification of the will in future generations. The sexual passion was conceived by Schopenhauer to be the second strongest emotion in the nature of man. He is said to have declared that mankind would be helpless if there existed another emotion as strong.

The simplest acts of will assertion are those which take place as mere bodily activities. They are, however, the results of purely self-centred motives, in which the will of one person often contracts the assertive power of another. This gives rise to the fundamental distinction between right and wrong. When the finite "will to live" of one person breaks through the limits which are required by the "will to live" of another, there arises *wrong* in its various forms. Opposition by force is less wrong than interference by deceit, because the latter breaks the bonds of mutual trust and destroys all sympathy and hopefulness. This exhibits at once the fundamental premise of Schopenhauer's ethics, the *apparent* separateness, the egoistic strife of the individual beings of the world, and the *true* unity of all mankind in the Real Will. It is only by the selfish *assertion* of the will that we are separate; by the *denial* of the will we all become one. The suppression of the finite will, the only purely rational act, is accomplished through a life of honesty, purity, and sympathy. But more important even than these moral motives is the recognition of the one truth of life, —all existence, all assertion of the will, is misery. "Before

us there is certainly nothingness. . . . To those in whom the will has denied itself this world of ours—which is apparently so real with all its suns and milky ways—is nothing.”⁵⁵

POSITION OF SCHOPENHAUER.

The pessimistic idealism of Schopenhauer represents the reaction against the formalism of the Hegelians. It appeals to a different side of character, a side of character which the advancing civilization of the nineteenth century has learned to appreciate more and more. Hegel is seldom read except by the professional philosopher; Schopenhauer, both on account of his brilliant literary style and his masterly expression of the struggle of life, appeals to the average man. He philosophizes on what is nearest to all his readers,—the motive, the strife, and the ambition of active life. There is no need of training to understand him, there are no subtle meanings which are only partly expressed. Schopenhauer is dogmatic, but yet asserts his opinion so lucidly and with so much skill that its force seems irresistible to us. Even his pessimism finds a hearty welcome. The current industrial problems, the reaction away from traditional forms of religion, in fact the whole social background of the present period, is tending towards a pessimistic view of the world. Individualism, upon which the whole Reformation and the progress of the northern races has been founded, is being discarded for a degenerate socialism. In all this restlessness and demand for the suppression of the individual, Schopenhauer is pre-eminently the philosophical apologist. He supplies a metaphysical background for emotional convictions and arouses an enthusiasm in a mystical interpretation of man and his social relations. For all these reasons the various forms of mystical idealism are to-day the most popular expressions of transcendental tendencies.

⁵⁵ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. (Last paragraph of the first edition.)

CHAPTER VIII.

RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY.

THE pessimistic naturalism of Schopenhauer was the last of the classic reconstructions of the Critical Philosophy. From the publication of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" to the death of Hegel, a period of just fifty years, Germany was the scene of a wonderful movement in the history of human thought,—a movement which has acted and reacted on the science, the literature, and the ideals of the nineteenth century. While each of the classic forms of German transcendentalism stands for a definite meaning, an original interpretation of Kant, those who have since written are concerned with the assimilation and reorganization of the older systems rather than in the development of new issues. English empiricism invaded Germany towards the middle of the century, and likewise the German idealism began to influence the development of British thought. The result of this intermixture of epistemological stand-points has been the convergence of all philosophy towards a state of equilibrium in which are to be found elements from almost every phase of philosophical development.

This conciliatory tendency has shown itself wherever the influence of philosophy is felt. It has sometimes degenerated into an indefinite attitude of mind in which conflicting and undigested elements are harmonized by a mere verbalism, and still again the meeting of various lines of thought has reacted on literature and helped to define more artistic conceptions of life. This struggle for the harmony of empiricism and critical rationalism affected ethics and metaphysics, and it has even penetrated into the fields of science and psychology,—generally less susceptible to the influence of epistemological controversies. It is the intent of this last chapter to outline some of the

recent tendencies of thought which have influenced the fundamental theories of philosophy. In this brief account we shall find that the philosophy of the *Absolute* has gradually attained a remarkable importance. That beneath science, psychology, ethics, and metaphysics there is an undercurrent of thought which finds expression in a Principle of Being co-extensive with the Universe. That, whatever stand-point we may take towards the world of fact experience, whether religious, ethical, or even sceptical, there still seems to remain a demand which is only satisfied in the presence of a deeper metaphysic. The ultimate conclusion of such a metaphysic we may call the Absolute; and its development from experience and thought may be similarly defined as the Philosophy of the Absolute. It is our purpose in the closing pages of this chapter to consider a few tendencies and stand-points which lead in this general direction. We may find that in these considerations which point towards a World-unity we are introduced to a concept dark and formless in itself, yet from its very depth and universality it may prove to be the logical implication of the elements of experience and the processes of thought.

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE.

Towards the close of the eighteenth century there were a number of remarkable developments in scientific theory. The French materialists, earlier alluded to in connection with Locke, were impressed with the mechanical nature of the entire universe and sought to establish the universality of the principle of material causality. This absolute reliance on the apparent infallibility of observation gave an unprecedented stimulus to scientific inquiry and indirectly produced a long series of discoveries. It was the time when such men as D'Alembert and Laplace were active in the theory of mathematics, and Priestly, Lavoisier, and Dalton in chemistry. Many of the men who contributed to the scientific activities of the early part of the nineteenth century are to be regarded as specialists

within a single field, and have therefore effected only an indirect influence on the history of philosophy. Yet there were men who felt the demand for a clearer understanding of the meaning of scientific conceptions at the same time that they recognized the advantage of their use. Among those who gave a wider philosophical interpretation to the advances of science is to be mentioned the Frenchman, Auguste Comte.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

He was born and reared under two distinct influences, each of which finds a place in his system,—the activities of the special sciences and the social unrest following the period of Napoleon. His "*Positive Philosophy*,"¹ as Comte's standpoint is called, has two distinct parts,—one is critical and the other constructive. In the critical portion Comte discovers, after a careful examination of the history of scientific theory, a certain law of progress observable in the development of all the sciences. With this law in mind he then seeks to construct an ideal for all science and to apply it within the field of sociology, a subject with which he finds himself especially concerned.

The Stages of Science.—The history of science exhibits three successive stages in its development,—a religious, a metaphysical, and finally a positive period. The first, or *religious*, is characterized by a reference, in the explanation of natural phenomena, to some incomprehensible spirit, such as the nature-gods of the savage pantheon, or a supernatural Being. It represents the scientific views of both the race and the individual in their periods of childhood. Everything in nature is regarded as animated, like the body of man; natural phenomena express the personal caprice of a supernatural agency. The second, or *metaphysical*, stage represents the period in which the point of reference is transferred from a personal agency to

¹ Cours de Philosophie Positive.

impersonal force. The natural processes are here explained by an immanent power which pervades all being. This force is an abstraction which nevertheless is regarded as real in itself; perfection, necessity, and other concepts of science are believed to be its laws. The metaphysical stage of explanation regards true nature as the generating source of all natural phenomena; it differs but little from the "*natura naturans*" of Spinoza. In brief, the metaphysical period in science represents nature as the expression of some esoteric, unknowable force which somehow makes itself felt but yet can never be directly known; whereas the religious attitude conceived it as the expression of a theistic will.

The third, or *positivistic*, stage is the ideal of all scientific inquiry. It has recourse neither to the will of God nor to an impersonal force for its explanations. It interprets the presented phenomena simply as they are in themselves, without any reference to their ultimate origin or meaning; it regards the laws of nature to be nothing more than convenient generalizations from experimental observation. No extravagant hypotheses are employed; only those formulæ or simple laws are recognized which make farther observation possible. The isolated experience must be united with others by some simple means; but this abstract law, unlike its conception in the metaphysical stage, is here conceived by the positive standpoint to have no reality in itself apart from the experiences by which it is defined.

Division of the Sciences.—With this interpretation of the history of science in mind, Comte next applies it to the world of sense-impressions. For this purpose he divides all science into six fields, according to the facility with which the positive stage may be attained and the complexity of the material employed. Mathematics was the first science to become positive, and at the same time its material is the simplest. The other five sciences in the order of their increasing complexity are: Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and, lastly, Sociology.

The phenomena of human intercourse and the interpretation of the laws of social progress comprise the science of sociology. It is the last of the abstract sciences to attain the distinction of the positive stage, for the material with which it deals is extremely complex.

Sociology.—The *theory of society*, with which Comte is especially concerned, constitutes the constructive phase of the Positive Philosophy. Society, which is based on the unity of the relations among men, may be regarded as an individual, the development of which is characterized by the fuller expression of its intellectual faculties; in its higher stages the nobler elements predominate over the baser passions. Personality, as the force of the social order, is the only element in nature worthy of devotion or respect. In this manner positivism develops into a religion of humanity and an ethics of altruism.

Position of Positivism.—The influence of the Positive Philosophy has been somewhat lessened by the fact that its disciples have tended to recognize two phases in the original system. Comte's first philosophy was scientific and critical, whereas in his later writings he tended to emphasize a mystical or religious element. Not religion in its ordinary sense, but rather an extravagant religion of mankind in which the universal man, society at large, was deified. Hero-worship was to be substituted for God-worship; the feelings of sympathy and altruistic love were to replace the intellect in the control of life. Yet, notwithstanding these later developments of the Positive Philosophy, the whole attitude of mind has had a momentous influence on the French and English philosophy of the nineteenth century. As well as calling attention to the application of scientific methods and philosophical ideals to the interpretation of social relations, it has stimulated a philosophy of science by demanding a more accurate expression of its fundamental laws.

HYPOTHESES IN SCIENCE.

The positivistic stand-point suggests at once the developmental character of the world-process in the Hegelian dialectic, and again the evolutionary aspect of recent British philosophy. Yet before science can be conceived in terms of a philosophical theory, the use of scientific hypotheses must be examined. For whatever importance we may discover in the meaning of evolution, or in the meaning of any other broad scientific hypothesis, it is valueless with reference to natural phenomena unless the ground of its application has been already determined.

Origin of Scientific Hypotheses.—The early history of any science is necessarily a record of observations, more or less accidental in their method of procedure. The development of science was possible only through broadening the point of view by means of a wider range of experience. No laws or principles could be formulated until there was a clear conception of the materials to be considered; and, on account of the limited range and the inaccuracy of methods at the disposal of the early scientists, the results which they obtained were either too narrow or else too broad. Early science concerned itself either with simple uncritical facts of experience or with the explanation of these facts by what we now consider to be extravagant hypotheses. It was content with the mere record of perceived experiments, or else endeavored to explain them by artificial constructions; no middle course seemed possible. But gradually as the fields of the separate sciences were clearly understood, as each became the object of special and detailed study, the old hypotheses were remodelled according to the demands of more enlightened knowledge. Narrow but comprehensive theories were substituted for ill-founded generalizations on the one hand and mere descriptions of facts on the other.

As new laws have been conceived with the increasing range

of facts at the disposal of the scientists, there has been developed a tendency to inquire into these laws. And the further this inquiry is carried the more the scientist leans on philosophy, for the more universal do his principles become. It is found that the simple fact of experience points to a principle behind it, and this in turn to a broader law, until finally science feels compelled to postulate an hypothesis so universal as to comprehend an indeterminate range of experience. With the growth of science these hypotheses tend to attain greater universality. The principle of multiplication is included within the binomial theorem, and this in turn finds a fuller expression in a theorem of the infinitesimal calculus. So it is throughout all science,—the narrower fact is subsumed under the broader principle; laws of the most diverse character are harmonized by some universal hypothesis. But yet there is a marked distinction between the hypothesis of modern science and its counterpart in ancient speculation. The latter had little reality beyond the imagination of the inventor, whereas the hypothesis as now employed by science is the result of extensive and correlated observation.

Implication of Scientific Hypotheses.—It must be further noted that the existence of hypotheses in science points towards two presuppositions which the empirical scientist is often unwilling to recognize. It may be observed that the generalizations—perhaps those through which science has achieved its most lasting result—are themselves *beyond direct experimental proof*; they are valid only so long as they find indirect support from extensive ranges of experience and can serve as appropriate forms or skeletons to indicate the unity underlying phenomena of the most diverse types. Physics finds it convenient to postulate “energy” as the point of reference for many forms of activity, yet energy itself can never be perceived,—its reality is inferred from generalizing the phenomena of light, magnetism, chemical affinity, heat, and mechanics. But besides going beyond direct experience and resting its authority on the

implications of experience in general, the hypothesis of modern science involves another presupposition, that of the organic *unity of nature*. Unless it is recognized that there is some ultimate relationship behind the forces of nature, the postulation of any law or hypothesis, itself beyond direct experience, would be utterly worthless and illogical. The force of this presupposition is by no means lessened even if science regards the hypothesis as simply a point of reference; for a series of experiences which on their surface have no similitude whatsoever can hardly be referred to a simple theory for their explanation unless the ultimate unity of nature is implicitly assumed. In their outward appearance there is no sameness in the moving pendulum of a clock and a red-hot stove, the magnetic current and a ray of light, yet on the presupposition that the phenomena of nature are the expressions of an underlying unity, science finds itself able to refer each to a something, called, if you like, by the term "energy."

EVOLUTION.

There is no broad generalization of scientific theory which has influenced the development of science during the nineteenth century more, or has a profounder meaning, than the concept of *Evolution*. Among the early Greeks the idea of a gradual transformation of lower into higher forms was a favorite theme. But their speculations would have proved to be of little interest to the modern scientist, with his just abhorrence of imaginative constructions, had it not been for two remarkable discoveries in biological science. One of these was in the field of embryology and the other in that of paleontology.

Embryonic Evidence in Support of Biological Evolution.—With improved methods of observation the biologist noted a remarkable resemblance between certain stages of embryonic life and other animal forms of a less complex nature than the one into which the embryo would subsequently develop. From this it was inferred, as the general but not exact

expression of a law, that the embryos of mammals pass through stages in their development which are comparable, although hardly identical, with lower and simpler conditions of life. There is a one-cell stage like the simplest bodies at present known to biology; and still again there is stage possessing gills, which is strongly suggestive of the fish. A German zoologist, Haeckel, has briefly stated this remarkable discovery in a familiar quotation "Ontogeny, or the development of the individual, is a shortened recapitulation of phylogeny, or the evolution of the race."

Evidence from Fossil Forms.—The evidence from paleontology, or the study of fossil remains, is even more conclusively in favor of the evolution of organic forms than that derived from the comparison of embryos. It was observed that the fossils found in the strata of rocks laid down in ancient geologic times could be easily interpreted as the antecedent forms of our present fauna and flora. Skeletons of the probable progenitors of the horse are embedded in the rocks of prehistoric ages; and further, the more recent the surrounding rock the more nearly does the fossil resemble the living species. Remarkable achievements have often resulted from a comparison and correlation of material, notwithstanding the limitations and difficulties of the task. *Hitchcock* believed it possible to construct a wholly new classification of certain birds (?) and reptiles by the observation of their footprints in the Triassic (?) sandstones of the Connecticut Valley.²

Universal Character of Evolution.—The problem involved in biological evolution is not, therefore, so much as to its existence as to the underlying unity of nature which it exemplifies and the forces which are operative in its expression. The deeper phases of science rest unsatisfied with the uncriticised belief that the hypothesis of evolution has a value; they

² *Ichnology of New England and Supplement, and United States Geological Survey, Monograph XXIX.*

inquire into the presuppositions upon which it is based and the laws by which it becomes manifested. But in this inquiry it soon becomes evident that the gradual development of the higher living forms from simpler conditions is only a single aspect of a principle, the operation of which extends throughout all nature; that in the interpretation of a single phase of evolution one soon discovers that there is involved by implication the conception of *universal evolution*. Kant, Laplace, and Herschel had established on a firm basis the evolution of planetary systems from original nebulous masses. The sciences of history and sociology have long recognized that the development of human institutions is a result of the action and reaction between the individual and his environment, continued through a protracted period of time. Since the beginning of a scientific interest in the growth of language the philologist has founded all his inquiries on the assumption that words are the result of a development from earlier and simpler forms.

Even in speculative thought the principle of evolution is by no means unfamiliar. In the philosophy of the Rationalists one will recall the evolving series of monads by which Leibnitz sought to explain the diversity of the world. The German transcendentalists were very familiar with the concept and desired to extend it to even a wider range of phenomena than will be admitted within the restricted limits of the physical sciences. Fichte wished to explain the mental functions as a gradual development from the fundamental will-activity. And Schelling expressed objective nature in terms of an inner force continually limiting itself and then transcending these limits, while the subjective life gradually unfolded the various phases of the principle of self-consciousness. Hegel, both in the "*Phenomenology of Mind*" and in the more mature expression of his system, is pre-eminently the philosopher of evolution. In his case evolution had the broadest possible significance, and not the technical meaning with which it is employed in biological science. The Universe, with all possible elements,—

concepts, phenomena, mental states, and human ideals,—was believed to be the expression of an infinite Thought-Idea, gradually developing into a richer and a fuller meaning. It represents an evolution according to meaning or thought, and not in accordance with the temporal before and after; a substitution of the logically complex—richer and more mature—for the logically simple and less highly organized. But in the treatment of the concept of evolution in science and in speculative philosophy there seems to be a marked difference of interpretation. Science employs the principle simply as a convenient hypothesis to explain numerous particular phenomena altogether inexplicable without reference to some fundamental unity. Philosophy, on the other hand, interprets evolution as the expression of a universal world-process. On the scientific side the tendency has been in the direction of a more and more accurate formula which could be definitely applied to organic life, a formula which had more of scientific accuracy and detail than is suggested by the indefiniteness and comprehensiveness of a world-theory. In connection with this empirical aspect of evolution two names are especially noteworthy, *Darwin* for his originality and *Spencer* for his power of systematization.

Darwin.—However universal one might assert the evolutionary hypothesis to be, its application to biological forms would have always remained in doubt unless scientific evidence could be accumulated whereby the transition of one organic species into another might be established. This was done by *Charles Darwin*. Already *Lamarck* had defined evolution in terms of acquired characteristics transmitted from generation to generation in constantly increasing intensity. Darwin, however, conceived another factor in the development of a species, which seemed to be susceptible of proof. He noted on a voyage to South America that all animals, both the extinct and the living, seemed exactly adapted to their surroundings, and that a peculiar environment seemed to be responsible for a peculiar

species. And, further, he noted in connection with breeders of fancy stock that a species can be changed at the will of man by properly selecting those parents which have the characteristics desired in the offspring. With these two scientific facts before him Darwin, in his work "*The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*," published in 1859, formulated the law of *natural selection*, or "the survival of the fittest," as it has been called. In brief, the theory is this: that individual which by mere accident possesses some quality through which it is better adapted to the environment than its fellows, will win in the struggle for existence. Individuals possessing this superior quality will tend to propagate with others who likewise possess it; while those in which it is lacking will be stamped out before they attain to their development. The accidental quality will thus gradually assume the importance of a racial character, and that species resulting from this transformation will be better adapted to its environment than its progenitor.

Darwin himself recognized that acquired characteristics as well as natural selection were factors in organic evolution. Subsequent biologists have disagreed on this point. *Weismann* declares that no acquired characteristic, however strong, can exert any influence on a succeeding generation. He points to animals which differ in nowise from remote ancestors, although their immediate parents possessed some marked peculiarity. A surgical operation performed through countless generations seems in nowise to affect the natural conditions of the organ in the next following generation.

Spencer.—In opposition to *Weismann* there have been those who have continued to recognize the original position of Darwin and give to the acquired characteristics an important function in evolution. Among this number Herbert Spencer stands prominent for systematic power rather than for originality of mind. Spencer endeavors to reconstruct positivism on the metaphysics of the English-Scotch school (of which Hamil-

ton was representative) and the scientific theory of universal evolution. Spencer "discovers" that religion and science are not only antagonistic to one another, but are also involved in internal contradictions, unless each recognizes that the Absolute is itself beyond the power of finite thought. This "Unknowable" Reality exists only as an inference from observed phenomena; its true nature as well as its origin is involved in hopeless mystery. Human knowledge is restricted to the world of given fact, and as such it should concern itself only with the given facts of experience and their relations. "Science is partially unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely unified knowledge."³

But even philosophy, in its struggle to unify the facts of experience, discovers in them a certain incomprehensible character which cannot be defined in relative terms. This may be symbolized as *force*, and the formal principle of its activity as causality. Conservation of energy and causality are the two fundamental propositions of science, and the nearest approach to the Unknowable. Alone, however, they are little more than meaningless abstractions; each requires a deeper principle to which the concrete phenomena of nature may be referred. This is *evolution*. Each special science concerns itself with partial truth as its goal; each contributes towards the unity of all knowledge as it is postulated by philosophy. The aim of each science is to bring its restricted data into such continuity that its systematized facts are able to find a place in the general concept of evolution. Each science refers to its phenomena in terms of some static element as matter, and some dynamic element as motion, and the general principle of evolution requires that each shall pass from a simple to a more complex form, "from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity."⁴

³ First Principles, Section 37.

⁴ Ibid., Section 145.

Although there is nothing strikingly original in Spencer's stand-point, the systematic power of his mind is clearly seen in the breadth of application which he finds for this initial principle. He is able to construct a system of biology, of psychology, of sociology, and of ethics on the evolutionary hypothesis. And he is eminently successful in discovering data within each of these fields which will exhibit the scope of the evolutionary hypothesis.

Philosophical Aspect of Evolution.—In this brief review of the scientific aspects of the evolutionary doctrine one perceives at once that the most general meaning of the term is the same both in science and speculative philosophy, and that the distinct tendency of science is to extend its application until its significance approaches near to the universality accredited to evolution by German transcendentalism. The value of the Spencerian evolutionary system lies not in its originality, but simply in the fact that it tends to suggest in a popular manner, and after the ways of physical science, the universality and breadth of the Hegelian world. But notwithstanding the tendency to seek a more philosophical basis for the scientific theory of evolution, there is yet a marked distinction between the conclusions which science and speculative philosophy draw from the same facts. Both interpretations agree that Nature is fundamentally a process of development, only they seem to disagree as to what it is that develops. Biological science often declares that the psychic activities of man are the direct product of continued environmental changes reacting on the lower forms of life, that mental phenomena, because they developed in parallel with physical changes, differ from them only in degree. This scientific interpretation of evolution seems correct as far as it goes, Schelling and Hegel would probably have said, only in pointing out the intimate connection between the psychical life and its material correlate they would have preferred to deify matter rather than materialize mind. Matter was to Hegel merely a lower form of a universal Principle

which expresses one of its higher stages as mind; while mind is not, as the scientists often infer, a more or less accidental correlative of movements of matter. The scientist reduces mind to matter; whereas the transcendentalist expresses matter as a lower phase of mind, and regards them both as different aspects of the Absolute.

THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Besides the tendencies which spring from the desire on the part of the physical sciences to understand their own presuppositions,—tendencies which lead towards a fuller and deeper *philosophy of science*,—there is another branch of research which from its very nature lies close to philosophy. *Psychology*, until comparatively recent years, has been classed as one of the strictly philosophical subjects. But gradually as the introduction of improved methods of research and increased laboratory facilities have tended to develop the causal nature of our mental states simply as such, it has become evident that psychology is truly an empirical science like physics or biology, and should be no longer treated as a branch of philosophy. Yet nevertheless the fact that psychology deals with the *causal* nature of mental states makes the bearing of its researches on philosophy which deals with the *meaning* of these mental states a matter of considerable importance. All knowledge must proceed by the activities of the human mind, and the science which considers these psychic states as empirically given data will always remain a subject of extreme importance to every branch of human inquiry.

Introspective Method.—It has only been within the last century that psychology has become clearly differentiated from the other branches of philosophy. The Englishmen, who have always been psychologists rather than metaphysicians, have tended to recognize the importance of mental analysis. From Hobbes and Locke to the present time they have sought to examine the contents of consciousness by the method of introspection,

believing that the central problem of all philosophy is the classification and causal arrangement of every element of our mental life. As a sure ground for the connection of our ideas, in the Humeian sense, the English introspective psychologists have emphasized association and the memory. In the strictest sense the basis upon which these rest is altogether unexplained. The self, thought, and even the duality of objective and subjective, are always presupposed, but never established. It is chiefly as introspective psychologists, in whose writings metaphysics and epistemology are hopelessly confused, that the "Scotch School" is of importance. The general position of this movement was earlier alluded to in connection with *Hamilton*, who is perhaps the most original representative.

Experimental Psychology.—In contrast to this introspection of the British thinkers there has arisen a clearly-defined tendency to introduce into psychology the experimental methods of other sciences. Herbart, whom we have earlier referred to as a Realist, may be regarded as the originator of this important movement. He follows the English psychologists, in so far as he regards consciousness to be the complex resultant of the psychical elements of sensation and ideas, but further suggests that the rise and fall, the centring of attention, or the inhibition of an idea may be expressed by exact mathematical relations. Herbart attempts to correlate the elements of consciousness with mathematical laws, and in so doing defines the basis for a broader and more scientific psychology.

Herbart's suggestion, impractical as it may appear in an exact application, was not without immediate effect. There were many who felt his influence and sought to discover a foundation for psychology in physics, biology, and anthropology rather than in speculative metaphysics. The most remarkable advance in the physico-biological side of psychology was made by *Fechner* about the middle of the nineteenth century. By means of a simple mechanical law he believed himself able to express the exact relationship between the psychical and physi-

cal phenomena. Briefly expressed, Fechner conceived that the intensity of the sensation varied as the logarithm of the external stimulus to which the sensation could be referred. A full treatment of this interesting conclusion may be found in any treatise on psychology. From these suggestions, made by men whose interests were mainly speculative, there has arisen the important and productive field of experimental psychology. Since 1874 Wundt and his younger pupils have been especially active in this field. Empirical methods, extremely accurate recording instruments, together with elaborate laboratory experiments, have entirely transformed the narrower introspective psychology of previous years.

The "Aspect Psychology." — Although Fechner is chiefly known in connection with his psycho-physical theory, his own personal interests lay in the solution of the world problem made prominent by the assimilation of German transcendentalism with the English empirical philosophy.

Herbart had made psychology a corollary of metaphysics, but in so doing had found it necessary to postulate a thorough Realism in order to account for the objective element in our experience. Fechner was an idealist in the strictest sense of the word, yet he acknowledges the value of all observational science. Both the speculative and the empirical demands could be recognized only on the supposition that each was an *aspect* of the same ultimate Real. Thought, reason, purpose lead us to an idealistic monism, experience and the analyses of science lead us towards an extended world of multiform reality. The law of psycho-physical relationship was merely an expression of a deeper unity between the singleness of thought and the variety of experience. Each unfolds an abstracted character of the same conscious Absolute.

In recent years the double-aspect theory of the Universe, defined by Fechner, has received considerable attention from those psychologists who have themselves felt the influence of the Kantian philosophy. There is an interesting passage by

Fichte in which he expressly declares that the "thing" given as fact, or represented, and the representation as such, belong to two different series. Universal law, causality, and the other methods of the exact sciences are applicable to the given fact as such; but the representation, on the other hand, belongs to a series which depends on the original assertion of the Ego, an act of asserting which never can itself be proved by the laws of the former series.⁵ Again, it will be remembered that Kant distinguished between the mechanical way of looking at reality, in contradistinction to the teleological, between the stand-points of science and of life. The former was the product of causality and the other categories of the understanding, the latter arose from conceiving nature in terms of purpose and value.

MECHANISM.—Those psychologists who find it convenient to regard Reality from the different sides of science and purposive value recognize the incompleteness of either aspect if taken alone as the whole truth. The idealism of Fichte laid its entire stress on the teleological stand-point, and the system as a whole failed to effect a more lasting influence on philosophy because it seemed to neglect natural science, which, from the very nature of the subject, is founded on the opposite mechanical view. There is at present an important tendency, of which Professor Hugo Münsterberg is representative,—often called the Neo-Fichteian movement,—which is impressed with the teleological meaning, the moral value of life, but yet recognizes that empirical science has an important place. Reality, the Absolute, is not a duality; it is rather the great active, moral, and purposive Principle of the world, which, when regarded from the different stand-points of causal science and life, presents the world according to two aspects, the mechanical and the teleological. On the one side the empirical science of psychology describes and seeks to explain every mental fact recog-

⁵ Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, Section 7.

nizing the universality of causation and mechanical law. Psychology, from the empirical stand-point, is thus rendered a purely positive science, in a Comteian sense. Everything is explained, if explained at all, by psychical law; the states of consciousness are treated simply as the necessary resultants of previous physical and psychical phenomena. Man is conceived as a machine causally reacting on his environment.

TELEOLOGY.—This objective way of regarding life is necessary for the empirical science of psychology. It supplies a ground for the reduction of the states of consciousness to law and order. But it is not the stand-point from which these same states are regarded by consciousness itself. Life may best be described by science as a causal series, but life itself refuses to regard the causal explanation to be the full conception of its meaning. Consciousness demands that purpose, value, moral dignity enter into the inner or subjective life of a single personality, and that these ideals cannot be expressed in the causal series of psycho-physics. Causality is sufficient, if applied directly to empirical facts, but altogether insufficient in the estimation of value and purpose. It is this latter purposive of the teleological side of life by which every person implicitly acknowledges the dignity of his own character through the mere recognition of conscious ideals. One prefers to regard as real what is reflected in one's own personality rather than what is discovered by the causal explanation of that personality. To this teleological side of our life belong the ideals of æsthetics, ethics, and religion; the purposes with which we define character and the motives which underlie an organized life.

THEORIES OF ETHICS.

Empirico-Rationalistic Ethics.—In earlier chapters we were able to distinguish two stand-points with regard to human conduct. We found Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Clarke representative of what might be called the *empirico-rationalistic* school of ethics. These thinkers rested the authority of moral

choice on the observations of experience and the laws of reason. Hobbes believes that the superior convenience of the accepted moral laws is a sufficient ground for their recognition, while Locke is equally positive that "Morality is capable of demonstration."⁶ Spinoza believed that the fundamental propositions of ethics are as undeniably true as the axiom that "the whole is greater than any of its parts;" and Clarke, the English rationalist in ethics, founded the moral relations among men upon certain appropriate correspondences, as certain in their own field as the truths of mathematics.

Intuitional Ethics.—In opposition to this school, which thus places experience and reason as the ultimate criteria of moral conduct, there has always flowed a counter-current of ethical thought which has tried to separate the field of the conscience from that of the reason. Shaftesbury, Hume, Kant, and Fichte suggest this *intuitional* stand-point. They all refer to some moral sense or faculty the operation of which cannot be directly estimated by the reason; an innate conscience whose dictates are universally valid, without question, for all mankind.

The naturalistic description of morality developed by Hobbes, with its emphasis on an egoism controlled by the exigencies of reason and experience, was opposed by a group of seventeenth-century thinkers known as the *Cambridge Platonists*. The most important of these English Neo-Platonists was *Ralph Cudworth*, a contemporary of Hobbes. He taught a thorough intellectualism in which truth and the ideas of truth are conceived as eternal and immutable. The principles of morality were recognized to be necessary and fundamental, like the truths of thought-intuitions; they were intuited by the mind and arose from an objective source in the Being of God. These moral truths could not change, nor could they develop with the requirements of the social compact, as Hobbes believed, but

⁶ Locke's Essay, Book IV., Section 18.

were rather the unchanging thoughts of God. This early form of intellectualism may be regarded as the beginning in England of the intuitionist school. Shaftesbury and his successors accepted the immutability of morality and looked upon the conscience as the peculiar faculty for the discernment of moral truth. This moral sense is independent of the reason and experience, and its intuitive truths are uninfluenced by either individual caprice or social environment. In its later forms intuitionism has become less distinct and has been inclined to admit an external or universalistic aspect to ethical principles. Adam Smith, a friend of Hume, based morality on the intuitive sympathy for all mankind, while recent writers have strongly emphasized an intuitive *imitation* or assimilation of our moral environment.

UTILITARIANISM.

Cumberland.—The first attempt to reconcile the dynamic character of morality—the empirico-rationalism of Hobbes—with the innate conscience of the Intuitionists was attempted by *Richard Cumberland*, who lived from 1632 into the early part of the next century. He is generally regarded as the first advocate of the universal welfare of mankind as the highest moral law, and in that sense he appears as an early advocate of the recent utilitarian movement. Cumberland accepts the empirical stand-point of Hobbes and discards the uncritical confidence of the Platonists in the intuition of the moral sense. But, on the other hand, he is especially interested in refuting the artificiality of the Hobbesian description of morality. He would prefer to regard the moral laws as *natural* and the virtues of generosity and sympathy as the expression of motives simple and natural rather than acquired. It is for the individual to will the universal Good,—sometimes regarded by Cumberland as perfection and sometimes as happiness,—and in the greatest possible good of all mankind we have the highest moral sanction. The movement from Cumberland to the later

Utilitarians is from an emphasis on a moral perfection to an emphasis on universal happiness, from ideal good to material welfare.

The Sanction of Happiness.—One of the early Greek schools, the Cyrenaic, conceived the *momentary pleasure* of the individual to be the ultimate moral sanction, and their followers, the Epicureans, transferred the emphasis from the momentary feeling to a *general happiness* throughout life. In each of these schools two presuppositions may be noticed,—experience qualifies the ground for happiness, reason determines its application. Every act is the result of an “*hedonistic calculus*,” an arithmetical computation of the amount of happiness that may be expected to arise from the act. Pleasures can be estimated and compared; this is the fundamental premise of all schools of ethics that recognize happiness as the ultimate moral sanction.

Bentham.—In 1789 *Jeremy Bentham* published the “*Principles of Morals and Legislation*.” His interest in ethics was from the legal rather than from the philosophical side; and he therefore brought into the foreground humanity rather than the individual. The idea of the organic structure of society is by no means so ancient in its application to ethics as one might presume. Plato pointed out the similarity between the state and the individual person and the analogous functions pertaining to each, and Aristotle described man in terms of his social environment; but it was not until comparatively recent times that it has been conceived possible to construct an ethics on the presupposition of the organic structure of society.

Bentham unites the Epicurean principle of happiness with this ideal of the social organism. We are all bound together by a bond of sympathy, all tending towards the ideal of maximum happiness. When, therefore, I promote the general happiness of society, I truly advance my own pleasure. The good of one is the good of many; the vices of one affect every member of society. The ultimate moral sanction is therefore

the "greatest happiness to the greatest number." Virtue is determined by experience; it is only distinguishable from evil by its positive effect on the general happiness of mankind.

Mill.—The Utilitarian ethics, thus based on the happiness of all mankind and the organic unity of society, found its most influential disciple in *John Stuart Mill*. He accepts the general position of Bentham, but yet feels distinctly the influence of the idealistic tendencies of thought. "Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure."⁷ In the support of this thesis Mill departs considerably from the thoroughly empirical stand-point of the earlier Utilitarians, although the derivative character of morality is always prominent. Like the other Utilitarians, he recognizes the social and religious grounds of moral distinction impressed upon the individual from without; but, besides these, Mill acknowledges the existence of an *internal sanction* or conscience,—“a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty.”⁸ But even after he has taken this decisive step he shrinks from the admission of the full consequences of an intuitive element in the choice of action, and seeks to rest the conscience on motives superimposed upon the character from without.

In the treatment of the possible objections to his theory Mill feels the odium of placing the intellectual and physical pleasures on the same plane. The hedonistic calculus of Mill not only recognizes a difference of quantity among pleasures, but also a *distinction* of quality. By the latter term he would discriminate between pleasures which are so diverse from one another that no quantity of the one, however large, would be

⁷ Mill's Utilitarianism, Chapter ii.

⁸ Ibid., Chapter iii.

comparable with the smallest quantity of the other. Thus the intellectual pleasures are of an inestimably higher quality than the sensual, and in an hedonistic calculus, which regards quantity alone, a comparison between them is impossible.

IDEALISM OF GREEN.

Utilitarianism and the Spencerian ethics of evolution represent the last important phases of the English ethics of empiricism. Both of these theories have in common a final reference to experience and a disregard for the problems which German metaphysics has impressed on the philosophy of the nineteenth century. Among those who have recognized the importance of metaphysical issues and at the same time have sought to discover the elements of permanent value in the empirical theory of morals, the Englishman *Thomas Hill Green* is perhaps the most remarkable. Green recognized with the Utilitarians the unity of society, but hesitated to establish the dignity of the moral life on the ultimate sanction of happiness. On the contrary, the ideal of society, a life of common interest, results only from the *perfection* of all the self-conscious personalities of which it is composed. By this emphasis on universal perfection he brings into the foreground the idealistic element in Cumberland, although personally Green was influenced by German transcendentalism. And in agreeable contrast to many of the English moralists, Green considers at length the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of ethics before he proceeds to construct a positive theory of morality. Knowledge and nature are interpreted idealistically. Both require a spiritual principle over and above the mere object of possible experience, "a self-distinguishing consciousness" which shall be itself non-temporal and non-spacial. This eternal spiritual Consciousness is partially realized in each individual man, who is therefore in the highest sense *free*,—owing to this relation between the human soul and the original, eternal Spirit. Each individual act is free, since it represents the iden-

tification of the inner, free self with some desire. The development or progress towards perfection, which is the ideal for the individual self, is possible only in terms of the common good, the well-being, the virtue, and the perfection of all mankind. The self-consciousness of the individual, whereby he recognizes the limitations of his own selfhood, unites him with the absolute Self-Consciousness, as the ideal of his fulfilment, "with the constant characteristic of self-consciousness and self-objectification, the one divine mind gradually reproduces itself in the human soul. In virtue of this principle in him man has definite capabilities, the realization of which, since in it alone he can satisfy himself, forms his true good."⁹

IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS.

The classic systems of metaphysics have generally emphasized some distinct approach to reality and some definite attribute of the Real. One cannot, however, make unalterable rules for the classification of philosophical systems, because in each case the epistemological elements give the resulting metaphysical structure a different setting. The history of metaphysical studies during the nineteenth century has tended to develop a system in which intellectual, emotional, and empirical factors are each recognized and each given its appropriate place. It is doubtful if there is any idealism which does not find a place for the achievements of science, no intellectualism which does not lay considerable emphasis on experience, and, on the other hand, the modern forms of realistic pluralism recognize, although they may not accept, the monistic arguments.

RUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE.

One of the broadest and most finished systems of reconstruction is the empirico-idealism of *Rudolph Hermann Lotze*, who died only about twenty-five years ago. Like Fechner, whom he recalls to mind in many respects, Lotze feels the influence

⁹ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book III., Chapter ii., Section 180.

of both the empirical naturalism of science and the idealistic monism of Fichte and Hegel. He studied medicine, physiology, and physiological psychology, at the same time that his interests were centred on speculative metaphysics. The product of these opposing influences is an idealistic metaphysic erected on the explanation of the presuppositions of science.

STAND-POINT.

Lotze is dissatisfied with the attempts of the Absolute Idealists to deduce a universe of variety from a single principle,—mere Consciousness or Idea. He prefers to follow the lead of Herbart and Hamilton, and first analyze the given “object.” Lotze discovers that the “thing” usually referred to as an object of conscious perception is not a simple ultimate, but rather a logical complex of relations, subsisting in an unperceived ground or unity, and each capable of undergoing change. Three elements are involved in the concept of the “thing:” its qualities—as they appear to perception in the form of relations; a real substance—logically required as the ground of these relations; and, finally, a “Position”¹⁰—by which alone the actual “thing” is distinguished from its mere thought.

Theory of the External World.—This analysis of the “object” of consciousness illustrates the analytical side of Lotze; it is, however, merely an introduction to the speculative issues. The world is given to us as a plurality of facts, which as objects we call “things;” thought gives to these facts their deeper meaning. Each of the elements of the “thing”—its qualities, its essence, its position—requires a universal element, which in the end can be nothing else than a form of the Absolute. It is false to consider the “thing” as something merely external, altogether different from one’s own self,—for there is a close analogy between the three elements of the “thing” and the human personality. Relation, the quality element of

¹⁰ Ladd’s Translation of Lotze’s Outline of Metaphysic, Section 25.

the "thing," is subjective in its nature, and is therefore easily comparable with the flux of consciousness; and, furthermore, the concept of selfhood, or Ego, is the only interpretation which we can give to the essence of the "thing,"—the unperceived unity of its qualities. Instead of the unsurmountable barrier between subjective and objective, Lotze substitutes a world of selves like the monads of Leibnitz. "Things" and "men" differ only in the degree of this selfhood.

The Absolute.—The interrelatedness of all "things," the eternal reassertion of a single type of reality, is still further illustrated by the interreaction of all the parts of nature. Causality, the reaction of one series of changes upon another, is inexplicable unless it is admitted that these two series are, in their innermost structure, the expression of a single unity. And, furthermore, the universality of purpose throughout nature and the infinite ranges of feeling, thought, and life lead us to interpret the efficient and ideal causes of the Universe as the Infinite Personality of the Absolute. God represents the complete purpose, as it is more or less reflected in the individual selves,—the Personality that consciously expresses the Universe.

Among the recent thinkers who have felt most deeply both the idealistic and naturalistic stand-points two names are especially notable,—in America, Professor Royce, and in England, Mr. Bradley. Neither hesitates to face the deeper problems of metaphysics, and both rest their psychological and ethical studies on a definite theory of reality. Both derive the premises of their philosophy from the same sources, and both arrive at conceptions of the Absolute which are comparable but dissimilar. Professor Royce feels the influence of the purposive selfhood of Leibnitz and Lotze, while the spirituality of Hegel and the infinite struggle of will of Schopenhauer determine the outward form of his philosophy. Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, follows the traditions of Spinoza, Kant, and

Schelling; the Absolute is infinitely wealthy, but yet so rich, so full of experience, thought, will, and the ideals of life that it can be expressed only as the abstract Unity of all Appearances.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

The Given Experience.—The initial demand of every metaphysic is, above all else, the explanation of the world of given experience; and the manner in which these experiences are defined generally determines the subsequent conclusions. Royce, influenced by that desire for scientific certitude so long a prominent characteristic of English thinkers, finds in the given presentation the necessary starting-point for every philosophy, but discovers a richness of meaning in every experience which ultimately leads us beyond the fact itself. Every experience contains within itself a meaning which is only partially realized in its fragmentary finitude. Every fact or every idea is a partial expression of the world-meaning; every fact is the necessary element in the unity of the whole. Like the monads of Leibnitz, each reflects the law of the whole, each idea is a phase of the ideal goal, and each partially expresses its full meaning.

Selfhood.—The purposive reality of simple facts is the initial premise of Professor Royce's philosophy. But full of meaning as this seems, it only partially expresses the richness of these facts. Spinoza and Schelling sought to bring the objective and subjective into harmony with one another. But Professor Royce regards the abstract Substance of Spinoza or the mere Identity of Schelling to be inadequate to express the ultimate world of facts, since these are so full of meaning. Like Lotze, he finds the true value and purpose of the fragmentary experience in the concept of selfhood, rather than in mere logical subsistence. Every personality feels its own finiteness most acutely when it recognizes the infinite possibilities of its development. There is here involved a kind of contradiction; the self is most infinite when it realizes its

finitude. This illustrates the real nature of the self as essentially an infinite purposive development. In its logical aspect it is comparable to the whole number series,—each separate term representing a finite stage in the realization of the infinite purpose of counting. Each separate phase, each idea, thought, and act of the human self is a partial expression of the purpose of that self,—the infinite purpose of self-expression. No finite act of the self is a full expression of its purpose,—there is always a beyond which constantly transcends the partially realized present.

The Absolute.—Although the nature of the self is infinitely rich, it differs only in degree from the fulness of meaning which each individual experience and idea only partially expresses. The principle of self-consciousness, through which we apprehend this process of infinite self-realization, is reflected in the deeper meaning of every “object” of the external world. The difference is only in degree; the reality of purpose and its fulfilment through an infinite series is the single Principle of the Universe. The Absolute, which represents in its complete selfhood the purpose and ideals of our finite world, is, like all else, a self. But the selfhood of the Absolute is incomparably richer than any of its phases. It is more than the mere sum of the parts of the world,—it is the world itself through the full expression of its purpose.

F. H. BRADLEY.

The Absolute of Professor Royce is infinitely rich in both content and meaning. It is the world, because It expresses the full meaning of the world. Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, defines the Absolute in much more formal terms. He discovers that the common elements of our world of thought and experience involve a disagreeable self-contradictory process, which renders the presuppositions of knowledge unintelligible in themselves. Relations, qualities, changes, even things and selves, present this unintelligibility, this infinite transcendency.

It is remarkable to notice that both Professor Royce and Mr. Bradley lay stress on the infinite transcendency of the single experience; the former recognizes in it a reflection of the Absolute, while the latter regards it as the evidence to show that experience is not the Absolute. But if in Mr. Bradley's mind the single experience is only an appearance, it is nevertheless the appearance of the Absolute. The finite facts are each aspects of Reality,—yet aspects which reflect the nature of Reality in different degrees. Behind and within the transient forms of the external world, the momentary thoughts, volitions, and feelings, there is a Unity which transcends the inadequate meaning of the human activities. The Absolute is both the completeness of the Mystic One and the actuality of Hegel's Thought-Idea.

SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT TIME.

There is a striking resemblance between the development of the race and the growth of a single individual. This similarity has been constantly emphasized by those who have made a philosophical study of history. A similar resemblance in development is often observable between the history of philosophy as a whole and the intellectual development of a single person. At some period of mental growth nearly every individual is aroused from the dogmatic recognition of traditional theories of reality to a personal struggle, often only half-consciously realized, with the same questions of life and the world which have perplexed mankind throughout all ages. In this personal contest of the individual reason with the full truth the historical study of philosophy is perhaps of special significance. It presents a phase of the development of civilization which, although apparently insignificant when compared with the forces of active life, is yet remarkable as the specific expression of those intellectual conditions which lie at the foundation of human progress.

While introducing us to an independence of thought and supplying the ideals for mankind separately and collectively, the historical study of earlier philosophy may perhaps indicate the general direction of future tendencies. Among these movements which we have followed from the period of the Renaissance to the interpretation given them by men now living there seems to be none of greater importance than the general *monistic* tendency. Not that the history of thought has gradually evolved a compact and thoroughly satisfactory explanation of the unity of the world,—on the contrary, there is no question more seriously discussed at the present time,—but only that historical study has taught us that some world-unity lies behind almost every notable system of philosophy. The materialist believes that the ultimate homogeneity of the world is intelligible only in terms of a single material substance coextensive with thought and matter, while the pluralistic realist, however he may resist the Unity of Being, is yet compelled to recognize that the plurality of elements can be conceived only through a process of thought-unity.

This monistic tendency in philosophy is not due to a narrow point of view. The recent systems of monistic idealism, of which those of Green, Professor Royce, and Mr. Bradley are excellent examples, well illustrate a certain significant depth and comprehensiveness. It is further true that not only this absolutistic stand-point but also the other important tendencies of the last few years indicate that philosophy as a whole rests on certain broad and general points of view, and that the individual movements are to be regarded as *types of thinking* rather than as specific formulations of dogmatic principles. These types of thinking are each of them the result of extensive correlation of various historical stand-points; each important movement is influenced by the broadest study of empiricism and rationalism, of idealism and realism. They are quite different in character from the earlier phases of modern philosophy in which each thinker could be definitely

connected with a certain national or restricted movement and had little appreciation for other philosophical stand-points. But at the present time there is no single school or movement of importance which has not felt the influence of the many different attitudes of mind which have composed the history of philosophy; there is no significant tendency of thought which can be said to have directly sprung from a single philosophical system in the same sense that Berkeley sprung from Locke or Fichte from Kant.

While referring in a very brief manner to what might seem to be important tendencies in the philosophical thought of the present time it might be well to recognize certain matters which no philosophy can ever afford to disregard,—the *starting-point* and the *method of procedure*. There are many details in every philosophical stand-point which the variety of conditions have made it necessary to change in the past, and which can hardly retain their present significance unaltered throughout the future, but yet it is possible to believe as a permanent truth that any system of philosophy must have some starting-point as well as some method to guide its inquiries. The determination of the starting-point and the method must depend on circumstances; yet the fact that *some* starting-point and *some* method are required is perhaps a fundamental truth in any system of philosophy. With this in mind it might be of advantage to inquire into the meaning of the *presuppositions* of philosophy,—as presuppositions are often considered to be the necessary starting-points for any investigation. This question, however, would naturally lead us to a consideration of the use of experience and thought, for historical study shows the importance of these elements, not only as the usual starting-points, but also as the means for the regulation of philosophical method. But before these more specific problems are considered the general nature of the meaning to be attributed to the term “presupposition” is certainly worthy of investigation. We may notice among the prominent tendencies of the present

time, in both science and philosophy, the desire to examine with considerable care the assumptions on which any inquiry rests. One recognizes a feeling of sceptical questioning when some axiom or fact is asserted to be undeniably true and beyond legitimate inquiry.

THE MEANING OF PRESUPPOSITION.

Since the time of Descartes the ideal method by which philosophy has sought to proceed begins with the recognition of no presupposition and from this negative ground erects a conception of reality considered to be sufficient in itself. But even such a procedure implicitly recognizes a starting-point,—thought, substance, or activity,—which, although regarded as the most fundamental principle of all knowledge, still retains the character of an assumption, since the proof of such a principle, by a reduction to simpler terms, is from its very nature intuitively denied. The relinquishing of this classic search for the highest principle of knowledge is a significant aspect of recent philosophy and may seem to many to be the same as the abandonment of all hopes for any philosophy whatsoever and the first step towards an uncompromising scepticism. But such a misunderstanding can arise only from a narrow and uncritical interpretation of the nature of presupposition. By defining a new meaning for the term it is perhaps possible to suggest a starting-point for philosophy which shall not require the unending search for a “first and unconditionally fundamental proposition” beneath all knowledge, but which shall emphasize the organic structure of philosophy and the unity of those constituent elements which can be unfolded from a single premise.

This is possible if we would consider a usage of postulate, axiom, or presupposition which has often appeared in recent mathematical discussions. Instead of indicating by the word “presupposition” some premise necessarily true, some assertion too self-evident to need further comment, we may mean by the

term simply a conception of such a nature that it defines, as nothing else can, the problem we seek to investigate. A presupposition, according to this view, would be simply a *necessary condition* for the possibility of the inquiry in question, some assertion that makes the problem possible. The so-called axiom, "a whole is greater than any of its parts," may be regarded, not as an improbable postulate, but rather as a presupposition without which the branches of mathematics dealing with finite magnitudes would be valueless. The assumption of this presupposition makes possible—as no other proposition can—the possibility of the conclusions of those mathematical sciences above mentioned. It is a determining condition; upon its truth an unlimited range of propositions may be firmly established, but with its falsity they also become false. No attempt is made to prove that such a proposition is true by deducing it from other propositions,—such a process would be endless,—its only "proof" lies in the unity of mathematics, of which it is an indispensable factor.

As far back as the time of Baumgarten, a disciple of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, the meaning of presupposition began to take this form, and the brilliant investigation of Kant into the presuppositions of sense and understanding—as the conditions which make the operation of these faculties possible—followed this general movement. But, unfortunately, many of Kant's disciples sought to bring unity into the Critical Philosophy by discovering a single fundamental axiom, rather than pursuing more carefully Kant's meaning. One may observe a suggestion of this attitude towards "presupposition" in Samuel Clark's treatment of miracles, as far back as the opening of the eighteenth century. While mathematics, so often the forerunner of philosophy in such matters, has gradually assumed this attitude towards its postulates; mathematical science has, since the time of Riemann, regarded its axioms or presuppositions to be merely the necessary conditions for its procedure, and has relinquished the vain endeavor of verifying

one postulate by another. And it becomes a matter of considerable importance that philosophy should likewise relinquish its hope of the discovery of a fundamental principle of all knowledge, itself independent of all else, and investigate more carefully the presuppositions or conditions which lie at the very heart of its existence, those postulates which make intelligible and possible the very conception of philosophy. Although these considerations may show that philosophy must have a general conception of its starting-point, they by no means exhibit its character. While defining its presuppositions it is readily seen that philosophy must begin with the simplest conceptions, but yet these conceptions must implicitly contain all the richness of meaning which may be subsequently unfolded. If they should not possess this implicit breadth, its presuppositions would be insufficient. In brief, *the starting-point of philosophy is fully defined by those necessary and sufficient conditions without which philosophy would be impossible and yet which implicitly contain all the world of meaning which philosophy can unfold.*

THE DUAL PRESUPPOSITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

This problem of discovering the foundations, or rather the necessary presuppositions, which make possible the problem of philosophy, is the most elemental and at the same time the most general inquiry of human knowledge. Its solution defines abstractly the field within which is contained all derivative truths, either simple or complex. For this reason the problem cannot be approached by the observational method alone, for observation, however extensive, cannot establish the validity of the ground upon which it, as mere observation, is founded. Nor, on the other hand, can thought extend its dominion to those regions of mere illusory appearance where, instead of the sound guide of experience, it meets with no other resistance than its own arbitrary will. From this consideration we have at once a clue which the philosophy of the present time has

recognized by uniting English empiricism with German transcendentalism; we see that both *experience* and *thought* are indispensable to philosophical inquiry. The one cannot be conceived without the other. Each is an abstraction in itself, and yet each is the supplement of the other. This dual pre-supposition which seems to supply the necessary conditions for all philosophical inquiry is certainly a starting-point which nearly all of the tendencies of the present either consciously or unconsciously recognize. Our present problem of interpretation would therefore seem to take the form of a more careful examination into the meaning of both *experience* and *thought* in order to unfold their relationship. But since we have noticed the importance of the monistic tendency in our contemporary philosophy, we would soon be led to inquire into the relation of the inner Unity of the world to our limited experience and to our finite thought. In view of these considerations, a more careful estimate of *experience*, *thought*, and their relation in the *Absolute* might prove of some assistance to the intelligent appreciation of the philosophical movements of the present time.

EXPERIENCE.

When we turn to experience in our search for its contribution to philosophy we meet with a peculiar difficulty. The whole world seems to our unreflective minds to be nothing but a flow of *heterogeneous facts*, possessing little intelligible order. The existence and continuous flux of these facts is perhaps the initial premise of psychology, and likewise, because of the apparent simplicity of the given facts, it may be regarded as a stand-point of fundamental importance to philosophy in general. It is possible that these so-called "facts" are more complex than they appear at first sight, but as presented elements their genetic simplicity should not be overlooked. And it is the belief in the simplicity of these "facts" of our mental life which arouses that feeling of confidence and certainty in the "given" character of experience. For the reason that we

must begin with empirically-given mental facts of some kind in order to proceed with any inquiry, it seems as if psychology as the science of introspection is certainly of especial importance to all philosophical research; but nevertheless this individualistic psychology, which merely attempts to unfold the activities of a single consciousness, should be carefully distinguished from the broad and universal science of psychology, which considers the mental activities of all mankind.

Starting with this so-called "given something," the premise of all introspective psychology, we are able to discover in a reflective state of mind that this experience is not a single differentiated and uniquely given element, but rather a point of reference or *centre of thought*. That is, what I call "*object*" is for me a point, a centre, an *x*, which is real only as a point of reference to which I may direct a process of thought. It is known only through a recognition in thought; it is temporally determined as the present by the past and future series of thought-processes. Such an unanalyzed something, which occurs as a node or point in the flow of consciousness, might be called a *psychological experience*, owing to the fact that it comes into the conscious life as an empirically given datum. It is merely a conscious centre; it is surrounded by thought-processes and possesses a kind of individuality or distinctness of its own, because it seems to come from a somewhere outside of consciousness. It is, in fact, the single experience of our ordinary life.

The Aspects of Experience.—In this description of the unanalyzed, given, or psychological experience it would very naturally occur that perhaps it is not so simple as might appear at first sight. It is possible that there is a kind of manifoldness in the empirical fact, a variety of aspects which may be discovered from a more careful analysis of its mere "givenness." Not that the experience itself is capable of division, but that it appears differently when regarded from two stand-points. From this difference of point of view it is possible to

discover two *aspects* or sides to this empirically given centre of consciousness. The first of these may be called its *individuality aspect*, by which the particular conscious centre or experience is separated from all else,—that which gives this single experience an individuality of its own in the flow of consciousness. And also there is the *relativity aspect*, by which the experience may be viewed as intimately connected or united with all the other experiences in the flow of consciousness. We will consider each of these aspects in their order.

THE INDIVIDUALITY ASPECT GIVES AN EXPERIENCE DISTINCTNESS.—In our common speech it is customary to refer to a certain “object” as itself, and no other. There is something about every experience which leads us to regard it as a unique something, as a distinct element of our life which can never come to us in just the same manner again. When I perceive a mountain, a tree, or anything else, the experience exists for me as an original something, as new and at the same time never to be repeated. Certain qualities, ideas, or whatever one wishes to call them, distinguish the mere “this” experience from all else; it seems to possess an individuality in the conscious life. This character of separateness, of difference from all else, may perhaps be called the *individuality aspect* of every experience,—using the term as just defined. But a perplexity immediately presents itself. How do I know that it is an individual experience unless I am able to place it in a negative relation to all other experiences? In other words, the knowledge that it is an individual fact, object, or experience implies that I have compared or related it to the rest of my conscious life. This introduces us to the second or relativity aspect of all empirical data.

THE RELATIVITY ASPECT GIVES AN EXPERIENCE MEDIATION.—Every psychological experience as the point of reference or centre of our consciousness possesses a certain character which unites it with all other experiences. I know this tree, because I have previously seen other trees. I know that this is a noise,

because I have heard similar sounds. The footstep of a friend is recognized, not as a mere immediate sensation, but rather as a particular centre in consciousness connected with other experiences extending indefinitely into the past. A sudden explosion is always apprehended together with its setting in consciousness,—its spacial characteristics, its probable cause, or its possible effect on the person,—and never merely as a simple unconnected point. It is this intimate interrelatedness of all the centres in the flow of consciousness that makes each present experience an indispensable part in the whole conscious life. This aspect of every psychological experience, or centre in consciousness, might be called its *relativity* aspect.

The Logical Experience as a Limiting Individuality.—We have discovered in the psychological or common experience two general characters,—an individuality aspect, by which we recognize it as a unique experience, and a relativity or mediate aspect, by which we connect it with other experiences. But the proportional intensity of these two aspects is not constant for every experience. The sudden flash of light is certainly less mediated than the recognition of a friend's face. They both possess the mediate or relativity aspect, but the former to a lesser extent than the latter. And, furthermore, we can easily observe that this degree or intensive value of the mediate aspect is different for every experience,—the relativity of the present to the past varies with each presented fact. This at once defines a serial ground for our experiences, depending on the intensive value of the mediation present in each. No experience is known to us which has not this relativity aspect, so that there is no experience which cannot be placed in such an orderly arrangement. In one direction of such a series the psychological experiences would become more individualistic, more defined by their distinctness and unrelatedness, while if followed in the opposite direction the mediation would come more and more into the foreground. Now the *limit* of the series, followed in the direction of the diminishing intensity

of the relativity aspect, may be regarded as an "experience" of a peculiar kind. As the limit of the series, as a something totally devoid of any mediacy and possessing mere individuality, it is a kind of experience which has only an implied reality, a sort of logical or hypothetical existence. It is never perceived by our human consciousness, for all the experiences of our daily life possess relativity as well as individuality. This logical experience is only inferred as that realistic entity possessing mere individuality and uniqueness; it would correspond to the experience of such a mind as could apprehend without mediacy.

Before turning to inquire into the significance of our thought in the problem of philosophy it might be well to review certain points suggested by this analysis of experience. It is to be especially remarked that an experience of pure individuality or pure relativity is never given to us; and yet at the same time it is equally incorrect to recognize that an experience is a mere undifferentiated oneness. The empirically given comes to us as a two-sided something, and should either of the two aspects be absent, the something could not be known to our human consciousness. An experience possessing only the individuality aspect would have merely a logical existence (*i.e.*, inferred as the limit of a series) inappreciable to human consciousness. On the other hand, the experience possessing the relativity aspect alone would correspond to a relation without terms, a concept applicable only to the Absolute and incomprehensible as an empirical fact. This is a matter of extreme importance. Experience never itself gives us a oneness, it always appears in the form of a duality. The two aspects are the necessary and sufficient terms of the experience. Neither can exist without the other, and neither has any meaning except in connection with the other. Our world of experience, as such, is founded on a realistic dualism, and not on a single "fundamental proposition." This dualism of the empirically given, however, immediately suggests a monism in thought.

THOUGHT.

The Category of Reality.—The boundary, uncertain and difficult to perceive, between psychology on the one hand and logic and metaphysics on the other is where the given in experience can no longer explain itself. Where the individual centre in consciousness requires for its full meaning an explanation that cannot arise from its own empirically-given nature. Both the individuality and the relativity aspects are united by our common meaning of experience, and when our *thought process* endeavors to grasp and employ this experience it finds it necessary to require that both aspects shall refer to one and the same ground. This ground of the unity of the two empirically-given aspects can never itself be recognized in experience, although it is always implied as soon as we begin to employ any empirical fact in thought. The unity of the two aspects of the psychological experience is thus the necessary condition on the ground of which the experience, as the empirically given, can be employed in the processes of thought. In other words, the individuality and the relativity aspects are alone given in the bare psychological experience itself; their unity is required by thought. This ground of unity, necessary for the operation of thought-processes, may be called the *Category of Reality*. Introspection presents us with the two aspects of experience,—individuality and relativity,—the ground for their deeper unity must be discovered by thought; and the category of reality is the abstract representation of this ground in thought.

ORDINARY USAGE OF REALITY.—This usage of reality, as that which holds together the two different characters of our given experience, is unconsciously employed by all of us. It is not an unfamiliar question to ask ourselves: Is this experience real or not? And in meeting this problem we unconsciously regard reality as that which is the bond of unity, or ground, of the two aspects earlier mentioned. One may observe,

in our common speech, that it is customary to require that two conditions shall be fulfilled in order that we shall conceive this or that something to be real. It must be capable of *direct appreciation*, and again it must *find a place* in the conscious life. We call this table real because of two indispensable lines of evidence. In the first place, the table is capable of perception, of appreciation,—it can be distinguished from the barren concept of “no-thing;” and again this table has a meaning for me,—the present perception of it is intimately associated with the recollections of other times. Without any exaggeration it may be universally asserted that if either of these two characters is absent the thing referred to could be called unreal in a perfectly definite sense. A mermaid is considered unreal, from a scientific stand-point, for it lacks the first character; in daily life we would say, “it cannot be perceived directly or indirectly by the senses.” The mermaid is real to Greek mythology, because its existence in that universe of discourse can be appreciated by definite means. And beside the demand which all of us feel, that an experience in order to be real must be capable of definite appreciation,—by some means at least,—we also feel that it must be intelligible, that it must have a definite relation to the rest of the conscious life. The meaning of a word in an unknown language is unreal, because it has no meaning for me, no place in my life; or, in other words, it is not related to the flow of consciousness.

FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE CATEGORY OF REALITY.—These considerations suggest the fundamental importance of the category of reality in our thought. Without it the processes of thought would be impossible, for they would then be unable to refer to experience. In this sense reality lies at the very foundation of our active mental life; as the basis of thought-processes it becomes the ground for all the derivative categories and forms of thought. As the broadest category it refers to the general possibility of all experience, and in this broad usage gives rise to other categories—directly founded on reality—

which enable thought to refer more specifically to restricted ranges of observation. Perhaps *objectivity* and *subjectivity* are the most important of these secondary categories, because they seem to refer directly to the two aspects of every experience,—the former to the individuality, the latter to the relativity. But it is only the specialists in logic who are interested in this very important field of the nature and order of the categories, so that it is advisable to pass over these more detailed inquiries while merely concerned with a general problem.

Difference Between Aspect and Category.—There are, however, a few matters which naturally recur at this point. Especially suggestive is the difference between *aspect* and *category*. The former, as we have here used the term, applies only to the given in experience, while category is almost universally associated with a condition of thought. One is *found* in experience, the other is *required* by thought. This distinction is of fundamental importance, for it indicates the transition from mere experience to the employment of that experience in our thought-processes. The aspects, just because they are empirically given, precede, both logically and genetically, the employment of experience by the categories of thought. But, furthermore, these aspects of experience give rise, through the ground of their unity, to the logical category of reality. This latter may be regarded as extremely important both to logic and to metaphysics, since it serves on the one hand as the basis for all the forms of our thinking process, and on the other it suggests the ultimate unity of experience and thought in the Absolute.

The Implied Existence of "Object" and "Subject."—There is another matter which illustrates this method of discovering truth by the mutual implications of experience and thought. Without entering into details, it may be interesting to note that the ordinary expressions of "subject" and "object" appear merely as *abstraction of thought*, as general conceptions which have no other than a logical or *implied exist-*

ence. "Object" is only an abstract expression for that something in our experience which thought refers to as an individuality. In its strictest sense it is only that hypothetical limit of a series of experiences in which the relativity aspect diminishes towards zero; but in our ordinary speech we mean by "object" anything that comes to us in experience with the individuality aspect prominent. And from a similar stand-point the "subject," or Ego, is merely a general or abstract expression for that continuum by which thought interprets the relativity of our experiences. It seems necessary to presuppose some abstract element, the subject, common to all the experiences of a single consciousness, since if these experiences had absolutely nothing in common there could be no personal continuity, and therefore no relativity among the empirically given facts.

It was earlier suggested that experience comes to us as a flux of conscious centres, each of which contains two aspects. And we further discovered that this empirical duality could not be employed by thought unless the category of reality was presupposed as the ground of the unity of the two aspects. We were therefore led to recognize that experience demands thought, and likewise thought demands experience; while both of them together form the necessary and sufficient condition for all philosophical inquiry. This general interpretation might be suggested to explain the movement in philosophy which seeks to inquire more carefully into the meaning and use of presuppositions and which seeks to unfold truth by the method of implication rather than by that of direct logical proof. It is to be observed that nothing was presupposed as true without proof; nothing was assumed as an absolute or fundamental proposition. On the contrary, experience and thought, with their intimate connection, were considered as the necessary and sufficient conditions for philosophical inquiry, but no attempt was made to prove their fundamental nature. Experience requires thought, and on the other hand thought is

only such in connection with experience. It is contended that this dual unity—this mutual supplementation of these two presuppositions of philosophy—contains within itself all that can ever be known and that philosophy itself is merely the unfolding of what is implicitly contained within the almost unlimited scope of its dual presupposition.

THE ABSOLUTE.

That tendency of philosophy which was earlier alluded to in connection with the monists is not restricted to the empirically given and its ground in thought. The meaning of philosophy is by no means exhausted when the connection between thought and experience is unfolded; but, on the contrary, the whole purpose of transcendental modes of inquiry is to develop the ultimate unity of the world, the final completion or transcendence in the Absolute of our limited experience and of our finite thought.

In the earlier chapters of this volume we have followed the history of monistic metaphysic through its religious, pantheistic, materialistic, idealistic, and even mystic phases, so that the concept of the Absolute is by no means unfamiliar. In the following pages it is not the purpose to prove the existence of any monistic Ultimate, and much less to connect it with any religious hypothesis. The purpose is to show that both experience and thought imply by their very nature an all-inclusive Unity, which may be expressed by the Reality of the Absolute. This conclusion, developed from the implications of both experience and thought, is more fundamental than the results of demonstrative proof,—for the latter always implies an unproved ground, which is itself of greater importance than the result which may be obtained from it by subsequent deduction. From the fact that all philosophy rests on a double presupposition, the approach to the concept of the Absolute is two-fold,—experience and thought. By the former it is perhaps possible to discover a monistic background for all consciousness, accord-

ing to which the Absolute becomes the highest form of experience, formal only and beyond the limitations of internal differentiation. By the implications of thought, on the other hand, the conception of the Absolute develops into the ultimate comprehension of all thought-processes, the deepest meaning of the category of reality, and the identity of all categories and forms of thought.

Experience and the Absolute.—From our analysis of the empirically given, it was discovered that the two aspects of experience exist in a different ratio of intensity for every psychological experience. And it was earlier suggested that an experience could be defined—having a logical reality only—in which the relativity aspect was entirely absent. Such a logical experience was an individuality in the strictest sense, a mere “this object” inappreciable except perhaps to an immediate consciousness. This logical experience was conceived as the limit of the series of experiences, in which the relativity aspect gradually diminishes; and likewise it would seem possible, from the opposite stand-point, to conceive and define an experience in which the individuality aspect should be deficient. Such an experience would represent the upper limit of a series of psychological experiences wherein the *relativity aspect alone existed*. This limit, as the complete *relativity* and *perfect mediacy*, suggests the Absolute from the stand-point of experience.

It will be observed that the complete relativity of the limit of this series carries us at once beyond the finite experiences of our daily life and introduces us to an “experience” which differs essentially from the elements of human consciousness. This will become apparent from an examination of such a limiting “experience.” To our ordinary consciousness it is the individuality aspect of every conscious fact which introduces the novel, the new, or the hitherto unperceived element into our life. It is the relativity aspect which co-ordinates this present newness with past experiences; establishes a relativity

between the related and the unrelated. Consider now this highest "experience" in which the individuality aspect is absent. A momentous change is implied; our finite consciousness, limited for its material to the variety in the flow of perceived facts, becomes an all-inclusive conception in which there is no possible newness, no appreciable points or centres, and, further, no limitation with respect to finite conditions. The richness of an experience will depend on the intensive value of its relativity aspect; the richest experience will be the one most intimately connected with all our past life, and therefore the one which mediates or synthesizes the greatest number of finite, individual facts into an homogeneous unity. And the Absolute, *as the relativity of all possible relativity*, will be like a relation with all possible terms,—the Universal of universals in which every element of the universe finds a place. This is readily recognized from the very fact that the Absolute is represented by an "experience" in which the individuality aspect is absent, for this implies that the newness or variety upon which individuality depends is also lacking. And, furthermore, the complete universality of the relativity aspect denotes that all possible variety is synthesized by the unlimited breadth of this single "experience."

Thought and the Absolute.—By means of the foregoing we were able to suggest a formal definition of the Absolute as the limit of a series of experiences increasing in relativity and comprehensiveness. The Absolute so described is purely formal in its nature and possessed of merely a logical reality. When, however, we approach this conception from the stand-point of thought, we are able to discover a new meaning altogether unattainable by the implications of experience alone.

While considering the relations of thought to experience it was suggested that the *category of reality* supplied the unity to the two aspects of experience; as the ground by which the empirically given this-fact, with its two aspects, can be employed by thought as a single element, the category of reality

must be looked upon as the basis for all the other categories and forms of thought. When conceived in this position, reality would seem to contain all the richness, all the variety—in fact, all the depth and meaning—of our thought-processes. No conception, however false, crude, or barren, but is definitely contained within this broadest conception of the category of reality. By this general characterization of reality two representations of it are possible. On the one side reality appears as the *mere logical ground* for experience and thought, and on the other as the *conceptual comprehension* of all the value and meaning of thought-processes. In the former sense reality is abstract and formal, merely the ground for the conceptual unity of the individuality and relativity of each experience; in the latter sense, however, when reality is conceived as the identity, the togetherness, or the comprehension of all categories and forms of thought, it becomes the Absolute, the complete homogeneity within which there is no differentiation, not even the antithesis of subject and object.

This distinction between the two representations of reality is of extreme importance. As we are accustomed to employ the term, it means simply the logical ground of thought, but when this logical ground is recognized to contain all the wealth and meaning and depth that is implicitly contained in thought itself, the conception assumes a new significance which, on account of its breadth and comprehensiveness, is the conception of the Absolute. As such, reality contains not only my finite restricted thought, but likewise all possible thought of all thinking beings. The Absolute, as the perfect mediacy of all experience, becomes synonymous with reality invested with all the richness and depth of thought. There could be no thought, idea, or concept which has not its appropriate place in this Highest Conception, just as we have previously seen that it implicitly contains every fact or experience.

This develops more clearly the internal unity of both experience and thought, for in the Absolute relativity and com-

prehensiveness become coextensive and identical. In this sense, therefore, as the mediacy of all possible experiences and as the comprehension of all thought, the Absolute becomes the ultimate unity of experience and thought. And because these were taken to be the necessary and sufficient presuppositions of philosophy in general, the Absolute is to be regarded as Ideal for the explanation of man and the world.

Formal Nature of the Absolute.—Undoubtedly the conception of the Absolute which has been here defined may appear too formal to be of any value. In the search for a monism which should include all the facts and all the meaning of the world there is an undoubted temptation to employ terms so abstract in their nature that the purpose of interpretation and explanation is obscured. But perhaps this difficulty is not so important as we are inclined to believe. And although it must be recognized that there can be no finite differentiation within the being of the Absolute, and for that reason it is to be regarded as an abstract conception very far removed from ordinary life, yet it is perhaps doubtful if more definite terms can be employed to describe a conception which from its very nature transcends all internal or external limitation. It cannot be referred to in terms of goodness, perfection, morality, will, or purpose without implying one of two alternatives. Either these terms mean, when applied to the Absolute, something altogether different from their significance in our ordinary appreciation of them, or else they limit the Absolute to a mere anthropomorphous fancy.

The Absolute not Personal.—And, furthermore, it is perhaps interesting to note that the nature of the Absolute, as the limiting Ideal of thought and experience, transcends the usual conditions by which our own experience is defined. We cannot describe it in terms of consciousness,—as we understand the term,—for consciousness implies internal centres analogous to our own experience, while the *Absolute is an homogeneous Unity, devoid of all differentiation except as this differentiation*

is implied by its unity. Nor, on the other hand, can the Absolute be defined as *self-consciousness*, for this requires an antithesis of self, and self that is conscious. The difficulty of this latter contradiction can be avoided only by conceiving the self-conscious Absolute as an infinite process,—a self-repeating series. This conception is certainly the least objectionable, if one wishes to use the term consciousness in some form; but it seems to be nevertheless an incomplete characterization of the Absolute. A process implies a logical succession of stages, each of which denotes an element in the infinite series of which it is a part; but as element it is distinguishable from its logical predecessors and successors, and the Absolute, as the law of the unity of these elements, is itself defined by each. Such an “Absolute” would be, therefore, only relative, since it is determined strictly by internal differentiation. In fact, it cannot be too strongly urged that such terms as consciousness should not be used in this connection, since personal attributes of any kind seem to introduce either an ambiguity or a contradiction. It is a constant ambition on the part of philosophy to establish the existence of an Absolute which shall meet the demands of a consistent monism and at the same time possess personal attributes. The difficulty of such an attempt is fundamental. Personality, however defined, implies a limitation and a differentiation. In the former case the personal attribute is such because it is defined in terms of a logically existent “not.” This “not” is excluded from the Being of the Personal Absolute, and hence the latter is defined with respect to the limitations of the “not.” Such a Being is not Absolute, but only relative. And again the personal attribute may lay stress upon finite differentiation within the being of the Absolute. In this case the differentiation must observe a certain law, or rather a ground, for the relation of the differentiated elements. This law or ground becomes, therefore, the true Absolute, which, because of its formal character, should be conceived as impersonal. But even if one should contend

that this law was itself personal, owing to some internal character, then it would be possible to define a still more fundamental Absolute which should express the ground for the application of this internal character to the law itself.

The formal terms with which it is necessary to allude to the Absolute do not permit, with certainty, the application of infinity, except figuratively. Finiteness and infiniteness are conditions of human thought dependent on the conception of limitation. As we approach the Absolute, however, the distinction no longer remains applicable, because the antithesis of limited and unlimited is transcended. Recent progress in the application of mathematics to logic¹¹ has developed the logical aspect of the infinite to such a degree that it is now impossible to employ the concept as a synonyme for mere immensity or greatness. There is no implication in our original conception of the Absolute which could lead us to believe that it is referable to the finite or to some degree ("dignity") of the infinite. Perhaps it is a kind of existence which is somehow both finite and infinite, or perhaps neither term, in its ordinary significance, can be used.

In these brief suggestions concerning the interpretation of the monistic tendencies in speculative thought several problems are especially significant. The view towards its axioms which post-Kantian philosophy has gradually come to accept demands a thorough investigation, not only of the first principles of our knowledge, but even of the presuppositions of these principles. At no time in the history of philosophy has this need been more apparent than now. We are no longer satisfied with a merely empirical or psychological analysis, such as has characterized a considerable portion of British philosophy even to the present time, but, on the contrary, we demand an investigation into the bases and grounds, the conditions and pre-

¹¹ Reference is made to the work of Dedekind, Cantor, and Royce.

suppositions, upon which all analysis, introspective or transcendental, must ultimately rest.

Closely connected with this question of the necessary and sufficient presuppositions of philosophy, there still remains the central problem of all systems of monism,—the reconciliation of unity and variety, of the one and the many. However deep we may go, there are still unexplored regions beyond which somehow seem to transcend our human thought and knowledge. Although the progress of philosophy has gradually unfolded what seemed to be a deeper and truer interpretation of Reality, there still remains no more significant tendency in philosophy to-day than the demand for the careful consideration of its central problem. Within the limited sphere of our own consciousness we are restricted to some form of a duality, the subject and the object. The classic attempts to transcend this duality have all proved objectionable in some respect. It has been found very difficult, if not impossible, to define either subject or object without implying the other. And although we may avoid certain aspects of this antithesis by restricting the duality to experience and thought, still the central problem of their unity remains unanswered. The fundamental distinction between the empirically given variety and the conceptional unity cannot be solved by neglecting either; on the contrary, a new philosophy must be born from the deeper union of experience and thought, which, if completely understood, would define as its Ideal the conception of ultimate truth and the Philosophy of the Absolute.



INDEX.

A.

- Abelard, Pierre, founder of mediæval conceptualism, 51
Absent objects, how real to Berkeley, 162
Absolute Idealism, 228, 235, 273
Absolute, The, Bradley, 314; Fichte, 241; formal nature of, 333; Green, 309; Hegel, 272; Lotze, 311; not personal, 333; prominence of conception, 286; relation to experience, 330; relation to thought, 331; Royce, 313; Schelling, 255; the unity of the world, 329
Abstract ideas, Locke, 128; Berkeley, 158; Hume, 170
Activity as self, Fichte, 241
Analytic judgments, Kant, 191
Anaxagoras, quoted, 30
Anaximenes, quoted, 29
Anselm, ontological proof, 83
Antimonies of cosmology, Kant, 208
Antithesis of dialectic, 263
A posteriori judgments, 192
Appearance, Herbart, 231
A priori judgments, 192
Aristotle, dualism of, 48
Arnauld, Cartesian, 87
Association of ideas, 170
Atheistic controversy of Fichte, 239
Attributes, with Spinoza, 96

B.

- Bacon, Francis, division of sciences, 68; Great Regeneration, 67; life of, 66; position of, 70
Bacon, Roger, mediæval empiricist, 53
Being, Hegel's doctrine of, 269
Bentham, Jeremy, 306
Berkeley, George, answers to opponents, 162; epistemology, 154; life of, 150; metaphysics, 155; stand-point, 153

- Boehme, Jacob, cosmology, 65; life of, 64; theology, 64
 Bradley, F. H., 313
 Brahma, the Hindoo Universal Self, 47
 Bruno, Giordano, ethics, 61; life of, 57; pantheism, 58; physics, 59; position, 61
 Buddhism, 40, 47, 277
 Butler, Joseph, ethics, 146

C.

- Cabanis, French materialist, 141
 Cambridge Platonists, 304
 Campanella, 56
 Cartesian School, 87
 Categorical Imperative, 215
 Categories, with Kant, 202
 Causality, Hume, 171; Kant, 203
 Chubb, Thomas, English deist, 143
 Cicero, quoted, 15
 Clarke, Samuel, English moralist, 144
 Collier, Arthur, English idealist, 158
 Comte, Auguste, French positivist, 287
 Conceptualism, general idea real in mind, 51
 Condillac, Étienne de, life of, 138; materialism, 138; sensationalism, 138
 Consciousness, Buddhism, 278; Descartes, 82; Reinhold, 237; Hegel, 266
 Copernicus, 56
 Cordemoy, 87
 "Critiques," of Kant, 184
 Cudworth, Ralph, ethics, 304; relation to Locke, 122
 Cumberland, Richard, ethics, 305
 Cyrenaics, Greek hedonists, 39

D.

- Darwin, Charles, English biologist, 295
 Da Vinci, Leonardo, 58
 Deductive method, 34
 Deed-act, Fichte, 241
 Deists, English, 142
 Descartes, René, foundations of philosophy, 81; influence, 86; life of, 77; metaphysics, 84; method in philosophy, 79
 Determinism, 37; Hobbes, 74; Locke, 135; Spinoza, 104

D'Holbach, French materialist, 141
 Dialectic movement, 261
 Diderot, Denis, French encyclopædist, 139
 Dualism, 29

E.

Eckhart, Meister, Christian mystic, 63
 Eclecticism, 179
 Edwards, Jonathan, 152
 Ego, primacy of, in Fichte, 241; transcendental, 201. See Self.
 Emotional philosophy, 251
 Empedocles, quoted, 30
 Empiricism, 26; contrasted with rationalism, 119
 Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel, 269
 Encyclopædists, French, 139
 English Empiricism, 65
 English ethics, 143
 Epicureans, 48, 306
 Epistemology, Berkeley, 154; defined as theory of knowledge, 25;
 Descartes, 85; Hobbes, 71; Hume, 168; Kant, 189; Locke, 127;
 Nicolas of Cusa, 55; Schopenhauer, 280; Spinoza, 100; stand-
 points contrasted, 147
 Essence, Hegel, 269
 Ethics, axioms, 36; Bruno, 61; Butler, 146; Clarke, 144; defined as the
 "ought" of conduct, 35; English, 143; Fichte, 248; Hegel, 271;
 Hobbes, 73; Hume, 175; empirico-rationalistic, 303; intuitionist,
 304; practical, 40; recent theories, 303; Schopenhauer, 282;
 Shaftesbury, 145; Spinoza, 101; theoretical, 38
 Evolution, 292; embryological evidence, 292; paleontological evidence,
 293; philosophical aspect of, 298; universal character, 293
 Existence, Descartes, 81
 Experience, aspects, 321; centre in thought, 321; presupposition,
 320

F.

Faculties of mind, Kant, 194
 Fechner, 300
 Fénelon, 87
 Fichte, J. G., ethics, 248; life of, 237; primacy of Ego, 241; relation
 to Hegel, 259; stand-point, 240; The Absolute, 247
 Freedom, Fichte, 246; Kant, 218

G.

Galileo, 57

Gassendi, 57

General ideas, controversy in scholasticism, 49

Geulinx, Arnold, Cartesian, 87

God, existence, see cosmological, ontological, and teleological proofs;
postulate, Kant, 219

Great Regeneration, Bacon, 67

Greeks, humanistic attitude, 15; philosophy, 47

Green, T. H., ethics of idealism, 308

H.

Hamilton, Sir William, 177

Hedonism, ethics of individual pleasure, 39

Hedonistic calculus, 306

Hegel, G. W. F., influence, 273; life of, 257; "Phenomenology of
Mind," 265; relation to former idealists, 259; system, 268

Heliocentric cosmology, 56

Herbart, J. F., influence, 234; life of, 230; metaphysics, 231; psy-
chology, 300

Hindoo philosophy, 46

History, philosophy of, 43

Hobbes, Thomas, epistemology, 71; estimate, 75; life of, 70; mate-
rialism, 72; metaphysics, 72; naturalism, 73; sociology, 74;
theory of man, 73

Humanistic philosophy, 15

Human Knowledge, Berkeley's *Principles* of, 151

Human Nature, Hume's treatise of, 165

Human Understanding, Locke's essay concerning, 123

Hume, David, ethics, 175; epistemology, 168; life of, 164; meta-
physics, 169; position, 176; scepticism, 173; stand-point, 168

I.

Idea, various meanings: Berkeley, element of perceptual world, 155;
Descartes, states of the soul, 85; Hegel, The "Idea," logical evo-
lution of finite forms of world, 265; Hume, derived processes of
mind, 169; Kant, illusory conceptions of reason, 206; Locke,
object of mind when it thinks, 127; Royce, expression of purpose,
313; Spinoza, modification of thought, 99

- Ideal of theology, Kant, 209
- Idealism, Absolute, 228, 235; Berkeley, 157; comparison of, 229; Green, 308; Kant, 205; Leibnitz, 112; mystic, 229; Royce, 312; transcendental, see Kant
- Identity, judgment of, Fichte, 243; Kant, 191
- "Idols" of Bacon, 68
- Immanent Reality of Spinoza's Substance, 96
- Immortality, Kant, 219
- Imperatives, Kant, 214
- Individuality, aspect of experience, 322
- Inductive method, 34
- Innate ideas, Descartes, 85; Locke's opposition, 126
- Intellectual awakening of Renaissance, 53
- Intellectual love of God, Spinoza, 103
- Intellectual space, Herbart, 233
- Intuitionism, ethics, 39, 304

J.

- Judgment, Kant's "Critique" of, 220

K.

- Kant, Immanuel, influence on Fichte, 238; influence on philosophy, 224; life and character of, 180; problems of the Critical Philosophy, 189; refutation of Berkeley's idealism, 163; scope of system, 223; theory of heavens, 182; the three "Critiques," 184; the "Critique of Pure Reason," 191; the "Critique of Practical Reason," 212; the "Critique of Judgment," 220
- Kepler, 57
- Knowledge, kinds of, Nicolas of Cusa, 55; Spinoza, 100; limits of, Locke, 133

L.

- Lamarck, biologist, 295
- La Mettrie, French materialist, 139
- Leibnitz, G. W., comparison with Locke, 135; doctrine of monads, 109; freedom, 113; life of, 106; metaphysics, 108; optimism, 114; "Pre-established Harmony," 112; scope of system, 114; theology, 113
- Leviathan of Hobbes, 71
- Libertarianism, 36
- Locke, John, doctrine of ideas, 127; ethics, 134; influence, 135; life of, 120; object of philosophy, 125; theory of knowledge, 132

Logic, axioms of, 33; defined as "ought" of thought, 32; Hegel, 258, 269; methods, 33; rules, 33
 Lotze, R. H., Absolute, 311; stand-point, 310
 Lucretius, definition of religion, 21
 Luther, 62

M.

Malebranche, Nicolas, Cartesian, 87
 Mandeville, English sociologist, 145
 Materialism, Cabanis, 141; defined, 72; D'Holbach, 141; French eighteenth century, 138; Hobbes, 72; La Mettrie, 140; position of, 141
 Mathematical method, Descartes, 80; Hobbes, 71; Spinoza, 93
 Mathematics, Kant, 198
 Matter, Berkeley, 157
 Mechanism, 302
 Mediæval philosophy, 48
 Melanchthon, Philip, 62
 Memory, Hume's ground of selfhood, 174
 Metaphysics, or ontology, Bacon, 69; base of sciences, 27; Berkeley, 155; Bradley, 313; Fichte, 241; Hegel, 269; Herbart, 231; Hume, 169; Kant, 206; Lotze, 310; recent stand-points, 309; Royce, 312; Schopenhauer, 281; science of reality, 28; Spinoza, 93
 Mill, J. S., English utilitarian, 307
 Modes, Locke, 131; Spinoza, 98
 Monads, Leibnitz, 109
 Monism, 29, 286, 315, 336
 Montaigne, quoted, 15; philosophy, 76
 Montesquieu, 137
 Moral law, Fichte, 248; Kant, 215
 Morality, influence to, Kant, 189
 Münsterberg, Hugo, 302
 Mystical Idealism, 229, 280, 284

N.

National characteristics of Renaissance, 53
 Natura naturans, Schelling, 252; Spinoza, 96
 Natura naturata, Schelling, 252; Spinoza, 96
 Natural history of mental processes, Fichte, 246; Hegel, 266; Kant, 195; Schelling, 254
 Natural selection, 296

Naturalism, pessimistic, 228
 Naturalistic philosophy, 16
 Nature Philosophy, Hegel, 270; Schelling, 252
 Nebular hypothesis, 182
 Neo-Fichteian movement, 302
 Newton, controversy with Leibnitz, 107; relation to Locke, 124
 Nicolas of Cusa, life of, 54; philosophy, 55
 Nicole, Cartesian, 87
 Nominalism, mediæval, general idea only name, 50
 Non-Ego, Fichte, 244
 Normative sciences, use of "ought," 31
 Noumenon, Kant, 205
 Novalis, Romanticist, 251
 Novum Organum, Bacon, 67

O.

Object, implied existence, 327
 Observed sequence, Hume, 172
 Occam, William of, mediæval nominalist, 50, 53
 Occasionalism, 87
 Omar Khayyâm, quoted, 38
 Ontogeny, 293
 Ontological proof of God's existence, Anselm, 83; Descartes, 83;
 Kant, 209; Spinoza, 96
 Optimism, definition, 39; Leibnitz, 114
 Origen, Christian mystic, 63

P.

Pantheism, 47
 Paracelsus, 55
 Paralogisms of psychology, Kant, 207
 Perception, definition, 24
 Personal identity, Locke, 132; Hume, 173
 Pessimism, definition, 40; Schopenhauer, 282
 "Phenomenology of Mind," Hegel, 265
 Phenomenon, Kant, 198
 Philosophy, defined as the rational unification of facts of experience,
 18; different from religion, 20; different from science, 19; gen-
 eral history, 45; meanings of, 13; problems, 22; scope, 18; two
 attitudes, 15; value, 314
 Phylogeny, 293
 Physics, early advances, 56

- Pineal gland, Descartes, 86
- Plato, Greek idealism, 48
- Pluralism, Leibnitz, 108
- Pomponatius, 55
- Positivism, 287
- Postulates of practical reason, Kant, 217
- Practical Reason, Kant's "Critique" of, 212
- "Pre-established Harmony," Leibnitz, 112
- Presentation, world as, 280
- Presupposition, meaning of, 317; of philosophy, 319
- Protagoras, 15
- Protestantism, 53
- Psychology, aspect theory, 301; defined as science of mental states, 23; element of, 24; introspective method, 299; science of, 299
- Psycho-physical parallelism, definition, 24; Spinoza, 98
- Pure Reason, Kant's "Critique" of, 191
- Purpose, Kant, 221; Royce, 312

Q.

- Qualities, primary and secondary, Locke, 131; Berkeley, 157

R.

- Rationalism, definition, 27; Continental, compared with empiricism, 148; deeper meaning, 117; school as whole, 115; problem of, 115
- Realism, mediæval, general idea objectively real, 49
- Realism, transcendental, 227, 232
- Reality, category of, 325
- Reals, Herbart, 232
- Reason, faculty of, Kant, 206; Absolute, Schelling, 255
- Reformation, The, 62
- Reid, Thomas, 177
- Reinhold, K. L., life and stand-point, 236
- Relativity aspect of experience, 322
- Religion, different from philosophy, 20; mental origin of, 20; philosophy of, 43
- Renaissance, scepticism of, 76; tendencies of, 52
- Right, Hegel, 271
- Romanticists, 250
- Roscellinus, 50
- Royce, Josiah, 312
- Rules of living, Descartes, 80

S.

- Sanction of happiness, 306
- Scepticism, Hume, 173; Renaissance, 76
- Schelling, F. W., life of, 251; stand-point, 252; position of, 284; relation to Hegel, 259
- Schleiermacher, definition of religion, 21
- Scholasticism, philosophy, 48
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, life of, 275; stand-point, 276; system, 280; position, 284
- Science, Comte, 288; different from philosophy, 19; Hume, 172; hypotheses in, 290; Kant, 204; of knowledge, Fichte, 239; Locke, 133; philosophy of, 40; recent tendencies, 286
- Scotch school, 177
- "Seeing all things in God," 86
- Self, theories of, Berkeley, 160; Descartes, 81, 85; Fichte, 241; Hegel, 271; Hume, 173; Kant, 207, 217; Leibnitz, 111; Locke, 132; Lotze, 311; Royce, 312; Schelling, 253; Spinoza, 97
- Self-consciousness, Hegel, 267; Schelling, 253
- Sensation, definition, 24
- Sensationalism, French, 137; Condillac, 138
- Sensibility, faculty of, Kant, 197
- Shaftesbury, educated by Locke, 122; ethics, 145
- Significant tendencies in present philosophy, 314
- Smith, Adam, 166
- Society, philosophy of, 42
- Sociology, Comte, 289; Hobbes, 74
- Solipsism, 250
- Space, Berkeley, 156; Herbart, 233; Kant, 197; Leibnitz, 110; Schopenhauer, 281
- Spencer, 296
- Spinoza, Benedict de, attributes, 96; epistemology, 100; ethics, 92; fatalism, 104; importance, 105; life of, 90; metaphysics, 93; modes, 98; naturalism, 103; psychology, 102; rationalistic tendency, 89; Substance, 94
- Spirit, Berkeley, 159
- Stoics, 48
- Subject, implied existence of, 327
- Sublimity, Kant, 222
- Substance, various meanings: Berkeley, spiritual not material, 158; Descartes, three primary reals, 85; Hume, idea contradictory, 170; Leibnitz, active force-atoms, 109; Locke, substratum of qualities, 130; scholastic, universal substratum, 131

Sufficient ground, principle of, 280

Synthetic stage of dialectic, 263

T.

Taste, judgments of, 221

Tauler, John, 64

Taurellus, 55

Teleology, contrasted with mechanism, 222, 303; judgments, 221

Teleological proof, Leibnitz, 112; Kant, 211

Telesius, 55

Theodicy, Leibnitz, 108

Theology, Berkeley, 161; definition, 30; different from religion and metaphysics, 31; Leibnitz, 108

Theory of knowledge, 25

Thesis stage of dialectic, 263

"Thing-in-itself," Kant, 195

Thomas & Kempis, 63

Thought, Descartes, 85; Hegel, 265

Time, Kant, 197; Schopenhauer, 281

Toland, John, deist, 143

Transcendental forms, Fichte, 241; Herbart, 232; Kant, 199; Reinhold, 237; Schopenhauer, 281

Transcendental idealism, see Kant; of Schelling, 253

Transcendental self, 201

Transcendentalists, the German, 226

U.

Understanding, faculty of, Kant, 200; Hegel, 267

Upanishads, 147, 278

Utilitarianism, ethics of universal happiness, 39, 305

V.

Vedic hymns, 46, 278

Vision theory, Berkeley, 155


Voltaire, 137

W.

Weismann, biologist, 296

Will, Fichte, 246; Kant, 213; Schelling, 254; Schopenhauer, 280

Wrong, Schopenhauer, 283



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